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Greetings
Dear readers,
Over the last year we have made huge strides forward in the process of 
integration in our region thanks to several major achievements. The Customs 
Union came into being, the Customs Union countries signed documents 
establishing the Common Economic Space and talks regarding Kazakhstan 
and Russia becoming WTO members entered a decisive phase.
The launch of the Customs Union will stimulate economic activity of our 
member states. Increased trade and investment cooperation in and the 
expansion of cross-border projects will fuel demand for financial resources. To 
satisfy this growing demand, financial markets and the banking sector must 
become more efficient and exploit fully the benefits of financial integration. 
The Eurasian Development Bank is five years old this year and is considered 
to be a truly successful post-Soviet integration project. Its investment and 
credit portfolio exceeds $2.5 billion, and we have set ourselves the target of 
$4 billion in the next three years. The Bank is enhancing its cooperation with 
major financial institutions and the international and national development 
institutions in its member states in order to promote the exchange of 
information and interaction on financial markets. 
The Bank has invested considerably in the research on the issues of regional 
economic integration, and in particular the future of financial integration. To 
this end, the Bank has carried out a major study of integration in the capital 
markets of Russia and Kazakhstan. Regional financial integration is highly 
complex, involving the integration of banking capital, banks’ penetration into 
neighbouring markets; the merging of trading floors; and the efficient servicing 
of cross-border trade and investment flows. Whilst projects and processes 
initiated at national level are extremely important, the needs and initiatives of 
enterprise are central to the Bank’s existence. 
This edition of the EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook, which the bank has 
published annually since 2008, is a compilation of authoritative papers and 
in-depth studies examining the most important aspects and issues of 
integration. The Bank is committed to studying commercial, economic, 
monetary and financial integration and to further this aspect of its work 
established in 2011 the EDB Centre for Integration Studies. This Centre 
will allow the Bank to continue its extremely valuable contribution to the 
analysis and support of regional integration. 
iGor FinoGenov
chAirmAn oF the edb execUtive boArd
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Greetings
Dear readers, 
Fostering integration within EurAsEC is integral to the economic 
development policies of its member states. The launch of a regional 
Customs Union in the post-Soviet space is a remarkable achievement 
which will bring real benefits for the economies involved. The Customs 
Union will dramatically reduce costs, boost production and increase the 
competitiveness of each national economy. After a long period of faltering 
progress towards integration, the efficient establishment of the Customs 
Union is testament to the member economies’ determination to achieve 
greater stability and efficiency and to forge ahead with this innovative 
development initiative. 
The creation of the Customs Union between Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia, the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund and the Common Economic Space 
are proof of the relevance and potential of regional economic integration. 
The Customs Union is already bearing fruit according to data showing rapid 
growth in revenues from commodities traded between Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Russia. Its main strategic benefits will come from economies of scale 
and improvements in global competitiveness in the medium to long term. The 
Customs Union is open to other countries whose governments choose to 
join. In April 2011 an official application was received from the government 
of Kyrgyzstan. If we demonstrate that the Customs Union and the Common 
Economic Space are truly efficient, they will evolve into the centres of 
economic integration for the entire post-Soviet space.  
The Eurasian Development Bank is one of the most important engines of 
economic integration. With the inception of the EDB Centre for Integration 
Studies this year, it will play an even greater role in promoting cross-border 
projects and trade and investment flows. The Customs Union Commission 
welcomes this initiative and wishes the new centre every success. 
serGey GlAzyev
depUty GenerAl secretAry oF eUrAsec 
execUtive secretAry oF the cUstoms Union commission 
AcAdemiciAn, rUssiAn AcAdemy oF sciences
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Greetings
Dear readers,
It is with great pleasure that we present the 2011 issue of the Eurasian 
Development Bank’s Eurasian Integration Yearbook. 
In 2010-2011, the Bank’s economic analysts have focused on the 
functioning of the Customs Union, the creation of the Single Economic 
Space and other key issues affecting regional financial integration. Over 
the last year we have completed detailed studies of economic cooperation 
between CIS and EurAsEC member states in hydroelectric energy, nuclear 
energy, telecommunications, agribusiness, the space industry and stock 
markets. All these documents are freely available on the Bank’s website. The 
Bank also commissioned the economic forecasting institutes of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine to conduct a 
joint study, which, for the first time, quantitatively assessed the 
macroeconomic effects of Ukraine’s participation in the Customs Union. In 
common with other analyses of the Customs Union, this study concludes 
that the fostering of cooperation and real economic integration between 
member states will generate tangible benefits for individual economies and 
the organisation as a whole. 
For the Bank, the year was marked by several important events. The Council 
of the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund, which is managed by the Bank, considered 
preliminary applications from Belarus and Armenia and approved a loan 
for Tajikistan. In 2010, the Bank opened a representative office in Minsk. 
Belarus’ membership of the Bank provides opportunities for cooperative 
projects that are vital for the country, and gives Belarusian companies 
access to the Bank’s long-term investment resources. 
Our analysts have also been extremely successful in 2010-2011. Last 
year, the EDB Technical Assistance Fund granted bursaries to more than 
ten research and publishing projects focusing on regional integration. 
These bursary competitions for researchers from CIS countries will be held 
annually. In 2011, we set up the EDB Centre for Integration Studies and we 
look forward to seeing the results of its work. 
I hope that the information and analysis contained in our Yearbook will 
provide answers to any question regarding the latest developments in 
post-Soviet integration. 
vlAdimir yAsinsky
edb mAnAGinG director 
For strAteGy And reseArch depArtment
1Eurasian Development Bank
Chronology
Our chronology of two decades from 1991 to 2010 embraces events which 
we believe have been of importance for the course of post-Soviet integration 
(and disintegration) in a decisive way. We look at the economic, political, 
institutional and military aspects, with an emphasis on the economic 
processes. 
1991: disintegration of the Soviet Union and emergence of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States
A Chronology of Two Decades 
of Post-Soviet Disintegration 
and Integration: 11-2010
December 
1991
The Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of 
December 8, 1991. 
December 
1991
Memorandum of December 21, 1991 to the Agreement Establishing the 
Commonwealth of Independent States is signed on December 8, 1991 in Minsk 
by Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. 
December 
1991
The Almaty Declaration of December 21, 1991. 
1991 Creation of a plan to unify the gas infrastructure of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
The state gas concern Gazprom strives to retain control over its most important 
assets in the former Soviet Union, primarily the gas transport systems in border 
republics. These attempts fail, and Gazprom becomes a purely Russian company.
December 
1991 
Agreement to maintain unified command of the strategic nuclear forces and 
mass-destruction weapons of the former Soviet Union. For conventional weapons, 
CIS countries agree to the principle of national armies being subordinate to the CIS 
Supreme Command.
1991 The Karabakh conflict starts (1991-1994).
1992: post-Soviet cooperation mitigates the consequences 
of disintegration in the face of a severe economic crisis
February 
1992
Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement of February 14, 1992.
February 
1992
Agreement on Customs Policy Principles of March 13, 1992.
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May 1992 Agreement on measures to facilitate settlement between businesses in CIS 
countries of May 15, 1992.
July 1992 Agreement on the status of the CIS Economic Court.
October 
1992
Agreement On the Common Monetary and Credit Policy of States Retaining 
the Rouble as Lawful Currency of October 9, 1992. 
1992 CIS Industry Councils, including transport and electric power, address the urgent 
task of preserving common industry systems inherited from the Soviet Union. 
February 
1992
On February 14, 1992 in Minsk, the heads of CIS countries adopt a declaration 
of non-use of force, a declaration of adherence to the principles of cooperation 
(maintaining unified command of armed forces for two years) and the Agreement 
on the Status of Strategic Forces. 
March 
1992
The Dnestr conflict between Moldova and the unrecognised Dnestr Moldavian 
Republic. On July 4, 1992 Russian troops under General Lebed enter the conflict 
to protect civilians and stop bloodshed. On July 7, 1992 representatives of Russian 
President arrive in the Dnestr region, and on July 21, Moscow and Chisinau sign the 
Agreement On the Principles of Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the 
Dnestr Region of the Republic of Moldova. A peacekeeping force is deployed in the 
region to ensure compliance with the terms of the agreement and maintain order. 
After July 1992 the Dnestr conflict enters a non-violent phase. No agreement 
on the region’s status had so far been reached, and relations between the rival 
parties remain strained.
March 
1992 
On March 20, 1992 in Kyiv, agreements on the CIS’ collective peacekeeping force, 
the principles of the formation of the CIS’ unified armed forces and the status of 
CIS border troops and a declaration of non-use of force are all signed.
April 1992 The Ukrainian authorities adopt a number of enactments on the subordination of 
the Black Sea navy to Ukraine. Russia responds with a decree establishing Russian 
jurisdiction over the navy “with subordination thereof to the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Unified Armed Forces of the CIS”.
May 1992 From December 1991 to May 1992, in order to minimise the international 
consequences of disintegration of the Soviet Union, the political concept of Russia 
as successor of the Soviet Union is developed and introduced internationally. This 
concept clearly defines Russia’s status in four legal matters: nuclear weapons, 
membership of the UN Security Council, overseas property, and the Soviet Union’s 
foreign debt. 
May 1992 A Collective Security Treaty is signed on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent. Moldova, 
Turkmenistan and Ukraine refuse to join.
July 1992 A peacekeeping force is deployed in the zone of the Georgian-South Ossetian 
conflict (1991-1992) to control the ceasefire, the withdrawal of troops and 
maintain order. 
August 
1992
On August 3, 1992 the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine agree to adjourn 
the Black Sea navy settlement until the end of 1995. The navy is withdrawn 
from the CIS Unified Armed Forces and is subordinated directly to the heads 
of both states. 
1992 Civil war begins in Tajikistan (ends in 1997).
October 
1992
A peacekeeping force is sent to Tajikistan.
1993: inconclusive initiatives inspired by the EU experience
January 
1993
The Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States of January 22.
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January 
1993
The Agreement Establishing the Interstate Bank of January 22, 1993 and 
Charter of the Bank. The protocol of the terms of the Bank’s operation in CIS 
countries of October 18, 1996 is agreed.
February 
1993
Gazprom threatens to suspend gas supplies to Ukraine because of arrears. Gas 
frictions become integral to Russian-Ukrainian politics.
July-August 
1993
The rouble zone collapses. From July 26, to August 7, 1993, Russia implements 
confiscatory monetary reform to withdraw the notes of the State Bank of the 
Soviet Union from circulation. Another purpose of this reform is to separate the 
monetary systems of Russia and other CIS countries that are using the rouble 
as legal currency. In 1992-1993 the former union republics introduce national 
currencies. The exceptions are Tajikistan (the Russian rouble remains in circulation 
there until 1995), the unrecognised Dnestr Moldavian Republic (the Dnestr rouble 
is introduced in 1994) and partly recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia (the 
Russian rouble continues to be in circulation). 
September 
1993
Nine CIS countries sign the Agreement Establishing the Economic Union on 
September 24, 1993; Turkmenistan and Georgia join later. Ukraine declares it 
would cooperate with the parties of the Economic Union as an associate member 
in certain areas corresponding to its national interests.
September 
1993
Inspired by the EU experience, on September 24, 1993 CIS countries sign the 
Agreement Establishing the Eurasian Interstate Coal and Metal Association 
in order to promote mutually beneficial and equal cooperation in the metal and 
coal industries, efficient high-tech production, product marketing, employment 
and welfare. The agreement falls short of its goals, and is formally terminated on 
September 19, 2003. 
May 1993 Russian military bases in CIS countries: Tajikistan
The 201st military base in Dushanbe, Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube is formed on 
the basis of the 201st motor rifle division which had been stationed in Tajikistan 
since the autumn of 1945. In 1980-1989 the division saw action in Afghanistan. 
In the early 1990s, with the outbreak of the Tajik civil war, it fell under Russian 
jurisdiction as a part of the collective peacekeeping force. The division remains in 
Tajikistan pursuant to the agreement on friendship, cooperation and mutual aid 
signed in May 1993. A special agreement on the status and terms of the Russian 
military presence in Tajikistan is signed in April 1999. On October 16, 2004 
the two countries sign an intergovernmental agreement on the personnel and 
organisational structure of the base.
June 1993 Break-up of the Unified Armed Forces. The post of Commander-in-Chief of the 
CIS Armed Forces was abolished and the Unified Headquarters was set up to 
coordinate military cooperation.
June 1993 During a meeting on June 17, 1993, the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine 
agree to accelerate the division of the Black Sea navy on a parity basis. However, 
the Moscow Agreement to this end is never ratified. 
1994: emergence of the Eurasian Union idea
1994 The Eurasian idea. Kazakh President Nazarbayev puts forward the idea of a new 
integration grouping, the Eurasian Union, which includes supranational bodies, 
common defence, a currency, decision-making by a qualified majority, and binding 
force of adopted decisions for its member states. The proposals are opposed by 
most CIS countries. The idea of the Eurasian Union is never implemented but is 
embodied later on in the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), Customs 
Union and Common Economic Space. 
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March 
1994
Gazprom discontinues gas supplies to Ukraine and demands the country settle up 
forthwith by ceding interest in Ukrainian gas pipelines and industrial facilities to 
Russia. 
April 1994 The presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine sign an agreement 
establishing a free trade zone on April 15, 1994.
The free trade regime applies to Russia’s trade with all CIS countries pursuant 
to corresponding bilateral agreements signed in 1992-1993. Some other CIS 
members also enter into bilateral free trade agreements. 
October 
1994
On October 21, 1994 the Agreement Establishing the Payment Union of the 
CIS is signed by all member states (Ukraine signs it with certain provisos). The 
Agreement becomes binding for Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Russia and Uzbekistan. 
October 
1994
The Agreement Establishing the Interstate Economic Committee of the 
Economic Union of October 21, 1994. This Committee is a permanent 
coordinating and executive body of the Economic Union and essentially the first 
supranational body of the CIS. 
November 
1994
On November 7, 1994 Gazprom halves its gas supplies to Moldova, and on 
November 11, the supplies are discontinued. On November 12, Gazprom and 
Moldovagaz agree to found the joint venture Gazsnabtranzit to which Moldova 
hands over its export pipelines as repayment of $40 million of its debt. 
April 1994 On April 15, 1994 in Moscow, the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine sign an 
agreement on phased settlement of the dispute over the Black Sea navy. The 
agreement provides, inter alia, that Ukraine receives 18.3% of the ships, and 
that the Russian and Ukrainian navies are stationed separately. 
June 1994 Peacekeepers are deployed in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict 
(1992-1993) with the purpose of localising the war, supervising troop 
withdrawal, disarmament and guarding military assets.
December 
1994
On December 10, 1994 Russia and Kazakhstan sign a 20-year lease agreement 
for the Baikonur launching site. In 2004 the lease is extended until 2050.
1994 Partnership for Peace programmes. All CIS members except Tajikistan (which 
joins in 2002) participate to a greater or lesser degree.
1995: Russia seals its military presence in CIS countries
January 
1995
On January 20, 1995 Belarus and Russia enter into the Agreement Establishing 
the Customs Union. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan join in mid-1996 and Tajikistan 
in 1998. 
May 1995 The Agreement Establishing the Interstate Currency Committee of May 26, 
1995. Ukraine secures the proviso that the agreement would become binding on 
it only after the introduction of their national currency, and Turkmenistan 
refuses to join. 
January 
1995
On January 6, an agreement on Russian radiolocation bases in Belarus is signed. 
These bases are not classed as military installations. Belarus charges Russia no 
rent for the use of these assets. The agreement is valid for 25 years. 
February 
1995
The collective security concept. On February 10, 1995, a unified air defence 
agreement is signed in Almaty.
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March 
1995
Russian military bases in CIS countries: Armenia
On March 16, 1995, a 25-year agreement on a Russian military base at Gyumri 
is signed. No rent is charged, and Armenia undertakes to provide all necessary 
utilities. The mission of Russian troops in Armenia is to cover the southern flank 
of the Russian Federation and defend Armenia as party to the Collective Security 
Treaty.
May 1995 The mandate of peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan and Abkhazia is extended. 
Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine refuse to join a 
common border defence agreement.
June 1995 Russia and Ukraine sign a new document under which they would receive 81.7% 
and 18.3% of the ships, respectively. However, the dispute is not yet permanently 
settled.
July 1995 Russian military installations in CIS countries: Moldova
On July 1, 1995 a Russian task force is organised in the Dnestr region on the basis 
of the disbanded 14th Army.
September 
1995
Russian military installations in CIS countries: Georgia
The 12th military installation at Batumi together with three Russian divisions 
stationed in Georgia receives the status of a Russian military installation in 
accordance with the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992. On September 
15, 1995 in Tbilisi, Russia and Georgia sign an agreement to extend Russian 
military presence in Georgia for another 25 years. Installations at Vaziani and 
Gudaut are to be withdrawn by July 2000. In accordance with the Russian-
Georgian agreement of March 2006, withdrawal of the 12th installation is to 
be finalised no later than October 1, 2008. The 62nd military installation at 
Akhalkalaki is maintained in Georgia on the same grounds as the 12th installation; 
withdrawal of equipment from this installation starts in May 2006.
1996: multidirectional foreign policy
1996 Russia signs bilateral agreements on measures to promote mutual convertibility 
and stabilisation of national currencies with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
October 
1996
Authorised representatives of CIS governments and central banks sign a 
protocol on the terms of the operation of the Interstate Bank which provides 
that interested central banks from CIS countries may enter into bilateral 
agreements with the Interstate Bank on the procedure for and rules of settlement 
and loan repayment. 
January 
1996
The Concept of Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts of January 19, 1996. The 
mandate of a peacekeeping force in Tajikistan is extended.
1997: emergence of the union state of Russia and Belarus 
and GU(U)AM – two organisations with polar opposite goals. 
Both lacked success
March 
1997
The Concept of Economic Integration Development of the CIS of March 28, 1997. 
April 1997 The Union State of Russia and Belarus. An agreement to this end is signed 
in 1997 based on the Union of Belarus and Russia founded in April 1996 with 
the aim of creating a single humanitarian, economic and military space. From 
January 2000 the Union is officially referred to as the Union State.
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1997 Emergence of GU(U)AM – an organisation encompassing Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine (Uzbekistan is a member in 1999-2005). The goals of 
GU(U)AM are to promote multilateral cooperation between member states 
in democratisation, economic development and integration with European 
countries. 
October 
1997
The Agreement on Common Non-Tariff Regulation in the Customs Union of 
October 22, 1997.
October 
1997
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine found a new grouping to promote 
cooperation in trade, economic development, transport and regional security. 
Uzbekistan joins in April 1999. In 2002 a free trade zone is declared. These 
initiatives proved inconclusive. 
May 1997 The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) is founded and all CIS 
countries become members. At this time CIS countries cooperate with NATO 
within the EAPC and Partnership for Peace frameworks. In addition, virtually all 
CIS countries have bilateral agreements and programmes of cooperation with 
NATO.
May 1997 An agreement on the terms of division of the Black Sea navy of May 28, 1997 
puts an end to the dispute between Russia and Ukraine. This document defines 
the status of the Russian Black Sea navy and the terms of its presence in Ukraine, 
and the rules of division and mutual settlement. The Russian navy will be stationed 
in Ukraine until 2017.
1997 The NATO-Ukraine Special Partnership Charter. 
1998: foundation of CAEC and development of the 
Russian-Kazakh relations – the prospective locomotive of 
post-Soviet integration
1998 Tajikistan joins the 1994 Agreement on Establishment of the Common Economic 
Space of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and the grouping is renamed 
into Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC).
1998 The CIS countries adopt a number of documents on pensions, visa-free travel, 
migration, and equal rights of entrance to educational institutions.
July 1998, 
October 
1998
Cornerstone events in Russian-Kazakh relations. In July 1998 the parties sign 
the Declaration of Eternal Friendship and Alliance towards the 21st century 
(neither Russia nor Kazakhstan have this type of agreement with any other 
country) and Agreement on Delimitation of the Northern Part of the Caspian for 
Exercising Sovereign Subsoil Use Rights. In addition, the parties sign a protocol 
on the settlement of the Baikonur financial matters. In October 1998 the 
Agreement and Programme of Deepening Economic Cooperation between 
Russia and Kazakhstan in 1998-2007 and a package of cooperation documents 
are signed. 
1999: the first inconclusive attempt at creating the 
Customs Union and the Common Economic Space
February 
1999
The Agreement Establishing the Customs Union and Common Economic Space 
of February 26, 1999. 
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April 1999 The Protocol of Intent and Amendments to the Agreement Establishing the Free 
Trade Zone of April 2, 1999 – a framework document which is to be adapted 
to the laws of each member state. It is signed by the presidents of Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Ukraine. The Protocol introduces a multilateral visa-free regime 
in the CIS instead of the former bilateral regime, and lifts all customs duties and 
similar taxes and fees and import and export quotas in mutual trade between the 
free trade zone. 
April 1999 Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan elect not to prolong the Collective Security 
Treaty of May 15, 1992.
2000: dissatisfaction with the scale of cooperation leads to 
the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community
February 
2000
The Agreement on the Common Customs Tariff of February 17, 2000.
February 
2000
On February 25, 2000 Gazprom again suspends gas supplies to Moldova on 
account of having received only one-third of the $15 million payable by the country 
since the beginning of the year. On February 26, supplies are resumed because 
the debt was settled. 
October 
2000
The 1995 Customs Union transforms into the Eurasian Economic Community.
The presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed 
the EurAsEC Agreement on October 10, 2000 in Astana. EurAsEC addresses 
a wide range of issues, placing an emphasis on economic cooperation and 
integration (with the ultimate goal of forming a common economic space and 
common market mechanisms) and coordination of the members’ approaches to 
integration into the global economy and trade. The priority areas for EurAsEC are 
transport, energy, agribusiness and labour migration.
December 
2000
Full-scale parallel operation of the Russian, CIS and Baltic grids is restored for the 
first time since the break-up of the Soviet Union. By the end of 2000 the grids of 
14 former Soviet republics operate in a parallel regime – even more than in the 
Soviet period. 
January 
2000
The decision to set up a unified anti-terrorist centre of CIS countries is adopted on 
January 25, 2000. Peacekeeping forces withdraw from Tajikistan.
2001: SCO
2001 Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan found the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation based on the Shanghai Five.
2001 Georgia hosts the first large-scale Cooperative Partner military exercises with the 
participation of NATO troops.
2002: Collective Security Treaty
January 
2002
Russian military bases in CIS countries: Azerbaijan
On January 25, 2002, an agreement on the terms of use of the Daryal 
radiolocation base at Gabala was signed. Russia agrees to pay Azerbaijan 
$7 million in annual rent and another $31 million in compensation for the use of the 
base from 1997-2001. The agreement is valid for ten years. 
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2002 The Agreement Establishing the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (Armenia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan). 
2002 The Central Asian Cooperation Organisation was founded in 2002. The new 
organisation succeeds the Central Asian Economic Union founded in 1998, taking 
on its tasks to promote regional cooperation and stability in Central Asia. The 
organisation exists until 2005. 
2003: the second attempt at creating the Common 
Economic Space – Ukraine joins
September 
2003
The Council of the Heads of CIS Countries resolves to finalise the formation of the 
free trade zone and enhance economic cooperation.
September 
2003
On September 19, 2003 the presidents of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
sign the Common Economic Space Declaration, Concept and Agreement. 
2003 RAO UES of Russia purchases power assets in Georgia from AES of the United 
States: AES Telasi (a power distribution company that operates low and medium 
voltage grids covering Tbilisi and adjacent areas), AES Mtkvari (the owner of unit 
9 at the Tbilisi State District Power Plant) and Khramesi (a Hydropower plant 
comprising Khramesi-1 and Khramesi-2). 
September 
2003
On September 18, 2003, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is 
founded based on the Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992.
September 
2003
Russian military installations in CIS countries: Kyrgyzstan
In the summer of 2002 Russia starts to show keen interest in stationing its task air 
force at Kant soon after the US and its allies in the anti-terrorist coalition had set 
up an air base at Manas airport near Bishkek. An intergovernmental agreement on 
the status and terms of the Russian air force’s presence in Kyrgyzstan is signed on 
September 22, 2003, and the 999th Russian air base is officially opened the next 
day. The agreement came into effect on August 11, 2005.
2004: the Common Economic Space initiative is suspended
February 
2004
On February 18, 2004 Russia discontinues all gas supplies to Belarus, following 
Minsk’s refusal to sign the agreement to establish a joint venture between 
Gazprom and Beltransgaz until the gas price for 2004 is agreed. Minsk offers 
$40 per 1,000 m3 of gas and Moscow insists on $50. On February 19, the gas 
blockade which lasted for 18 hours and 47 minutes is lifted. Belarus begins to 
buy gas at $46.68 and Gazprom does not receive any interest in Belarusian gas 
pipelines.
2004 The Georgian-South Ossetian conflict.
Since 2004 CSTO’s joint military exercises of the Rubezh series. 
2005: an upsurge in economic cooperation at a company and 
industry (energy, metal, banking, etc.) level in 2005-07
February 
2005
On February 16, RAO UES of Russia and the government of Tajikistan sign an 
agreement on the completion of the Sangtuda–1 HPP. To this end a joint venture 
of the same name is founded by Inter RAO UES (75%) and the Tajik Ministry of 
Energy (25%). 
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March-
December 
2005
Prices for Russian gas skyrocket. 
March: the price increase for Belarus is announced, but on April 4, Vladimir Putin 
promises to keep the price at the current level, and on December 19, the parties 
finally agree that in 2006 Belarus will receive 21 billion m3 of gas at $46.68 per 
1,000 m3 (i.e. the price does not change).
September: the gas price for Georgia for 2006 increases from $62.5 to $110. For 
2007, Gazprom raises the price even further, to $235.
November: the forthcoming price increase to $110 for Armenia is announced 
(the 2005 contract provides for supply of 1.7 billion m3 at $54). The Armenian 
government sounds a note of doubt that the country can afford to pay that much. 
Russia offers Armenia an interest-free loan as compensation for the higher 
gas price. As an alternative, Russia is prepared to receive title to a generating 
unit at the Razdanskaya Thermal Power Plant and all Armenian gas pipelines.
November: a price increase to $160 for Moldova for 2006 is announced. In 
2005 Gazprom supplied gas to the country at $80. For 2007, a price of $170 
is agreed.
November: Gazprom and Azerbaijan agree that gas supply and transit will be 
paid for at market prices. In 2006 Azerbaijan receives gas from Gazrpom at 
$110 (compared to $60 in 2005). Gazrpom intends to raise the 2007 price to 
$235.
2005 The Ukrainian leadership demands revision of the navy agreement. Ukraine also 
claims various hydrographic facilities. The Russian lease of the naval base in 
Sevastopol is partially paid for by gas.
2006: major joint projects, an upsurge in mutual 
investments and the inception of the 
Eurasian Development Bank
January 
2006
On January 1, 2006 Gazprom suspends supplies to Ukraine. Only gas for transit 
to European buyers is loaded into the pipeline. According to Gazprom, on January 
1-3, Ukraine took 223.5 million m3 of Russian gas. On January 4, Ukrainian 
delegation arrived in Moscow and signed an agreement on gas supplies to Ukraine 
at $230 for five years. Thus Ukraine will receive gas at $95, as Rosukrenergo 
mixes expensive Russian gas with cheap gas from Central Asia. 
March 
2006
On March 27, Rospotrebnadzor bans the sale of wine and related components 
from Georgia and Moldova. On April 26, 2006 the Federal Customs Service is 
ordered to block import of the Georgian mineral water Borjomi and Nabeglavi for 
not complying with Russian quality requirements.
Since the summer of 2007 over 40 Moldavian wineries have had their 
products recertified and are permitted to resume sale in Russia. In April 2010 
Rospotrebnadzor again rejects a 47,000-litre wine shipment on account of “not 
complying with the safety requirements”.
June 2006 On January 12, 2006 the Presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan sign the 
Agreement Establishing the Eurasian Development Bank with a charter capital 
of $1.5 billion. The Agreement is ratified in June. The Bank is headquartered in 
Almaty. Armenia and Tajikistan become members in 2009 and Belarus in June 
2010.
December 
2006
A new gas conflict between Russia and Belarus ends in an uneasy compromise, 
and Gazprom and Beltransgaz agree the terms of gas supplies and transit for 
2007-2011. The price for 2007 is $100 per 1,000 m3. A price formula for the 
period from January 1, 2008 is adopted; it is identical to that applying to Russian 
supplies to Europe. The Belarusian party secures the provision that 55% of 
supplies in the first half of 2007 will be prepaid and the balance is to be paid not 
later than July 23; 100% prepayment will be required from July 1. 
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2006 The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict
2007: negotiations over EurAsEC’s Customs Union 
begin; rapid economic growth triggers a boom in mutual 
investments in key industries
May 2007 Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajikistan and Armenia sign an 
agreement establishing a common energy market.
May-
August 
2007
New gas conflict with Belarus.
A joint venture is founded to transport Russian gas through Belarusian territory. 
Gazprom and the State Property Committee of Belarus sign an agreement under 
which Gazprom acquires 50% of shares in Beltransgaz for $2.5 billion.
September 
2007
Tajikistan terminates the contract for the completion of the Rogun Hydropower 
Plant with Rusal of Russia. The company is accused of playing into the hands of 
Uzbekistan as it refused to build a dam to a height of 325 m, which would have 
enabled Tajikistan to control the region’s water resources. Russia later expresses 
the wish to resume the project but the terms offered by Dushanbe are deemed 
unacceptable. 
October 
2007
The Concept of Future Development of the CIS and Plan of Action to this end.
October 
2007
The Agreement on the Customs Union Commission of October 6, 2007. 
October 
2007
The Agreement Establishing a Common Customs Territory and the Customs 
Union of October 6, 2007.
October 
2007
An agreement on peacekeeping activities is signed by the heads of CSTO states on 
October 6, 2007 and comes into effect on January 15, 2009.
2008: Russian-Georgian war; Georgia’s withdrawal from the 
CIS and Uzbekistan’s virtual withdrawal from EurAsEC
January 
2008
Agreement on unified tariff and customs regulation of January 25, 2008.
May 2008 Another post-Soviet state, Ukraine, officially joins the WTO on May 19, 2008. 
Kyrgyzstan did so in 1998 and Georgia joins in 2000. 
August 
2008
On August 14, 2008 the parliament of Georgia voids documents on the country’s 
membership of the CIS.
October 
2008
On October 20, 2008 Uzbekistan suspends its membership of EurAsEC. 
November 
2008
The Strategy of Economic Development of the CIS until 2020. 
December 
2008
The Agreement on the procedure of calculating and paying customs duties by 
Customs Union members of December 12, 2008.
May 2008 On May 23, 2008 the Ukrainian National Security and Defence Council resolves to 
commence the procedure of joining NATO.
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May 2008 On May 20, 2008 Ukrainian President Yuschenko issues a decree entrusting the 
government to draft a law on terminating the Russian-Ukrainian navy stationing 
agreements in 2017.
2008 Russia and Georgia wage a war in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
2009: global economic crisis prompts closer economic 
cooperation between the post-Soviet countries
January 
2009
Russian-Ukrainian disagreements over gas supplies lead to a gas crisis in the 
beginning of 2009. The absence of a formal agreement between Russia and 
Ukraine and the unauthorised intake of gas transported through the Ukrainian 
territory to European consumers prompt Russia to discontinue all gas supplies 
on January 7, 2009.
Russia resumes supplies to Ukraine and gas transit to Europe on January 20, 
2009. 
January 
2009
On January 1, 2009 Uzbekistan discontinues transit of electricity from 
Turkmenistan to Tajikistan.
February 
2009
The Customs Union Commission, a supranational body of Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia within the EurAsEC framework, holds its first session. 
February 
2009, 
June 2009
On February 4, 2009 the Interstate Council of EurAsEC resolves to establish the 
EurAsEC’s Anti-Crisis Fund of $8.5 billion and the High Technology Centre – an 
organisation in charge of implementing research and technical programmes and 
innovative projects. A package of documents on the Anti-Crisis Fund is signed on 
June 9.
March 
2009
Russia submits a draft multilateral agreement on a free trade zone to CIS experts. 
About 110 agreements on mutual trade between different CIS countries are now 
in effect. 
June 2009 A “milk war” between Russia and Belarus bursts out on June 6, 2009. 
Rospotrebnadzor bans milk import from Belarus on account of the producers’ 
failure to renew their permits in accordance with new Russian technical regulations 
applying to milk and milk products. On June 18, 2009, during a new round of talks, 
the parties agree that Belarusian producers will gradually renew their export 
documents. 
June 2009, 
August 
2009 
On June 10, 2009 Georgian President Saakashvili declares Georgia’s 
withdrawal from the CIS. On June 12, 2009 the Georgian parliament 
unanimously adopt two resolutions on the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly. 
The formal procedure of Georgia’s withdrawal is finalised on August 18, 2009, 
and non-all-CIS agreements and resolutions of CIS bodies cease to be binding on 
the country. However, Georgia remains party to a number of important 
multilateral economic agreements regulating trade, transport and intellectual 
property protection in the CIS.
July 2009 The fourth and last generating unit with a capacity of 670 MW is launched at the 
Russian-Tajik Sangtuda Hydropower Plant. 
October 
2009
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan agree all constitutional documents of the 
Customs Union, including the final version of the Customs Code. The states 
negotiate procedures relating to the external Russian-Kazakh and Russian-
Belarusian borders, which are scheduled to start functioning on July 1, 2010 
and July 1, 2011 respectively. A common customs tariff is agreed and submitted 
for approval. 
November 
2009
On the closure of a EurAsEC Interstate Council session, the presidents of the 
countries in attendance sign a package of documents on the inception of the 
Customs Union on January 1, 2010. 
The Customs Code Agreement of November 27, 2009.
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December 
2009
On December 1, 2009 Uzbekistan withdraws from the Unified Energy System of 
Central Asia. 
December 
2009
December 14, 2009 Turkmen President Berdymukhamedov, Kazakh President 
Nazarbayev, Uzbek President Karimov and Chinese president Hu Jintao open 
the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline, putting an end to Gazprom’s monopoly on 
Turkmen gas. 
December 
2009
Russia offers Belarus duty-free supplies of oil for internal consumption 
(6 million tons a year). All other oil supplies are subject to export duties. Since 
2010 the reduction factor ceases to apply to oil and oil products supplied to 
Belarus (in 2009 it was 0.356). The Belarusian party insists on preserving this 
factor but Moscow refuses. 
December 
2009
The presidents of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan announce that the Common 
Economic Space will be formed by January 1, 2012. 
February-
June 2009
On February 19, the Kyrgyz parliament repudiates the agreement with the US on 
the Manas air base, and on March 6, repudiates agreements with the 11 states 
of the anti-terrorist coalition whose military personnel are stationed at Manas. 
It had been agreed that in the event of unilateral termination by either party the 
other party must be given 180 days to complete all procedures required for the 
closure of the military installation. The coalition’s military personnel are to leave 
Kyrgyzstan not later than August 20, 2009.
However, on June 22, Kyrgyzstan and the US sign an agreement on a US transit 
centre at Manas to support anti-terrorist activities in Afghanistan.
February 
2009
On February 4, 2009 the presidents of CSTO states adopt the resolution 
to form the Collective Rapid Response Forces, and sign package of corresponding 
documents on June 14, 2009.
June 2009 Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan sign the Collective Rapid 
Response Forces Agreement on June 14, 2009, at a CSTO summit. Belarus 
refuses to attend the summit on account of “economic discrimination” by Russia. 
Russia acts as chair in place of Belarus. The technical chairmanship of CSTO is to 
continue until a final decision on chairmanship is made. 
July 2009 On July 2, 2009 the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine calls on Russia to return navigation 
and hydrographic facilities used by the Russian Black Sea navy. Earlier, Ukrainian 
courts adopted resolutions that these facilities must be handed over to Ukraine, 
but the Russian navy command refused to obey them.
2009 Scheduled CSTO military exercises West 2009 and Interaction 2009 in Belarus 
and Kazakhstan (team-building war-games by the CRRF).
2010: inception of the Customs Union and preparation 
of constitutional documents of the Common Economic Space 
of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia
January 
2010 
The common customs tariff of the Customs Union becomes effective.
January 
2010 
Starting early 2010 Russia and Belarus discuss the volume of duty-free oil 
supplies to Belarus. On March 17, the parties agree that, after the inception of 
the single customs space in 2012, all customs duties will be lifted. Until that 
time Russia is to supply 6.3 million tons of oil for internal consumption by 
Belarus. However, on March 25, Belarus files a claim with the CIS Economic 
Court demanding that Russia cancel the customs duties imposed since January. 
February 
2010
The idea of Ukraine joining the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan 
is voiced for the first time.
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February 
2010
Gazprom receives 50% of shares in Beltransgaz on February 25, 2010; changes 
follow on March 2, 2010. 
April 2010 On April 2, 2010 the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine permits the Moscow 
Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) to acquire more than 50% of shares in the 
First Stock Trading System. As a result, MICEX will have over 50% of votes in the 
supreme managing body of this Ukrainian stock exchange. 
April 2010 On April 21, 2010 gas supply agreements are signed by Gazprom and Naftogaz 
of Ukraine. In 2010 Ukraine is to receive 36.5 billion m3 of gas at a discount of 
$100 – however, not more than 30% of the gas price. The discount applies to 
30 billion m3 in 2010 and 40 billion m3 in each subsequent year. 
May 2010 On May 28, 2010 the Prime Minister of Belarus fails to attend tripartite talks in 
St. Petersburg, and Russia and Kazakhstan made a number of agreements on the 
Customs Union bilaterally. The parties sign documents introducing the Customs 
Code from July 1, 2010 and some amendments to the Customs Code. Belarus 
signs these documents a few days later. 
June 2010 On June 11, 2010 the leaders of SCO states sign the regulation On Procedure for 
Admitting New Members to the SCO. In view of the organisation’s requirements, 
the most likely candidates for membership are India, Pakistan and Mongolia, which 
already have the observer status. 
June 2010 On June 18, 2010 the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund Council satisfies the first 
application for aid. The St. Petersburg meeting of the finance ministers of the 
member states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Armenia) 
resolves to provide Tajikistan with a loan of $70 million at a fixed interest rate of 
1% per annum for 20 years. 
June 2010 The gas conflict between Russia and Belarus.
July 2010 The Customs Code becomes effective (for Russia and Kazakhstan on July 1, 2010 
and for Belarus on July 6). 
December 
2010
On December 9, the heads of the three states sign a package of documents on the 
Common Economic Space, which is to be launched on January 1, 2011. 
March 
2010 
On March 4, 2010 the lease of Baikonur is extended until 2050. 
April 2010 On April 21, 2010 the presidents of Russia and Ukraine hold talks and sign an 
agreement to extend the term of presence of the Russian Black Sea navy in 
Crimea for 25 more years after 2017. The agreement is ratified by the national 
parliaments on April 27. On April 21, a supplementary agreement to the gas 
supply agreement of January 19, 2009 is signed in Kharkov; it provides for a 30% 
discount on gas supplies to Ukraine in exchange for the extension of the Russian 
navy presence in Sevastopol until 2042 (the initial agreement expires in 2017). 
The rent increases pro rata the discount. 
June 2010 CSTO exclude the use of force for the settlement of the armed conflict in the south 
of Kyrgyzstan. On June 14, the Secretaries of national Security Councils of CSTO 
states resolve to provide aid to Kyrgyzstan including aircraft, equipment, military 
transport, etc., but not arms. 
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Declaration of independence by the former Soviet 
Union republics
Republic
Declaration of 
sovereignty
Declaration of 
independence
De jure independence
Estonia November 16, 1988 August 20, 1991 September 6, 1991 
Latvia July 28, 1989 August 21, 1991 September 6, 1991 
Lithuania April 18, 1989 March 11, 1990 September 6, 1991 
Georgia May 26, 1990 April 9, 1991 December 26, 1991 
Russia June 12, 1990 — December 26, 1991 
Moldova June 23, 1990 August 27, 1991 December 26, 1991 
Ukraine July 16, 1990 August 24, 1991 December 26, 1991 
Belarus July 27, 1990 August 25, 1991 December 26, 1991 
Turkmenistan August 22, 1990 October 27, 1991 December 26, 1991 
Armenia August 24, 1990 September 23, 1991 December 26, 1991 
Tajikistan August 24, 1990 September 9, 1991 December 26, 1991 
Kyrgyzstan December 15, 1990 August 31, 1991 December 26, 1991 
Kazakhstan October 25, 1990 December 16, 1991 December 26, 1991 
Uzbekistan June 20, 1990 August 31, 1991 December 26, 1991 
Azerbaijan October 18, 1991 August 30, 1991 December 26, 1991 
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Crisis impact on CIS economies
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) remained the most rapidly 
growing region in the global economy throughout the 2000s. In 2003-2007, 
it was second only to Asian emerging markets in terms of annual economic 
growth rates. On the other hand, the region suffered worst from the fallout of 
the global economic and financial crisis: in 2009 real gross domestic product 
(GDP) in post-Soviet countries dropped by 6.6%, compared to 3.7% in 
Central and Eastern Europe, 1.8% in the western hemisphere, and continuing 
economic growth in some developing countries (IMF, 2010). 
The economic dynamics varied greatly across the CIS. The worst GDP drop 
was recorded in Ukraine and Armenia (by 15.1% and 14.2% respectively); 
these countries were followed by Russia and Moldova (7.9% and 6.5% 
respectively) in 2009. The Belarusian and Kazakh economies were nearly 
stagnant. At the same time, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
demonstrated economic growth at over 4%.
However, this general GDP performance was the product of complex 
interaction between very different components. The crisis has the most 
serious negative influence in investment demand. Investments in fixed assets 
in 2009 declined in six of the ten region’s countries for which data is available. 
The largest decline in investments was observed in Ukraine (41% of the 
previous year’s level), Armenia (37%) and Moldova (35%). In Azerbaijan and 
Tajikistan, investments dropped by 18% and in Russia by 16% (according to 
the CIS Interstate Statistics Committee).
This decline in investment in national economies was largely attributable to 
the decrease in  foreign capital inflow. According to balance of payments 
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statistics, direct investments in 2009 dropped by 51% from the 2008 level 
in Russia, by 20% in Kazakhstan, by 13.6% in Belarus, and by 56% in Ukraine 
(International Financial Statistics, November 2010). Notably, in 2009 the 
item Other Investments & Payables in the balance of payments of Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine became negative, which indicated not only disruption 
of capital inflow through this channel (which had been the principal source 
of foreign investments in the pre-crisis period), but also reversion of capital 
flows (particularly, repayment of foreign debt). 
We can identify several directions of the impact of the crisis on investments 
and the general economic dynamics in CIS countries: 
1)  reduced opportunities to raise capital or refinance existing debt on global 
financial markets, which led to a decline in portfolio and other investments. 
This influence became evident at an early stage of the crisis and first 
affected the CIS’ most developed and open financial systems (those of 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine); 
2)  decrease of foreign direct investments resulting from challenges faced 
by parent companies in their home countries and a lack of global demand 
for the products of recipient companies from the CIS - most of these are 
from the extractive or metallurgy sectors which were suffering from 
collapsing prices1;
3)  persisting decline in foreign investment due to internal factors (recession 
in national economies and a lack of domestic demand). This factor was 
especially critical to investment in companies oriented towards domestic 
markets. 
The discussion of the main trends in investment cooperation between the 
CIS countries during the time of the crisis and a preliminary assessment of 
the role of the intraregional channel in delivering crisis fallout to these 
economies are offered below. 
The hypotheses
Prior to the crisis joint investment was the most rapidly growing area of 
economic cooperation within the CIS. The emerging Russian transnational 
companies (TNCs) started a massive invasion into post-Soviet markets, and 
were joined by TNCs from Kazakhstan in the mid-2000s. The preconditions 
for this boom were the high rates of economic growth in both TNCs’ home 
countries, which allowed the TNCs to gather momentum for entering regional 
markets, and recipient countries, which made them attractive targets for 
investment.
1 According to the IMF, in 2009 annual average prices of oil dropped by 36.3% and prices of 
metals by 28.6% (IMF, 2010).
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This model of regional integration could not escape the influence of the 
2008-2010 crisis. Obviously, Russian and Kazakh TNCs had to revise their 
overseas investment strategies. It is hardly possible to identify any general 
direction of this transformation. To simplify the task, we offer three hypotheses 
of how the crisis influences investment cooperation in the CIS; we will term 
them investment recession; replacement growth; and interstate cooperation. 
Whereas our first hypothesis is based on the assumption that investment 
cooperation between CIS countries has declined to some degree, the other 
two, by contrast, forecast an upsurge or at least sustained continuation of 
investment activity, however, driven by different factors.
Investment recession. The most readily forthcoming assumption is that 
progress in investment activity has been suspended or even reversed. The 
crisis reduced the financial potential of Russian and Kazakh companies 
(particularly, their ability to raise the foreign capital necessary to support 
their expansion in the CIS or overseas sales), made them more cautious 
about selecting potential investment targets abroad, and forced them to give 
up many ambitious projects, while concentrating on consolidation of assets 
in their home countries. In this case the logical chain appears fairly simple: 
a decline in business activity and hostile environment causes companies to 
phase out their international business to the detriment of domestic business 
and to refrain from embarking on new projects to the detriment of on-going 
ones. 
Replacement growth. A drawback to the investment recession hypothesis 
is that it effectively ignores the possible reaction of intraregional players 
and businesses from recipient countries to the changing global and regional 
situation. In recent years the most serious factor restricting Russian 
expansion was competition from large TNCs from highly industrialised 
countries. The latter also had to limit their activity, thus vacating a niche 
for Russian corporations. Similarly, the crisis led to a dramatic depreciation 
of assets located in the CIS countries and made their owners and 
beneficiaries more concessive. As a result, although the resources of 
post-Soviet TNCs formally shrank, in fact they may have even increased 
as external pressure eased, which in turn would have led to an increase in 
investments. 
In other words, the 2008-2010 crisis can be viewed as the “creative 
destruction” process in which a new system of interrelations emerges and 
replaces the existing one; the intensity of economic cooperation declines 
in one place and increases in another. It is important to remember that, 
whereas the crisis did impede transnational expansion in quantitative 
terms, it may well be the case that TNCs sacrifice their “image” projects for 
the sake of transactions that pay back. And this, in a longer term, works to 
promote regionalisation. We cannot subject this assumption to any reliable 
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empirical study due to the scarcity of available data, but at least it cannot 
be discarded.
Interstate cooperation. The crisis has affected not only regionalisation: 
during its two years, some serious positive developments were observed 
in interstate cooperation both within the framework of formal integration 
initiatives and on a bilateral basis. The crisis forced states to adopt a 
more cooperative stance. This was dictated by the need to overcome the 
crisis fallout (EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund) and a broader integration agenda 
(Customs Union). Generally, an upsurge in formal cooperation in crisis time 
is a peculiarity of post-Soviet integration (which makes it distinct from many 
other integration projects) (Libman, Vinokurov, 2010). Whereas in the 
mid-2000s some CIS governments were becoming increasingly sceptical 
of foreign investment in general (e.g. in Kazakhstan) (Libman, Ushkalova, 
2009) or, more particularly, Russian companies’ involvement in key economic 
sectors (e.g. in Tajikistan) (Libman, 2009), the recession and need for 
investments may have reversed this sentiment. 
In addition, the severe economic crisis of 2008-2009 fostered political 
changes in Ukraine and created preconditions for the improvement of 
relations with Russia in 2010 with favourable implications for business. This 
can be viewed as an indirect positive impact of the crisis. Since April 2010, 
broader Russian involvement with the Ukrainian economy was discussed 
at many occasions: primarily regarding access to denationalised Ukrainian 
assets for Russian companies, and also broader cooperation in key sectors 
such as nuclear power, aircraft building and ship building (Rosbalt-Ukraine, 
April 24, 2010; Gritsenko, 2010). 
An upsurge in interstate cooperation can also influence business activity 
through other channels. The fact that the government is assuming a more 
active role in the Russian (and, to a lesser extent, Kazakh) economy is 
obvious, and the influence of this process on the overseas policies of Russian 
companies is not uniform. Many observers theorise that the government’s 
influence on overseas transactions by Russian companies is not significant 
or at least does not contradict the standard decision-making logic (Vahtra, 
2007); the state’s presence in key sectors targeted by foreign expansion 
(e.g. oil & gas) is limited in principle (Hanson, 2009). However, we can 
assume that in crisis time at least selected large transactions are being made 
under government pressure (as the government’s role as the main source 
of support is increasing), i.e. for political considerations; later we will discuss 
this factor in more detail. 
We should stress that all these hypotheses are largely speculative. The 
investment recession hypothesis is based on the premise that the resources 
of Russian businesses have shrunk; it is not definite, however, bearing in mind 
sizeable government support programmes that target large corporations. 
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The replacement growth hypothesis essentially assumes that companies 
from post-Soviet states are the only group capable of seizing the vacated 
niche. But there are a number of other countries whose foreign trade has 
been affected by the crisis even less than that of Russia, and they are also 
keen to expand their presence in post-Soviet markets; this is particularly the 
case for China (SKOLKOVO, 2009). 
The assessment of formal progress in formal integration is not as easy as 
it may seem. Firstly, we should remember the example of “integration for 
survival” in the 1990s, when similar factors (economic hardship) encouraged 
businesses to actively pretend integration without any real action (Libman, 
2007). Secondly, even if we assume that the existing institutions do function 
(for the Customs Union that statement is fairly true, at least for now); their 
impact on the business is not yet clear. There are grounds for expecting the 
emerging system to be overly intricate and plagued by inconsistencies (at 
least in the medium term), which may impede cooperation. Thirdly, as has been 
noted on many occasions, a formal institutional environment is no advantage 
for Russian business: quite the opposite, it functions far more confidently 
under unclear and poorly formalised rules. 
Now we will attempt to summarise at least some indirect evidences in 
support of the above hypotheses. We will focus on the first two hypotheses: 
interstate cooperation will be discussed only to the extent to which Russian 
corporations are exposed to political pressure in crisis time. Let us look at 
official statistics, published news, and information available from corporate 
websites. These sources should be treated with a degree of caution in the 
context of our study. Official statistics obviously understates investments in 
post-Soviet countries; in addition, investments vary considerably from one 
country to another. It is likely that official figures will include payments under 
transactions made in the pre-crisis period, i.e. the impact of the crisis will 
be reflected with a time lag. As for press releases and corporate websites, 
this information is likely to distort the picture in favour of replacement 
growth: typically, start-up of a new transaction or project receives much 
greater coverage than any consequent withdrawal (with the exception of 
very large transactions). These circumstances should be kept in mind 
when looking at the empirical data (largely incomplete or indirect) available 
to us. 
Finally, we should remember that the outbreak of the crisis coincided with 
the next phase of quantitative transformation of Russian TNCs, i.e. their 
geographic reorientation. The notion that the post-Soviet space is an 
isolated region, the development of which is determined principally by its 
internal logic has little to do with reality. Informal integration has long since 
moved beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union, although the scale 
of this process varies depending on the form of business activity. Whereas 
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the traditional targets for Russian investment are European and post-
Soviet countries (SKOLKOVO, 2008; Sethi, 2009), in recent years Russian 
expansion went further, to Africa and Asia (Kuznetsov, 2010). The fact that 
this phase coincided with the outbreak of the crisis complicates the task of 
verifying our hypotheses. 
Investment cooperation as reflected by national 
statistics
First, let us look at quantitative data on investments in post-Soviet 
countries. To evaluate Russian investment in the region, we will use two 
main sources: the Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian 
Federation, and the balance of payments (as stated by the Central Bank of 
Russia). As shown in Figure 2.1a, in 2009 both Russian investments in CIS 
countries and investments by CIS countries in Russia declined significantly 
(according to data from the Federal State Statistics Service). The decrease 
Figure 2.1. 
Inflow of investments 
from Russia to CIS 
countries
Source: Federal State 
Statistics Service 
of Russia; Bank of 
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was about 10% for Russian investments and over 30% for investments by CIS 
countries. This trend was observed in all post-Soviet states except Tajikistan, 
Moldova and Turkmenistan (whose investments in the Russian economy 
increased; however, these three countries together contribute only 2% of 
all investment). For example, Ukraine’s investments in Russia in 2009 
reached only 43% of the 2008 level; the same indices for Kazakhstan and 
Belarus were 61% and 72%, respectively. 
Whilst Russian investments in CIS countries increased significantly in 2008, 
investments by Ukraine and Kazakhstan in Russia declined. Interestingly, if 
we exclude Belarus from our analysis of 2009, we will obtain a picture of 
serious decline in Russian investments: 65% of the 2008 level in Ukraine 
and 51% in Kazakhstan. Thus, quantitative indicators of investment activity 
clearly speak in favour of the investment recession hypothesis, although 
this conclusion is better justified for CIS countries than for Russia itself. The 
crisis also reversed the upward trend in CIS countries’ investments in Russia 
(Libman, 2008): Russian investments clearly prevailed in the investment 
balance of 2009, mainly due to a sharp increase in 2008 when other CIS 
countries were already exposed to the crisis. This is logical, bearing in mind 
the role of financial system component of the crisis in Kazakhstan and deep 
economic recession in Ukraine.
Russian direct investments data from the balance of payments (see Figure 
2.1b) present a somewhat different picture. The 2008-2009 crisis did not 
suspend the growth of Russian investments in post-Soviet economies, but 
caused it to slow. Investments from CIS countries did indeed drop in 2008, but 
then continued to increase. The situation with portfolio investments was not 
as good (Golovnin, Ushkalova, Yakusheva, 2010). The assets of Russian 
investors in the CIS shrank from $113 million to $24 million in 2008, but 
in 2009 increased to $71 million, thus exceeding the 2006 level, yet falling 
short of the 2007 level. Payables dropped from $192 million in 2007 to 
$152 million in 2008, and the year 2009 saw net withdrawal of CIS countries’ 
portfolio investments from Russia, with a slight improvement in the first 
quarter of 2010 (however, the pre-crisis level was much higher). 
An analysis of CIS national statistics allows us to look at the situation from a 
different perspective. 
According to the National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan (see Figure 
2.2a), investments from other CIS countries to this country in 2009 were 
10% down, whilst Russian investments increased significantly (by contrast, 
Russian statistics indicate a significant decrease). Kazakhstan’s standing 
in the Kyrgyz economy deteriorated: whereas in 2007-2008 it nearly 
achieved the status of the largest foreign investor, in 2009 its 
investments in the country shrank dramatically. Notably, the overall 
investment inflow into Kyrgyzstan continued to grow, but the level of Chinese 
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Figure 2.2. 
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capital decreased, i.e. there were no signs of “seizing the niche”. Direct 
investments showed comparable dynamics (see Figure 2.2b): investments 
from CIS countries dropped by 35%, and investments from Kazakhstan 
(the main source of foreign investments) dropped by more than 40%; the 
decrease in Chinese investments was not as big, and Russian investments 
increased slightly.
According to Ukrainian statistics (see Figure 2.3), slow but sustained growth 
in accumulated investments by Russia in Ukraine and by Ukraine in Russia 
was observed in 2008-2010, except several short periods of decline. The 
assessment of this data is complicated by the fact that the main investor in 
Ukraine is Cyprus, which, in the opinion of some experts, masks the inflow of 
Russian capital, especially into the financial sector (Obozrevatel, June 12, 
2010).
Figure 2.4. 
Investment inflow 
and outflow in/from 
Kazakhstan ($ million)
Source: National 
Bank of Kazakhstan
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Kazakhstan’s statistics are most supportive of the negative expectations 
of investment recession. Investments by CIS countries in the Kazakh 
economy dropped sharply, which is attributable mainly to Russian 
withdrawal. In 2009, Kazakh investments in CIS countries dropped eight 
times, and investments in Russia nearly ten times (however, investments 
in Kyrgyzstan grew slightly, but this trend was unsustainable2 and turned 
into withdrawal in the first quarter of 2010). Total investments in 
Figure 2.5. 
The share of Russian 
(a) and Kazakh (b) 
investments in total 
investments in CIS 
countries
Sources: see Figures 
2.1-2.; for Belarus 
– the National Bank 
of Belarus
Notes: For Ukraine – share in accumulated direct investments as at January 1, of the following 
year; for Belarus – data on direct investments; the share is calculated as ratio of the Payables 
(Direct Investments) item of the financial account of the balance of payments in respect of Russia 
to the credit of the Investments in Domestic Economy (Direct Investments) item of the financial 
account of the balance of payments. For Russia – data from the Federal State Statistics Service. 
Data for Belarus is shown in the right scale
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Kazakhstan from other world countries also declined in 2009 compared to 
2008, but investments from China slightly increased.
In the case of Belarus, we can use data from the balance of payments 
in respect of Russia that reflects the inflow of direct investments into 
the country. However, this source contains no indications of decline 
during the crisis, showing gradual growth from $828.6 million in 2007 to 
$1.0688 billion in 2008 and $1.4201 billion in 2009. This effect may 
be attributable to Gazprom’s regular payments for the purchase of 
Beltransgaz (Heifetz, 2009; Yeremeeva, 2009).
In Figure 2.5a we summarise our analysis of the Russian share in total 
investments in CIS countries. This share increased in three of the four 
countries under review (Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine), and slightly 
decreased in Kazakhstan. Data on Kazakhstan’s overseas investments (see 
Figure 2.5b) are available only for Kyrgyzstan and Russia: in both countries 
Kazakhstan’s share in total investments shrank in 2009. In other words, 
Russia’s scenario fits the replacement growth hypothesis, whilst pure 
investment recession is being observed in Kazakhstan.
Summing up these quantitative assessments, we should note that the 
2008-2009 statistics differ significantly in individual CIS countries and 
may lead to contradicting conclusions. However, we can say safely that the 
crisis has resulted in dramatic decrease of Kazakhstan’s investments in 
post-Soviet countries (especially in Russia; the situation with Kyrgyz assets 
is somewhat more difficult to assess). Russia’s situation was not as plain: 
although it had a period of decline in 2009, this decline was less dramatic 
than in other CIS countries (according to Ukrainian statistics, there were no 
setbacks at all). On the whole, quantitative data cannot decisively justify the 
investment recession hypothesis in the case of Russia. Its standing should 
not be overestimated, since the results of the assessment were strongly 
influenced by investments in Belarus. However, the Russian share in total 
investments did increase, which flatly correlates with the replacement 
growth hypothesis. Finally, the behaviour of external players was also not 
uniform: China was actively expanding its presence in Kazakhstan but 
withdrawing from Kyrgyzstan. 
Another drawback of quantitative analysis is the fact that the crisis has 
forced businesses to actively employ various non-transparent investment 
schemes in order to optimise accounts. Of course, under increasing 
pressure from fiscal authorities (which were concerned about dramatic 
decline in tax revenue in crisis time) business practices may have ultimately 
reverted to type, but it is very likely that what we observed in 2009 was not 
a decline in investments but transfer of a large number of transactions to 
the informal sector or a boom in offshore schemes (which in any case 
dominate the mutual investments structure in the CIS). Therefore we 
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deem it necessary to look into individual transactions and companies in 
post-Soviet states in the crisis period. 
Key transactions: general trends
The picture resulting from an analysis of individual transactions is somewhat 
different from that painted by the statistics. In this section we concentrate 
on Russian investment projects. There is practically no news of any recent 
investment initiatives from Kazakhstan, and not surprisingly: the country’s 
strong financial sector which had been the main engine of its expansion in CIS 
markets fell as the first victim of the global crisis. In essence, Kazakhstan was 
the only CIS economy that fully suffered the first tide of the crisis in 2007-
2008 (Golovnin, Ushkalova, Yakusheva, 2010:5). 
To date there are several assessments of Russian TNCs’ response to the 
crisis from the perspective of expansion beyond the CIS (Kuznetsov, 2009; 
Vahtra, 2009; SKOLKOVO, 2009). During the first half of 2008 Russian 
overseas investment activity continued in direct contradiction to the global 
downward trend. Moreover, according to some sources (Kuznetsov, 
Chetverikova, 2009), leading TNCs started to reduce staff in Russia in the 
pre-crisis period whilst hiring more personnel for their overseas subsidiaries. 
Their standing deteriorated in the second half of 2008, i.e. when the second 
wave of the crisis reached CIS countries. Many transactions were cancelled 
or postponed for the indefinite future. Notably, it was the most active players 
in the past years’ expansion who had to revise their strategies. However, 
it would be incorrect to speak about a standstill, as overseas assets of 
Russian companies grew continuously in the face of the crisis. 
As for situation in the CIS region, at an early stage of the crisis some Russian 
companies were forced to abandon their projects3, particularly, in construction 
(PIK, Inteco, Mirax Group) in Ukraine. Thus, in October 2008, Inteco froze its 
project to construct the Moskovskiy residential district in Kyiv. Mirax Group 
sold its unfinished Mirax Plaza Ukraine skyscraper in Kyiv to AEON (Pappe, 
2009) – the latter is also Russian-controlled. The situation in Russia’s 
building industry was extremely adverse even against the backdrop of the 
overall economic recession; incidentally, this industry was hit by the crisis at 
an early stage. In 2009, Russian construction companies made a number of 
large transactions in Ukraine: Promyshlenniy Kontsern acquired 99.99% in 
Planeta-Bud (which had suffered a 57.8% loss of profit)4 in Crimea. As 
3 According to some estimates, this trend was attributable to emerging opportunities to buy 
attractive assets in Russia and therefore was temporary (investory.com.ua, March 23, 2009).
4 It is not clear whether this was a new transaction or redistribution of control: previously 95% of 
shares was held by Vilmorin Holdings of Cyprus; Promyshlenniy Kontsern declined to comment 
on its affiliation to this company on account of commercial confidentiality (Interfax-Ukraine, July 
29, 2009).
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commented by Y. Tsukanov, Director of Link Development, “the building 
industry is in a miserable condition like no other: demand and prices 
collapsed together with credit, and prices for building materials hold so far. 
That is why construction assets are the first to be sold at “crisis” prices. So 
far, only Russians show interest in these acquisitions: they are ready for our 
[i.e. Ukrainian] risks” (Kommersant-Ukraine, September 22, 2009).
Setbacks were also observed in other sectors: for example, LUKoil cut 
investment in its petrol stations network in Ukraine (Blyakha, 2009). LUKoil’s 
forthcoming investment in the Khvalynskoye oilfield and other oil & gas projects 
in Kazakhstan also came into question (Paramonov, Strokov, Stolpovsky, 
2009). 
In some instances the crisis produced complex effects. In October 2008, 
EuroChem acquired the government’s block of shares in Sary-Tas (50.7%), 
establishing EuroChem-Udobreniya LLP to this end, and paid up the 
company’s debt for fifteen years of standstill. Investment in this project 
is expected to total $2.5 billion by 2015. The facility, which has remained 
idle for many years, will be used as a basis for a new industrial complex 
comprising a mining and ore dressing works and three plants producing 
phosphate (1 million tons a year), nitrate (0.8 million tons) and combined 
(0.5 million tons) fertiliser. The company intends to finance this project 
exclusively from its own funds. Possibly, this sizeable initiative by EuroChem 
was inspired principally by the favourable situation on the global mineral 
fertiliser markets in the pre-crisis period (which enabled to company to 
accumulate enough liquidity to support its investment programme even 
after the outbreak of the crisis) and lower cost of electricity and labour in 
Kazakhstan (RBC Daily, October 10, 2008).
But EuroChem’s other projects in Kazakhstan were delayed due to the crisis. 
In February 2009, the company asked the Kazakh government to refrain 
from putting out to tender the Araltobe and Kestiktobe phosphate deposits 
(in which the company showed interest in 2008), so as to allow it to return 
to this matter later, when the situation on the phosphate fertiliser and 
capital markets improves (Ekspert, March 4, 2009; Novyie khimicheskiye 
tekhnologii, March 4, 2009). EuroChem finally secured mining rights in 
respect of these two deposits plus Gimmelfarbskoye in June 2010. However, 
according to V. Torin, Head of PR & Communications at EuroChem, this delay 
was due not only to the crisis but also bureaucratic procedures: “the 
project is fairly big, and unnecessary rush may play a negative role. Support 
from authorities at all levels and prompt decision-making will be critical 
to implementation.” (Kursiv, July 1, 2010). It is not really possible to say to 
what extent the delay was attributable to the crisis or political and 
bureaucratic reasons. From the very beginning, the Sary-Tas project was 
positioned as CIS-oriented, and the three abovementioned deposits are 
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intended to support sales in Kazakhstan or, if domestic demand is not 
sufficient, elsewhere. 
Later in 2008-2010 Russian companies implemented a number of large 
projects in the CIS (this list is less impressive than several years ago; in many 
cases these were the completion of projects from previous years rather than 
new ones). In June 2009, Polymetal acquired 100% in the Varvarinskoye 
gold and copper deposit in Kazakhstan (Three K Exploration and Mining Ltd) 
from Orsu Metals of Canada (vesti.kz, June 17, 2009). As the company 
announced, this transaction reached up to $20 million. TNC-ВР purchased 
two oil bases and 36 petrol stations in Kyiv Oblast and the city of Kyiv from 
Gepard Group, and now intends to further expand this petrol stations network 
in Ukraine (covering Dnepropetrovsk and Donetsk). Vimpelcom acquired 7% 
of shares in the cellular operator Unitel in Uzbekistan, thus securing 100% 
control over the company (Starostenkova, 2010). Just prior to the crisis, in 
June 2008, TMK Group was joined by KMK-Kazakhstan, manufacturer of 
compressor pipes and casing tubing for the oil & gas industry. In autumn of 
2008, the construction company Promstroi Group completed acquisition 
of Kazmekhanomontazh and Avtomatika of Kazakhstan (this evidences the 
stability of investment activity of small TNCs in crisis time, see Kuznetsov, 
2009). 
Despite the crisis, Russian investors were expanding their presence in 
Ukraine’s metallurgy. In September 2008 EVRAZ completed the acquisition 
of Palmrose Ltd (Sukhaya Balka and Petrovsky Dnepropetrovsk Metal Works; 
shares in Bagleikoks, Dneprokoks and Dneprodzerzhinsk Charred Coal & 
Chemical Plant) from Privat group that was initiated in April 2008. The total 
cost of this transaction exceeded $2 billion. In December 2009 a group of 
Russian investors affiliated with shareholders of Metalloinvest and EVRAZ 
purchased the controlling block of shares in Industrialny Soyuz Donbassa 
(ISD). This transaction also exemplifies the complex effects of the crisis: 
according to available information, in 2008 EVRAZ and ISD were about to 
complete the transaction, but the progress halted as the crisis started to 
manifest itself. However, in a year the Russian investors managed to form a 
large pool (the total transaction amount was $2-2.5 billion, and was financed 
by Vneshekonombank). In other words, investment recession did take place, 
but it resulted in temporary suspension of investments rather than 
repudiation of the project. It is also presumed that the asset was sold at 
a material discount (due to its indebtedness), which can also be viewed as 
evidence of replacement growth (Kommersant, January 11, 2010; Bankir, 
January 17, 2010).
Another transaction that has been negotiated since 2008 and continued 
into the crisis period is the acquisition of KazakhGold of Kazakhstan by Polyus 
Gold. This transaction deserves closer attention due to its importance. 
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KazakhGold Group owns Kazakhaltyn, a major Kazakh gold producer, which 
operates three largest gold mines. The company’s principal shareholder was 
the Asaubayev family. Since 2005, KazakhGold’s shares have been traded on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). In November 2008, the Kazakh Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources permitted Polyus Gold to buy 50.1% of shares 
in the company (under Kazakh law, the state has the pre-emptive right in such 
cases); and in September 2008 the company’s value was estimated at $746 
million (BFM.ru, November 17, 2008). In June 2009, the transaction was 
officially closed and announced on the LSE: Polyus Gold acted as guarantor 
under KazakhGold’s $200-million bond issuance with maturity in 2013, 
and also provided KazakhGold with two loans for a total of $100 million. In 
June 2010, Polyus Gold announced a reverse takeover that would enable 
it to register in a foreign jurisdiction and access the LSE (finam.ru, June 30, 
2010).
But in 2010 it became clear that KazakhGold’s financial statements 
published by its former owners were materially misleading: its asset value 
was overstated by 14% and profit by 40%, and net loss was understated by 
163% (Kursiv, March 26, 2010; MAonline, July 1, 2010). The Russian party 
filed a claim with the High Court in London demanding the former owners pay 
$450 million in damages. In July 2010, the Kazakh government declared that 
the transaction would be revised on account that Polyus Gold had allegedly 
paid much less for KazakhGold than the initial assessment of $269 million. 
The permit for selling KazakhGold shares to Polyus Gold was cancelled, and 
the Kazakh Ministry of Industry and New Technology forbade Kazakhgold 
to issue additional shares to Polyus Gold. In conjunction with that, a media 
campaign against the Russian company was staged in Kazakhstan. Experts 
believe that this hostile about-turn was provoked by legal action against the 
Asaubayev family who have close ties with the Kazakh elite. This transaction 
is very illustrative of risks associated with attempts to enter non-transparent 
post-Soviet economies (Evrasia Internet, August 10, 2010). On the other 
hand, the potential for trouble was already there when Polyus Gold’s omitted 
to do any due diligence prior to the transaction – presumably, in an attempt 
to outstrip the other bidder, Zijin of China (Gornopromyshlenniy portal Rossii, 
August 9, 2010).
In October 2010, Polyus Gold and KazakhGold admitted that they reached 
deadlock and the merger process could not be finalised by October 29, 
2010, i.e. the proposed closing date of reverse takeover (RBK, October 26, 
2010). However, in December 2010, Polyus Gold and the Asaubayev family 
(AltynGroup Kazakhstan LLP) compromised on the sale of all Polyus Gold 
assets in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Romania to AltynGroup for $509 
million (payable in two instalments until March 11, 2011 and June 8, 2012). 
According to available estimates, this transaction only covers the cost of 
acquisition of KazakhGold in 2009, but does not compensate Polyus Gold 
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for investments made in KazakhGold or any associated damage. Ultimately, 
the Russian investor will acquire the parent company KazakhGold without 
assets, which can be used as a vehicle for listing on the LSE (through reverse 
takeover) and then, possibly, merger with a large international gold producer. 
In other words, the KazakhGold transaction was reduced from an investment 
project designed as part of expansion in the post-Soviet space to a mere 
technical procedure of accessing international financial markets (the latter 
issue is still up to the Kazakh government which has to restore the revoked 
permit for Polyus Gold to buy KazakhGold shares) (Fincake, December 8, 
2010).
Polyus Gold’s transaction exemplifies the standard philosophy of post-Soviet 
business expansion (i.e. reliance on non-transparent arrangements and the 
manner in which external competition risks are handled), but, for the purposes 
of our study, it is primarily an example of how a Russian investor completed 
a promising acquisition that it had deemed strategic in the face of the crisis. 
Moreover, no crisis developments could make the acquisition of the desired 
assets by Russian TNC more prudent. Despite the global crisis, the TNC 
was conducting business as usual, and with a great deal of post-Soviet 
specific features at that. 
Financial sector transactions
More interesting observations can be made on some landmark transactions 
in the financial sector.
The transactions under review were clearly dictated by economic recession 
in post-Soviet countries. They allow us to study the role of a political agenda 
(at least potential) behind them. Remarkably, these two transactions in the 
banking sector had similar background but brought about very different 
results, and this adds interest to our comparative analysis (we can even talk 
about compliance with the most similar different outcomes criterion which is 
used in comparative studies in social sciences).
One of the uncompleted transactions negotiated in 2009 was an 
inconclusive attempt by Sberbank at buying Bank TuranAlem (BTA) of 
Kazakhstan. This investment initiative in itself exemplifies the logic of 
replacement growth: BTA, one of the backbone Kazakh banks, was put up 
for sale solely due to the serious problems caused by the first tide of the 
global crisis. In view of the bank’s financial troubles, the Kazakh government 
resorted to partial nationalisation: 75.1% of BTA shares were purchased 
by the public holding company Samruk-Kazyna (this contradicted the 
general government line in banking sector management of the recent two 
decades which was based on the flat premise of private sector domination). 
The government announced that its shareholding in the bank would be 
temporary, 3-5 years at most.
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The search for potential buyers began, and Russian Sberbank (which already 
had a subsidiary bank in Kazakhstan) was most favoured, especially in view 
of the recent admission of Samruk-Kazyna’s head Kairat Kelimbetov to the 
Supervisory Board of Sberbank in the summer of 2009. On June 2, 2009, 
Anvar Saidenov, Chairman of BTA, announced that the bank had received a 
single official bid from Sberbank. Earlier, in April, news came of Sberbank doing 
a due diligence exercise in the respect of BTA and negotiations over purchase 
of all Samruk-Kazyna’s share. In his interview to Kommersant (Kommersant, 
June 3, 2009), German Gref, President of Sberbank, said that he was awaiting 
the completion of the restructuring of BTA (whose foreign debt was estimated 
at $13 billion) and execution of all investment agreements, after which he 
would consider buying the shares. 
However, by autumn of 2009, it was rumoured that Sberbank would refuse to 
buy BTA due to the latter’s poor standing. Observers were speculating about 
the political aspect of the negotiations, which is relevant to our study, i.e. the 
stance of the Russian government that was interested in the transaction 
(of course, acquisition of BTA would be very opportune in the context of the 
new wave of talks over closer regional integration). Overall, the word is that 
the political agenda is unlikely to force Sberbank into a clearly uneconomic 
deal, and the most probable future scenario is “endless talks” without flat 
refusal (Respublika, September 4, 2009). Finally, in October 2009, BTA 
signed a memorandum of understanding with a creditors committee on 
restructuring, which granted the creditors long-term control over the bank, 
thus making the chances of acquisition even fainter (Zarschikov, 2009).
The second similar project in the banking sector was more successful. In 
December 2008 – January 2009 (i.e. much earlier, during a more acute 
phase of the crisis) Vneshekonombank purchased Ukrainian Prominvestbank. 
This transaction has much in common with the inconclusive BTA transaction. 
Prominvestbank was founded in 1992 on the basis of former Prominvestbank 
of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and in 2008 ranked sixth in Ukraine 
in terms of assets. Massive withdrawal of private deposits in the autumn 
of 2008 (which totalled $1 billion in the first week of October alone) forced 
the National Bank of Ukraine to introduce provisional administration in 
Prominvestbank (for the first time in the country). Apparently, this decision 
was dictated not only by the crisis but also a raider action in 2008 allegedly 
backed by Russian players (Advisers, March 13, 2010). The search of a 
potential strategic investor was made in a desperate rush (according to 
Vladimir Krotyuk, interim administrator and Deputy Chairman of the National 
Bank of Ukraine, bids from western financial institutions were turned down on 
account that they requested several months for the decision-making process; 
see Prostobankir.co.ua, March 4, 2010). Potential buyers included individual 
investors and private and public banks from Russia and Ukraine (Sberbank, 
NRB and Alfa Bank were all mentioned). Eventually, Vneshekonombank 
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won and invested 1.1 billion hryvnias ($158 million) in Prominvestbank’s 
charter capital. Another 7 billion hryvnias was provided in long-term loans. 
Vneshekonombank acquired 75% +3 shares in Prominvestbank. On 
February 10, 2009, Vneshekonombank transferred to Prominvestbank 
the first $390 million from a subordinated loan, and a week later 
Prominvestbank announced that its operation stabilised. 
Vladimir Dmitriyev, Chairman of Vneshekonombank, said that until recently 
the bank had not seriously considered entering the Ukrainian market, 
concentrating instead on internal reform and creation of a development bank. 
But eventually that step was made despite the difficult financial position of 
the acquired bank and the little promise Ukraine’s banking sector offers at 
the moment (NewsRu.ua, December 21, 2009). Vneshekonombank’s head 
explains the choice of Prominvestbank by the role it plays in lending to the 
Ukrainian industry: it has a large number of clients, and many of them have 
close ties with Russian manufacturers. Vneshekonombank intends to use 
Prominvestbank for adjusting settlement with Ukraine (UGMK, April 1, 2009). 
It is also planned to make the bank one of Ukraine’s top five (RBK-Ukraine, 
March 5, 2009). Vneshekonombank received a bid to purchase 
Prominvestbank from Slav AG owned by the Ukrainian politicians 
and businessmen Sergei and Andrei Klyuyev who also hold shares in 
Prominvestbank (they were among the potential buyers of the controlling 
block of shares). Vladimir Dmitriyev jokingly comments that this acquisition 
was made out of “proletarian internationalism”, meaning that at that 
difficult time neither private nor public Russian banks had resources 
necessary for rehabilitation measures5. 
As we have mentioned above, this transaction closely resembles 
Sberbank’s BTA project, but there are two material distinctions. First, 
Vneshekonombank as a public corporation can be expected to be far more 
politically motivated. Second, Vneshekonombank’s overseas platform is no 
match for that of Sberbank, although it has a subsidiary in Belarus (since the 
Soviet period). Therefore, we cannot discard either motive for investment 
expansion: replacement growth (taking advantage of the critical condition 
of a potentially lucrative asset, since the transaction was made at the very 
peak of the crisis) and political interests (which, however, are always 
important to Vneshekonombank irrespective of the crisis). It is likely that the 
commercial and political considerations were both present in this case.
Comparing the BTA and Prominvestbank projects allows us to make several 
observations. Russian banks (especially government-owned ones), heavily 
injected with public funds during the crisis, were well positioned to embark 
5 Interview of Vladimir Dmitriyev at Prominvestbank’s website, www.pib.com.ua/pr/biznes 
20090608.php.ru, 12.08.2010.
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on buying up crisis-stricken assets in CIS countries in accordance with the 
replacement growth scenario. In many cases they took a very prudent stance 
on the emerging opportunities, carefully selecting truly promising assets. And 
in some cases, by contrast, they took fairly high risks. Government control, 
albeit formal, does not necessarily mean that political considerations will 
prevail, even in crisis conditions; this depends on the government’s part in an 
individual company.
Some illustrative crisis-time transactions related to the stock market 
infrastructure. Notably, before the crisis cooperation between stock 
exchanges and depositories from different CIS countries was rather formal 
and hardly went beyond memoranda of understanding or membership of 
business associations (The International Association of CIS Stock Exchanges 
and the Association of Central Depositories of Eurasia) (Golovnin, 2009). 
However, the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) often assumed 
an active role in promoting financial integration initiatives. 
The crisis changed the situation dramatically, especially as concerns 
cooperation between Russian (RTS) and Ukrainian stock exchanges 
(Golovnin, 2010). Earlier, Russian stock exchanges have made several 
inconclusive attempts at entering the Ukrainian market through joint 
projects with local infrastructure organisations. Finally, at an early stage of 
the crisis (in May 2008) the RTS launched the Ukrainian Stock Exchange 
jointly with Ukrainian players (this time, we can refer to a “brand new” 
investment rather than acquisition of an existing asset). Trade on the 
new exchange opened in March 2009; for the first time in Ukraine, 
Internet trading facilities were introduced, which at once elevated the 
new exchange to a leading position and wrecked the monopoly of the First 
Stock Trading System (FSTS). Notably, the latter had grasped the threat 
at an early stage, and in June 2008 secured the supply of a new trading 
platform (also capable of supporting Internet trading) by the MICEX. 
However, the FSTS failed to outstrip its competitor in launching the 
new system (this was done in April 2009). As a result, the FSTS lost its 
position permanently and started to consider selling shares to a foreign 
strategic investor. According to the FSTS management, the only response 
to the offer came from the MICEX (Investgazeta, January 25, 2010). In 
December 2009, the management approved the sale of 50% + 1 share to 
the MICEX, and the transaction was closed in mid-2010. 
Thus, the main part of Ukraine’s stock market infrastructure came under 
the control of Russian capital, including government-owned structures (the 
principal shareholder of the MICEX is the Central Bank of Russia). 
The above two transactions, especially the MICEX’s FSTS project, fit 
the replacement growth scenario. In addition, investments by the 
Russian stock exchanges are clearly strategic in essence, whereas 
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Vneshekonombank will most probably sell its Ukrainian asset that does not 
fully correspond to its core business (and most probably to another Russian 
player). These transactions pave the way for future financial cooperation 
between post-Soviet countries, and success of this cooperation will largely 
depend on Russian stock exchanges’ performance in Ukraine. The first 
upgrade to the national infrastructure has been already made (the launch of 
Internet trading). 
The crisis and entering global markets 
There are also a number of other examples of how Russian businesses 
took full advantage of the crisis conditions to improve their international 
standing. In this case we refer not only to expansion in the CIS but also the 
associated asset diversification processes. In June 2009, Atomredmetzoloto 
(ARMZ), a member of Rosatom, secured a strategic alliance with Uranium 
One of Canada. The company exchanged its 50% stake in the Karatau deposit 
in Kazakhstan (the remaining 50% is held by Kazatomprom) for 16.6% of 
additionally issued shares in Uranium One plus $90 million (the latter amount 
may increase by $60 million depending on Karatau’s performance in the next 
three years). The Canadian party was granted the pre-emptive right to buy 
ARMZ assets outside Russia (obviously, Uranium One is chiefly interested 
in Kazakhstan). ARMZ became the first strategic investor in formerly public 
Uranium One. Thus, ARMZ secured itself access to Uranium One’s global 
resources scattered over several continents (ARMZ’s own resources in 
Russia are very costly to operate due to the harsh climate) (Ekspert, June 16, 
2009). ARMZ also strengthened its presence in Kazakhstan where Uranium 
One operates a number of deposits (Akdalinskoye and Yuzhno-Inkaiskoye 
(70%) and Kharasanskoye (30%)) that can be developed at a fabulously low 
cost.
Bearing in mind that in June 2010 ARMZ increased its share in Uranium 
One to at least 50%, this transaction holds even greater promise for the 
Russian party. It appears that the crisis forced Russian companies to seek 
expansion beyond their priority target regions of Europe and the CIS. In this 
particular case, however, internal political developments in Kazakhstan played 
a role: some time ago Uranium One became involved in a major scandal (the 
so-called “Dzhakishev case”) relating to unlawful privatisation of a number 
of uranium deposits. Experts believe that the transaction with ARMZ will 
provide Uranium One with a degree of protection in Kazakhstan. The latter 
consideration becomes even more important in view of the fact that the 
proposed sale of about 20% of shares in Uranium One to Toshiba has not 
so far been authorised by the Kazakh government (although Toshiba was 
not refused flatly and, according to its Vice-President Yasuharu Igarashi, is 
already participating in Uranium One’s operation; the approval process lasts 
beyond reason) (Kursiv, June 10, 2010).
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Conclusions
Although the cited information is largely incomplete and non-systematic, we 
can draw certain conclusions. Kazakh companies, one of the two investment 
forces in the CIS, have acted generally in accordance with the investment 
recession scenario. Therefore, the formation of the CIS’ second integration 
core in this country is open to question (Vinokurov, Libman, 2010). In this 
respect, however, the Kazakh government and TNCs will have the final word. 
The situation with Russian TNCs is not as simple. Evidence of investment 
recession, i.e. suspension of announced projects and a decline in the number 
of new initiatives, is in place. However, not all developments in Russia speak in 
support of the investment recession hypothesis: later in 2008-2010, Russian 
TNCs completed several sizable transactions (it does not matter that most 
of them had been initiated in the pre-crisis period). In other words, Russian 
investment activity in CIS countries and elsewhere proved resistant to the 
crisis. Notably, most of the projects suspended in the autumn of 2008 were 
finalised in 2009, when the peak of the crisis was over (e.g. in metallurgy and 
mining).
We have also found evidence of replacement growth, first of all in the 
financial and banking sectors (and, partially, in construction and metallurgy); 
but the outcomes of the reviewed projects were different. The replacement 
growth logic was clearly visible in projects to diversify the overseas assets 
of Russian TNCs and promote expansion beyond the post-Soviet space. In 
this case, however, complex interrelation between crisis developments and 
changes in the strategy of Russian TNCs makes the analysis of resulting 
effects a challenging task. In quantitative terms, the Russian share in total 
investments in those CIS countries for which data is available increased 
(the only exception was Kyrgyzstan), which also fits the replacement 
growth hypothesis.
The role of interstate cooperation in investment remained insignificant 
throughout 2008-2009. We have grounds for assuming that the warming of 
Russian-Ukrainian relations in the spring and summer of 2010 and inception 
of the Customs Union will give an added impetus to investment cooperation. 
However, since these changes in international relations coincided with 
economic recovery in Russia, it is difficult to put a simple valuation on this role. 
An analysis of the above assumption will only become possible in a few years. 
A political agenda may have exerted certain influence in some implemented 
and proposed transactions, but the degree of this influence should not be 
overstated.
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The macroeconomic fallout of the global economic crisis in 
CIS countries 
As we have discussed previously (Golovnin, Ushkalova, Yakusheva, 2010; 
Libman, Golovnin, 2010), the economic impact of the current global 
crisis became fully apparent in developed countries in the second half 
of 2008. Signs of stagnation had appeared at the end of 2007, but in 
the wealthiest economies, real gross domestic product (GDP) dynamics 
remained on a positive trajectory into the last quarter of 2008. In the 
United States, for example, real GDP dropped by 0.3% in the third quarter 
of 2008 (compared to the same period of the previous year) and by 2.8% 
in the following quarter. In Germany and throughout the European Union 
(EU), economic stagnation began in the third quarter of 2008 (with GDP 
growth rates of 0.5% and 0.1%, respectively), and the next quarter saw 
notable falls of 2% and 2.1%, respectively. In developed countries the 
crisis was at its peak during the first three quarters of 2009, and only in 
the fourth quarter of that year were the early shoots of a revival observed 
in the US, and the decline in GDP in the EU began to slow down. The first 
three quarters of 2010 saw sustained upward development. However, the 
benchmark used, i.e. the peak of the crisis period, is quite low1. Therefore, 
assessment of the subsequent dynamics of these developed economies 
remains inconclusive.
The crisis spread from developed economies to developing ones mainly 
via two channels: the contraction and even inversion of capital flows; and 
the contraction of aggregate demand in developed countries. The latter 
channel involved a reduction in exports from developing countries to 
developed countries and the reduction of revenue from factors of 
production of developing countries working in developed countries, chiefly 
migrant labour. In this study, we focus principally on the contraction of 
aggregate demand. 
* This paper is a part of the Regional Integration Studies Programme of the EDB Technical 
Assistance Fund in Regional Effects of the Global Economic Crisis in the CIS.
1 Based on OECD data (www.oecd.org).
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If we examine the crisis dynamics in CIS countries using GDP and industrial 
production data (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2), we can identify several distinct 
models. When looking at the timing of real GDP slowdown, the countries 
divide into three distinct groups, as follows: 
1) in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine a sustained downward trend began 
in the second quarter of 2008, although economic growth rates 
remained fairly high; 
2) Azerbaijan joined these economies in the third quarter of 2008 and 
Armenia and Belarus in the fourth quarter; and 
3) in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Tajikistan, GDP started to decrease in early 
2009 and reached its nadir almost at once. 
In contrast, industrial production dynamics suggests an earlier and 
simultaneous exposure to the crisis: industrial production rates started to 
slow down in Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine in the second 
quarter of 2008 and in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in the third quarter 
(following a collapse in the price of oil, these countries’ staple export). The 
two exceptions were Tajikistan, where industrial production started to fall in 
early 2008, and Kyrgyzstan, where the crisis hit only in early 2009; up to that 
point, considerable world demand for gold had been compensating for the 
country’s declining industrial production.
Table 3.1.
Real GDP dynamics 
(% of the same period 
of the previous year) 
Source: CIS Interstate 
Statistics Committee 
(www.cisstat.com)
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Azerbaijan 113.8 116.5 115 110.8 104.1 103.6 106.1 109.3 105.4 103.7
Armenia 113 110.9 113.1 106.9 93.9 86.7 83.5 85.8 105.5 106.7
Belarus 111.3 110.9 111.2 110.2 101.1 100.3 99.7 100.2 104 106.6
Kazakhstan 106.1 105.7 104 103.3 97.8 97.6 98.5 101.2 107.1 108.5
Kyrgyzstan 106.7 107.7 107.2 108.4 98.7 98.2 101.2 102.3 116.4 105
Moldova 104.3 105.4 107.6 107.8 93.1 92.2 92.3 93.5 104.7 105.6
Russia 109.3 108.4 107.7 105.6 90.5 89.8 90.7 92.1 102.9 104.2
Tajikistan 103.2 105.8 107.2 107.9 103.5 102.8 102.7 103.4 106.8 107.4
Ukraine 108.5 106.2 104.3 102.3 79.8 82.2 84 84.9 104.9 106
In most countries a decrease in real GDP was first recorded in the first 
quarter of 2009 and the crisis reached its peak in the second and third 
quarters. Thus, there was a time lag of approximately one calendar quarter 
between the moment when the crisis struck developed economies and when 
it spilled over into developing ones. Industrial production data paints a similar 
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Table 3.2.
Industrial production 
dynamics (% of 
the same period of 
the previous year) 
Source: CIS Interstate 
Statistics Committee 
(www.cisstat.com)
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Azerbaijan 112.9 113.8 112 106 97.8 101 105 108.6 105.6 103.5
Armenia 100.2 99.8 103.4 102 90.5 88.5 88.6 92.2 110.4 112.3
Belarus 115.2 113.6 113.4 111.5 96.1 96.9 96.2 98 105.9 108.8
Kazakhstan 103.7 103.8 103 102.1 95.4 97.3 99 102.7 111.5 111
Kyrgyzstan 104.7 106.5 109.5 114.9 80.8 81.2 88.6 93.6 178.8 141.8
Moldova 107.7 104.6 102.8 100.7 75.8 75.1 75.7 77.8 104.9 106.6
Russia 106 105.2 104.1 100.6 84.5 85.5 87.1 90.7 109.5 110.2
Tajikistan 89.9 96.1 97.5 96 91.8 86.7 90 93.7 116.3 112
Ukraine 105.7 104.5 102.5 94.8 68.2 69 71.7 78.1 110.8 112
picture but suggests a more profound and protracted impact straddling the 
first three quarters of the year. Economic growth rates accelerated in 
Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan in the third quarter of 2009 and in Kazakhstan 
and Tajikistan at the end of 2009; in the other CIS countries growth rates 
started to gather momentum only in 2010. Industrial production dynamics 
became positive in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in 2009 (due to rising world oil 
prices) and in the rest of the CIS in 2010. 
In GDP terms, the crisis dynamics witnessed in Russia was reflected in 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine and to a lesser extent Moldova. Russia’s industrial 
production trends during the crisis were mirrored in Armenia, Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine. These similarities can be explained both by external 
factors, i.e., for Kazakhstan the fall in energy prices and for Ukraine and 
Moldova a drop in demand from the EU and the countries’ close economic 
interdependence. 
The different groups of CIS countries were exposed to the crisis in different 
ways2:
1) the dual impact of the crisis on net exports and investments, particularly 
in Russia and Ukraine. Armenia also falls into this group, although a decline 
in its net exports was not as dramatic since imports also declined; 
2) the impact on net exports, where investment continued to have a positive 
effect on GDP even though these were lower for most of the period. This 
group includes Belarus; 
2 Classification based on quarterly data from the EurAsEC+ Economic Review (2009) and CIS 
Economic Review (2010) and EBRD annual statistics (www.ebrd.com).
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3) the impact on household consumption. This would not normally be seen 
as a manifestation of the effects of a crisis as it is consumption that is 
least susceptible to economic fluctuation. However, effects on 
consumption were observed in Kyrgyzstan (2009); 
4) the shifting impact on different components of GDP. For example, 
the negative impact on GDP in Kazakhstan was chiefly a result of 
the crisis influence on net exports in the first and third quarters 
of 2009, net exports and investments in the second quarter of 
2009, and household consumption in 2008 and the fourth quarter 
of 2009. In Moldova, the impact on net exports in 2008 shifted 
to consumption and investments in 2009. 
Exchange rate dynamics also merit closer attention in our analysis of foreign 
trade (see Table 3.3).
All CIS countries were subject to a substantial devaluation of their 
national currencies against leading world currencies via the foreign 
trade and capital flow channels. The scale of these devaluations 
varied across the CIS, depending on objective factors and 
government monetary policies. Traditionally, economic crises are 
accompanied by so-called “competitive devaluations”. However, the current 
crisis has proved that, although there may have been sizeable fluctuations 
in individual countries, on the whole, the devaluations of CIS currencies 
against the US dollar remained within comparable ranges. The countries 
whose national currencies appeared most resistant to the crisis were those 
of Azerbaijan (not surprisingly, in view of the country’s good macroeconomic 
health), Moldova and Georgia. The Ukrainian hryvnia and the Belarusian 
rouble fared the worst. Devaluation rates in the other CIS countries averaged 
18-21% between the first quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2010 
except in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where no uniform exchange rates 
exist. In other words, no significant competitive advantages were generated 
by these fluctuations during the crisis period. 
However, at certain stages short-term advantages did exist as exchange rate 
dynamics varied over the period concerned. The first country to experience 
the devaluation of its currency was Kazakhstan in the third quarter of 2007, 
as it was the first CIS country to feel the impact of the global crisis. Kyrgyzstan 
followed in the first quarter of 2008, since its economy is heavily dependent 
on Kazakhstan. The Russian rouble started to fall in the third quarter of 
2008 and most other CIS currencies in the fourth quarter of 2008. Currencies 
reached their lowest in the first quarter of 2009, but some countries 
(Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova) suffered a second wave 
of devaluations in the first half of 2010, which may be interpreted as 
competitive devaluation in the context of improving macroeconomic 
conditions.
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Table 3.3.
Appreciation/devaluation of CIS currencies 
against the US dollar (in % of the previous 
period)
Source: International Financial Statistics 
Database (http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/).
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Foreign trade dynamics in the CIS during the crisis
The global crisis hampered the expansion of CIS countries’ foreign trade, 
having caused a sudden, profound and simultaneous collapse of foreign trade 
worldwide (Baldwin, 2009). In most CIS countries the first signs of the crisis 
manifested themselves in foreign trade in the third quarter of 2008, and in the 
fourth quarter the values of exports to CIS and remote markets collapsed3. It 
should be noted, however, that export dynamics in the pre-crisis and crisis 
periods varied significantly from one CIS economy to another.
The impact of the crisis on foreign trade was first felt in Belarus, Georgia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. According to the IMF, total export volumes in 
these countries started to decline in July 2008. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
this decline was largely attributable to a reduction in the value of raw cotton 
exports to remote markets. Exports from Belarus and Georgia declined as a 
result of the decrease in demand in Europe.
In most CIS countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Turkmenistan and Ukraine) total export volumes started to decline in August 
2008. For the CIS fuel and energy exporters, i.e. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Turkmenistan, this contraction was caused by a fall in oil prices 
in July. A decline in industrial production in developed countries seriously 
impacted upon Ukraine’s exports, since this country’s staple commodity 
exports are metals and metallurgical products. Moldova, whose exports 
are dominated by agricultural produce, also started to feel the effects of 
the global crisis in August 2008, particularly on its extensive trade with 
Western Europe. However, the rate of its decline in exports was well below 
that of raw material and metal exports.
Kyrgyzstan, whose main exports are gold and rare-earth metals, was the last 
CIS country to suffer the macroeconomic impact of the crisis on its exports. In 
July 2008 its total exports fell by 2% compared to the previous month due to 
a reduction in exports to remote markets and, more significantly, falling cotton 
prices. This trend was at its most stark in December 2008, when investors 
put their trust in gold to see out the crisis and gold prices consequently 
increased. 
The export dynamics of the different CIS economies were not uniform. Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine witnessed an unbroken decline from 
August 2008 to early 2009 (for Russia and Kazakhstan this continued until 
February 2009 and for Turkmenistan and Ukraine until January 2009). In 
the rest of the CIS, export volumes decreased less steadily. In Belarus, 
Georgia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia total export volumes rallied in 
3 Hereinafter, based on data from the IMF Directions of Trade Statistics Database (http://www2.
imfstatistics.org/DOT/).
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September 2008 (and in December in Azerbaijan), and then the downward 
trend resumed. A similar rise and fall in exports was recorded in Tajikistan in 
October-November 2008 and in Moldova in December 2008. For Kyrgyzstan’s 
total exports, the picture was different again. In July-September 2008 the 
value of the country’s exports was increasing. In September total exports 
increased by 4.2 times compared to August; in October they returned to 
the August level, but then rose again into November. In December 2008 
exports began to decline. These oscillating patterns in some CIS countries 
reflected fluctuations in world prices for agricultural produce.
Exports to CIS and remote markets declined in most of the CIS countries 
almost simultaneously. In August 2008 a sustained downward trend in 
exports to CIS markets ended in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. 
The decline in exports was dramatic in Armenia, but in September and 
October export volumes rose almost to July levels before falling again from 
November. A similar picture was observed in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan: 
monthly intraregional export volumes dropped slightly in August, returned to 
the July level in September, and began to decline sharply again in October. 
Kyrgyzstan followed this rise and fall but with a delay of one month. In 
Georgia, this scenario started in July, but an abrupt downward trend 
developed fully only in November. In Kazakhstan and Moldova, a substantial 
decline in export to CIS markets began in October and November 2008, 
respectively, and in Tajikistan only in January 2009. 
For most CIS countries, the export crisis was at its worst in January 2009, 
except in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, where minimum monthly export 
volumes were recorded in February 2009, and in Azerbaijan in March 2009.
A recovery in CIS countries’ total exports began in 2009, and in most 
countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan and 
Ukraine) the recovery was not a smooth one. Declines in monthly export 
volumes in these countries were caused primarily by price fluctuations 
on world commodity markets, and the dynamics of their exports to CIS 
markets typically followed the pattern of exports to remote markets. The only 
exceptions were Tajikistan where the crisis had little, if any, effect on exports 
to Russia and other CIS countries, hence both these indicators remained 
stable from early 2009 to early 2010. Azerbaijan’s exports to CIS markets 
also showed uninterrupted growth in 2009. 
Russia and Kazakhstan saw a gradual increase in total export volumes 
in 2009. Russia also increased its exports to CIS markets, whereas 
Kazakhstan’s intraregional exports were in decline from October 2009 to 
January 2010.
The 2009 export dynamics for Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
need to be considered separately as it was subject to a particular set of 
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circumstances. After the disruption of Russian natural gas exports to 
Ukraine following the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict in January 2009, 
Turkmenistan boosted its gas supplies to Ukraine in February-March 2009 
to over 90% of its total gas exports to CIS markets. Meanwhile, Turkmen 
gas supplies to remote markets remained at the very low levels reached in 
December 2008. On April 8-9, 2009, an accident occurred on the Central 
Asia-Centre gas pipeline in Turkmenistan, and gas supplies to Russia 
(including transit volumes) were discontinued4. Although the pipeline was 
repaired, Russia received no more Turkmen gas until January 9, 2010 owing 
to a dispute between the two countries over new supply terms. As a result, 
Turkmenistan saw an unprecedented decline in its exports to CIS countries 
and total exports in 2009. Formally, this decline had nothing to do with the 
global crisis, yet there are grounds for attributing Russia’s reluctance to 
buy Turkmen gas to the global situation. The falling demand for gas from 
Gazprom’s major customers such as Ukraine resulting from industrial 
stagnation made Russian and Turkmen gas producers direct competitors. 
In parallel with this, in February-May 2009 Uzbekistan’s exports to CIS 
markets increased, compared to monthly export figures in 2008, but in June 
2009 Uzbek exports dropped to their lowest monthly total that year and 
started to rise again only in September 2009.
Export volumes to CIS countries and total export volumes in Kyrgyzstan 
increased from February 2009, and began falling again in September.
In most CIS countries (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia 
and Ukraine) a decline in imports from regional and remote markets first 
manifested itself in August 2008 (see Figures 3.4-3.15 of the Annex). Monthly 
imports in Azerbaijan began to fall in September 2008, in Turkmenistan and 
Kyrgyzstan the fall came in October 20085, in Uzbekistan in November and 
Tajikistan in December. 
Imports from regional and remote markets fell to their lowest in January 
2009 in all CIS countries except Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia and Kyrgyzstan. 
In Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia the low point came in February 2009 
(coinciding with the lowest oil prices) and in Kyrgyzstan in December 2008 
(minimum imports from CIS markets were recorded in January 2009)6.
4 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan blamed Gazprom for the accident. It was 
Turkmenistan’s view that the accident has been caused by a sharp decrease in Gazprom’s offtake 
of gas without sufficient notice to allow for changes to be made to the system’s operating regime. 
Gazpromeksport delivered a letter about the reduced consumption to Turkmenistan on April 7, 
and began to reduce the taking of gas one day later on April 8. Therefore, the Ministry argues, 
the letter does not constitute prior notice, since the Russian side should have given at least one 
week’s notice (Prime-TASS. April 10, 2009).
5 A sharp increase in Kyrgyzstan’s imports began in January 2009.
6 Monthly IMF data (IMF Directions of Trade Statistics, http://www2.imfstatistics.org/DOT/).
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The impact of the crisis on CIS countries’ total foreign and 
intraregional trade
In comparative terms, the crisis had its most severe impact on exports in 
energy producing countries such as Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, because 
of these countries’ specific export structures and due to price fluctuation 
during the crisis (in case of Turkmenistan there were also other influences, as 
discussed above). According to the IMF, annual export values in Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan decreased by 70.5% and 69.2% respectively in 2009 
compared to the previous year. The decrease was somewhat less dramatic 
in Kyrgyzstan (40.7%), Ukraine (40.6%) and Russia (38%). Moldova and 
Georgia felt the least impact on their exports (declines of 18.8% and 24.8% 
respectively). In the other CIS countries the decrease in exports averaged 
30-35% (30.1% Tajikistan, 30.7% in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 34% in 
Armenia and 34.7% Belarus)7.
For the purposes of examining exports to CIS and remote markets we 
can divide CIS countries into two groups. In most CIS countries, especially 
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Turkmenistan and Ukraine, exports 
to CIS markets dropped faster than exports to remote markets in 2009, 
compared to the previous year. In contrast, intraregional export was 
apparently more resistant to the crisis in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and acted as a buffer against external shocks. In 
Belarus, exports to CIS and remote markets declined at approximately equal 
rates.
The impact of decreasing exports to CIS markets on the country’s total 
exports8 was most severe in Turkmenistan (total exports decreased by 
47.1% in 2009 compared to 2008)9, Belarus (15.4%), Ukraine (14.9%), 
Uzbekistan (14.1%) and Armenia (13.3%). The impact of decreasing export 
to CIS markets was less severe in Azerbaijan (fall of 0.2% in 2009 compared 
to 2008), Tajikistan (1.1%), Kyrgyzstan (2.9%), Kazakhstan (7.3%), Moldova 
(7.8%), Russia (8.4%) and Georgia (8.6%). On the whole, decreasing 
intraregional exports resulted in a 9.3% decrease in total exports by CIS 
countries in 2009 compared to the previous year.
7 Annual IMF data (IMF Directions of Trade Statistics, http://www2.imfstatistics.org/DOT/.
8 In this case, we use the ratio (A) of the country’s absolute exports to CIS markets in 2009 
and 2008 (modulo) to its total exports in 2008: (A=(ExCIS2009–ExCIS2008)*100% /Ex2008, where 
ExCIS2009 – exports to CIS markets in 2009, ExCIS2008 – exports to CIS markets in 2008, Ex2008 
– total exports in 2008). This index A shows us how (in %) the decline of the country’s exports to 
CIS markets in 2009 compared to 2008 influenced its total exports (i.e. what percentage of the 
decline in total exports is attributable to a decline in intraregional exports).
9 Notably, the decline in Turkmenistan’s intraregional exports was attributable mainly to 
disruptions of gas supplies to Ukraine in January and April-December 2009 (in the latter case, 
following the pipeline accident).
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Figure 3.1. 
Contribution of the 
decline in exports 
to CIS and remote 
markets to the total 
decline in CIS exports 
(in 200 compared 
to 200) 
Source: based on 
data from the IMF 
Directions of Trade 
Statistics, http://
www2.imfstatistics.
org/DOT/).
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CIS countries can be divided into four groups depending on the role of 
the global or regional (secondary) channel through which the global crisis 
affected their commodity exports10:
1) countries affected principally by declining global demand and prices, 
whereas secondary (regional) effects were negligible (i.e. less than 10% 
of the decline in total exports was attributable to the decline in exports 
to CIS markets: Azerbaijan (0.3%), Tajikistan (3.7%) and Kyrgyzstan 
(7.1%);
2) countries in which the secondary (regional) effects of the crisis played a 
moderate role (20-39% of the decline in total exports was attributable 
to the decline in exports to CIS markets): Russia (22.1%), Kazakhstan 
(23.7%), Georgia (34.7%) and Ukraine (36.6%).
3) countries in which secondary (regional) effects of the crisis played a 
significant role (40-49% of the decline in total exports was attributable 
to the decline in exports to CIS markets): Armenia (40%), Moldova 
(41.8%), Belarus (44.5%) and Uzbekistan (46%); 
4) countries in which secondary (regional) effects of the crisis played a 
decisive role (more than 50% of the decline in total exports was 
attributable to decline in exports to CIS markets): Turkmenistan (66.8%). 
For five CIS countries secondary (regional) effects were the principal channel 
through which the crisis affected their export development, and for four 
countries these effects were significant.
10 Classification is based on the contribution (A’) of the decline in the country’s exports to CIS 
markets in 2009 compared to 2008 to the decline in total exports in 2009 compared to 2008 
(in %) (A’=(ExCIS2009–ExCIS2008)*100% / Ex2009–Ex2008, where ExCIS2009 – exports to CIS markets in 
2009, ExCIS2008 – exports to CIS markets in 2008, Ex2009 – total exports in 2009, Ex2008 – total 
exports in 2008).
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Generally, the decline in imports by CIS countries resulting from the crisis 
was on a scale comparable to that of the decline in exports. In comparative 
terms, the most dramatic declines in imports were observed in Ukraine (down 
by 46.9% in 2009 compared to 2008), Russia (39.8%), Moldova (33.1%), 
Georgia (31.3%), Belarus (27.5%) and Armenia (25.3%). In terms of value, 
imports dropped significantly in Kazakhstan (by 24.5%) and in Tajikistan (by 
22.8%). The least severe decline in imports was observed in Azerbaijan and 
Uzbekistan (14.8% and 7.8% respectively). Imports increased by 22.3% in 
Turkmenistan and nearly doubled in Kyrgyzstan. The average decline in import 
values reached 35.4% in CIS countries in 2009.
In 2009 most CIS countries’ imports from the region declined faster than 
imports from remote markets. The exceptions were Armenia, Tajikistan 
and Ukraine, where the situation was the reverse. Intraregional imports in 
Turkmenistan increased more slowly than imports from remote markets.
There was a slight increase in imports from remote markets in Uzbekistan, 
whereas intraregional imports fell.
The impact of declining intraregional imports11 on the country’s total 
imports was especially pronounced in Belarus (a 19.6% decline in total 
imports in 2009 compared to 2008), Ukraine (16.1%), Kazakhstan (13.5%), 
Kyrgyzstan (13.1%), Moldova (12.2%), Georgia (11.8%) and Tajikistan 
(11.1%). This impact was less marked in Turkmenistan (intraregional 
imports increased by 1.8%), Armenia (a decrease of 5.1%), Azerbaijan (a 
decrease of 6.3%), Russia (a decrease of 8.5%) and Uzbekistan (a decrease 
of 8.2%). 
CIS countries can be divided into five groups depending on the impact of 
declining intraregional imports on their total imports (i.e. resistance of 
intraregional imports to the effects of the crisis compared to imports from 
remote markets)12: 
1) exceptions, i.e. countries in which intraregional import dynamics did not 
result in any decrease in their total imports: Turkmenistan (imports 
from CIS and remote markets increased) and Kyrgyzstan (an increase 
11 In this case, we use the ratio (B) of the country’s absolute imports to CIS markets in 2009 
and 2008 (modulo) to its total imports in 2008: (A’=(IMCIS2009–IMCIS2008)*100% /IM2008, 
where IMCIS2009 – imports from CIS markets in 2009, IMCIS2008 – imports from CIS markets in 
2008, IM2008 – total imports in 2008). This index B shows us how (in %) the decline of the 
country’s imports from CIS markets in 2009 compared to 2008 influenced its total imports 
(i.e. what percentage of the decline in total imports is attributable to a decline in intraregional 
imports).
12 Classification is based on the contribution (B’) of the decline in the country’s imports from 
CIS markets in 2009 compared to 2008 to the decline of total imports in 2009 compared to 
2008 (in %) (B’=(IMCIS2009–IMCIS2008)*100% / IM2009–IM2008, where IMCIS2009 – imports from CIS 
markets in 2009, IMCIS2008 – imports from CIS markets in 2008, IM2009 – total imports in 2009, 
IM2008 – total imports in 2008).
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in imports from remote markets compensated for losses resulting from 
declining intraregional imports); 
2) countries in which 20-25% of the decline in total imports was 
attributable to the decline in intraregional imports: Armenia (20.2%) 
and Russia (20.5%);
3) countries in which 30-40% of the decline in total imports was 
attributable to the decline in intraregional imports: Ukraine (34.4%), 
Moldova (36.9%) and Georgia (37.6%); 
4) countries in which 40-50% of the decline in total imports was 
attributable to the decline in intraregional imports: Azerbaijan (43.5%) 
and Tajikistan (48%); and
5) countries in which more than 50% of the decline in total imports was 
attributable to the decline in intraregional imports: Belarus (71.4%), 
Kazakhstan (55.2%) and Uzbekistan (over 100%)13. 
Figure 3.2.
Contribution of the 
decline in imports 
from CIS and remote 
markets to the total 
decline in CIS imports 
(in 200 compared 
to 200)
Source: based on 
data from the IMF 
Directions of Trade 
Statistics, http://
www2.imfstatistics.
org/DOT/).
13 The fact that this index exceeded 100% is explained by a slight (1.2%) increase in Uzbekistan’s 
imports from remote markets in 2009 compared to 2008; as a result, the decline in 
intraregional imports was faster than the decline in total imports. Clearly, the decline in 
Uzbekistan’s total imports was attributable solely to declining intraregional imports.
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In eight CIS countries the decline in intraregional imports accounted for 
more than one third of the total decline in imports.
To summarise the impact of the crisis on foreign trade (commodity export 
revenues) through different channels, we can also identify four country 
groups14: 
1) countries in which secondary (regional) effects were negligible 
(i.e. the decline in commodity revenues from CIS markets accounted 
for not more than 2% of the total decrease in revenue: Azerbaijan 
(1.6%);
2) countries in which secondary (regional) effects of the crisis had a 
moderate impact (15-25% of the total decrease in revenue was 
attributable to the decline in commodity revenue from CIS markets: 
Kyrgyzstan (17.1%), Russia (21.5%) and Armenia (24.8%); 
3) countries in which the secondary (regional) effects of the crisis had 
a significant impact (30-40% of the total decrease in revenue was 
attributable to the decline in commodity revenue from CIS markets): 
Moldova (37.6%), Georgia (37.2%), Kazakhstan (36.2%), Ukraine 
(35.3%) and Tajikistan (32%); and
Figure 3.3.
Contribution of 
the decline in 
intraregional turnover 
to the total decline in 
CIS turnover 
(in 200 compared 
to 200)
Source: based on 
data from the IMF 
Directions of Trade 
Statistics, http://
www2.imfstatistics.
org/DOT/.
14 Classification is based on the contribution (C) of the decline in the country’s commodity turnover 
with CIS markets in 2009 compared to 2008 to the decline in total commodity turnover in 2009 
compared to 2008 (in %) (T=(TCIS2009–TCIS2008)*100% / T2009–T2008, where TCIS2009 – commodity 
turnover with CIS markets in 2009, TCIS2008 – commodity turnover with CIS markets in 2008, 
T2009 – commodity turnover in 2009, T2008 – commodity turnover in 2008).
Global Crisis and Post-Soviet 
Regional Integration
Mikhail Golovnin, Darya Ushkalova “Foreign Trade in CIS 
Countries During the Economic Crisis”
Remote markets Intraregional
0
0
0
20
0
-20
-0
-0
-0
A
ze
rb
ai
ja
n
A
rm
en
ia
B
el
ar
us
G
eo
rg
ia
K
az
ak
hs
ta
n
K
yr
gy
zs
ta
n
M
ol
do
va
R
us
si
a
Ta
jik
is
ta
n
Tu
rk
m
en
is
ta
n
U
zb
ek
is
ta
n
U
kr
ai
ne
%
C
IS
 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2011
4) countries in which secondary (regional) effects of the crisis had a 
decisive impact (more than 50% of the total decrease in revenue was 
attributable to the decline in commodity revenue from CIS markets: 
Turkmenistan (78.7%), Uzbekistan (61.6%), Belarus (57.7%).
To better assess the impact of declining intraregional trade on the region’s 
economies we should also consider the ratio of absolute decline in exports 
to CIS countries in 2009 (compared to 2008) to nominal 2009 GDP 
(in US dollars at the current exchange rate), and similar ratios calculated 
for intraregional imports and commodity revenues. If we apply the first ratio, 
CIS countries can be divided into four groups15 (see Table 3.4): 
1) countries in which their decline in exports to CIS markets was excessive 
relative to the size of their economy: Belarus and Ukraine (notably, both 
are among the largest CIS economies);
2) countries in which their decline in exports to CIS markets was significant 
relative to the size of their economy: Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and 
Moldova;
3) countries in which their decline in exports to CIS markets was moderate 
relative to the size of their economy: Armenia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan; 
and
15 Classification is based on the ratio (D1) of absolute decline in the country’s exports to CIS 
markets in 2009 (compared to 2008) to nominal GDP (in US dollars at the current exchange 
rate) in 2009 (in %) (D1=(ExCIS2009–ExCIS2008)*100% / GDP2009, where ExCIS2009 – exports to CIS 
markets in 2009, ExCIS2008 –exports to CIS markets in 2008, GDP2009 – nominal GDP (in US 
dollars at the current exchange rate) in 2009). Turkmenistan is excluded from this classification 
due to the absence of reliable GDP data.
Table 3.4.
Ratio of absolute decline in intraregional export in 200 
(compared to 200) to nominal 200 GDP
Source: based on data from the IMF Directions of Trade 
Statistics, http://www2.imfstatistics.org/DOT/); World 
Economic Outlook, October 2010).
Country Ratio (%)
Belarus 10.3
Ukraine 8.5
Kazakhstan 3.5
Russia 3.1
Uzbekistan 3
Moldova 2.3
Armenia 1.6
Georgia 1.2
Kyrgyzstan 1
Tajikistan 0.3
Azerbaijan 0.2
Global Crisis and Post-Soviet 
Regional Integration
Eurasian Development Bank
4) countries in which their decline in exports to CIS markets was negligible 
relative to the size of their economy: Azerbaijan and Tajikistan.
Using a similar ratio calculated for the absolute decline in intraregional 
imports, CIS countries can be grouped as follows16 (see Table 3.5):
1) countries in which their decline in imports from CIS markets was 
excessive relative to the size of their economy: Belarus, Ukraine, 
Kyrgyzstan and Moldova;
2) countries in which their decline in imports from CIS markets was 
significant relative to the size of their economy: Tajikistan, Georgia and 
Kazakhstan; and
3) countries in which their decline in imports from CIS markets was negligible 
relative to the size of their economy: Armenia, Uzbekistan, Russia and 
Azerbaijan.
16 Classification is based on the ratio (D2) of absolute decline in the country’s imports from CIS 
markets in 2009 (compared to 2008) to nominal GDP (in US dollars at the current exchange 
rate) in 2009 (in %) (D2=(IMCIS2009–IMCIS2008)*100% / GDP2009, where IMCIS2009 – imports from CIS 
markets in 2009, IMCIS2008 – imports from CIS markets in 2008, GDP2009 – nominal GDP (in US 
dollars at the current exchange rate) in 2009). Turkmenistan is excluded from this classification 
due to the absence of reliable GDP data.
17 Classification is based on the ratio (D3) of absolute decline in the country’s commodity turnover 
with CIS markets in 2009 (compared to 2008) to nominal GDP (in US dollars at the current 
exchange rate) in 2009 (in %) (D3=(TCIS2009–TCIS2008)*100%/GDP2009, where TCIS2009 – commodity 
turnover with CIS markets in 2009, TCIS2008 – commodity turnover with CIS markets in 2008, 
GDP2009 – nominal GDP (in US dollars at the current exchange rate) in 2009). Turkmenistan is 
excluded from this classification due to the absence of reliable GDP data.
Table 3.5.
Ratio of absolute decline in intraregional 
imports in 200 (compared to 200) to 
nominal 200 GDP
Source: based on data from the IMF 
Directions of Trade Statistics, http://www2.
imfstatistics.org/DOT/); World Economic 
Outlook, October 2010).
Country Ratio (%)
Belarus 15.8
Ukraine 11.7
Kyrgyzstan 11.7
Moldova 11
Tajikistan 7.2
Georgia 6.9
Kazakhstan 5.4
Armenia 2.7
Uzbekistan 2.4
Russia 1.8
Azerbaijan 1.1
Using a similar ratio calculated for the absolute decline in intraregional 
commodity revenue, CIS countries can be grouped as follows17 (see Table 
3.6):
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1) countries in which the decline in intraregional commodity revenue was 
excessive relative to the size of their economy: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova 
and Kyrgyzstan;
2) countries in which the decline in intraregional commodity revenue was 
significant relative to the size of their economy: Kazakhstan, Georgia, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and Armenia; and
3) countries in which the decline in intraregional commodity revenue was 
negligible relative to the size of their economy: Azerbaijan.
Table 3.6.
Ratio of absolute decline in intraregional 
commodity revenue in 200 (compared to 200) 
to nominal 200 GDP
Source: based on data from the IMF Directions of 
Trade Statistics, http://www2.imfstatistics.org/
DOT/); World Economic Outlook, October 2010).
Country Ratio (%)
Belarus 26
Ukraine 20.2
Moldova 13.3
Kyrgyzstan 12.7
Kazakhstan 8.9
Georgia 8.1
Tajikistan 7.5
Uzbekistan 5.4
Russia 4.9
Armenia 4.3
Azerbaijan 1.3
The results obtained allow us to draw general conclusions about the 
importance of regional trade channels for different CIS economies. Declining 
intraregional trade had the severest impact on Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and a lesser impact on Georgia, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Russia. At the same time, the secondary 
(regional) effects of the crisis on foreign trade were very significant in 
practically all CIS economies, which indicates their strong interdependence. 
The only country which largely escaped the impact of the crisis on foreign 
trade through its own regional trade was Azerbaijan.
The impact of the global economic crisis on CIS export and 
import geography
The global economic crisis dramatically altered the geography of export 
and import operations by CIS countries, particularly the contribution 
of each individual country to the region’s export and import structure. 
Essentially, whether or not the 2008 crisis will lead to a protracted decline 
in the contribution of intraregional trade to total CIS exports and imports 
(as happened during the Russian crisis in 1998), has been the key question 
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for researchers interested in foreign trade and integration processes in the 
post-Soviet states. 
According to the IMF, intraregional trade as a proportion of total commodity 
revenue did contract during the crisis period in most CIS countries. 
Intraregional exports increased [as a proportion of total commodity revenues?] 
in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan18, whereas it decreased 
in the rest of the CIS (except Georgia) and on average in the region. Exports 
to CIS markets as a proportion of Georgia’s total exports remained practically 
unchanged. 
The share of intraregional import increased in Armenia, Tajikistan and Ukraine, 
and decreased in the rest of the CIS and on average in the region (see Table 
3.7).
18 The increase in the proportion of CIS exports in the export structure of Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had different causes. In Azerbaijan this increase can 
be explained principally by “the low 2008 benchmark effect”: against the background of 
extraordinarily high energy prices in the first half of 2008 and the small share of energy in 
the country’s intraregional exports, the share of CIS markets in Azerbaijan’s total exports 
appeared to have dramatically reduced. In Kyrgyzstan, the increase in the CIS exports’ share 
of the export structure was attributable to a decline in this index in 2008 resulting from 
rising gold prices; increasing exports of gold to remote markets in the third and fourth 
quarters of 2008; and the somewhat better dynamics of exports to CIS markets as compared 
to exports to remote markets in 2009. In Tajikistan, the increase in the CIS exports’ share of 
total exports can be explained primarily by more sustained exports to CIS markets in early 
2009 (compared to remote markets). In Uzbekistan, an upward trend CIS exports’ share of 
total exports started at the end of 2007.
Table 3.7.
Intraregional exports 
and imports as a 
proportion of total 
exports in CIS 
countries in 200-
2010 (%)
Sources: * calculated 
based on IMF data; 
** data from the CIS 
Interstate Statistics 
Committee.
Intraregional exports as a proportion of total 
exports in CIS countries
Intraregional imports as a proportion of total 
imports in CIS countries
2008* 2009*
1st half of 
2009**
1st half of 
2010**
2008* 2009*
1st half of 
2009**
1st half of 
2010**
Azerbaijan 3.4 10.4 6.1 9.8 32.7 30.8 30 31.9
Armenia 30.9 26.8 19.6 17 29.6 32.8 32.4 30.9
Belarus 44.1 43.9 43.7 53.2 65.9 63.8 63.6 61.1
Georgia 36.2 36.7 – – 31.7 29.1 – –
Kazakhstan 19.4 17.4 18 13.7 42.5 38.4 42.8 48.4
Kyrgyzstan 47.8 75.8 38.3 28 53.7 20.4 55.6 56
Moldova 39.4 38.9 35.7 38.3 35.5 34.9 37.4 32.1
Russia 13.8 8.8 15.6 14.1 13.7 9.2 12.8 15.2
Tajikistan 15.6 20.8 22 13.1 56.5 58.8 55.2 55.7
Turkmenistan 57.1 34 – – 30.1 26.0 – –
Uzbekistan 56.7 61.4 – – 43.1 37.5 – –
Ukraine 35.6 34.9 33.7 35 39.3 43.6 43.6 43.9
CIS average 18.4 15.2 18.9 17.4 27.4 25.4 27.8 28.2
Global Crisis and Post-Soviet 
Regional Integration
Mikhail Golovnin, Darya Ushkalova “Foreign Trade in CIS 
Countries During the Economic Crisis”
2 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2011
However, it is premature to talk about long-term changes to CIS export 
and import geography. In 2010, most CIS countries witnessed a recovery 
of trade with both CIS and remote markets. This gradual revival of CIS 
countries’ foreign trade will inevitably change ratios of intraregional exports 
and imports, which in turn will depend not only on the level of economic 
activity in the post-Soviet space but also on the pace of recovery of world 
commodity markets, price dynamics, etc. 
The data in our study provide the basis for interpreting trends in future 
economic cooperation between post-Soviet states. 
Our analysis of the impact of the global crisis on CIS countries’ foreign 
trade debunks the theory that economic interdependence between the 
region’s countries is fading away, as are preconditions for regional economic 
integration. It was through the intraregional trade channel that the crisis 
had its greatest impact on the region: it played a decisive, significant or 
moderate role in 10 of the 12 CIS countries (i.e. more than 19% of the 
decline in total exports was attributable to the decline in intraregional 
exports). With regard to the dynamics of commodity revenues, the impact 
via intraregional (secondary) trade was significant or decisive in 11 CIS 
countries (more than 20% of the decline in total revenues was attributable 
to the decline in intraregional trade revenues).
Whereas conclusions regarding the degree and nature of the impact of the 
global crisis on economic cooperation between CIS countries are clear and 
indisputable, many trends identified indicate that economic interdependence 
between them might still prove controversial. 
Expectedly, countries most extensively involved in trade within the CIS have 
experienced the greatest impact of the intraregional dimension of the global 
crisis; this is true of both raw materials suppliers andmanufacturers of 
high-value-added finished products. Long-standing cooperation in production 
and a relatively large proportion of mutual trade accounted for processed 
products was a decisive negative factor in the dramatic collapse of industrial 
production in the region’s largest economies. Belarus and Ukraine, the 
region’s most integrated economies, were the worst affected by the fall of 
intraregional exports. 
For some analysts, this situation illustrates the excessive vulnerability of 
mutual commodity trade to the crisis. It has prompted some experts to 
recommend phasing out this kind of interdependence and to question the 
benefits of further economic integration. For others, the crisis has proved 
that the region’s largest economies are still heavily interrelated and 
therefore have laid the foundations for successful regional integration and 
the maximisation of the economic benefits of integration. In this context, the 
accelerated introduction of the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus 
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and Kazakhstan at the peak of the crisis appears fully justified, although its 
composition may seem less than ideal from the economic point of view. 
The latest phase of economic cooperation between CIS countries is 
transitional in nature, and the future of their mutual trade and economic 
relations will depend largely on how they react to current challenges. The 
lessons learned from the Russian crisis of 1998 allow us to assume that, 
should the interested parties fail to make necessary efforts to reverse the 
downward trajectory of mutual trade, this may result in the permanent loss 
of existing economic ties. The loss of markets in the post-Soviet space will be 
highly disadvantageous for most of the region’s countries, especially during 
the recovery phase, as their industrial products remain highly competitive 
in these markets. The post-Soviet space remains the principal outlet for CIS 
high-value-added industries such as mechanical engineering. According to 
the CIS Interstate Statistics Committee, for example, in 2008, the Machines 
and Equipment category accounted for 10.2% of all Russian exports to CIS 
markets and for 1.6% of exports to remote markets. This situation is also 
typical of the entire CIS: in 2008 exports of goods in this category to CIS and 
remote markets accounted for 17.9% and 1.9% respectively in Belarus; for 
2.3% and 0% in Azerbaijan; for 8% and 4.4% in Armenia; for 3.1% and 0.2% 
in Kazakhstan; for 6.6% and 0.6% in Kyrgyzstan; and for 18.1% and 5.3% in 
Ukraine. It is therefore obvious that phasing out mutual cooperation will have 
grave effect on the economic development and structure of CIS countries and 
make overcoming the crisis even more difficult. 
The parties involved must take steps to revive mutual trade links which 
have deteriorated significantly during the crisis. First of all, they must 
minimise the effects of the fall in demand for industrial products from CIS 
buyers. This can be achieved by expanding preferential lending, particularly 
targeted loans from the Eurasian Development Bank. Furthering regional 
economic integration would also have a positive effect on the development 
of CIS economies in the recovery phase. To this end, Interstate 
agreements on the joint development of certain economic sectors would 
also be effective. 
Our analysis shows that in the wake of the crisis the preconditions for 
expanding mutual trade are still in existence. Importantly, the relatively strong 
rate of recovery of the Russian economy and, accordingly, capacity of the 
Russian market provides CIS countries with unique opportunities to increase 
their share of exports to this market, provided that the necessary economic 
policies are in place. 
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Migrants’ Remittances*
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The role of international migration in post-Soviet economies
External labour migration has become an important part of foreign trade. 
It exerts significant influences on recipient and donor economies, primarily 
through the migrants’ remittances channel. 
Intensive migration began in post-Soviet countries soon after independence. 
The 1990s saw a Russian exodus from the former Union republics, which in 
many cases was caused by social tension or interethnic conflict rather than 
economic hardship alone. Identifiable trends in true labour migration from CIS 
countries to Russia emerged in the 2000s. 
The main reason for this migration was the considerable disparity in per 
capita income between individual CIS countries. The visa-free regime 
between CIS countries, relatively simple border-crossing procedures, ease 
of finding work, mutual recognition of diplomas and common mentality 
and language all facilitated this process. The two main recipient countries 
were Russia and Kazakhstan, which had the highest per capita income in 
the CIS (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1.
Per capita GDP  
in CIS countries  
in 2000–200 
(in $ at the current 
exchange rate)
Source: IMF, 2010
* This paper is a part of the Regional Integration Studies Programme of the EDB Technical 
Assistance Fund in Regional Effects of the Global Economic Crisis in the CIS.  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Armenia 593 659 740 874 1113 1523 1982 2853
Azerbaijan 648 693 749 864 1019 1538 2415 3759
Belarus 1043 1242 1474 1810 2318 3098 3805 4672
Georgia 686 728 777 919 1188 1484 1765 2326
Kazakhstan 1229 1490 1655 2063 2863 3786 5261 6638
Kyrgyzstan 278 308 322 381 435 479 546 725
Moldova 354 407 458 547 720 830 949 1229
Russia 1794 2096 2377 2968 4100 5322 6932 9140
Tajikistan 160 167 188 237 309 337 402 520
Turkmenistan 1082 1469 1815 2347 2871 3419 4192 5006
Ukraine 642 788 886 1057 1378 1844 2319 3090
Uzbekistan 551 461 378 393 460 542 636 821
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In 2000, according to the CIS Interstate Statistics Committee, the 
difference in wage levels between Kazakhstan, which paid the highest 
wages, and Tajikistan, which had the lowest, was 12-fold. Later, Russia moved 
into the lead with regard to nominal wages, but there was still an eleven-fold 
gap between the countries at the top and bottom of the scale. Throughout 
the pre-crisis period, closest to wages in Russia were wage levels in 
Kazakhstan, also the destination for large numbers of migrants. Next closest 
to Russia was Belarus, which is not a significant contributor to or recipient 
of international migration. The gap between the country’s own wages and 
those of leading countries clearly correlated with the number of citizens-
turned-migrant workers in other CIS countries. The largest wage gap in 
2008 was between Tajikistan and Russia (Russia’s wages were 11 times 
higher than Tajikistan’s); this gap was also considerable in Kyrgyzstan 
(5 times), Moldova (3 times) and Armenia (2.5 times). These disparities 
persisted throughout the 2000-2008 period despite the overall growth in 
wages. 
Russia naturally attracts migrants from other post-Soviet countries due to 
its substantial economy and relatively high per-capita income. According to a 
World Bank report published in November 2010, Russia is the second largest 
migrant recipient after the US (WB, 2010), and is the destination point of 
two of the world’s five busiest migration corridors: Ukraine-Russia (which is 
second only to Mexico-the US) and Kazakhstan-Russia. 
Any analysis of international migration is complicated by the difficulty of 
establishing the actual number of migrants and defining the different types of 
migration. It has been estimated that Russia presently has 12.3 million officially 
recorded immigrants (WB, 2010) plus 5 to 8 million illegal immigrants. The 
latter category includes migrants who remain in Russia after their permitted 
stay has elapsed. 
The influx of labour migrants into Russia continued throughout the pre-crisis 
period. The number of foreigners in the Russian economy increased 11.4 
times in 2000-2008. In comparison, the number of Russians who moved 
abroad to work in that period increased 1.6 times (Elefterova, 2010).
According to the CIS Interstate Statistics Committee1, 29% of all immigrants 
in Russia in 2009 were from Uzbekistan, 16% from Tajikistan, 9% from 
Ukraine, 7% from Kyrgyzstan and 7% from Moldova. In total, about 75% of 
registered migrants were from CIS countries. The situation was different in 
Kazakhstan: only 9% of immigrants were from CIS countries and the rest were 
from Southeast Asia, mainly Vietnam. Workers from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan dominate the foreign workforce in the Kazakh economy. In 
1 www.cisstat.org
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the pre-crisis period there were 800,000 migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan, 
1.5 million from Tajikistan and 2.5 million from Uzbekistan; they constitute 
15%, 20% and 9% of their home countries’ population respectively.
Generally, migration flows between CIS countries are reversible, i.e., the 
migrant’s family remains in his home country and he sends them most of 
the money he earns. In some cases, however, families also move and form 
resident ethnic communities, and such migrants cannot be classified as 
labour migrants. Typically, migrant workers are men (80-90% of the total) 
who spend between six months and several years in Russia.
Labour migration helped to ease the tension resulting from severe 
unemployment in CIS countries. It compensated for the natural decrease in 
population in Russia and Kazakhstan and filled particular social and economic 
deficits created by that population decrease. For the first time in the post-
Soviet period Russia’s population grew by 25,000, and 330,000 people were 
granted citizenship in 2009 (Noskova, 2009). Immigration thus compensated 
for the population decrease due to mortality, even though the numbers were 
not huge. Maintaining a positive balance of migration is now critical for Russia 
in order to prevent population decline.
According to the Federal Migration Service, in the first half of the 2000s, 20% 
– 35% of migrants were employed in sales, catering, agriculture or forestry. 
Around 15-20% of migrants worked in construction and a further 15-20% 
in transport (Tyuryukanova, 2005). Other sectors employed much smaller 
numbers of migrants. Some economic roles are now permanently filled by 
migrant labour, i.e., migrant workers have entirely or almost completely 
replaced the local workforce because of their competitive advantage (their 
willingness to accept informal work agreements, the low cost of labour, 
fewer problems with alcohol, etc.). Migrant-dominated sectors included 
construction and building repair, utilities, sales and road maintenance. This 
apparent “reservation” of certain occupations for migrants from particular 
CIS countries was initially typical only of Moscow, but the trend later spread to 
other large cities, and other areas.
Most migrants were employed in the shadow economy, which was 
significant in the early 1990s. Non-regulated migrant flows created the right 
conditions for various “shadow industries” to emerge. The prominent role of 
the shadow economy (in employment structures in general and particularly 
with regard to crossing borders, employment procedures, labour conditions 
and residence in Russia) makes migration within the post-Soviet space 
different from other regions due to relative weakness of labour 
migration authorities, poor information sharing, strong informal 
structures (ethnic communities and networks) and very low job security 
for workers. Generally, employers are interested in preserving this 
situation, since it confers significant competitive advantages such as 
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low labour costs and opportunities to evade social taxes given a migrant 
workforce, which has little awareness of its rights.
Russia’s migration policy is based on the universal principles of overall and 
national quotas, the pre-emptive right of Russian citizens to employment and 
the “employer’s initiative” (Tyuryukanova, 2005). A migrant becomes a legal 
worker in Russia when an employer has filed a request with the migration 
authorities, and a vacant position is available. Quotas create the paradoxical 
situation whereby large numbers of migrants stay in the country illegally even 
though there are plenty of officially announced positions available. 
In order to ensure that migration flows are of highly qualified rather than 
unqualified workers, i.e., to improve the professional and social structure of 
the migrant workforce, the Sootechestvennik (“fellow citizen”) programme 
was launched. Its objective is to repatriate ethnic Russians who have lived 
in post-Soviet states since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, or who 
have emigrated to other parts of the world. In this case, entire families will 
move rather than just the workers, and therefore considerable investment 
is required in order to provide the necessary infrastructure for returning 
families. An alternative to labour migration from CIS countries would be the 
depopulation of Russia’s “company towns”, but this solution also gives rise to 
similar problems and need for investment. In any event, the potential number 
of such migrants is too small, and the impetus for them to move too weak 
(and continues to weaken) compared with the willingness of labour migrants 
to move in from other CIS countries, so these alternatives cannot be expected 
to change the structure of migration flows decisively. 
Changes in the distribution of demand for labour have been incorporated 
into official quotas on certain professions. In 2010, quotas were 
abolished for certain categories of migrants, primarily for highly qualified 
specialists (“elite migrants”). The criteria for this category are quite vague 
(generally, the employer must state that the migrant will be paid at least 
2 million roubles a year); it includes top managers, country directors of 
transnational companies, etc. Quotas were also abolished for engineers, 
teachers and researchers, but such migrants are very few and typically 
reside outside Russia. 
Migrant quotas were cut by 50% from 3.9 million to 1.95 million in 2009. 
The decline in demand for labour was a direct result of the crisis and resulting 
fear of unemployment. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, February 1, 2010). The new 
quotas were not filled, however, only 82% of the permitted number of 
migrants was actually allowed into Russia in 2009, and 1.4 million work 
permits were issued. The number of officially registered migrants fell three 
times during the crisis from 13.5 million in 2008 to 4.5 million in 2009 (Novyie 
izvestiya, October 14, 2009). The quotas were reduced unevenly across 
the regions. The largest cut in quotas (from 600,000 to 200,000 in 
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2010-2011) was registered in Moscow (employers, advertised 1.4 million 
vacant positions in 2010) (Interfax, June 3, 2010), but this was principally 
a political move. The formal explanation was that these vacancies had to be 
reserved for Muscovites who might lose their jobs during the crisis. In fact, 
however, the employment specialities of residents and migrants hardly 
overlap, especially in Moscow. In 2010, the overall Russian quota was 
reduced by another 40% to 1.398 million2. In 2011, this quota will remain 
almost unchanged (1.235 million), but will be increased by several hundred 
thousand if Russia’s demand for foreign workers turns out to be higher than 
expected. 
However, this data does not accurately reflect the situation. The crisis 
triggered a massive outflow of migrants from the official sector to the 
shadow economy. According to different sources, 2 to 3 million migrants 
lost their jobs between 2008 and the first half of 2010. A decline in demand 
for labour in Russia and Kazakhstan made things difficult for migrants from 
CIS countries, but the situation in their home countries was even worse. 
Despite formal measures to ease unemployment (for example, Tajikistan’s 
government decreed that 180,000 new jobs would be created, which in 
practice meant several people sharing one job and clandestine redundancies) 
(Rossiyskaya gazeta, February 1, 2010), there was no reason for labour 
migrants to return home. On average, only 20% of migrants returned to 
Central Asian countries. Thus, illegal immigrants in Russia and Kazakhstan 
accounted for 65-80% of the total number of migrants during the crisis. In 
order to allow these people to work legally, a licensing system was proposed; 
migrants employed in the private sector (household assistance, construction, 
repairs, etc.) are required to buy a licence, which legalises their stay in the 
country. However, the cost of a licence (1,000 roubles per month) is too high 
for most migrants and a disincentive for them to legalise their stay. 
As a result, although the crisis had a negative impact on migration, it did not 
change migration trends significantly.
The dynamics of remittances in post-Soviet countries during 
the crisis
In 2006, before the crisis took hold, Russia was the fifth largest source of 
migrant workers’ remittances ($11.4 billion annually) (Mohapatra, Ratha, 
2010) after the US, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Germany. Despite a 
dramatic decline in remittances in 2009, Russia moved to fourth position 
($18.6 billion). Russia receives $5.6 billion annually in migrants’ remittances 
from other countries. 
2 Data from the website of the Russian Ministry of Health and Social Development (www.
minzdravsoc.ru).
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According to the World Bank, global remittances totalled $316 billion in 
2009, which represents a 6% decrease compared to the previous year 
($307 billion of the total was sent to developing countries). The World 
Bank forecasts that migrant labour remittances will total $335 billion in late 
2010 (remittances made up a total of $325 billion by November 2010), which 
is nearly the same as in 2008 (Ratha, Sirkeci, 2010). A 7.1% increase in global 
remittances is forecast in 2011. It should be remembered, however, that this 
growth is from a low starting point. Even if these growth rates are sustained, 
they should not be expected to reach pre-crisis levels any time soon.
Globally, the dynamics of remittances during the crisis resembled that of 
other financial flows, but were somewhat more stable. According to World 
Bank experts, this is due to the huge number of migrant workers and the 
fact that migrants send their families only a small part of their income and 
continue to do so even when their earnings fall (Mohapatra, Ratha, 2010). 
It is thought that during a crisis or natural disaster, migrants strive to send 
their families as much as they can. However, the latter statement does not 
accurately describe the situation in the CIS region. The extremely low living 
standards of migrant workers in Russia and Kazakhstan allowed them to 
subsist on negligible sums and send nearly all their earnings to their home 
countries. 
The dynamics of remittances largely correlated with fluctuations in 
the Russian economy, and permeable borders enabled the effects of the 
crisis to spread swiftly through the migrants’ remittances channel. But the 
converse is also true: economic recovery in Russia resulted in an increase 
in remittances, although this growth lagged behind the growth in industrial 
production. 
Remittances from Russia to other post-Soviet countries are also unique in 
their sensitivity to fluctuations in world energy prices. It may seem obvious 
in view of the large proportion of oil and gas in Russia’s export structure, but 
this correlation is much weaker in the Gulf states where migrants play an 
even greater role in the economy. One possible explanation is fluctuations in 
the exchange rate in the pre-crisis period (Golovnin, Ushkalova, 2011). The 
collapse of world energy prices coincided with a significant devaluation of CIS 
countries’ currencies. The impact of the rouble exchange rate on remittances 
manifested itself in a decline in dollar-denominated remittances which was 
more dramatic than had been anticipated.
Remittances quickly react to the worsening crisis in labour-recipient 
economies, and any decline in remittances in turn impacts strongly on 
labour-donating economies. Donor economies are highly exposed to external 
shocks, and remittances from abroad function as a stabilising buffer against 
these. The economic contribution of these remittances was remarkable 
before the crisis. In 2007, for example, remittances accounted for 48% of 
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GDP in Tajikistan, 29% in Moldova and 27% in Kyrgyzstan3. These three 
countries were included in the World Bank’s list of most remittance-
dependent countries, based on a threshold of 25% of GDP. Armenia and 
Uzbekistan are also highly dependent on remittances. Although Uzbekistan 
does not supply any official statistics in this area, there are grounds for 
estimating its dependence at 13% of GDP (International Crisis Group, 2010). 
These statistics go hand in hand with the fact that the Russian and Kazakh 
economies are highly dependent on migrant workers from CIS countries who 
dominate certain sectors such as construction. 
Migrants’ remittances have the potential to stimulate individual sectors of 
national economies and boost investment and production. On the other hand, 
this money can also trigger inflation. The mutual interdependence between 
labour donating and recipient economies manifests itself in the instant spread 
of negative and positive movement; even before the crisis, the increase in 
remittances to Central Asian countries helped to fuel inflation as people’s 
increasing buying power led to higher prices. Domestically produced goods 
were replaced by cheaper Russian and Chinese products, shown by the 
dramatic increase in import figures in the pre-crisis period.
Before the crisis, the annual growth in remittances in the post-Soviet space 
averaged 25-35% (Kommersant-Dengi, April 13, 2009). Owing to a lack 
of data, however, no definitive quantitative assessment can be made. The 
Current Transfers item of the CIS countries’ balance of payments can be said 
to present reasonably accurate picture of remittance dynamics.
At the peak of the first wave of the crisis in late 2008, remittances stopped 
increasing and in some countries, e.g. Tajikistan, incoming remittances 
started to decline (Vinokurov, 2009). In 2009, remittances fell throughout 
the CIS by about 25%, according to the World Bank, and were at their 
lowest in the second quarter of that year. 
Interestingly, the decline in production in the formal sector of the Russian 
economy was stemmed in the autumn of 2009, but the disproportionate 
decline in remittances from this country continued. In the first three quarters 
of 2010 remittances increased, particularly those of migrant workers, but 
they still fall short of absolute pre-crisis figures. The crisis strained many 
existing links between post-Soviet countries, as is illustrated by the fact 
that payments from Russia to CIS countries recover at a slower rate (a lag of 
5-10 percentage points) than payments to remote countries.
At the end of 2010 total remittances began to approach pre-crisis levels, but 
these pre-crisis figures are yet to be achieved (see Table 4.2).
3 According to the balance of payments figures presented by respective national statistics 
committees and the CIS Interstate Statistics Committee.
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Table 4.2.
Rate of growth 
(decline) in 
remittances (as % of 
the same period of 
the previous year)
Source: balance 
of payments of 
Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Armenia, Moldova 
and Tajikistan (based 
on respective central 
bank data)
 
2008 2009 2010
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
Paid
Russia 150 135 121 89 82 68 77 94 111 128 118
Migrant workers’ remittances 135 129 105 74 70 70 83 103 113 110 111
Russia, paid to CIS countries 142 135 113 81 78 71 78 95 97 108 112
Migrant workers’ remittances to CIS 
countries
138 133 106 74 69 70 80 98 104 103 108
Kazakhstan 86 53 63 77 73 104 78 85 79 81 153
Migrant workers’ remittances 82 52 62 76 74 102 79 88 80 83 134
Received  
Armenia 126 123 134 105 77 67 67 79 119 78 -
Moldova 152 157 143 104 69 76 68 91 105 99 153
Migrant workers’ remittances 135 136 132 100 58 57 57 72 104 109 134
Moldova, received from Russia 291 201 173 105 89 89 74 101 115 107 143
Migrant workers’ remittances from 
Russia
181 170 192 118 119 71 68 86 113 139 134
Tajikistan 164 184 162 113 75 62 64 79 115 – –
Ukraine 107 114 107 79 89 75 74 97 99 114 193
Migrant workers’ remittances 109 106 94 73 82 70 70 88 80 101 196
The dynamics of labour migrants’ remittances in individual 
CIS countries
The Kazakh economy became an early victim of the crisis because it is 
highly integrated into the global financial system. A rapid decline in 
remittances from Kazakhstan began in early 2008. In mid-2009 this 
decline slowed down, but in the third quarter of that year remittances 
were again 22% down compared to the same period of the previous year, 
and since then the negative trend has resumed. Until the second quarter 
of 2010, remittances were declining by 20% per quarter on average. A 
breakthrough came in the third quarter of 2010, when remittances shot up 
by 50%. A similar, albeit less dramatic pattern was observed in remittances 
made by Kazakh migrant workers, most of whom work in Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan. 
The dynamics of remittances received by Moldova, Tajikistan and Armenia 
were fairly similar: rapid growth until the end of 2008, a decline in 2009 
with the lowest point in the 2nd-3rd quarters, and an upward trend after the 
third quarter of 2010. There is a direct correlation between the changes 
in remittances paid from Russia and the remittances received by the three 
countries mentioned above. Kyrgyzstan, an economy that is strongly oriented 
towards Kazakhstan, also suffered a 20% decline in remittances at the end 
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of 20094. All these states belong to the group of CIS economies discussed 
above, which were the most dependent on migrants’ remittances in the pre-
crisis period. 
We are able to study remittances by migrants working in Russia in more 
detail by using data from various express payment companies (Pochta Rossii, 
Western Union, Contact, Migom, Unistream, and others). Although these 
data sources do not include cash carried by migrants themselves and various 
informal or semi-formal methods of transfer, it enables us to analyse the 
regional structure of remittances.
The current leaders in terms of remittances received through payment 
systems are Uzbekistan (25% of total remittances, or just over $2 billion in 
the first three quarters of 2010), Tajikistan (19% or $1.58 billion) and Ukraine 
(13% or $1.27 billion). These three countries have been the recipients of the 
largest sums since the pre-crisis period, but then Ukraine’s share increased 
to 25%.
The average quarterly growth of remittances made through payment systems 
in the CIS before the crisis was sometimes as much as 70%. The highest 
growth rates were recorded in remittances to Ukraine and Uzbekistan; these 
countries were also in the lead in absolute terms. Remittances by migrants 
from Moldova were also increasing rapidly. As a rule, payments to workers 
(and, accordingly, remittances) peaked during the 3rd and 4th quarters of each 
year, and the lowest total payments were recorded in the first quarter (i.e. 
when most construction work is suspended until spring). These trends are 
clear in data from previous years. Therefore, the sharp decline in remittances 
to all CIS countries in the first quarter of 2009 was attributable both to the 
seasonal factor and to recession. This decline was unprecedented: even taking 
into account salary cuts in the first quarter, remittances to CIS countries 
totaled less than 70% of the same period of the previous year.
The different speeds at which remittances fell in response to the crisis can 
be explained by the employment specialisation of the migrants themselves. 
Migrants from Moldova who work mainly in construction were the first to be 
affected by recession in Russia and reduced their remittances in early 2009 
(this was reflected in Moldova’s balance of payments). By autumn of 2009, 
decreases in migrants’ remittances from Russia were recorded in Ukraine, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. The most dramatic decrease in remittances through 
payment systems was recorded in Ukraine: in the third quarter of 2009, 
the remittances totaled only one-third of the previous year’s figure, but the 
situation stabilised somewhat in the fourth quarter. Tajikistan’s dynamics 
was better in comparison with other economies that are heavily dependent 
4 Balance of payments data of the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan.
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Table 4.3.
Remittances from Russia made 
through the main payment 
systems (in % of the same period 
of the previous year)
Source: Central Bank of Russia. 
The payment systems include: 
Anelik, BLIZKO, Coinstar Money 
Transfer, Contact, InterExpress, 
Migom, MoneyGram, PrivatMoney, 
UNIStream, Western Union, 
AsiaExpress, Allyur, Blits, Bystraya 
Pochta, Zolotaya Korona, Lider, 
Pochta Rossii
Note: 1 – transaction amount; 
2 – average transaction amount.
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on remittances: after a decline in the first quarter of 2009, pre-crisis levels 
were restored in the middle of the year. This can be explained by the fact that 
Tajik migrant workers were very numerous and many of them were employed 
in utilities and sales (i.e. sectors which were least affected by the crisis) or had 
poorly paid jobs, which locals were unwilling to take. Remittances from Russia 
to Belarus also remained stable, but these were made mainly by citizens 
rather than migrant workers. Most CIS countries (especially in Central Asia) 
saw a noticeable increase in remittances in the first three quarters of 2010, 
but this growth should be viewed as a “catch-up” after the preceding decline.
Another indicator of the impact of the crisis on migrant workers is the change 
in average transaction amounts. Salary cuts resulted in a decrease in the 
average transaction amount from $800 in early 2008 to $450 in the first 
quarter of 2009. By the third quarter of 2010 the figure had increased to 
$530. At the peak of the crisis the average transaction amount dropped 
most significantly in remittances to Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Ukraine. That 
is, workers from these countries were most affected by the decline in demand 
for labour in Russia. The volatility of this indicator (there were fluctuations 
throughout 2009 and the first half of 2010) suggests that the negative 
consequences of the crisis are still being played out. 
Before the crisis migrants’ remittances stimulated consumer demand and, 
to some extent, investment in recipient countries, and the crisis reversed this 
trend. Retail turnover was stagnant in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan in 2009, and 
dropped by 5% in Moldova and by 17% in Ukraine. Significant increases in 
demand were observed in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan only, where retail turnover 
increased by 13% and 17% respectively5. Armenia saw a 50% decrease 
in construction (Sberbank’s Centre for Macroeconomic Studies, 2010), 
which had previously been financed mainly by migrants’ remittances. Despite 
generally favourable macroeconomic dynamics in Uzbekistan, EBRD experts 
observed the negative impact of the decline in remittances from Russia and 
Kazakhstan on the country’s economy (EBRD, 2010).
The ratio of migrants’ remittances to recipient countries’ GDP also declined 
during the crisis (see Table 4.4). In the first half of 2009, i.e., during the most 
5 Data from the CIS Interstate Statistics Committee.
Table 4.4.
Ratio of remittances 
received to GDP (in %)
Source: Calculated 
based on data from 
the central banks of 
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Moldova, Tajikistan 
and Ukraine and the 
IMF
  2007  2008 2009
Armenia 11.1 10.6 10.5
Kyrgyzstan 26.8 28.8 26.4
Moldova 29.5 28.9 24.5
Tajikistan 48.3 52.7 37.4
Ukraine 2.9 2.3 2.9
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acute phase of the crisis, remittances to Moldova accounted for 19.5% of 
the country’s GDP (compared to 29% in 2007), and by the end of the year 
they accounted for 24%. In Tajikistan this index declined during the two crisis 
years (2008-2009) from 48% to 37%. In other words, remittances in 
US dollars were declining faster than GDP. This index showed smoother 
dynamics in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine.
***
Migrants’ remittances act as a major channel of secondary spread of the 
crisis in the post-Soviet space. This channel was especially significant for 
traditional labour-donating countries. Production declined dramatically in 
Russia and Kazakhstan, as these countries were directly affected by the 
crisis through the foreign trade channel and were highly integrated into 
the global financial system. The crisis led to mass staff and salary cuts and 
delays in payment, which in turn triggered an outflow of migrant workers. 
Severe unemployment in CIS countries was attributable to two factors: 
staff cuts, which were directly caused by the crisis and subsequent decline 
in demand, and the return of migrant workers from abroad. This situation, 
coupled with the deteriorating living standards of migrants’ families, has the 
potential to increase social tension.
Migrants’ remittances turned out to be highly sensitive to the decline in 
production in Russia and were a significant factor in negative economic 
developments in the recipient countries. The importance of these remittances 
for individual CIS countries enables us to conclude that the regional component 
of the crisis has played a decisive role in these countries, especially in Tajikistan 
and Moldova. 
Despite the recovery in production in Russia’s legitimate economy, remittances 
by labour migrants remain at a relatively low level. This can be explained by the 
difficulties migrants face getting back the jobs they had before the crisis. In 
addition, crisis salary levels persist. Thus, this channel of interaction between 
states appears to be less fluid than, for example, the foreign trade channel: 
positive post-crisis developments are channelled through it indirectly and with 
a long time lag. 
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Abstract
This paper makes an attempt to assess intraregional trade in the Eurasian 
supercontinent during the post-Soviet period. Applying a gravity regression 
for a period between 1995 and 2008, we assess the dynamics of trade 
agreements in Eurasia, often nicknamed ‘spaghetti’ in Europe, ‘noodle’ in Asia 
and ‘lapsha’ in the post-Soviet region. Finally, we perform a simulation of trade 
potential and evaluate to what extent Eurasia and all its groupings over-trade 
or under-trade with each other. Despite the recent regionalism activities in 
this supercontinent we found a lot of potential, but less evidence of 
integration.
Introduction
Eurasia is a massive and diverse supercontinent that stretches for 8232 km 
from Cape Dezhnev in the East to Cabo da Roca in the West and 8505 km from 
Cape Chelyuskin in the North to Cape Piai in the South. For many centuries 
it was home to the Great Silk Road that brought goods and prosperity from 
Europe to Asia. Linking China and the Roman Empire through Russia and the 
Central Asian region, there were three important trade routes between the 
East and the West. The goods were passed from stage to stage, requiring 
sophisticated trade arrangements and financial transactions. Of course, 
profits from the trade had to be large enough in order to sustain such arduous 
long distance trade. Political stability throughout the routes also ensured 
the steady supply of goods and safe passage. Despite the hardships of the 
distance and geography, the Silk Road was one of many examples in the world 
that the gravity of nature can be eventually overcome by profit motivations 
and human ingenuity in trade and finance. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the obvious question was whether 
the emergence of a new trade block would bring trade diversion or trade 
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creation in the Eurasian supercontinent. Applying a gravity model on a sample 
set of 162 countries, we assess the recent dynamics of intraregional trade 
in the Eurasian supercontinent during the post-Soviet period. We perform a 
simulation of potential trade in order to figure to what extent Eurasia and all 
its groupings over-trade or under-trade with each other compared to regional 
trade agreements (RTA) in other regions. The title of the paper stems from 
this focus: spaghetti stands for Europe, noodles for Asia, and lapsha (the 
Russian word for noodles) for emerging trade agreements in the post-Soviet 
space. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a brief literature survey, 
while section III discusses the comparative advantage of the regions and their 
changing trade patterns. Section IV applies a gravity model to quantify the 
effects of regional trade agreements, Section V estimates trade potentials 
and, finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Europe and Asia = EURASIA?
World economic history, as it was written in the 19th century, identified 
Europe as the centre of economic gravity. However, up until the end of the 
18th century at least half of the world’s GDP had been produced in Asia. 
According to Braudel (1992), in 1750 the global GDP was about $155 billion, 
77% of which was generated in Asia. During the 18th century, Europe began 
to outpace Asia in technological, economical and militaristic development, 
but by the end of World War II this hegemony had disappeared and shifted 
back to Asia. Postwar Japan showed high capacity to import and adapt 
advanced technologies from the USA. Following Japan’s example, other 
Asian countries put their efforts into building an Asian export-driven model of 
economic development through the so-called ‘flying geese’ patterns1. Blessed 
with abundant and cheap labour force, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong 
Kong quickly promoted industrialisation, initially by becoming subcontractors 
of Japanese manufacturing companies. Other countries of the region later 
joined them in the same mode of production. 
Up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Asia and Europe were two quite 
separate regions. With enlargement of the European Union (EU), and especially 
rapid economic growth in China and the recent economic rebound in Russia, 
Eurasia saw a huge growth in intraregional trade between its two biggest 
regions. Trade between the EU and Asia reached $1.09 trillion in 2008. In 
2009, China was the world’s largest exporter ($1.47 trillion) and the second 
largest importer ($934 billion) in monetary terms. The land route between 
East Asia and the EU can be a potential trade corridor that represents a 
1 ‘Flying geese’ pattern is a model for international division of labour in East Asia based on dynamic 
comparative advantage (Akamatsu, 1962).
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great opportunity for smaller and landlocked countries to enter into a stage 
of potentially strong economic growth as the trade patterns between the 
regions are largely complementary. 
At the same time, Eurasia is home to dozens of bilateral and multilateral 
trade agreements. However, in most cases they are not in operation. This 
paper attempts to assess the relative impact of the main multilateral trade 
agreements in Eurasia: the EU in Europe, Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) in Asia, and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the post-
Soviet space. In addition, we look at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
groupings in North and South America and Africa to control for other effects 
since we use global dataset. 
An issue of regionalism versus multilateralism has been a topic of long 
discussions since Viner’s model of a customs union (Viner, 1950). Much of 
these discussions address trade creation and trade diversion effects of 
an RTA. Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) and Panagariya (1999) favour 
multilateralism by arguing that smaller countries lose from an RTA and 
gain from multilateral agreements. Since RTAs give preferential treatment 
to member countries, they divert trade from non-members. The liberalising 
country foregoes tariff revenue from the new union members. From this point 
it follows that the larger the trade partner’s share of total imports, the bigger 
the tariff revenue loss when a trade agreement is formed. Since developing 
countries often have high trade dependencies and high tariffs, Bhagwati 
and Panagariya argue that they will lose from an RTA. They make the case 
for multilateralism, arguing that the smaller country gains when domestic 
producers compete at the world price, and any tariff revenue transferred to 
the RTA partner will be returned to domestic consumers.
De Melo et al. (1993) present a more balanced view of the welfare effects 
of an RTA by considering an analytical model in which integration can both 
create and divert trade. In this setting: (i) the higher the pre-RTA tariff and the 
lower the post-RTA tariff, the larger the benefits and the smaller the costs 
of adopted RTA; (ii) the larger the production cost differences within RTA 
members, the less likely that the cheap goods will be sold outside an RTA; and 
(iii) the greater the complementarity in import demands between the union 
partner, the greater the gains from an RTA. The latter is related to the ‘natural 
trading partner’ theory that suggests regional trade agreements reach their 
full potential when the political and ideological differences among participating 
countries are minimal. 
Another point of view is the so-called ‘spaghetti and noodle bowl’ approach 
first introduced by Jagdish Bhagwatti (1995), which suggests that different 
tariffs and rules of origin in multiple RTAs result in a spaghetti/noodle bowl 
phenomenon that increases the burden for business. Bhagwati focuses on 
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the fact that the rules of origin are operative under RTAs because of the 
selective nature of these agreements: to reduce or eliminate tariffs only on 
specific items imported from specific countries. This proposition is almost 
meaningless under a multilateral agreement, like the WTO, because equal 
tariff rates are applied to all imports, regardless of their country of origin, as 
long as the country is a WTO member. Based on this, Bhagwati argues that 
the creation of numerous regional agreements makes production network 
among countries inconsistent from economic efficiency point of view. He called 
this situation a spaghetti bowl phenomenon. 
On the other hand, with the slowdown in progress of Doha trade deals, 
comprehensive well-designed RTAs may be a means of achieving regional 
liberalisation and structural reforms, which could constitute a building block 
to multilateral liberalisation. The ‘noodle bowl’ phenomenon caused a recent 
boom of RTAs in Asia and created specific costs and benefits for the region, 
as well as for the world economy. It suggests that, in the absence of a Doha 
trade deal, comprehensive, well-designed RTAs may be a means to achieve 
regional liberalisation and structural reforms, which can constitute a building 
block to multilateral liberalisation. Countries reap benefits from an RTA when 
they create and enhance long-term market access opportunities for their 
products and services. For many export-oriented economies, such as the 
ones in Asia, the access to foreign export markets was crucial. Although a 
country must open its domestic market to its RTA partners, the liberalisation 
process enables the country to source cheaper imports from its partners, 
which it can use as inputs to its export production. In addition, the goods, 
services and investment sectors of all RTA members are forced to improve 
their efficiency to hold their own against competition both inside and outside 
the RTA. Cheaper imports will also benefit consumers. That brings overall 
benefits from spaghetti regionalism. 
The recent trade is that more and more countries are turning their attention 
to RTAs. Countries are taking that route because these agreements are 
often a more practical and feasible way to liberalise trade. RTAs can bring 
faster results than the multilateral process. They may enable the parties to 
make commitments that are more meaningful and more trade liberalising 
than a multilateral grouping. And very often they address issues that are not 
even on the multilateral agenda. RTAs can be valuable in dealing with tough 
issues, which often cause deadlocks on the multilateral front in areas such as 
agricultural services. 
The slow pace of multilateral negotiations has given a greater impetus to 
bilateral and regional trade negotiations. According to a recent count by the 
WTO, there are almost 300 regional or bilateral free trade agreements in 
force. And this number is expected to rise in coming years. Eurasia is a home 
to a dozen regional trade agreements, and together they comprise a noodle 
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bowl in Asia, a spaghetti in Europe and a lapsha in between two regions (see 
Figure 5.1). The EU has been active in this area for years. Asian countries 
such as Japan, Korea and China are actively negotiating agreements with 
their neighbours and more distant trading partners.
The very success of these negotiations can make liberalisation on a 
multilateral scale more difficult as governments devote greater time and 
attention to deals that can be concluded quickly. They can also detract from 
multilateral efforts by stretching already scarce negotiating resources, 
especially in developing countries. Whether the end result will be competitive 
discrimination or competitive liberalisation depends on each particular 
case. We look at Eurasian agreements to see whether wider markets helm 
economic agents to achieve economies of scale in production, and thus, 
lower the average cost of output per unit. We use the spaghetti, noodle and 
lapsha of Eurasia and try to make a single recipe. 
Figure 5.1. 
Eurasian Spaghetti-Noodle-Lapsha
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Trade Patterns and Structure
From the beginning of a century Eurasia has seen a huge growth in its 
international trade. The figure below shows intraregional trade dynamics in 
the Eurasian supercontinent. Eurasia, together with the rest of the world, 
has seen a dynamic growth in trade since the 1970s. However, the speed 
was different. In general, the world trade in the 1960s was 30% less open 
than today’s trade (see Figure 5.2). Continental Europe has been in a leading 
position since the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
1958 with an average tariff rate of 18% (Baldwin, 2006). By 2000 when all 
the cuts in the Uruguay round were phased in, the average tariff rate reached 
4% and the trade openness of Europe reached 80%. The speedy economic 
reforms in China and dissolution of the USSR played a major role in a drastic 
increase in trade in Europe and Central Asia and, in turn, the emergence of 
the spaghetti bowl in the region. 
Figure 5.2. Dynamics of 
Eurasian Trade Openness
Source: WDI, World Bank
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East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Asia World
The second part of the past century has also seen a sharp emergence of 
Asia in trade. Japan’s trade grew to over 5% of the world’s total and was 
followed by the emergence of China and a rapid growth of intra-Asian trade. 
Today Asia counts for 28% of the world’s total trade turnover.
Despite this high growth, the share of intraregional trade is still very low for 
particular groupings (see Figure 5.3). Due to its size and diversity, Eurasia 
trades a lot within its own continent. The main contributor is the European 
Union as Asia’s groupings and the CIS are still at very low shares of intraregional 
trade. 
If we look separately at Asia, most of the trades are done within the region, 
less so with Eurasia, with North America being a major trading partner. The 
post-Soviet region trades less within itself, but more with Eurasia. 
 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2011
Global Crisis and Post-Soviet 
Regional Integration
Figure 5.4. 
Structure of 
intraregional trade 
of Eurasia: 200
Source: TradeMap, 
WTC
Let’s now look at the structure of trade. The structure of intra-Eurasian trade 
is quite diverse and balanced with each commodity group constituting at least 
5% of the total. Although the highest share is held by machinery and electrical 
equipment (28%), followed by chemicals (13%) and mineral products (13%), 
the main contributor of high-skilled manufacturing trade is still the EU (its old 
and new members), while textile and electrical goods are usually supplied by 
Chinese producers. 
Figure 5.3.
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The emergence of Eastern Europe and former Soviet states provided a space 
for commodity diversification of production structure within Europe. Asian 
production and distribution networks have been constantly evolving since the 
1960s because of shifting comparative advantages due to improvements 
in labour force skills, increased capacity to adapt new technologies and the 
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presence of cheap unskilled labour (Foxley, 2010). Russia and Central Asia 
have a high concentration of raw materials, both intraregional and inside 
Eurasia.
Gravity Regression
The gravity model has its roots in Newton’s gravity law, which says 
that gravitational force between two objects is positively related to relative 
masses and negatively related to distance between them. The estimated 
model contains data for 162 countries over the period 1995-2008. 
Trade data come from IMF DOT Statistics database. Zero-valued trade is 
omitted, as in this dataset missing trade means an absence of trade (Coe 
et al, 2002), and estimation is carried out on an unbalanced panel dataset. 
All variables, excluding dummies are in natural logarithms. Following 
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), we allow for country and year heterogeneity, 
and use real values of variables (e.g. trade deflated by US CPI, real GDP). 
Following Carrere (2006) we chose Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimation 
technique, which allows fixing the omitted variables bias. Following Baldwin 
and Taglioni (2006) we allow for fixed time and each country’s effect. A short 
description of the gravity model and data estimation techniques is presented 
in the Appendix. We add a remoteness variable to control for home bias 
effect.
We start by looking at the interaction of RTA dummies and time dummies 
to see the evolution of integration processes for main trade groupings in 
the world between 1996-20082. Figure 5.5. shows that the main 
trade agreements in Eurasia – the EU and the ASEAN demonstrate 
increasing importance of intraregional ties, while importance of the CIS 
and the SAARC is growing at a slower pace. Dynamically growing intra- 
regional ties of EU and ASEAN act as a hub that attracts newcomers to 
join their agreements. Thus, during 1996-2008 EU-15 attracted Eastern 
neighbours and has grown to EU-27. Most recently ASEAN concluded 
trade agreements with Japan, China, Korea and India. Slower development 
of intraregional trade of CIS and SAARC probably reflects high share of 
informal trade. For instance, in South Asia informal trade comprises 50-
100% of formal trade. 
The evolution of the Eurasian dummy is somewhere in-between though 
it is more dynamic than the WTO dummy. Despite the inclusion of China in 
2001, protest activity surrounding the WTO Ministerial Conference of 
1999 in the United States slowed the pace of multilateral negotiations.
On the other hand, the regression results indicate that WTO members 
trade 6-13% above the world average. Unlike them, hub groupings in the 
2 We follow Brambor et al (2006) in interpreting interaction terms.
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Figure 5.5.
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Eurasia trade 17-38% below the world average, although the coefficients 
for both the EU and ASEAN are not significant. Coefficients of CEFTA and 
CIS present positive and statistically significant signs, while the coefficient 
for SAARC is not significant. The point estimate of 2.4 for the CIS implies 
that when two countries of a pair belong to that grouping, they trade 10 
times the level [exp(2.4)-1=10] that two other similar countries would 
trade. 
For the non-Eurasian groupings it can be clearly seen that all groupings 
in North and South America, as well as Africa, except for Common Market 
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for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), trade above average. The only 
coefficient that is statistically significant is for Latin American agreement. 
Evolution of MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market) dummy over time 
has been similar to hub dummies in Eurasia, while African RTAs have been 
showing strong progress since 2000. 
Trade Potentials
An interesting picture arises from our estimates of trade potential. In 
Eurasia, the CIS grouping over-trade with each other, while ASEAN and the 
EU under-trade. ASEAN, which is probably the most important trade block 
in Asia, has trade potential levels somewhat comparable to those of the EU. 
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These dynamics make intra-Eurasian trade still below its potential level but 
rapidly increasing. 
African groupings largely over-trade with each other. This trend has 
emerged since 2000 and is rapidly increasing. In the Americas the level 
of over-trade is not very high and somewhat similar to wider-Eurasian 
potentials, with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
MERCOSUR being under the level of trade potential and Latin American 
Free Trade Association (LAFTA) being above.
Conclusions
There are two explanations of the regional trade spaghetti, noodle and 
lapsha bowls phenomenon in Eurasia. On one hand it is the consequence of 
no clear leadership within its two regions: Europe and Asia. In Asia, Japan 
and China dispute the role, while Korea is promoting trade and culture. More 
integration with the EU is not visible in the near future due to the fact that 
the EU economies are currently trying to overcome existing economic 
problems. On the other hand, the absence of progress with multilateral 
agenda calls for further regional negotiations. Instead, greater diversification 
of exports destinations to elsewhere in Eurasia and beyond will probably be 
an important source of additional growth in the near future.
In general, we have three main findings from this empirical exercise. First, 
both Eurasia and the WTO are found to be below their potential levels, while 
Eurasian intracontinental trade is more dynamic and with more room to 
grow. Second, for two hub-groupings in the region – the EU and the ASEAN 
– despite disputes and economic slowdown, actual trade is well below 
its potential level, and we can only expect them to grow further. Third, 
intraregional trade in the CIS is still above the levels predicted by the gravity 
model. It is coupled with a continuing reduction in exports to each other, 
which suggests an evidence of trade diversion. 
How the integration processes in Eurasia will evolve is a subject for further 
analysis and observation. Despite the large number of spaghetti-noodle-
lapsha RTAs at the present moment we do not yet see any perspective for 
pan-Eurasian integration in near future. 
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Annex 5.1. Trading structure of regional groups in Eurasia
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SAARC
CIS
The Basics of the Gravity Model
The gravity model of international trade takes its roots from Newton’s 
gravity equation, and relates the trade between a pair of countries to their 
economic mass, often measured by their respective GDPs, and the distance 
between them. It was brought into use for the estimation of international 
trade by Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963). Anderson (1979) and 
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Bergstrand (1985), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Evenet and Keller 
(2002) developed theoretical justifications based on increasing returns 
to scale, imperfectly competitive markets and firm-level product 
differentiation. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) improved the empirical 
microfoundation of the gravity equation by introducing a theoretical and 
practical way of deriving a “multilateral resistance” term. 
A great volume of empirical literature use gravity equation for the estimation 
of trade, investments and other bilateral transactions. The most notable 
estimations of bilateral trade flows are Frankel (1997) and Rose (2000). 
Egger (2002) suggested a correct way of controlling for heterogeneity in 
gravity equation on panel data and estimation of trade potentials. Finally, 
Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) sorted out the empirical specifications and use of 
dummy variables. We follow their specification as:
Despite the recent suggestions of two-stage non-linear estimations 
(Helpman et al, 2008) we favour the Hausman-Taylor (Hausman-Taylor, 
1981) estimation that became a widely accepted and standard technique 
for estimation when the gravity model is applied (Egger, 2002 and Carrere, 
2006)3. The Hausman-Taylor method allows for the inclusion of time-invariant 
variables in trade projections and circumvents the problem of an ad hoc 
estimation of the country pair-specific dummy variable needed for a projection 
based on the fixed-effects estimator. In addition, it removes the correlation 
between the error term and included variables which often plague random-
effects estimation.
3 Helpman et al (2008) proposes treatment of zero-trade and asymmetric trade flows. But we 
still think that low trade volumes (no matter if unidirectional or two-way low volumes) signify 
low development of trade relations. Thus, treatment of multilateral resistance and unobserved 
effect seem more important to us.
Name Description Source
Trade Log of bilateral trade (exports + imports) deflated 
by US CPI
DOT Statistics, 
IMF and IFS, IMF
Distance Log of great circle distance between capital cities
Income Log of Product of Real GDPs WDI, World Bank
Wage difference Log of Product of GDPs per capita WDI, World Bank
Remoteness Log of simple average of remoteness variable WDI, World Bank 
and distance
RTA dummy 1 for country pairs that belong to RTA, and 0 
otherwise
Wikipedia
Interaction variables RTA dummy multiplied by variable 
Data Definition 
and Sources
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, where τij= f(distij, otherstuff)
Vij
PUSA
τij
1-σ
GDPi GDPj
Pi Pj
GDP GDP
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Results of gravity 
equation
VARIABLES Fixed effects Random effects Hausman –Taylor
Distance 1.104*** -0.55*** -0.651***
[0.154] [0.144] [0.146]
GDP 0.326*** 0.383*** 0.383***
[0.045] [0.03] [0.03]
GDP per capita -0.071 -0.129*** -0.129***
[0.043] [0.029] [0.029]
Remoteness 2.029*** 0.363** 0.286*
[0.156] [0.145] [0.147]
WTO 0.112*** 0.063*** 0.063***
[0.012] [0.01] [0.01]
Remoteness – WTO -0.02** 0 -0.002
[0.009] [0.01] [0.01]
EU -0.14*** -0.183 -0.184
[0.044] [0.147] [0.166]
Remoteness – EU -0.278*** -0.347*** -0.372***
[0.025] [0.084] [0.094]
ASEAN -0.264 -0.452 -0.458
[0.17] [0.573] [0.648]
Remoteness – ASEAN -0.054 0.036 0.026
[0.083] [0.28] [0.316]
SAARC 0.663** 0.735 0.616
[0.294] [1] [1.127]
Remoteness – SAARC -0.523*** -0.531 -0.494
[0.162] [0.549] [0.619]
CEFTA 0.22 0.693 0.921*
[0.14] [0.469] [0.526]
Remoteness – CEFTA 0.229*** 0.039 -0.069
[0.059] [0.199] [0.223]
NAFTA 1.238*** 1.379 1.422
[0.313] [1.066] [1.201]
Remoteness – NAFTA -1.226*** -1.36* -1.415
[0.232] [0.787] [0.884]
LAFTA 0.729*** 0.808** 0.811**
[0.094] [0.325] [0.368]
Remoteness – LAFTA 0.041 0.037 -0.001
[0.069] [0.238] [0.269]
COMESA -0.129* -0.049 -0.029
[0.075] [0.235] [0.27]
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VARIABLES Fixed effects Random effects Hausman –Taylor
Remoteness – COMESA 0.433*** 0.342** 0.355**
[0.045] [0.145] [0.166]
MERCOSUR 0.752** 0.609 0.713
[0.309] [1.076] [1.218]
Remoteness – MERCOSUR -0.451*** -0.42 -0.469
[0.124] [0.433] [0.49]
SADC -0.13 0.016 0.114
[0.14] [0.437] [0.499]
Remoteness – SADC 0.301*** 0.283 0.19
[0.079] [0.252] [0.286]
CIS 2.272*** 2.383*** 2.429***
[0.07] [0.235] [0.266]
Remoteness – CIS -0.265*** -0.27* -0.253
[0.043] [0.145] [0.164]
Constant -26.568*** -14.018*** -12.799***
[2.043] [1.858] [1.949]
Number of observations 118797 118797 118797
R-squared 0.773 0.909 0.909
Number of pairs 10233 10233
Hausman test 769 167.3
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Note: Standard 
errors in paren-
theses,  statistical 
significance: *- at 
10%; **- at %; 
***- at 1%
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Introduction 
The effectiveness of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) is largely 
determined by the effectiveness of its institutions, their ability to make 
decisions aggregating the interests of all member states and the ability to 
enforce those decisions. A strong institutional structure is particularly 
important during the transition from negative to positive integration, i.e., in 
the case of the Eurasian Economic Community, the creation of the EurAsEC 
Customs Union. This in turn means that many of the most crucial decisions 
are made in real mode (e.g., management of customs policy). In this paper we 
examine the formation and development of the institutional structure of the 
Eurasian Economic Community, the interaction between its bodies, decision 
making mechanisms and process of implementing of the decisions. We 
analyse the institutional structure of the Eurasian Economic Community in 
terms of its dependency on objective economic and political processes in the 
post-Soviet space, and in terms of its impact on the dynamics and direction of 
the integration process.
The institutional structure of the EurAsEC, and the basic operating 
parameters of the Customs Union (CU) and Common Economic Space (CES), 
were all based on the example of the European Union (EU). The leaders of 
the Community have pointed this out on several occasions. For example, 
the chairman of the Council of Federation Committee on the CIS Issues, V.A. 
Gustov (2008: 19) argues: “Without exaggeration we can say that recently 
developed regulatory and legal frameworks for regional integration [meaning 
mostly the EurAsEC – N.K.] in the world are largely a reflection of practice of 
the establishment and development of the EU”. Therefore, this study is built 
largely on the comparative analysis of EU institutions and the EurAsEC.
However, regional characteristics differ so greatly that even though the 
EurAsEC’s institutional structure is based on the EU experience a fundamentally 
different organisation is developing. At the outset it is important to mention 
two key observations. Firstly, a comparative analysis of the institutional 
structures of the Eurasian Economic Community and the EU does not equate 
“different” with “bad”. The various shortcomings of EurAsEC’s institutional 
structure will be discussed further. However, many differences are caused by 
objective factors and therefore cannot even be considered as shortcomings.

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Integration processes in the former Soviet Union have certain specific 
characteristics, i.e., the low proportion of intraregional trade; the significant 
role of extra-regional actors (the EU, China, USA, and, in part, Turkey), 
whose economic and political influences contribute to the “breaking up” of 
the integration space; and the absence of significant historical experience of 
statehood for many countries emerged after the collapse of the USSR, which 
makes any attempt at limiting national sovereignty extremely problematic.
Secondly, the EurAsEC and the EU have disparate historical experience having 
been in existence for 10 years and 60 years respectively. Enhancing integration 
requires solutions that are possible only when there is a high level of mutual 
trust, which in turn develops only from the experience of cooperation, and any 
accumulation of experience results from a step-by–step approach over a long 
period of time. Any attempt to speed up the process is most likely to lead to 
failure. That is why existing comments on the institutional structure of the 
EurAsEC are not intended as criticism but as constructive approaches for 
further development.
The Bodies of the EurAsEC
Before analysing the institutional structure of the EurAsEC, it is important 
to give a brief description of EurAsEC’s principal bodies. Its governing 
bodies are the Interstate Council, the Integration Committee, the 
Interparliamentary Assembly and the Community Court. Subsidiary bodies 
include the Integration Committee Councils, the Commission of Permanent 
Representatives and the Secretariat.
The EurAsEC Interstate Council is the supreme governing body of the Eurasian 
Economic Community. The Council is composed of heads of state and heads 
of government.
The Interstate Council “considers questions of principle in Community activities 
affecting the common interests of member states, defines the strategy, 
directions and perspectives for developing integration and takes decisions 
aimed at implementing EurAsEC goals and objectives.” (Treaty, 2000, article 
5). This is the only body that can adopt decisions binding for member states. 
The Interstate Council approves decisions on a consensual basis. In general, 
this body resembles the European Council apart from the fact that the 
decisions of the European Council are de jure non-binding.
The EurAsEC Integration Committee is a standing body of the Eurasian 
Economic Community.
The Integration Committee is composed of the deputy heads of government 
of the Community states. The main role of the Integration Committee is to 
support the interaction of EurAsEC bodies, to prepare draft decisions and 
documents for the Interstate Council and to maintain control over their 
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implementation. The status and composition of the Integration Committee 
are similar to those of the Council of European Union (Council of Ministers). 
However, there is a significant difference: the Integration Committee 
examines and approves draft decisions, prepares proposals, reports and 
reviews, but it does not decide anything. All decisions are made by the 
EurAsEC Interstate Council. For that reason, less importance is attached to 
the Integration Committee’ ability to adopt decisions with a two-thirds majority 
vote.
The Integration Committee may establish subsidiary bodies in the form of 
councils and commissions, established either to represent a particular policy 
area or to perform a particular function. Currently there are 18 councils, 
e.g., the Social Policy Council, the Transport Policy Council, the Council of 
Heads of Customs Services, etc. In addition, there are four commissions 
with responsibility for specific aspects of trade policy, e.g., the Commission 
on Cooperation in the Sphere of Export Control. In general, these bodies 
are comparable to various configurations of the EU Council of Ministers. 
However, there is a significant difference in the level of competence and 
function performed. Sectoral councils are the key decision-making bodies 
in the EU, while in the EurAsEC they perform two basic functions: preparing 
draft decisions and implementing agreements between the member states. 
To say more accurately, the councils themselves do not implement decisions 
- this is the responsibility of their members, i.e., the heads of public authorities 
of member states. Thus, the implementation of EurAsEC laws into national 
legislation (since the law of the EurAsEC has no direct effect) takes place at 
national level and in the absence of any strict monitoring.
A key subsidiary body of the Community is the EurAsEC Commission of 
Permanent Representatives. Its role is “to support the ongoing work of the 
Community, coordinating and reconciling the member states’ positions, […] 
and supporting the interaction between the Community and the appropriate 
bodies, institutions and organisations of the Community member states” 
(Regulations, 2003, article 5). The Commission of Permanent Representatives 
takes decisions by a two-thirds majority. However, it is specifically stipulated 
that these decisions are binding only for the Secretariat of the Integration 
Committee. For the member states, the commissions and councils these 
decisions are only advisory in nature. The Commission is composed of 
Permanent Representatives of EurAsEC member states appointed by the 
heads of member states. The Commission of Permanent Representatives 
resembles COREPER, which supports the operations of the EU Council of 
Ministers.
The Integration Committee Secretariat organises the work of the Interstate 
Council and Integration Committee and provides it with information and 
technical support. The Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General who 
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is appointed by the EurAsEC Interstate Council for a three-year term of 
office. Secretariat officials are the highest-ranking administrators of the 
Community. However, although when on duty they “shall not seek or receive 
instructions from any party or authority external to the Community” and are 
responsible only to the Eurasian Economic Community (Regulations, 2001, 
article 37), their real independence is in doubt. The reason for such doubt is 
the national quota system for allocating senior posts in the Secretariat. But 
scepticism about the Secretariat’s independence is also expressed because 
of its small staff. The Secretariat can not be compared with the European 
Commission: it lacks independence from the member states, has neither 
legislative nor executive powers and its task is limited to providing support 
for the Interstate Council and Integration Committee. The only body similar to 
this in the structure of EU institutions is the General Secretariat of EU Council 
of Ministers.
There are two further governing bodies whose status is secondary to those 
mentioned above: the InterParliamentary Assembly and the Community 
Court of Justice. 
The Interparliamentary Assembly of the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurAsEC IPA) is the Community’s body of parliamentary cooperation. The 
objectives of the IPA are “to facilitate the formation of a coordinated EurAsEC 
legal policy; to coordinate the legislative activities of the national parliaments 
in order to achieve EurAsEC’s goals and objectives; and to assist in creating 
organisational and legal conditions for bringing the national legal codes 
of Community member states into line with treaties concluded within the 
framework of EurAsEC” (Regulations, 2002, article 2-3). The IPA plenary 
session is held once a year, but there are several committees working on 
a permanent basis. A key feature of the IPA is that it does not participate 
in preparing Interstate Council decisions and EurAsEC international 
agreements.
The Community Court of Justice is charged with providing a uniform 
interpretation of EurAsEC law and settling disputes of an economic nature 
arising between the Parties on matters relating to implementation of the 
decisions by EurAsEC bodies and the provisions of treaties adopted within 
EurAsEC. Decision of the Court is adopted by two-thirds of the judges. 
Presently the CIS Economic Court of Justice executes the function of the 
Court of Justice of the Eurasian Economic Community.
Features of the EurAsEC’s institutional structure
Our theoretical analysis focuses on a few key features of the institutional 
structure of the EurAsEC.
1. “Integration processes [in the EurAsEC – N.K.] develop at various 
speeds and on different levels” said Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister, 
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S.E. Naryshkin (2008, 15). It could even be said that the idea of 
differentiated integration in the CIS has reached its ultimate realisation.
There are several types of differentiation:
• opt-outs – when a country stipulates that it exempts itself from 
certain technical aspects of a policy or indeed exercises its right not to 
participate at all in a particular policy area (for example, Britain is not 
part of the Schengen zone);
• opt-ins – when a country, having exercised the right to not participate 
in some policy area, retains the right to participate in certain aspects of 
this policy (this would apply to the participation of Great Britain and Ireland 
in the development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the 
EU);
• the vanguard and rearguard model – when some countries of the 
integration organisation form a group to implement a large-scale project, 
and the rest of the countries are either unwilling or unable to participate 
in this. They reserve the right, however, to join the vanguard in the future 
(e.g., the euro zone in the European Union).
In practice, CIS countries always have the right to choose whether or not to 
sign each of the international agreements within the CIS framework. Since 
there are no time limits for the ratification of these agreements, the CIS 
countries also have the right to ratify or not to ratify such agreements. As 
a result, by the year 2000, half of the former Soviet republics had ratified 
between 40-70% of the CIS agreements they had initially signed (Analytical 
Report, 2001: 75). These ratified agreements are often not enforced in any 
case, although this is not relevant to the notion of differentiation.
Political leaders were aware of the fact that the absence of a unified legal 
framework is a hindrance to any integration initiatives. From this perspective, 
the creation of EurAsEC was a great step forward – the legal framework of 
the Community exists in the form of the EurAsEC Treaty and other 
Community agreements determined by the decision of the Interstate 
Council. Article 9 of the EurAsEC Treaty states that the adoption of all these 
agreements is mandatory for any country acceding to the Community, 
i.e., it implies that this is obligatory for all member states. In this respect, 
the EurAsEC legal framework is completely analogous to the EU acquis1. 
Another extremely important factor that contributes to the unity of the legal 
framework of the Eurasian Economic Community is the fact that these 
treaties could not be signed with reservations. Thus, EurAsEC is committed 
to avoiding the phenomenon of disorderly differentiation, which former 
1 Although the scope and status of the documents are in no way comparable.
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president of the European Commission Jacques Delors warned against 
in Europe, claiming that the European Union risked turning into “a giant 
department store, where everyone would pay only for what he takes from the 
shelf” (quoted by Shemyatenkov, 2000: 41)
The apparent complexity of implementing the basis of this integration project, 
i.e., the creation of the Customs Union and Common Economic Space, can be 
explained in the following way. Participation in the Customs Union involves a 
significant revision of the entire customs and tariff system, the formulation 
of a common trade policy and the establishment of new institutions. All 
these changes require a high degree of coordination and the adoption of 
decisions that are disadvantageous in the short term. Also, the creation of 
the Common Economic Space, conceived as the space of four freedoms, is 
impossible unless legislation in several areas is harmonised more extensively 
and unless there are efficient institutions to implement such legislation. 
There must also be sufficient mutual trust between the member states. In 
such circumstances, it is easy to understand why, during the creation of the 
EurAsEC Customs Union, member states began to gravitate towards the 
vanguard and the rearguard model of differentiation, which is already well 
established in the European Union.
Three EurAsEC countries make up the Customs Union: Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus. All the key features of vanguard and rearguard integration 
apparent in the EU are reflected in the Customs Union:
• The unity of the institutional structure of the vanguard and all of 
EurAsEC2 
• The objectives of the vanguard correspond to the basic direction of 
development and objectives of the whole of EurAsEC
• Creating a vanguard does not negatively impact the level of integration 
across the whole of EurAsEC
• Other countries may join the vanguard when they are ready to take on 
additional obligations
Using the vanguard and rearguard integration model brings obvious benefits, 
but it also has major disadvantages. In the case of EurAsEC, the greatest 
concern is the imbalance between the level of integration achieved across the 
Community and the potential (if it is reached) for deeper integration between 
the countries of the vanguard. In the European Union the built-in vanguard 
(Economic and Monetary Union) is based on a long and stable functioning EU-
wide customs union and single internal market. The EurAsEC, in contrast, 
2 For example, the supreme body of the Customs Union is the Interstate Council, acting in the 
member states that participate in the Customs Union.
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is still developing a free trade zone and the current regime is based on a 
number of bilateral agreements, which are not always followed strictly. In 
these circumstances, the establishment of the Customs Union and, in 
particular, the Common Economic Space, risks breaking the Community 
apart.
The second disadvantage is the fate of the rearguard (Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan). They will have a very difficult task chasing the hopefully rapidly 
progressing vanguard. Given the significant differences in the level of 
economic development of the three leading and the two following countries, 
the temporal differentiation between the vanguard and rearguard may be 
transformed into a permanent centre-periphery structure. The question 
is whether the peripheral countries are reconciled to their status or would 
they begin to reorient themselves towards other non-regional players. 
However, the position of the rearguard will largely be determined by the 
degree of success of the Customs Union and its ability to attract the 
rearguard economies.
2. The process of integration in the EurAsEC does not correspond to the 
classical scheme of regional economic integration, i.e., free trade area 
(FTA) – customs union – common market – economic and monetary 
union. However, apart from the EU, few integration organisations could 
boast the agreement of theory and practice. In the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the free trade zone is complemented 
by a major liberalisation of capital flows. In the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) the task of creating an FTA was only adopted 
in 1992, 25 years after the establishment of the organisation. It was 
achieved relatively recently, in 2002, and only then with significant 
exceptions, coinciding with the implementation of a number of measures 
on the liberalisation of services and capital flow. In 1970-1980, the 
ASEAN’s activities were limited to sector cooperation only.
In the EurAsEC there is a de facto free trade area, but with numerous 
exemptions and common practices that, in principle, are not consistent with 
the rules of the FTA, such as quotas and export duties. The basis of the free 
trade regime is the legal framework inherited from the 1990’s and based 
on bilateral agreements between member states of the Community. In this 
regard, there is a need legally to consolidate existing relationships in this 
region in a multilateral format. 
There have been numerous attempts to create a customs union within 
the CIS, some of these between the five member states of the Community. 
The latest attempt now under way involves Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus. It should be remembered that from 2000 until quite recently 
the coordination of national customs tariffs in these countries was about 
60%, which is quite high. At the summit held on June 9, 2009, the heads 
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of governments of the Community managed to agree on full coordination 
of customs tariffs.
Although the five member states of the EurAsEC have not fully liberalised 
the movement of goods, they have already signed a number of agreements 
on the liberalisation (streamlining) of the movement of capital, services and 
labour, which are in line with the creation of a common market. For example, 
regarding the movement of labour, we may mention the Agreement on 
reciprocal visa-free travel of November 30, 2000, and the Agreement 
regarding the system for mutual recognition and equivalence of academic 
degrees of September 27, 2005. 
The insurance industry has demonstrated particular progress in the service 
sector: the Agreement on cooperation in the insurance industry of April 27, 
2003 and the Agreement on exchange of information between insurance 
oversight and insurance regulation bodies of September 30, 2004 were 
successfully implemented. There are also several agreements relating to the 
regulation of foreign exchange and securities markets (the Agreement on the 
exchange of information between the competent authorities regulating the 
securities markets dated December 23, 2003, the Agreement on cooperation 
in the securities market dated June 18, 2004 and the Agreement on 
cooperation in organisation of the integrated foreign exchange market dated 
January 25, 2006).
Moreover, there are trends in cooperation on the freedom of movement 
of goods that sometimes go beyond the classic understanding of an FTA or 
CU. Harmonisation of technical regulations is an important step in developing 
a common market and the Eurasian Economic Community reached 
agreement on the harmonisation of technical regulations in 2005. Thus, it 
would be very difficult using classical theory to determine at what stage 
of economic integration the Community has arrived. The disparities 
between theory and practice are well illustrated by the opinion of Russian 
economists: in the EurAsEC “the regulatory environment remains super-
liberal compared to other integration processes (as in the case of trade) 
or uncertain (as in the case of migration or movement of capital)” (Osipov, 
Pukhov, 2007: 7).
Neither are certain sectoral cooperation activities consistent with the 
classical model, especially with regard to energy, transport and the use of 
water resources. Among recent developments that should be mentioned 
are the establishment of the EurAsEC Centre for High Technology and the 
EurAsEC “Innovative Biotechnologies” Interstate Target Programme. Sectoral 
cooperation is also occurring in non-economic spheres, which is unusual 
for organisations with a low degree of integration: measures are being 
implemented to protect borders, and there is cooperation in judicial sector 
including the criminal law. 
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Finally, in recent years the countries of the Community are actively developing 
several cooperation projects: the construction of the Sangtuda-1 hydropower 
plant in Tajikistan and the Kambarata-2 hydropower plant in Kyrgyzstan); 
the development of Zarechnoye uranium deposit in Kazakhstan; and the 
construction of an aluminium complex in Kyrgyzstan. Typically, these projects 
are aimed either at increasing exports, or creating unified production chains 
in the EurAsEC countries. An important prerequisite for the realisation of 
such projects was the establishment of the Eurasian Development Bank in 
2006, with capital of $1.5 billion.
While sectoral cooperation and realisation of particular projects can only 
be welcomed, the stability of the integration process, including the sectoral 
cooperation itself is, in our view dependent upon progress in the field of general 
economic integration, primarily the creation of a functioning customs union. 
Uzbekistan left the EurAsEC relatively painlessly. Indeed, the only negative 
consequence of this country’s, actions was its exclusion from multilateral 
cooperation on water resources management. However, it would be much 
harder for Uzbekistan to have left a highly effective Customs Union.
It is gratifying that in 2006-2007 the three countries of the Community 
agreed upon a concept for the Customs Union that meets the most stringent 
criteria. It requires a common customs territory and common customs duties; 
it does not allow, as a rule, any tariff and non-tariff regulatory restrictions 
upon mutual trade; its governance allows for the functioning and development 
of the Customs Union; it has a common customs regime. It is now time for the 
practical implementation of the Customs Union.
3. A key feature of the institutional structure of the EurAsEC is its vertical 
organisation, which implies the approval of decisions on the basis of 
consensus among the heads of states exceptionally.
The institutional structure of the European Union was originally created 
with the idea of maintaining a balance between the intergovernmental body 
(the Council of the European Union) and supranational body (the European 
Commission). The European Parliament was a later addition to these key 
institutions and its competence has continuously expanded since the late 
1980’s. This structure has allowed the institutions to harmonise common 
(European) and private (national) interests. Moreover, the ability of the 
European Commission and European Parliament to influence the decision-
making process has contributed to balance the interests of different EU 
countries, easing in particular the dispute settlement between large and 
small countries, or net donor countries and net recipients. In the EurAsEC 
there is a clear “vertical power structure”: Integration Committee Councils 
– Commission of Permanent Representatives – Integration Committee 
– Interstate Council. Historical concern among the former Soviet republics 
over the question of sovereignty precludes the creation of supranational 
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bodies. The weakness of the parliamentary institutions in each of the 
Community’s countries predisposed to a more facultative role for the 
Interparliamentary Assembly. In such circumstances, the vertical 
institutional structure of the EurAsEC was an inevitable outcome. This is not 
a drawback in itself, but combined with the fact that all binding decisions 
are made by the Interstate Council, this tends to decrease the efficiency of 
the legislative process. Moreover, this situation limits opportunities for 
business lobbyists and other interested parties, which is a disadvantage 
because lobbyists can often act as a feedback mechanism and provide 
essential expertise.
At a first glance, it may appear that EurAsEC bodies actively follow qualified 
majority rule, but detailed analysis shows the opposite. Although member 
states acknowledge the need to move to majority voting in theory, they are 
not ready for it in practice. Decisions taken by the Commission of Permanent 
Representatives are approved by a majority of two-thirds of the votes. 
However “if there is a dissenting opinion of any of the permanent 
representatives [...] the question shall be referred to the Integration 
Committee of the EurAsEC” (Regulations, 2003, article 10). Integration 
Committee decisions are adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the votes, 
however the question is referred to the Interstate Council for consideration 
if “four Contracting Parties have voted in favour of a decision but the decision 
has not obtained a two-thirds majority” (Treaty, 2000, Article 13), that 
is, if Russia voted against it. However, the Commission of Permanent 
Representatives and the Integration Committee prepare only draft 
decisions and agreements for the Interstate Council to approve, and if they 
adopt any decisions on their own, the latter are only procedural in nature. 
The only EurAsEC authority that has the power to make binding decisions is 
the Interstate Council, which acts only by consensus. Practice shows that 
even at the level of the Commission of Permanent Representatives voting 
takes place extremely rarely, and the Integration Committee resolves 
issues exclusively by consensus3.
When structured in such a way the decision-making process has several 
shortcomings.
• The constant search for consensus basically makes any decision very 
difficult to adopt;
• As practice shows, issues already agreed at lower levels (in working 
groups, the Commission of the Permanent Representatives or sectoral 
councils) are often “unpacked” and discussed again at the Integration 
Committee and the Interstate Council4;
3 Interview with a senior official of the Secretariat of the EurAsEC Integration Committee.
4 Interview with a senior official of the Secretariat of the EurAsEC Integration Committee.
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• Even when there is no dissent, the decision-making process has to go 
through every body from the working group to the Interstate Council 
which, in accordance with the regulations, takes one and a half years 
(Shurubovich, 2006: 184) - a very long time;
• The institutional structure of the Eurasian Economic Community 
has created a gap between the two channels of decision-making: the 
Integration Committee Secretariat, the Commission of Permanent 
Representatives and the Integration Committee on the one hand, and 
EurAsEC subsidiary bodies (sectoral councils and commissions) on the 
other. There are serious doubts regarding the ability of the Commission of 
Permanent Representatives to coordinate the work of subsidiary bodies, 
and the Integration Committee meets too infrequently to perform this 
function effectively. This makes it difficult to combine individual decisions 
and to form a compromise packages. 
One favourable development was the establishment of a Customs Union 
Commission (CUC) by the EurAsEC Customs Union. This body is empowered 
to make decisions by a majority of two-thirds of the votes and, where there is 
disagreement, is not required to refer the decision to the Interstate Council. 
The votes are distributed between the three countries as follows: Russian 
Federation – 57%; Belarus – 21.5%; Kazakhstan – 21.5%.
The relatively broad mandate of the CUC is to “act as a standing regulatory 
body of the Customs Union” and “within the limits of its competence ensure the 
implementation of international treaties constituting the contractual and legal 
framework of the customs union” (Treaty, 2007, articles 1, 6). The EurAsEC 
Interstate Council (Customs Union supreme body) approved a limited list of 
“sensitive issues” on which the CUC should decide unanimously. This is an 
important step forward because it means no individual country has the power 
to block a decision on issues not included in the abovementioned list5. Time will 
tell how extensive the CUC competences will be, and how often majority vote 
will be used in practice.
4. Another significant disadvantage of the institutional structure of the 
Eurasian Economic Community is the absence of any authority that would 
serve to protect the common interests of the Community. In the European 
Union such authorities are the European Parliament and the European 
Commission, however, in the EurAsEC neither the Interparliamentary 
Assembly nor the Customs Union Commission can claim to represent the 
common interest.
The weakness of the IPA is determined by political situation in member 
states as well as by the extremely limited competence of this body. The 
5 The management of the Customs Union would be impossible without such a mechanism.
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EurAsEC IPA is composed of deputies delegated by the parliaments of 
EurAsEC member states. Given that the legislative authority of the member 
states is de facto dependent on the executive powers, the ability of the IPA 
to play an independent role is open to question. As for the competence of 
the IPA, it is not involved in the EurAsEC decision-making process (there is 
no mechanism for mandatory consultation). Currently, the role of the IPA is 
limited to developing model codes and laws and drafting proposals for the 
fundamentals of legislation of the member states.
The Customs Union Commission is theoretically a supranational body, but it 
is still not able to function as a representative of the common interests of the 
Community. The supranational authority must meet several criteria:
• it should have its own competence, conferred on it by member states;
• it must not make decisions by consensus;
• decisions must be binding, including for any state that objected to the 
decision;
• decisions should enter into force without any action at national level 
(e.g., ratification or approval in some form).
Our analysis of existing documents suggests that the CUC meets these 
criteria. However, its structure does not allow it to be considered as a 
representative of the common interests of the Community. Members 
of the European Commission act as individuals, independent of national 
governments, and do not request instructions from their governments. 
Members of the CUC are there because they hold an official post – deputy 
prime minister or minister – in a member state government and therefore 
they must defend the national interests of “their own” state. There is 
moderate optimism for the future evolution of this body based on the 
treaty provision that “the number of the Parties’ representatives in the 
Commission and their status may be altered upon completion of the 
customs union establishment.” (Treaty, 2007, article 4) It remains to be 
seen how the Eurasian Economic Community Customs Union will balance 
the two fundamental requirements for its institutional structure, i.e., 
transfer of powers in trade policy to the supranational level, without which 
the CU cannot function; and ensuring that the institutions can harmonise 
the vital interests of individual member states and prevent decisions being 
sabotaged at the national level.
5. The way in which the Eurasian Economic Community’s decisions have 
been implemented leaves a great deal to be desired, which raises 
the question of how to establish effective mechanisms for enforcing 
decisions and monitoring their execution. This problem is undoubtedly 
a preoccupation of certain higher officials of the Community and its 
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member states. The chairman of the Interparliamentary Assembly, 
M. Ubaidulloev, (2008: 8) on behalf of the IPA, emphasized the need to 
“develop proposals and norms of the treaty establishing the Eurasian 
Economic Community as it relates to exercising control over fulfilment 
of the Community’s decisions on national and international levels, as 
well as defining the criteria of the parties’ economic responsibility if 
they fail to fulfil its obligations.” 
Today there are two ways in which decisions can be adopted in the Eurasian 
Economic Community: by the decision proper of the Interstate Council and 
by international agreement signed at the meetings of the Interstate Council. 
There is practically no difference between these methods in terms of the 
order of their implementation: international agreements must be ratified by 
all member countries in accordance with national procedures; decisions of 
the Interstate Council shall be implemented by the member states “by 
adoption of the necessary national regulatory instruments, in accordance 
with national legislation.” (Treaty, 2000, article 14) Another evidence 
that these two types of documents have much in common is the fact that 
decisions of the Interstate Council are not signed by the Chairman but 
by all members of the Interstate Council6. The execution of decisions is 
entrusted to the heads of the member states’ executive authorities. Thus, 
the implementation of Community decisions into national law takes place at 
the national level (since the EurAsEC law has no direct effect) and in the 
absence of any strict monitoring.
For the five member countries, this problem is mitigated by the fact that 
the majority of Interstate Council decisions are concepts, strategies or 
agreements containing mainly “soft law” provisions and therefore these 
decisions cannot conflict with national legislation. They tend to establish rights 
and obligations only for the participating countries, but not for individuals or 
legal entities. However, the CU has created a significant body of legislation 
that should be applied by national courts and executive bodies. The activities 
of national executive authorities should be subject to external monitoring, 
otherwise the legislation of the Eurasian Economic Community risks 
becoming a bare right.
Such external monitoring may be either judicial or political, but ideally 
these two forms of monitoring would be combined, mutually reinforcing 
each other. 
Since 2003 the CIS Economic Court of Justice has performed the functions 
of the EurAsEC Community Court of Justice. However three factors limit the 
role of the Community Court. 
6 Chairman of the Interstate Council signs only the organisational and protocol papers.
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Firstly, it has a relatively narrow jurisdiction in rem. The Court can examine 
Eurasian Economic Community treaties only if the latter contain a special 
clause. At the end of 2010 the court could adjudicate disputes in 57 of the 
Eurasian Economic Community agreements, forty of which relate to the CU, 
and its decisions are binding only for the three countries of the Community.
Secondly, the Court has limited jurisdiction in personam: the Community Court 
is not empowered to examine claims made by individuals. It should be noted 
that the power of the EU Court of Justice to consider claims from private 
persons was one of the most important “engines” of integration in the EU. 
Appropriately with the establishment of the CU, the Community Court Statute 
was amended in 2010. In particular, the court received the power to consider 
the complains of economic entities of Customs Union member-states about 
the infringement of CU law (Statute, Article 14).
Finally, it is not entirely clear what the legal implications of the decisions of the 
Community Court of Justice are. On the one hand, court decisions are final 
and without right of appeal. However, they are binding only for the parties to 
the dispute. Theoretically, therefore, the state that did not participate in the 
dispute may continue practices deemed to be illegal. Moreover, there is no 
clear mechanism for the enforcement of court decisions because they are not 
incorporated into the national legislation of the member states. Theoretically, 
in case of default on a court decision, any party to the dispute may apply to 
the Interstate Council. But this would seem wholly unrealistic if “an economic 
entity” was the plaintiff. Another weakness of the court is its lack of 
communication with the national courts, since national courts are not obliged 
to consider decisions of the Community Court of Justice. Although the 
highest judicial bodies in member states are entitled to apply to the court with 
queries on the interpretation of Eurasian Economic Community legislation, 
they are not obliged to do so. Thus, the national courts are tempted 
deliberately to ignore the laws of the Community.
This is strikingly different from the legal procedures of the EU Court of 
Justice: if the national law is deemed to be inconsistent with EU law it 
is automatically stopped to be implemented by the national courts and 
authorities. The role of the Community Court of Justice is illustrated well by 
the fact that during the ten years that the Eurasian Economic Community 
has existed, the Community Court considered only one case! 
In any case, judicial monitoring is time consuming and very expensive financially, 
and it should therefore be used only in extreme cases. Political monitoring is 
a much more efficient tool for day-to-day operations. Theoretically, political 
monitoring may take the form of either regular reports of the executive 
authorities of member states to EurAsEC bodies or the compilation of 
complaints filed with relevant national authorities by economic entities. The 
latter method would be used where a firm in country A, operating in country 
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B, encounters a violation of EurAsEC legislation by country B authorities 
and complains to the authorities of its native country A. The authorities 
in country A register the complaints and file them for the relevant bodies 
of the Community. The CUC and its subsidiary bodies, it is hoped, through 
regular discussion, would effectively resolve the problem of the failure 
to implement decisions. In this context, the sensitive issue of potential 
non-compliance could be discussed without undue politicisation. This 
method of political monitoring might be especially efficient because in 
practice the ministers and heads of other national authorities play a 
key role in the enforcement of decisions: “what is important is the will of 
national ministers.7” 
Given the limited power of the Community Court and the degree of 
ambiguity regarding the legal status of its decisions, the political mechanism 
of mutual control in the course of subsidiary bodies, is, in fact, the only 
option. All the same, it should be said that political monitoring requires a 
high level of mutual trust.
Conclusions
Based on our analysis we have been able to formulate a number of 
recommendations for improving the institutional structure of the EurAsEC 
and for the development of integration processes at large. Recommendations 
are based not necessarily on what is desirable, but on what is possible given 
existing economic relations between the Community’s member states, 
their current level of integration, and their internal political and economic 
situations. 
1. Active cooperation in specific sectors should continue, especially in 
those sectors where there are interested partners (energy, transport). 
It is important to give preferential treatment to industrial cooperation, 
technology transfer and investment cooperation. Measures to reduce 
competition at the markets of third countries, including coordinating 
pricing and delivery volumes (e.g., in the fuel and energy complex, 
metallurgy, chemical industry), should have a major impact8. 
2. Alongside the implementation of sectoral programmes and certain 
projects, financial solidarity must be strengthened, for example, by 
requiring a minimum contribution even from member states of the 
Eurasian Economic Community that have no direct interest in certain 
projects. In future, it would be useful to increase the budget and to fund 
projects out of the common budget. Otherwise, the implementation 
7 Interview with a senior official of the Secretariat of the EurAsEC Integration Committee.
8 We should follow the example not only of the EU but of other integration organisations. For 
example, within the ASEAN there is an association of coffee producers.
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of measures will regularly be compromised by the need to conduct 
complex negotiations each time about the contributions required from 
member states.
3. It should be clearly understood that the future of the EurAsEC depends 
on the efficacy of the Customs Union between the three member 
countries and movement toward the Common Economic Space (CES). 
Nevertheless the desire to hasten the development of the CES should 
not lead to “loss of quality”.
4. The work of the Customs Union should not be confined to issues of 
foreign trade. All countries benefit from establishing the Common 
Economic Space, but these benefits are unevenly distributed. The 
countries with the most competitive economies obtain the greatest 
positive impact. The interests of less competitive countries should be 
supported through “compensatory” regional or industrial policies. Such 
policies should be implemented at the supranational level (for example, 
by giving appropriate powers to the CUC) and financed by the common 
budget. The presence of a “compensatory” policy may give the rearguard 
countries an additional incentive to join the Customs Union.
5. The CUC should operate initially according to two principles: strict 
adherence to the practice of adopting decisions by majority in those areas 
where it is stipulated, and taking into consideration the interests of the 
countries opposing the adoption of certain decisions on the basis of their 
national interests. As a rule, the adoption of the decision should be by 
majority, otherwise it would be impossible to operate the CU. However, 
this should not “intimidate” participating countries, otherwise they may 
attempt to sabotage the common decisions.
6. It would be desirable to transform the CUC into a body that can uphold the 
common interests of the Community, which is possible only by changing 
the fundamental principle of its forming. This is an extremely difficult step, 
but the possibility of such a transformation is provided for in the signed 
Treaty on the CUC.
7. Within the structure of the EurAsEC it would be beneficial to consider 
the possibility of transferring the right to make certain decisions from 
the highest level (the Interstate Council) to the Integration Committee 
and the subsidiary bodies. This will significantly reduce the time it takes 
to make decisions (by allowing decision-making by qualified majority), 
which in turn will make member states more inclined to compromise.
8. It makes sense to involve the Interparliamentary Assembly in the 
preparatory process of decision-making of the Interstate Council. 
Currently, the best possible way for the IPA to participate is through 
a system of regular mandatory consultations. It would be helpful to 
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coordinate legislative plans for the IPA with the prospective activities of 
the EurAsEC.
9. Enactment of the Customs Code in 2010 has revealed a lack of 
effective communication between the bodies of the EurAsEC and the 
business community. The potential of the existing Eurasian Business 
Council had not yet been fully realised. Information flow should be 
two-way: EurAsEC bodies might demonstrate greater transparency, 
thus providing a stable and predictable regulatory environment, and 
could increasingly rely on the expertise and advice of the business 
community in drafting decisions.
10. To increase the effectiveness of the institutional structure of the 
EurAsEC it is essential to improve coordination between the sectoral 
councils. There are two possible solutions, which could be implemented 
simultaneously. The first solution is to hold joint meetings of two or three 
councils on issues of related competencies. Secondly, similar sectoral 
councils could be merged on a permanent basis. Interaction between 
sectoral councils will not only enhance the consistency between the 
decisions taken and the overall objectives of the Community, but would 
also create an opportunity for legislative proposals to be bundled so that 
effective compromises can be considered.
11. The more numerous the EurAsEC legislative acts would be, especially 
that of the Customs Union, the more the quality of implementation of 
decisions at the national level may become the “achilles heel” of the 
EurAsEC. In this regard, it makes sense to consider increasing the role 
of the Court of Justice of the Community by enhancing its links with the 
national courts. However, this is a long-term problem which can only be 
solved with the judicial reform at national level.
12. EurAsEC decisions should be streamlined and their legal force and 
role in national law of member states should be clarified. It is also 
desirable to formalise the existing mechanism for political monitoring of 
the execution of EurAsEC decisions at national level. The best solution for 
this would be to give the CU Commission and sectoral councils oversight 
powers.
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 On Possibility of Artificial 
Currency Devaluation Within 
the Customs Union*
Introduction 
After Japan’s currency interventions in September 2010, the overall view 
was that a “devaluation race” had begun, i.e. a situation where countries strive 
to weaken their currencies so that their economies can gain a competitive 
advantage. However, the IMF head promptly responded to these statements, 
saying he sees no threat of a global currency war. 
The recent currency interventions by a number of countries can be viewed as 
a form of protectionism. After World War I, some governments adopted such 
a policy in order to preserve jobs and protect domestic industry. However, 
these governments refrained from making more decisive steps towards 
economic restructuring such as wage cuts or reforms aimed at enhancing 
labour productivity. Nowadays, currency interventions are largely a means 
of preventing currencies from rapid strengthening rather than artificial 
devaluation. 
Artificial devaluation entails an increase in exchange reserves and a soft 
monetary policy. The latter may in turn result in non-optimum distribution of 
capital and pave the way for bubbles in the housing and other asset markets. 
Efforts to weaken a national currency at all costs are counterproductive, 
especially where several currencies are being devalued simultaneously. In such 
a situation, the price of gold and other precious metals and raw materials will 
increase, and all participants in a devaluation race will eventually lose, as will 
all third parties, due to stricter protectionist policies, shrinking international 
economic cooperation and potential setbacks in the global financial system. 
Any benefits of devaluation for each individual country will be wiped out by 
similar actions by neighbouring countries.
At the summit in November 2010 in Seoul, the heads of the G20 agreed that 
any “war” in this sphere, or any artificial devaluation of national currencies, 
is inadmissible. Although no direct measures against low exchange rate 
policies were promulgated, the parties agreed to control swift or chaotic 
* “This paper has been written in November 2010, and only focuses on a possibility of competitive 
devaluation within the Customs Union. Nevertheless, a Belarusian currency crisis that ended up 
with a 56% devaluation in May 2011 to some extent confirms our proposition that none of the CU 
members would have an interest in artificial devaluation of national currency”.
12Eurasian Development Bank
Institutions of Regional 
Integration
Evgeny Vinokurov, Elvira Kurmanaliyeva “On Possibility of Artificial 
Currency Devaluation Within the Customs Union”
exchange rate fluctuations, to move towards currency systems that would 
reflect market fundamentals, and to give up competitive devaluation of their 
currencies. This further indicates their understanding of the harm such 
protectionist policies may bring about. It is therefore premature to talk about 
the start of a devaluation race.
In December 2010 the heads of the three Customs Union countries (Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus) signed the fundamental documents to form the 
Common Economic Space (CES). With the inception of the Customs Union, 
the issue of unilateral currency devaluation by any one member becomes 
even more pressing. What are the prospects for such behaviour, and what 
consequences would artificial devaluation have in Customs Union states? In 
this paper we attempt to answer these questions. The next section discusses 
recent trends in the formation of national currency exchange rates in these 
three countries. Section III discusses the probability of competitive devaluation. 
Section IV provides an insight into the effects of real devaluation on trade flows. 
The last section summarises our analysis.
The foreign exchange policy in the Customs Union
Should a country have to fix its national currency exchange rate or, quite the 
opposite, allow it to float freely? Maybe the Customs Union members should 
form a monetary union with the neighbouring countries and adopt a common 
currency, as did the European Union? All these forms of currency regime have 
already been tested. The ability of a monetary union to stand up to currency 
wars depends on the situation in each individual country or union. 
A monetary union is the most definite form of fixing currency exchange rates. 
Its most obvious advantage is the stability of the exchange rate. Unlike under 
a volatile floating exchange rate scenario, the stability of a common currency 
works to reduce exporters’ risks. Another important advantage is that union 
members are unable to interfere with the currency market to promote the 
artificial devaluation of their currencies against those of their partners. A 
monetary union also has a number of drawbacks. The most notable is the 
loss of independence in macroeconomic policy making. No central bank in a 
union can raise or reduce its official rate without consulting its counterparts. If 
business cycles in union countries are fully synchronised, this process is easy. 
But where countries need different monetary policies, as is the case with 
Greece in the European Union, this can pose major problems.
From the perspective of the macroeconomic synchronisation of the Customs 
Union states, calculations using the System of Indicators of Eurasian 
Integration (SIEI)(EDB,2009) in Figures 7.1. and 7.2. suggest that there is no 
trend towards the macroeconomic convergence of post-Soviet states. The 
leaders in terms of convergence are small groups, first of all EurAsEC-3 (the 
Customs Union). The second decade since the disintegration of the Soviet 
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Figure 7.1.
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Union saw the convergence process in all the five post-Soviet country groups. 
This convergence was driven by similarities in the monetary and credit policies 
of all countries in the region and, to some extent, trends in the global currency 
market.
In December 2010 the heads of the Customs Union states met in Moscow 
to discuss the formation of a Common Economic Space, which is expected 
to take place in 2012. To this end, a package of documents was signed on 
various aspects of economic cooperation between Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan within the CES framework. These documents will become law 
after ratification by each member state. The most important among the 
17 agreements are those pertaining to the coordination of macroeconomic 
and monetary policies. Macroeconomic coordination will include agreeing 
currency exchange rates and foreign debt, inflation and budgetary deficit 
levels; and monetary coordination will include agreeing currency 
interventions and mutual settlement in national currencies. The initial 
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version of this agreement provided for closer cooperation in monetary 
policy making, but then central banks voiced their concerns about losing 
independence in implementing these policies. The issue of a common currency 
has not been discussed so far.
Is a currency war in the Customs Union possible?
How instrumental can devaluation be in securing a competitive advantage for 
any of the Customs Union state? To answer this question we need to make 
a distinction between nominal and real devaluation (i.e. the slumping of a 
national currency exchange rate), artificial devaluation caused by central bank 
interference with the currency market, and natural devaluation resulting from 
a country’s macroeconomic situation. 
Real bilateral exchange rates (RER) and real effective exchange rates (REER)1 
reflect actual changes in the standing of a currency and competitiveness 
of a country. The dynamics of REER and RER in the Customs Union states, 
as shown in Figures 7.3. and 7.4., have several notable trends. In the period 
from 2001 to 2009, REER was increasing in Russia and Kazakhstan, which 
means a trend towards more expensive exports and poorer competitiveness. 
Belarus’ REER was declining steadily, making the country’s exports more 
competitive. 
The mechanism of nominal artificial devaluation is as follows: a country 
replenishes its foreign exchange reserves by buying foreign currency on 
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1 REER is calculated as average real exchange rate of the currency of country C against 
the currencies of all trade partners P:                                                                      ,  where B
P
- share of 
partner P in trade with country C; Pr
C
 - prices in country C; Pr
P
 - prices in partner country P; 
and K
P
- exchange rate.
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the market, which enables it to issue more national currency and create 
conditions for nominal devaluation.
In the short term, artificial devaluation will make national exports cheaper 
compared to those of other countries and encourage growth in demand for 
the country’s products. These effects are much weaker in industries whose 
product cost structure is dominated by imported components. However, 
apart from these benefits for exporters, devaluation of this sort entails some 
negative consequences. Particularly, devaluation of the national currency 
renders loans denominated in foreign currency expensive for domestic 
borrowers. Countries with huge foreign debt may also face problems caused 
by significant devaluation (this is relevant to Belarus, since its foreign debt 
accounts for 52% of GDP and is growing rapidly). In countries with historically 
high inflation levels, artificial devaluation and an excessive supply of money 
may escalate inflation. On the whole, the real exchange rate of a currency 
does not change in the medium term. In other words, manipulating exchange 
rates does not bring about any improvements in competitiveness in the long 
and medium term, and the costs of artificial devaluation exceed the short-
term benefits.
Let us look into the dynamics of five indices (compared to the same month of 
the previous year) for each country: central bank currency reserves, supply 
of money M2, exchange rate vs. the US dollar, consumer price index (CPI) 
and manufacturers’ price index (MPI).
As is shown in Figures 7.5 and 7.6, the monetary mass in Russia changes 
almost in parallel with currency reserves. Thus, in 2001-2010 monetary 
mass was growing by 35% per annum on average, resulting in growth in 
manufacturers’ prices. An insignificant change in the nominal exchange rate 
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Figure 7.5. 
Changes in central 
bank currency 
reserves and 
monetary mass M2 
(%)
Sources: IFS, IMF and 
the central banks of 
Russia, Kazakhstan 
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caused gradual real strengthening of the rouble (i.e. an increase in REER) and 
deterioration of competitiveness. 
The situation in Kazakhstan is largely identical, apart from volatility: currency 
reserves were growing by 37% per annum on average throughout the 
period under review. This resulted in a 40% growth in monetary mass and 
an 11% growth in manufacturers’ prices. The exchange rate of the Kazakh 
tenge strengthened somewhat in real terms, albeit to a lesser extent than 
that of the Russian rouble.
The Belarusian economy differs significantly in this respect from the Russian 
and Kazakh economies. From 2005 to mid-2008 the Belarusian rouble was 
fixed against the US dollar, and currency reserves were replenished largely by 
external borrowing. Therefore, the diagram does not reflect the correlation 
between changes in money supply and changes in currency reserves. 
Nevertheless, the expansive monetary and credit policy in 2001-2006 
created conditions for an average 34% growth in manufacturers’ prices. 
After devaluation of the national currency in 2009 the Central Bank of 
Belarus introduced a regulated floating rate, thus creating conditions for 
correlation between currency reserves and the monetary mass (see figure 
7.5) and the emergence of inflation pressure in early 2010 (see Figure 7.6). 
As a result of considerable nominal devaluation of the Belarusian rouble 
against the currencies of trade partners (namely, Russia) Belarus’ REER 
gradually declined throughout 2001-2009.
During the 2009 crisis, nominal natural devaluation of the Russian rouble, 
Kazakh tenge and Belarusian rouble peaked at 47%, 25% and 36% 
respectively (see Figure 7.6); devaluation against the US dollar in that year 
averaged at 28%, 22% and 30% respectively. 
A higher rate of this devaluation compared with other Customs Union states 
improved the competitiveness of Belarus’ exports in 2009 by 1.1% on 
average (Figure 7.4 shows a decline in real bilateral exchange rates of Belarus 
vs. Russia, and Belarus vs. Kazakhstan).
What are the prospects of artificial devaluation of the Belarusian rouble in 
the near future? Belarus will probably not need to resort to such a measure 
in order to maintain competitiveness on the markets of its partners in the 
Customs Union, as their “raw material” currencies will do this job for Belarus 
(the rouble and the tenge are likely to strengthen). An important factor that will 
fuel inflation in Belarus in the near future is the expansive monetary and credit 
policy; it has been pursued since May 2010 and was partially responsible 
for a 6% increase in GDP in the first nine months of 2010. This policy also 
resulted in a significant increase in foreign debt and the cost of labour, and is 
expected to dramatically reduce Belarus’ competitive advantage and devalue 
its currency even further. 
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Our analysis of data confirms that none of the Customs Union countries 
can artificially devalue its currency in order to improve competitiveness in 
the medium and long term, because any currency intervention results in an 
increase in the monetary mass and pressure on prices. Artificial manipulation 
of the exchange rate can only bring about short-lived growth in demand for 
exports, but then pressure on prices adjusts the real exchange rate of the 
national currency. 
What are the consequences of real devaluation?
As we have mentioned in the previous section, a country cannot make its 
exports more competitive by means of artificial devaluation. A real exchange 
rate, which indicates a country’s competitiveness, is determined solely by 
macroeconomic policy and the changing situation on external markets. 
Any change in competitiveness (e.g., real currency devaluation) must change 
(increase) demand for the country’s exports. Let us look into a connection 
between exports and real exchange rates in the Customs Union states. Table 
7.1 shows the ratios of correlation between real bilateral exchange rates and 
export flows, by commodity group. Commodity groups that account for at 
least 10% of a country’s total exports to any importing country are marked 
bold. Grey cells contain net export commodity groups in 2001-2009. Since, in 
accordance with economic theory, real devaluation is beneficial for a country’s 
exports, the correlation ratio value must be negative. A higher ratio indicates 
closer correlation between exports and real exchange rate2.
For Russian exports, a positive correlation ratio means that real devaluation of 
the rouble is unlikely to further Russian exports considerably, as the Russian 
economy is heavily dependent on export of resources, which prices are 
dictated principally by the global situation. Real devaluation will not influence 
the competitiveness of Russian exports. 
The situation is different in Belarus: correlation ratios are negative in all 
industries, however, just like in Russia and Kazakhstan. A positive trade 
balance in many commodity groups indicates Belarus’ strong competitive 
advantage over its partners in the Customs Union. If the competitive 
conditions of trade with Russia improve, Belarus’ food, textile, shoes and 
mechanical engineering will have an advantage. Belarus is a net exporter in 
trade with Kazakhstan and has a competitive advantage in practically all non-
raw-material commodity groups. 
Kazakhstan has a negative correlation value in trade with Russia and in 
some commodity groups exported to Belarus. Particularly, improved 
competitiveness in trade with Belarus will benefit textiles and shoes, 
2 Notably, since ratios were computed based on the annual values of nine years (2001–2009), 
correlation ratios are statistically insignificant.
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Table 7.1.
Ratios of correlation 
between exports 
and real bilateral 
exchange rates in the 
Customs Union (in 
2001-200)
Source: computed 
based on IFS, IMF 
and TradeMap 
International Trade 
Centre statistics
HS code Commodity group
Russian 
exports to 
Kazakhstan
Kazakh 
exports to 
Russia
Belarusian 
exports to 
Kazakhstan
Kazakh 
exports to 
Belarus
Russian 
exports to 
Belarus
Belarusian 
exports to 
Russia
01–2 Food and farm produce 0.2 –0.61 –0.79 0.31 0. –0.94
2–2 Minerals 0.83 –0.78 –0. 0. 0.98 –0.2
2–3 Chemicals 0.84 –0.82 –0. 0. 0. –0.2
0–3 Rubber 0. –0.3 –0.68 0.2 0.2 –0.
– Timber and paper 0. –0. –0. 0. 0. –0.
0– Textile and shoes 0. –0.1 –0. –0.34 0. –0.79
–1 Cement, glass and precious metals 0. –0. –0.0 0. 0.2 –0.3
2–3 Iron and steel 0.87 –0.82 –0. 0.81 0.81 –0.8
– Electric machinery and equipment 0.82 –0. –0.54 0. 0.67 –0.87
– Cars and transport equipment 0.82 –0. –0.46 –0.33 0.3 –0.64
0–3 Instruments and optic equipment 0. –0. –0. 0.3 0. –0.
– Furniture, toys and sport equipment 0. –0.2 –0. –0. 0.2 –0.3
 Others –0.2 –0.33 –0.3 0.3 0.1 –0.3
Total 0. –0. -0.2 0.3 0. –0.
transport equipment, furniture and sports equipment. On the whole, these 
industries are of little significance for the economy.
Therefore, calculations of simple correlation ratios indicate that Belarusian 
exports have an advantage over the exports of Russia and Kazakhstan. Being 
a net exporter of food and electric and transport equipment to Russia and 
Kazakhstan, and having a competitive advantage in these commodity groups, 
as well as pursuing flexible monetary and credit policy, Belarus can secure 
long-term growth in exports within the framework of the Customs Union. 
The Russian and Kazakh economies depend principally on exports of raw 
materials and therefore are not sensitive to parity changes in the prices of 
export products. 
Conclusions
Artificial devaluation is not in the interests of the Custom Union members. 
Our analysis of data confirms that none of the Customs Union countries 
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can artificially devalue its currency in order to improve competitiveness in 
the medium and long term because any currency intervention results in an 
increase in the monetary mass and pressure on prices. Artificial manipulation 
of the exchange rate can only bring about short-lived growth in demand for 
exports, but then pressure on prices adjusts the real exchange rate of the 
national currency. 
The flexibility of export prices means that exports are inversely proportional 
to the real exchange rate, i.e. a comparative growth in prices must result in 
a decline in demand for exports. A simple correlation calculation based on 
nine years of annual data showed an inverse relationship between bilateral 
exports and real exchange rates of the Russian and Kazakh currencies, which 
reflects the raw material orientation of these economies. The most important 
commodity groups of Belarus have negative correlation ratios, which indicates 
that Belarus has good prospects for growth in exports; this country trades 
mainly in non-raw-material products with its Customs Union partners. 
Of course, the Customs Union economies differ from each other in 
macroeconomic structure. Therefore, the formation of the Common 
Economic Space will require a well-balanced approach towards concerted 
macroeconomic and foreign trade policy making. 
Annex 7.1. Structure of foreign trade within 
the Customs Union (%)
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Source: TradeMap
Note: codes are given in accordance with the Foreign Trade Commodity Codes: 01–2 – food and farm produce; 2–2 – 
minerals; 2–3 – chemicals; 0–3 – rubber; – – timber and paper; 0– – textiles and shoes; –1 – cement, 
glass and precious metals; 2–3 – iron and steel; – – electric machinery and equipment; – – cars and transport 
equipment; 0–3 – instruments and optic equipment; – – furniture, toys and sport equipment;  – others.
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Main Conclusions
This study, conducted by the Eurasian Development Bank with support from 
the Professional Association of Registrars, Transfer Agents and Depositories 
(PARTAD), provides an assessment of the prospects and challenges of 
integration of the capital markets of Russia and Kazakhstan. Our analysis of 
the legal framework for mutual penetration of Russian and Kazakhstani 
capital in the form of stock market instruments shows that there are 
no insurmountable barriers to this process. Moreover, the basic legal 
preconditions for this mutual penetration are all in place. However, as the 
financial crisis persists and the capital markets of Russia and Kazakhstan 
fail to function as a single financial centre in the global financial market, 
these established preconditions are still of limited use.
Notably, these two EurAsEC member states have no explicit political or other 
barriers to integration of capital markets. This warrants synchronisation of 
their regulatory systems and infrastructure, which will allow them to quickly 
and efficiently organise, for instance, trading in Kazakhstani securities 
and depository receipts on Russian stock exchanges; to secure reliable 
communication between the holder, the issuer and the registrar by electronic 
document management systems; and to enable the disclosure of information 
on these financial instruments at a single EurAsEC centre, irrespective of 
location, in both Russian and English.
The survey of stock market participants reveals that potential issuers and 
professional players currently show little interest in the integration of the 
stock markets of Russia and Kazakhstan and prefer international markets. 
Thus, competition with other financial centres necessitates significant 
efforts to improve the attractiveness of regional financial solutions and 
instruments. 
To this end, the establishment of a common Eurasian financial centre with 
infrastructure elements located across EurAsEC countries and form a 
nAtAliA 
mAqsimchook 
(edb),
pArtAd
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single exchange, clearing and settlement system should be the ultimate goal. 
Existing economic or technical advantages mean that most of these elements 
will be concentrated in Russia, however, the EurAsEC members (primarily 
Kazakhstan) will have a role to play in the capital and physical infrastructure of 
the main institutions of this supranational financial centre. 
As part of this effort, the EDB can position itself as a unique institution which 
can not only catalyse the investment process but also serve as an 
infrastructure bridge between the capital markets of Russia and Kazakhstan 
and, potentially, other EurAsEC countries. It is of particular importance 
because, according to our survey, the level of mutual Russian and 
Kazakhstani capital market penetration does not match the actual potential 
for bilateral cooperation.
Decision-making on capital market integration issues could be greatly 
accelerated if, following the inception of the Customs Union of Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus (which seemed unrealistic just a short time ago), 
the issue of a common currency is once again placed on the political agenda. 
The adoption of a common currency would spur diverse synergetic effects 
in the economies of the member countries. In the short to medium term 
a broader use of national currencies in mutual trade could have positive 
effect on the integration of capital markets. 
To date, the most serious concerns are centred around the fact that, though 
the Russian economy faces the challenges of post-crisis rehabilitation, no 
strategic documents or policies have yet been formulated on the development 
of the Russian financial market as the backbone of an integrated EurAsEC 
capital market. This is a dangerous oversight as competition between the 
developing markets is tough. 
We hope that this publication will contribute to the policy-making and 
formulation of measures for the development of the capital markets in 
Russia and Kazakhstan. The main conclusions of the study are presented 
below. 
Opportunities for mutual penetration in the Russian and Kazakhstani 
stock markets
• Extensive economic ties between Russia and Kazakhstan open 
opportunities for closer interaction between the national stock markets. 
The most important issue here is perfection, harmonisation and unification 
of the legal framework for the issuance of, and trading in securities and 
the activities of professional stock market players. 
• Some regulatory provisions and mechanisms for trading and placement 
of foreign securities on Russian and Kazakhstani markets are already in 
place. 
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• Free trading in Russian and Kazakhstani securities (registration of 
transactions) in each other’s territories, including organised markets, 
is technically impossible unless registrar licences become mutually 
recognised.
• In the case of Russian and Kazakh depository receipts (RDR and KDR), the 
legislation was passed ahead of market needs, as not a single issuance 
has been registered to date.
• Integration of the securities markets of two states is still at an initial 
stage. Both Russian and Kazakhstani regulations provide for foreign 
securities turnover on the national organised markets, but currently 
Russian regulations contain more restrictions compared to those of 
Kazakhstan. 
Needs and preferences in respect of the mutual penetration of stock 
markets: survey results 
• Kazakhstani players are interested in Russian financial market as a source 
of financial resources. By contrast, Russian businesses view Kazakhstani 
capital market as a springboard to Kazakhstan’s natural resources. As 
one would therefore expect, most Kazakhstani organisations are keen 
to have their securities traded on the Russian market, whereas Russian 
companies are not interested in the Kazakhstani market in this way. 
• Natural resources, financial institutions, energy, and telecommunications 
are the priority sectors for Kazakhstani professional stock market 
players. Russian players only indicated interest in the natural resources 
sector and in Kazakhstani financial institutions. 
100%
Finance
Natural resources
Telecommunications
Agriculture
Energy
Consumer goods 
production
0%
30%
0%
20%
0%
Priority sectors 
for Kazakhstani 
professional players
• Most of the Kazakhstani organisations that already hold Russian 
securities intend new purchases in the next six months. Over 30% of 
respondents intend to buy Russian securities for the first time. Some 
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respondents pointed out that they buy Russian securities in the form 
of GDR or ADR internationally rather than from the Russian stock 
exchanges. 
Kazakhstani 
ownership of Russian 
securities
Russian ownership 
of Kazakhstani 
securities
%
0%
USA
2% 2%
Great Britain Canada Europe Other
2%
Kazakhstani 
ownership of other 
countries’ securities
Interest in having 
securities listed in 
Russia
12% % 2%
Yes No No reply
• At present, Kazakhstani issuers are not interested in the Russian market 
and most of them have listed their securities on the LSE. Direct trading in 
foreign securities on Russian stock exchanges is limited by excessive legal 
restrictions. 
• As the financial crisis persists and the capital markets of Russia and 
Kazakhstan still have insufficient integration with the global market, the 
Russian and Kazakh legal provisions for the issuance of RDR and KDR on 
foreign securities in the national stock exchanges are still of limited use. 
• Financial resources controlled by Russian private pension funds 
or management companies can be viewed as a potential source of 
Russian portfolio investments in Kazakhstani securities. However, to 
Own securities from Russian issuers Do not own No reply
2% % 12%
Own securities from Kazakhstani issuers Do not own
% %
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use these opportunities provided by Russian law, index funds holding 
Kazakhstani securities must be created. This is unlikely to happen in 
the near future, at least until the Kazakhstani capital market recovers 
from the global crisis and/or Kazakhstani securities are traded on the 
Russian market.
• Kazakhstani pension funds are active players on the financial markets 
of the republic and elsewhere. However, they should not be relied on as 
a means of significant investments abroad, particularly not in Russia. 
At present they are redirecting their investment strategy towards 
increasing holdings of Kazakh government securities and reducing 
investments in foreign securities.
Integration of Russian and Kazakhstani stock 
exchanges
• Our survey covered Russia’s main stock exchanges (RTS and MICEX) 
and their Kazakh counterpart – KASE. RTS ranks first of the two in terms 
of investments in other country. To date, only RTS has a subsidiary in 
Kazakhstan (Commodity Stock Exchange ETS) and holds Kazakhstani 
securities. 
• Russian stock exchanges are showing interest in cooperation with Kazakh 
partners and wish to add Kazakh instruments to their trading lists. 
• Although the main responsibility for simplifying interaction between 
organised market players from two countries lies with stock exchanges 
themselves, the legislation also has an important role to play in this 
process. For example, both stock exchanges and professional capital 
market players need an adequate mechanism of nominal holding for 
foreign investors that should fit in with the laws of two states, and a 
developed clearing system, including centralised functions.
• Another important element of technical integration is the development 
and introduction of a common electronic document management 
technology, which would allow information exchange between the stock 
exchanges and the traders to be standardised and accelerated.
• In the short term, the main focus should be on the integration of stock 
exchanges of Russia and Kazakhstan as the hosts of the most developed 
markets in EurAsEC. A positive example of integration on the commodity 
market is the establishment in late 2008 of the Eurasian Trade System 
(ETS) commodity exchange by RFCA (40% of the charter capital) and RTS 
(60%). 
• We should also highlight the project to create the Eurasian Stock 
Exchange of Agricultural Produce, Raw Materials and Foodstuffs that is 
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being developed on the initiative of the EurAsEC Integration Committee 
with the participation of Russian and Kazakh partners. This basically 
competes with the above ETS project. The new exchange will be based on 
the Belarusian Universal Commodity Exchange and is expected to start 
in 2011. If this project becomes a success, it would be desirable for its 
members to find mutually acceptable mechanisms for its integration 
with the ETS – perhaps envolving already operational trading floor in 
Almaty. 
• During the past decade a great deal of organisational work has been 
carried out in both countries, however we cannot so far say that an 
adequate level of integration has been achieved, nor can we say that we 
are nearing a common stock exchange space.
Introduction
At the current stage of the economic development of post-Soviet countries 
their capital markets generally show very modest achievements, with 
only Russian and, to a lesser extent, Ukrainian and Kazakhstani markets 
approaching a medium level of development. With the persistent 
fragmentation of the economic space of the CIS and EurAsEC, less than a 
year ago only bilateral interaction between capital markets was deemed 
feasible. However, the events that took place during this short time span, 
particularly, the realignment of political forces in Ukraine and the inception 
of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, have created 
potential for advancing closer interaction of capital markets. This potential 
could be amplified further if Russia and Kazakhstan attempt to coordinate 
their initiatives to create internationally recognised financial centres in both 
countries. 
The need for a coordinated development approach is driven by the challenges 
two countries have in common, combined with increasing activity in each 
other’s stock markets by their professional players and infrastructure 
organisations, including the stock exchanges themselves. Enhancing the 
interaction between Russian and Kazakhstani capital markets is pivotal in 
the light of the prospective launch of Russia-Kazakhstan-Belarus Common 
Economic Space (CES). This interaction could provide a basis for regional 
economic integration in general and promote the development of a transborder 
financial infrastructure in particular. Integration of financial markets will enable 
a more efficient application of savings and attract additional investments. 
Issuers will be able to reduce their borrowing costs and investors will have the 
opportunities to diversify their investment portfolios, resulting in lower 
investment risks. The funds raised on the integrated capital markets of 
Russia and Kazakhstan (and, prospectively, other CES countries) can be used 
to finance transborder infrastructure development in various sectors. 
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Therefore, the assessment of the prospects for integration of the capital 
markets of Russia and Kazakhstan is an important stage for coordinated 
economic development of these countries and other EurAsEC members 
alike. In the present conditions, EurAsEC needs a comprehensive financial 
policy which must be closely related to the real sector of the economy. 
The assessment includes, inter alia, a comparative analysis of the legal 
framework and regulations applicable to the capital markets of both 
countries in order to identify critical differences and develop common 
approaches to common problems. Following this logic, close attention must 
be paid to the development of consolidated financial market infrastructure, 
including interconnected systems of exchange trading, settlement and 
clearing, in order to create the technological premises for free movement of 
capital.
More precise tuning of financial market regulation and infrastructure (in legal 
and institutional terms) will require identification of the needs and preferences 
of market players from both countries, and with due regard for the fact that 
these needs and preferences reflect the current regulatory environment 
and infrastructure. Overcoming the existing barriers will require an analysis 
at the supranational level. This report is the EDB’s contribution to study 
and systematise the main problems impeding the integration of the capital 
markets of Russia and Kazakhstan.
Current status: mutual penetration of stock markets and 
infrastructure
• At present, Russia and Kazakhstan have the most developed stock 
markets in the post-Soviet space.
• However, the weak legal framework renders them prone to crises and 
impedes mutual penetration.
• Integration of the securities markets of EurAsEC and CIS countries is still 
at an initial stage.
The development and main features of the stock markets of Russia and 
Kazakhstan 
The development of the stock markets
In both Russia and Kazakhstan, the stock markets evolved in parallel with the 
market economy. The foundations were laid in the 1990s, when privatisation 
gave rise to the first joint-stock companies, broker firms and stock exchanges. 
Russia implemented a mass privatisation programme, and initially privatisation 
coupon exchange occurred outside the organised market. In Kazakhstan 
stock market development and privatisation of state assets proceeded 
simultaneously – through public placements on the young stock exchange. 
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This resulted in the state-initiated placements being largely sold to strategic 
investors, rather than the public at large. 
Almost simultaneously both countries adopted laws to regulate the stock 
market and created the necessary infrastructure, including stock exchanges, 
depositories and clearing agencies. Various factors, such as institution building, 
adoption of new laws and socioeconomic reforms eventually determined the 
specific features of the national markets (Golovnin et al., 2010). 
Whereas in the 1990s the stock market functioned essentially as a 
mechanism for the redistribution of property, from the early 2000s they 
worked to attract investments in the economy. The first foreign securities 
appeared on Russian (Tararuyev, 2010) and Kazakhstani (Dontsov, 2003) 
stock markets, and nongovernment issuers were becoming increasingly 
active. However, the real investment potential of the stock markets still fell 
short of the countries’ need for financial resources.
Between 2005 and 2007 there was an upsurge in stock market activity in 
both countries: the average annual growth of the Russian Stock Exchange 
(RTS) was 50%, whilst that of Kazakhstani Stock Exchange (KASE) exceeded 
150%. Russian and Kazakhstani markets became leaders in the post-Soviet 
space in most parameters. For example, at the end of 2007 capitalisation of 
the Russian and Kazakhstani markets had reached 99.8% and 40.8% of GDP, 
respectively. Yet in many other qualitative characteristics (market liquidity, 
dividend yield, number of instruments traded) they lagged behind the leading 
developing markets, let alone the developed markets. 
The financial crisis of 2008 seriously affected the dynamics and structure 
of the Russian and Kazakhstani securities markets. A dramatic capital 
outflow, pressing macroeconomic problems (inflation, slowdown in 
industrial growth, huge external private sector debt, etc.) led to a 
Figure 8.1.
Stock market indices 
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protracted decline of the overcapitalised markets at the end of 2008 
(see Figure 8.1). The level of non-residents’ transactions and private 
investors also shrank, and other categories of investors, such as investment 
funds, low-keyed, too.
The decline in market capitalisation in 2008 was especially sharp in Russia 
and Kazakhstan, as these countries had the most open economies in the 
CIS. According to the CIS Executive Committee, this index dropped by more 
than 70% in Russia and more than 40% in Kazakhstan (CIS Executive 
Committee, 2009). Today the markets look more optimistic. In late June 
2010 capitalisation on KASE was $52.6 billion1. In dynamics, this 
represents a 19% increase over 2009, yet it falls some 30% short of the 
2008 capitalisation level. In Russia, as at September 30, 2010, total market 
capitalisation had reached $817 billion – an annual growth of 21.5%, but 
merely 35.6% of the 2008 level2. 
The Russian and Kazakhstani stock markets are the unquestionable leaders 
in the CIS in absolute figures. Belarus has a market of government securities, 
but there is no notable progress in the corporate market development. In 
Central Asia, organised securities markets are very weak, although they have 
demonstrated positive dynamics in recent years. 
Currently both the Russian and Kazakhstani stock markets lack a strong 
investor base. Many regulatory issues still need to be worked out, and market 
players are less protected than in developed countries. The derivatives 
market, which provides protection against risks, is also poorly developed. 
In its assessment of the stock market laws of its 29 member states the 
EBRD classifies Russia and Kazakhstan as medium compliance countries 
by International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) standards 
(EBRD, 2008).
The Russian stock market is characterised by considerable commercial bank 
activity. Only limited quantities of shares from Russian issuers can be found 
in free circulation. This situation can be explained by high concentration of 
shares in the hands of a limited number of holders. Individual investors have no 
direct access to the market, because shares are being bought up in packages 
by wholesale brokers and commercial banks. Institutional investors (unit and 
incorporated investment funds, pension funds, insurance companies) are not 
sufficiently represented among the professionals. On the whole, the Russian 
market is still largely speculative (Sergeyev, 2007). 
In Kazakhstan, banks are also active stock market players. They issue shares, 
bonds, bills of exchange, certificates of deposit and other instruments, act as 
1 http://www.investfunds.kz/indicators/.
2 http://stocks.investfunds.ru/indicators/capitalization/.
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investors and carry out agency transactions in securities (Dontsov, 2003). 
Companies working in the retail sector and investment services make no 
secret of the fact that their goal is merely to raise financial resources in 
Kazakhstan with a view to invest them abroad. This position bears no promise 
of benefit for the Kazakh economy, but nevertheless creates a competitive 
environment and fuels market activity (Biznes & Vlast, 2008). Pension funds 
had been the largest group of domestic investors prior to the crisis, but, due 
to their investment rules, they have currently reduced their presence on 
the shares and bonds market. Compared to Russia, the Kazakhstani stock 
market is characterised by low liquidity of the secondary market which is 
attributable mainly to a lack of traded instruments and poor development 
of the derivatives and shares markets. Many Kazakhstani issuers are still 
reluctant to disclose their financial information or share control over their 
business with external shareholders (Karagusova, 2008). Generally, these 
problems can be found in all CIS stock markets, and this, along with the 
legal barriers, impedes the integration process in the region.
Interaction between Russia and Kazakhstan in investments and finance 
Economic cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan is traditionally 
intensive. According to data from the System of Indicators of Eurasian 
Integration (EDB, 2009), the country pair Russia-Kazakhstan shows the 
highest level of integration in terms of mutual trade. The EurAsEC region, 
which both countries belong to, also records positive integration dynamics. 
Whereas in 2000 Russian investments in Kazakhstan accounted for as 
little as 0.4% of the total investments in EurAsEC countries, by 2008 this 
figure had increased to 7.7% (Heifetz, 2009). However, the main target 
for Russian investments is Belarus. Kazakhstan, on the contrary, is the 
main investor in Russia within the EurAsEC grouping. In 2000 Russia 
received 49% of all investments in EurAsEC countries, and by 2008 this 
Table 8.1.
Accumulated mutual 
investments by 
Russia and EurAsEC 
countries (early 
200, $ million)
Source: Heifetz, 
200
Russian investments in EurAsEC countries EurAsEC countries investments in Russia
2000 2008 2000 2008
All All
Direct and portfolio 
investments
All All
Direct and portfolio 
investments
Belarus 490.2 771.2 661.9 2.5 103.5 32.7
Kazakhstan 2.2 99.7 30.2 5.7 894.8 228
Kyrgyzstan 0 20.6 0.1 0.1 70.5 532
Tajikistan 0 61.7 1.2 0 25.9 0
Uzbekistan 0.4 333.9 250.7 3.5 7 5.2
Total EurAsEC 492.8 1287.1 944.1 11.6 1101.7 271.1
Total CIS 555.6 2521.4 1921.3 19.3 1502.6 562.8
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figure had increased to 81%. Thus, the interaction between Russia and 
Kazakhstan demonstrates an upward trend (see Table 8.1).
To date, the Russian investments in neighbouring countries (particularly, 
EurAsEC members) target exclusively natural resources and energy (Heifetz, 
2009). In Kazakhstan, the main recipient of Russian capital is the fuel and 
energy complex. According to a number of open sources, many large stock 
market players in Russia, including RTS, MICEX, Sberbank, Depository and 
Clearing Company, and Rosbank, show sustained (albeit narrow) interest in 
cooperation with Kazakhstani securities market institutions.
Financial institutions from CIS countries are strengthening their presence 
on each other’s markets (Golovnin, 2008). Russian and Kazakhstani banks 
are especially active in foreign expansion; in particular: VTB, Sberbank and 
Alfa Bank of Russia and BTA Bank, Kazkommertsbank and Halyk Bank of 
Kazakhstan. Russian investment companies are gradually entering the 
emerging CIS stock markets, preferring the relatively advanced markets 
of Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Thus, KIT Finance and Renaissance Capital 
established their presence in Kazakhstan, and Troika Dialog joined them 
recently. In addition, two management companies (subsidiaries of Russian 
companies), KIT Fortis Investment Management and Avangard Capital, 
are now operating in Kazakhstan. Members of Kazakh banking holding 
companies are also present in the Russian stock market. These are typically 
small, except for East Kommerts investment group, which at the end of 
2007 ranked 7th among Russian investment companies in terms of 
securities transactions.
Unlike banks and investment companies, organisations representing stock 
market infrastructure (stock exchanges, depositories, clearing agents) do 
not so far have a significant presence in other countries’ markets. They 
interact mainly by entering into memoranda of understanding. There are 
three examples worth noting: KASE’s shareholding in the Kyrgyz Stock 
Exchange; a joint project between RTS and Ukrainian investment 
companies to establish a new Ukrainian Stock Exchange; and a joint 
project between KASE and RTS to launch the Eurasian Trade System in 
Almaty.
As mentioned above, after the crisis of 2008-2009 
the stock markets of Russia and Kazakhstan faced 
similar problems: a decline in liquidity, the withdrawal 
of foreign investors, and a drop in stock indices. 
Under these conditions the importance of portfolio 
investments grew up in both countries. According 
to statistics (see Table 8.2), Kazakhstan ranks 26th 
in terms of portfolio investments in Russia, whilst Russia ranks 11th in terms 
of portfolio investments in Kazakhstan.
The financial markets of Russia 
and Kazakhstan principally work as 
mechanisms for raising speculative 
capital which leaves the country fast 
during a crisis. 
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Table 8.2.
Portfolio investments 
(200, $ million)
Source: CPIS, IMF
Investments in Russia Volume % Ranking
Investments 
in Kazakhstan
Volume % Ranking
Luxemburg 5609 23 1 USA 18526 59 1
Ireland 5024 20 2 UK 1883 6 2
USA 3225 13 3 Japan 1870 6 3
Netherlands 2483 10 4 Germany 1693 5 4
Virgin Islands 1889 8 5 France 1625 5 5
Cyprus 1877 8 6 Netherlands 1553 5 6
UK 1317 5 7 Italy 766 2 7
Germany 889 4 8
International 
organisations
727 2 8
Australia 780 3 9 Australia 584 2 9
International 
organisations
505 2 10 Belgium 429 1 10
Kazakhstan 17 0 26 Russia 428 1 11
Table 8.3.
Russian portfolio and 
direct investments 
($ million)
Source: CIS Statistics 
Committee
From Russia to the CIS From the CIS to Russia
2000 2005 2008 2000 2005 2008
Total CIS 118 162 1164 7 71 151
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 41 0
Armenia 0 126 437 0 4 2
Belarus 77 8 667 0 11 16
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kazakhstan 0 1 51 0 9 104
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 0 21
Moldova 31 0 0 1 0 0
Tajikistan 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 1 1
Ukraine 10 27 9 6 5 7
Official statistics indicates that mutual investments by two countries 
remain at a minimum level. Russian direct and portfolio investments in 
Kazakhstan in 2008 amounted to as little as 1.4% of all foreign investments 
(see Table 8.3).
Interaction between the stock markets in the CIS in the pre-crisis period 
was studied by Libman (2010). His calculations of stock indices correlation 
showed that this interaction is especially intense between the Russian 
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and Kazakhstani markets. The correlation index in the period from July 
2000 to May 2008 was 0.96. This can be explained by the high degree of 
convergence of two economies and the way these are regarded by foreign 
investors, who approach both in a similar fashion. According to recent 
data, during the crisis (from June 2008 to December 2009) correlation 
increased to 0.98 – a clear sign of the strong ties between the Russian and 
Kazakh economies. At the beginning of 2010 the correlation of RTS and 
KASE indices dropped back to 0.74. 
In an attempt to identify the reasons for low financial 
integration observed despite intensive trade, 
interconnected infrastructure and close historic 
and cultural links, we might turn to the example of 
Asian countries. Traditionally, mutual trade is high, 
but their stock markets practically do not interact at 
all. The International Bank for Economic Cooperation 
conducted a study of integration of stock markets 
in Asia (Garcia-Herrero et al., 2008) and the authors put forward four 
hypotheses on the factors which determine the degree of interaction: 
1) geographic direction of investments; 2) trade; 3) profitability; and 
4) liquidity. The conclusion was that the absence of integration in Asian 
markets can be explained principally by low liquidity and underdeveloped 
financial systems, which cause investors to turn their attention to other 
financial centres.
Similarly, a lack of liquid instruments for institutional investors and long-term 
capital within the country and, as a result, outflow of large issuers towards 
foreign stock exchanges impede the development of the stock markets in 
Russia and Kazakhstan and the interaction between them. 
Comparative analysis of legal frameworks and infrastructure 
The extensive economic ties between Russia and Kazakhstan open 
opportunities for closer interaction between the national stock markets. The 
most important issue in this context is the enhancement, harmonisation and 
unification of the legal framework for the issuance of and trading in securities 
and the operation of professional stock market players. The current status of 
the legal framework deserves close attention; in Table 8.4 we compare some 
critical provisions of securities market regulation in two countries.
Basic legal framework
All professional activities on the securities market are subject to licences 
issued by the authorised body in charge of the securities market: the Federal 
Financial Markets Service (FFMS) in Russia and the Agency for Regulation 
and Supervision of the Financial Markets and Financial Organisations (FSA) 
in Kazakhstan. The main functions of these bodies are: to create incentives 
The absence of integration in Asian 
markets can be explained principally by 
low liquidity and underdeveloped financial 
systems, which make investors turn their 
attention to other financial centres. 
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Russia Kazakhstan
Main law The Law On the Securities Market (RF, 1996) 
provides for the following activities:
1) brokerage;
2) dealer services;
3) securities management;
4) clearing;
5) depository services;
6) registrar services; and
7) organisation of trade in securities.
The federal executive body in charge of the 
securities market (RF, 2004) is  FFMS which 
controls and supervises financial markets 
(except insurance, banking and auditing). 
The Law On the Securities Market (RK, 
2003a) provides for the following activities 
on the securities market:
1) brokerage;
2) dealer services;
3) registrar services;
4) investment portfolio management;
5) pension fund investment management;
6) custodian services;
7) transfer agent services;
8) organisation of trade in securities and 
other financial instruments; and
9) depository services.
State regulation and supervision of the 
financial market is the responsibility of the 
Agency for Regulation and Supervision of 
FSA (RK, 2003b).
Registrars There is a restriction on registrar services for 
foreigners. In accordance with the Russian 
Law On Joint-Stock Companies, for joint-
stock companies comprising more than 50 
shareholders a share register must be kept 
by a registrar. The same law also provides 
that for these companies the registrar may 
act as a tabulation commission at general 
meetings of shareholders. However, only 
companies comprising more than 500 
shareholders are obliged to employ registrars 
to do so.
In accordance with the Law On the 
Securities Market, a register system is 
compulsory for equity securities and must 
be kept by a registrar.The functions of, and 
requirements for registrars are all set forth 
in the Rules of Keeping a Register System 
and are largely identical to those imposed by 
the Russian register rules. 
Depositories Under Russian law, foreign depositories 
are not treated as “professional securities 
market players” and therefore cannot be 
recognised as depositories or open fiduciary 
accounts with a Russian depository. Russian 
depositories can open accounts for non-
resident depositories as beneficial owners 
only, but not as nominal holders (Aksenova, 
2007). 
Professional securities market players 
(“nominal holders” under Kazakh law) and 
foreign depositories and custodians may 
open fiduciary accounts with the Central 
Depository of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Public placement 
and/or trading in foreign 
securities
There is a list and a reference book of foreign 
instruments which the FFMS recognises 
as securities. Only selected securities may 
be publicly placed and/or traded in Russia. 
A precondition for the placement of foreign 
securities is registration of the respective 
prospectus with FFMS. Public placement of 
foreign securities is subject to approval by a 
stock exchange. Notably, a stock exchange 
may approve the placement only if the 
securities are listed on a stock exchange 
from FFMS’ list (this does not apply to 
securities issued by international financial 
organisations).
Nongovernment securities issued under 
the laws of foreign states and securities of 
international financial organisations from 
the official list of the stock exchange may be 
traded on the organised securities market in 
Kazakhstan. The list of international financial 
organisations whose equity securities may 
be traded on stock exchanges is drawn by 
stock exchanges themselves and must be 
approved by the Agency of Regulation and 
Supervision of the Financial Market and 
Financial Organisations. Issuers who wish to 
include their shares or debt securities in the 
first quality sector must meet very stringent 
requirements. 
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for the improvement of corporate governance of financial organisations; to 
monitor the financial market and financial organisations in order to secure the 
stability of the financial system; to place an emphasis on financial market 
segments which are exposed to higher risks in order to maintain financial 
stability; to introduce modern technology; and to ensure that end users 
have access to all the information on the activities and services of financial 
organisations.
Stock market registration system
The stock market registration system consists of two groups of professional 
market players: registrars and depositories.
In Russia, as at July 1, 2010, only 48 professional market players held 
licences for registrar services. Their number shrank rapidly over recent 
Issuance of national 
depository receipts 
representing foreign 
securities
Russian law imposes certain requirements 
for RDR issuers. RDR may be issued by a 
depository which meets FFMS requirements 
as to equity capital size and has a track 
record of at least three years. At present, 
the list of permitted issuers includes 64 
organisations, mainly central depositories 
from foreign states, including the Central 
Depository of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
 If the issuer of the underlying securities does 
not assume any obligations to RDR holders, 
such RDR may be issued only if the securities 
are listed on a foreign stock exchange from 
FFMS’ list.
Requirements for RDR registers are set 
forth in the rules of keeping registers of RDR 
holders. In accordance with these rules, a 
register of RDR holders may be kept either 
by the issuer (depository), irrespective of the 
number of holders, or a registrar.
It should be noted that the law anticipated 
market needs, as not a single RDR issuance 
has been registered to date.
Under Kazakh law:
1) a KDR issuer must hold a licence for 
custodian business;
2) the shares of a KDR issuer must be on 
the official highest quality list of the stock 
exchange;
3) a KDR issuer must have operational 
risk management and corporate 
governance systems.
The issuer of the underlying asset may not 
be registered in an offshore territory or 
affiliated with an organisation registered in 
an offshore territory, and must have a rating 
not lower than ‘ВВ-’ from Standard & Poor’s 
or Fitch Rating Ltd.
Underlying securities issued by residents 
of Kazakhstan must be on the official first 
quality list (the “Shares” sector) of a stock 
exchange operating in Kazakhstan.
Registration and confirmation of title to 
KDR is the responsibility of the Central 
Depository of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 
No KDR issuances have been registered to 
date.
Placement of national 
securities abroad
In accordance with the Russian Law On the 
Securities Market, Russian issuers may place 
their securities outside Russia by various 
methods, including placement of securities of 
foreign issuers who confirm their rights to the 
equity securities of Russian issuers under for-
eign law, however, subject to FFMS approval 
and other conditions.
There are a number of requirements for the 
number of shares of Russian issuers which 
are to be placed and/or traded outside 
Russia.
Residents of Kazakhstan may place their 
shares abroad if they are on the official 
first quality list (the “Shares” sector) of a 
stock exchange operating in Kazakhstan. In 
addition, Kazakhstani shares may be placed 
abroad if they are listed in the “Non-listed 
Securities” sector of a stock exchange 
operating in Kazakhstan.
Table 8.4.
Stock market 
regulation in Russia 
and Kazakhstan
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years after the FFMS introduced the requirement that each registrar must 
service at least 50 issuers comprising at least 500 holders; a requirement 
that impedes competition. Many organisations find it difficult to overcome 
this administrative barrier, as there are very few initial placements and the 
number of shareholders in joint-stock companies tends to shrink as a result 
of equity consolidation. Furthermore, smaller companies are permitted to 
perform registrar functions by themselves. At present the FFMS does not have 
any real tools by which to interfere with registrar and counting commission 
functions in companies. Notably, it is the procedure for convening meetings 
and especially the absence of a clear definition of the duties of a counting 
commission in the law that causes many corporate conflicts.
In Kazakhstan, as at July 1, 2010, there were 11 
licensed registrars that are entitled to engage in this 
business irrespective of the number of issuers they 
service. They interact with three licensed transfer 
agents. A register system is compulsory for equity 
securities and it must be maintained by a registrar; 
this presents an advantage over the Russian law 
that allows issuers with less than 50 holders to keep 
registers by themselves. 
As at July 1, 2010, 738 market players held licences for depository services 
in Russia. Most of them use these licences for providing their clients with 
access to settlement and depository systems and registers, thus acting as 
client (custodian) depositories. Consequently, Russian professional market 
players and investors use the services of such depositories to dispose of 
shares and units in unit investment funds without directly accessing the 
registrar, i.e. by book-entry settlement using custodian accounts and 
representing the holders’ interests in the register or other depository as 
nominal holders.
Some serious problems with regulation of depository business in Russia 
are associated with gaps in the Federal Law On the Securities Market. The 
situation is complicated even further by the Central Bank’s wide interpretation 
of its authority to impose special requirements for registration of title to 
government securities and to issue instructions to this end without consulting 
with the FFMS or the professional community. As a result, depositories are 
forced to maintain special register systems and charts of accounts which 
do not comply with FFMS regulations and existing business procedures 
(formulated in self-regulating organisations’ standard documents). 
The existence of different approaches to regulation of book-entry settlement 
should be excluded. Imperfect regulation is a major weakness of the Russian 
stock market’s registration infrastructure. The regulations change too often 
and are complicated by the established trading and registration systems. 
In Kazakhstan, a register system is 
compulsory for equity securities and 
such a system must be maintained by a 
registrar; this represents an advantage 
over Russian law which allows issuers with 
less than 50 holders to keep registers by 
themselves. 
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According to FFMS requirements, the registration 
of title to foreign securities intended for pubic 
placement (trading) in Russia must be registered 
with a depository whose business meets the general 
requirements applicable to depositories. In addition, 
the FFMS imposes some special requirements on 
this type of depository:
1) it must have a track record of at least one year;
2) it must provide services associated with 
receiving yield from foreign securities or other 
payments to which the holder is entitled, to all 
persons (depositors) whose title to foreign securities 
it has registered.
Finally, the depository must maintain an account for each of those persons 
acting on behalf of other persons with a foreign registrar from FFMS’ list. 
These strict requirements for depositories were dictated by the problem 
of foreign nominal holders. It is associated with the threat of liquidity outflow, 
i.e. a shift of activity from Russian stock exchanges to foreign exchanges 
(Golovnin et al., 2010). A reluctance to operate on domestic stock markets 
can lead to the loss of potential market turnover in Russia and other CIS 
countries. 
Kazakhstan has a two-tier depository system. The first tier consists of 
the Central Depository. The second tier is comprised of the first category 
brokers and dealers (who are authorised to maintain clients’ accounts 
as nominal holders (and register transactions in securities)) and banks 
providing custodian services. As at July 1, 2010, there were 11 custodian 
banks and 81 licensed brokers and dealers. Notably, the Central 
Depository started to establish correspondent relations with depositories 
from other CIS countries earlier than its Russian counterparts (Golovnin et 
al., 2010).
To sum up, Russian Law On the Securities Market does not recognise 
professional market player licences issued under foreign laws. Russian 
registrars cannot open fiduciary accounts for non-residents, including 
depositories and other nominal holders, and can only open these accounts 
for depositories licensed by FFMS. As a result, depositories and other nominal 
holders cannot establish correspondent relations, which in turn preclude 
settlement under transactions in securities (supply of securities or money). 
Kazakh law already contains all the necessary provisions. Fiduciary accounts 
can be opened with the Central Depository of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
not only by nominal holders that qualify under Kazakh law, but also by foreign 
depositories and custodians. 
The problem with foreign nominal holders 
is associated with the threat of liquidity 
loss, i.e. shift of activity from Russian stock 
exchanges to foreign ones.
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of the Russian stock market’s registration 
infrastructure. This regulation changes 
too often and is complicated by the 
traditional organisation of the trading and 
registration systems.
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Placement of foreign securities
Our comparison of two countries’ legal frameworks 
shows that certain legal preconditions for mutual 
capital flows in the form of financial instruments are 
already there. However, the existing differences in 
Russian and Kazakh laws create barriers to these 
flows, specifically the legal restrictions on mutual access to stock markets 
and issuance and placement of securities. 
At present, foreign securities can be placed in Russia and Kazakhstan by two 
methods: 
• public placement and/or trading in foreign securities;
• issuance of national depository receipts representing foreign securities.
Importantly, a permit to trade in foreign securities on Russian and Kazakhstani 
stock markets can be issued by a stock exchange, subject to approval by the 
authorised body. In Russia, in contrast to public trading, public placement 
of foreign securities can be permitted only by the FFMS. In any event, public 
placement is initiated and performed by stock exchanges, and they are 
responsible for the introduction of foreign securities on the market. However, 
Russian stock exchanges can handle only securities that are listed on a 
stock exchange from FFMS’ list (with the exception of securities issued by 
international financial organisations); furthermore, the stock exchange must 
be member of: 
• the World Federation of Stock Exchanges;
• the Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges; or
• the CIS International Association of Stock Exchanges.
The stock exchange in question must be incorporated in one of the 
OECD/FATF/MONEYVAL countries. This can also be a state with which 
the FFMS has an agreement on interaction3. If a stock exchange withholds 
its permit for public placement, a permit can instead be issued by the FFMS, 
provided that the securities meet certain liquidity and investment risk 
requirements. 
The Russian Law On the Securities Market is different in that it regulates not 
only public placement of, and trading in foreign securities, but also the private 
Legal restrictions on mutual access 
to stock markets and issuance and 
placement of securities create barriers  
to mutual capital flows.
3 FFMS’ Order no. 10-29 dated April 27, 2010. On Approval of Criteria and Procedure for 
Inclusion of Foreign Stock Exchanges Whose Listing Is Compulsory for Issuing Permits by 
Russian Stock Exchanges for Trading in Foreign Securities without a Permit from the Federal 
Executive Body in Charge of the Securities Market for Public Placement and/or Trading in 
Such Securities in the Russian Federation. Vestnik FSFR. 2010. no. 7
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placement of these on the Russian stock market. Even if a foreign issuer does 
not intend to make an initial public offering in Russia and offers its securities 
to a small number of chosen investors, it must obtain a permit from the FFMS 
and have the prospectus registered; furthermore, it must furnish the FFMS 
with a notice on completion of placement.
One of the major problems that impede introduction 
of foreign securities to the Russian market is 
information disclosure. The securities market 
is essentially a market of information, and its 
competitiveness directly depends on the speed of 
disclosure of information on traded instruments 
and respective issuers. The law requires Russian 
stock exchanges where foreign securities are 
traded to ensure the disclosure of this information. 
FFMS experts believe that the stock exchanges 
can cope with this task by themselves (Medvedeva, 
Filimoshin, 2010). To date, however, one cannot 
say that full disclosure of information on corporate 
events is being achieved.
Under Kazakh law, non-residents cannot issue shares. Placement of non-
residents’ securities issued under Kazakh law or in other jurisdictions, including 
Russia, is subject to licensing.
Issuance of securities abroad
This section poses the biggest number of impediments to the integration 
of the stock market legal framework and legislation in both Russia and 
Kazakhstan. Under Kazakh law, residents are permitted to issue securities 
abroad and place them with non-residents only if their previously issued equity 
securities are listed on a stock exchange in Kazakhstan. In addition, placement 
of securities with non-residents must be registered as currency transactions 
related to foreign investments by residents.
So far, no issuances or public placements of foreign securities have 
taken place on the Russian market, but Russian and Kazakh laws provide 
for these transactions. At present, the Russian regulations are more 
restrictive in respect of trading in foreign securities than the Kazakhstani 
regulations.
International treaties and their role in the development of stock 
markets
Russia and Kazakhstan are both members of various integration groups. The 
most efficient vehicle to address the issues of financial markets integration 
could be the EurAsEC. In 2004 its members entered into an agreement on 
At present, Russian regulations are more 
restrictive in respect of trading in foreign 
securities compared with Kazakhstani 
regulations.
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cooperation in the banking sector (EurAsEC, 2004), which provides, inter 
alia, for the creation of an interstate securities market.
The parties to this document undertook to adopt measures to: 
1)  harmonise laws regulating:
• the issuance of securities; 
• the placement of, and trading in residents’ securities in other countries; 
• the placement of, and trading in non-residents’ securities; 
• the activities of professional securities and mutual investments market 
players4;
• disclosure on the securities market; 
and set forth: 
• the qualification requirements for professional securities and mutual 
investments market players; and
• the requirements for transactions on the securities market; 
2) harmonise the corporate codes of conduct;
3) develop common approaches to control over the securities market.
To date, the financial markets of all EurAsEC countries can be classified 
as “developing”. Thus, according to a World Economic Forum report 
(WEF, 2009), in 2008 the volume of trade on the stock markets of 
Russia and Kazakhstan (the group’s leading economies) totalled 58.45 
and 8.57% of GDP, respectively (compare this to 443.57% in Hong Kong, 
the absolute leader in this respect). The other EurAsEC countries lag 
far behind the leaders in banking sector development, which makes the 
initiative to create a common stock market a long-term plan. Therefore, 
it seems reasonable to first promote interaction between the Russian and 
Kazakhstani markets with subsequent inclusion of other EurAsEC members 
and Ukraine – a country which has extensive economic ties with this 
community.
It should be admitted at this point that the integration of the securities 
markets within EurAsEC is still at an initial stage. This statement is best 
illustrated by the fact that so far the regulatory bodies of Russia and 
Kazakhstan have no memoranda on understanding or information exchange. 
Furthermore, KASE is even absent from the abovementioned list of foreign 
4 Mutual investments market players are investment funds, nongovernment pension funds, 
management companies, special depositories of investment funds and nongovernment pension 
funds, and other organisations defined as such in national laws
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stock exchanges whose listing is compulsory for a Russian stock exchange 
to issue a permit for trading in foreign securities without a permit from the 
FFMS. 
An important step towards an efficient corpus of international 
documents aimed at furthering capital markets development in Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus would be to resume the work on the 
draft Agreement On Adoption of International Standards of Settlement 
under Transactions in Securities and Derivatives which was halted in 
2005 following the refusal by Ukraine’s former leadership to participate 
in the effort to create the Common Economic Space (CES). This draft 
contained provisions on harmonisation of laws regulating settlement on 
securities markets; registration and keeping of securities, including the 
structure and organisation of national registration systems; depository 
registration; interaction between registration and clearing organisations; 
and settlement under transactions in securities, including cross-border 
settlement.
Article 9 of the draft Agreement set forth the following principles of 
settlement:
“The Parties believe that settlement orders under transactions in securities on 
the regulated market must be carried out not later than the next business day 
following receipt of these orders by a depository organisation or a registrar, 
unless a later date is indicated in the order.
The Parties understand that efficient settlement can only be achieved by a 
full switch to electronic messaging in recognised international formats and 
automation of message processing”. 
We believe that these principles remain relevant, although in 2008 
the EurAsEC Integration Committee made an attempt to draft an 
agreement on creating the conditions for free capital movement on financial 
markets.
Needs and preferences of Russian and Kazakhstani stock 
market professional players
• Studying the needs and preferences of market players from both 
countries in respect of mutual capital market penetration provides a 
basis for legal and organisational adjustment of the regulatory systems 
and infrastructure of the financial markets. 
• The results of the survey confirm the conclusions of our comparative 
analysis of laws regulating financial markets.
The preparation for this report was accompanied by a survey of 
professional market players from Russia and Kazakhstan. The main 
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purpose of the survey was to study the opinions of various organisations 
concerning their plans and preferences in respect of mutual market 
access, adequacy of mechanisms available for that, and existing problems 
and impediments. Apart from general questions the survey also included 
sections on investments in the other country’s securities market, placement, 
and cooperation between Russian and Kazakhstani stock exchanges. The 
questions were selected so as to cover a maximum circle of respondents of 
various specialisations. The results of the survey confirm the conclusions 
on the prospects for integration of two countries’ financial markets. 
Survey of professional stock market players from Russia 
and Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan: categories and specialisation of stock market players
The majority of Kazakhstani respondents who took part in the survey were 
professional market players (82%).
Figure 8.2.
Categories of 
Kazakhstani 
respondents
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Figure 8.3.
Specialisation of  
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The structure of specialisation of Kazakhstani respondents indicates that 
many of them engage in multiple professional activities provided for by 
Kazakh law (see Figure 8.3). The most frequent combination (about 17%) 
is dealer/broker services plus investment portfolio management. The 
respondents typically engage in numerous activities, which illustrates 
the flexibility of Kazakh law in this respect. From the point of view of 
prospective interaction, Russian investors and professional market players 
will have sufficient choice to select partners with the required functions in 
Kazakhstan.
The most popular specialisation on the Kazakhstani stock market is 
broker/dealer business and investment portfolio management (see Figure 
8.4). The structure of licences issued by FSA confirms this conclusion 
(see Table 8.5).
Kazakhstan: investments on the Russian securities market
18% of the respondents have subsidiaries in Russia (see Figure 8.5), and 29% 
hold Russian securities. Taking into account that 11.8% of the respondents 
skipped to answer the question on ownership of Russian securities, we can 
assume that the number might be larger (perhaps about 35%). This indicates 
that holding foreign instruments is easier than establishing subsidiaries 
in the neighbouring state. In any case, given the fact that the Russian 
securities market is well developed and offers higher liquidity compared to the 
Kazakhstani market, the number of Kazakh holders of Russian securities is 
likely to be greater.
The data allows us to conclude that Kazakhstani professional market players 
maintain a presence on the Russian securities market. 
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management
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Most of the organisations that already hold Russian securities intended to 
buy more in the following six months (the survey was conducted in April–May 
2010). Of those who do not hold Russian securities, over 30% intend to buy 
them. These data are illustrative of relative attractiveness of the Russian 
market to Kazakhstani professional players.
25% of Kazakhstani respondents hold securities from foreign issuers 
other that Russian. They commented that these countries have highly 
developed and diverse stock markets capable of satisfying the needs of both 
the issuer and the investor. These markets offer high liquidity and are well 
regulated.
The respondents indicated that they had acquired Russian securities on 
international stock exchanges in the form of GDR or ADR and not directly from 
the Russian stock exchanges. 
Kazakhstani professional market players are interested in securities issued 
by the following sectors (see Figure 8.8):
Professional players As at 01.01.07 As at 01.01.08 As at 01.01.09
Brokers and/or dealers 69 87 84
Brokers from the Regional 
Financial Centre of Almaty 
1 19 20
Registrars 17 17 15
Custodians 9 10 11
Pension asset managers 13 11 13
Investment portfolio managers 37 61 66
Self-regulating organisations 2 2 2
Transfer agents 2 3 4
Depositories 1 1 1
Trade organisers 1 1 1
Total 152 212 217
Table 8.5.
Number of 
organisations by 
professional activities 
on the Kazakhstani 
securities market
Source: FSA (200)
Figure 8.5.
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All respondents who answered this question uniformly mentioned natural 
resources. Many of them also mentioned energy. Telecommunications and 
finance are also attractive to Kazakhstani players. 
As mentioned above, 29% (or, we presume, 35%) of Kazakhstani 
respondents hold Russian securities. Of this number, over 85% is 
represented in the registers by depositories, and only 14% is represented 
directly. Of those represented in registers by nominal holders, equal 
numbers of respondents preferred the services of depositaries and Russian 
custodians. One respondent works with a licensed Russian subsidiary of a 
Western custodian. 
Kazakhstan: quality of services of Russian registrars 
Over 70% of the respondents indicated their satisfaction with the 
services of Russian registrars. The respondents were asked to evaluate 
the quality of services by price, speed, convenience, additional services, and 
uninterrupted service, on a five-grade scale (5 is the highest mark). The 
respondents gave high marks to practically all of these components. 80% 
Figure 8.7.
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are satisfied with the speed of service and 60% are satisfied with prices. 
Marks for convenience, additional services and uninterrupted service were 
uniformly high. 
Most respondents who were dissatisfied with the quality of services 
mentioned the high cost of depository services. One respondent 
(represented in a register by a depository) mentioned inadequate 
information exchange with the depository.
64% of those who answered the question on the desirability of 
direct interaction with Russian registrars by electronic document 
management systems using digital signatures expressed their wish to use 
this type of system. 
Kazakhstan: problems of interaction with Russian financial institutions
Answering the question on problems with interaction with Russian 
financial institutions, including registrars, most Kazakhstani respondents 
mentioned the legal restrictions on double nominal holding:
Table 8.6.
Problems of 
interaction with 
Russian financial 
institutions
The impossibility of double nominal holding of Russian securities impedes direct investments  
in Russia by Kazakh investors
The absence of a central depository in Russia
Kazakh law restricts the activities of financial institutions outside Kazakhstan
Legal restrictions on opening accounts with foreign custodian banks, e.g. Russian banks
Kazakh and Russian laws make it impossible to buy Russian securities on MICEX and RTS, since 
under Russian law securities must be kept by a Russian depository, and under Kazakh law the 
securities must be registered with a local custodian. At the same time, Kazakhstani custodians 
and depositories cannot open accounts with Russian depositories. This complicates access to 
MICEX and RTS
One of the most urgent problems is associated with the nominal holding of Russian securities 
by foreign brokers and the need for a mechanism of confirmation of title of beneficial owners. 
This issue has been voiced at the Association of Financiers of Kazakhstan (AFK). If this issue 
is resolved, Kazakh investors who hold Russian securities will be able to exercise their right to 
receive issuer information (on shares and depository receipts representing the shares) and 
other rights attached to securities, and therefore will be able to protect their interests more 
efficiently
The most serious problem for Kazakhstani players who enter foreign markets as brokers  
is that Kazakh law restricts the opening of accounts with foreign custodians. This issue has  
been debated for many years, but to no avail. This issue is now being addressed by the 
Association of Financiers of Kazakhstan, and working groups are being created to this end  
from time to time. Unfortunately, the FSA does not seem to be interested to address this 
problem
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Joint efforts to harmonise the laws of two countries. Consultations on strategic development, 
PR and marketing. Exchange of information. Studying each other’s IT infrastructure and trading 
and clearing tools. Cooperation in developing IТ solutions for the Kazakhstani derivatives market 
Opening Central Depository’s accounts with Russian depositories and vice versa, for the 
purposes of registering and transferring Russian and Kazakhstani securities
Simplifying the procedure of joint listing on Russian and Kazakhstani stock exchanges
Developing legal frameworks for short sale: legal solution plus technical support. IT 
infrastructure for the organising of trades in Kazakhstan
Cooperation in developing stock exchange infrastructure using advanced technology. Developing 
the derivatives market
Double listing
Integration of custodian systems in order to eliminate barriers to Kazakh investor’s activity in 
Russia and vice versa (as an alternative to integrating both markets into Euroclear)
Kazakhstan: placement of securities in Russia
As for the prospects for the introduction of Kazakhstani securities to the 
Russian market, only 12% of the respondents who answered this question 
are considering the opportunities (see Figure 8.9). 29% of the respondents 
did not answer this question.
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As for the issuance of RDR, 88% of the respondents indicated that they have 
no interest in this instrument, and 12% did not answer this question. 
The question on preferred methods of introducing Kazakhstani securities to 
the Russian stock market was answered as follows: issuance of RDR (12%); 
direct trading (12%); and creating conditions for the settlement of Russian 
securities in Euroclear and Clearstream (6%). 70% of the respondents did 
not answer this question. 
The above data allows us to conclude that at present Kazakhstani professional 
players are not keen to introduce their securities to the Russian market. As a 
consequence, the problem of selecting professional Russian mediators for the 
introduction of Kazakhstani securities is not urgent at present. As there have 
not been any RDR issuances, Kazakhstani market players have difficulty in 
assessing their prospects for the use of this mechanism. Direct trading on the 
Russian stock market is naturally restricted by the stringent requirements 
imposed by Russian law. 
Kazakhstan: proposals on cooperation
Kazakhstani respondents suggested the following forms of cooperation:
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Table 8.7.
Possible forms of 
cooperation
1.%
Issuers (finance)
Trade organisers
Clearing agents 
Depositories
Transfer agents
Special depositories
Trust managers
Pension assets 
managers
Unit investment fund 
managers
Registrars
Dealers
Brokers
.%
1.2%
1.2%
2.3%
3.%
.%
.1%
1.2%
0%
2.%
2.%
Figure 8.10.
Specialisations of 
Russian respondents
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Creating conditions under which attracting portfolio investments by Kazakhstani and Russian 
organisations would be easier and cheaper than it is on Western markets
Cooperation prospects depend on infrastructural interaction between two stock markets
Russia: categories and specialisations of stock market players
In contrast to Kazakhstani respondents, nearly half of all Russian respondents 
were issuers. All of these issuers are professional stock market players. All 
responding organisations engage in multiple activities and offer integrated 
services to their clients.
Russian respondents can be divided into the following groups by type of activity 
(see Figure 8.10).
The most popular activity permitted by Russian law is depository services 
(82%). Other frequently mentioned activities are broker and dealer services 
(73%) and trust management (45%). 
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Russia: investments on the Kazakhstani securities market
In contrast to Kazakhstani organisations, Russian respondents maintain 
a stronger presence in the neighbouring capital market: some of them hold 
Kazakhstani securities (see Figure 8.11) and, at the same time, have affiliates 
in Kazakhstan (50%).
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holding Kazakhstani 
securities
% 
Own securities from Kazakhstani issuers Do not own
%
82% of Russian respondents do not intend to buy Kazakhstani securities 
in the next six months. Typically, Russian businesses view Kazakhstan as 
a source of natural resources and are reluctant to invest (or organise 
investing) in other sectors of the Kazakh economy. However, there is a 
degree of interest in the Kazakh financial sector. We can conclude that 
currently Russian professional securities market players do not consider 
Kazakhstan as a target for placement. 
46% of the respondents hold Kazakhstani securities. Of this figure, over 
36% is represented in registers by the Central Depository and 18% are 
represented directly. The remaining percentage is represented by either 
licensed Kazakh affiliates of Western custodians or licensed Kazakh affiliates 
of Russian banks. 
Russia: quality of services of Kazakhstani registrars 
Over 70% of the respondents indicated their satisfaction with the services 
of Kazakhstani registrars. The respondents were asked to evaluate the 
quality of services by price, speed, convenience, additional services, and 
uninterrupted service, on a five-grade scale (5 is the highest mark). Marks 
for all these components were uniformly high. Some respondents 
mentioned the high cost for the services of the Kazakh affiliate of a Western 
custodian. 
Russia: placement of securities in Kazakhstan
Most Russian respondents have no plans to introduce their securities to the 
Kazakhstani market. However, theoretically they would prefer direct trading 
on the Kazakhstani stock market (18%) as a method of introduction. This 
would enable them to avail themselves of the Central Depository services. 
This method of entering the Kazakhstani market is preferred because of 
its transparency and the exclusion of excessive mediators’ fees. To date, 
Russian respondents show no interest in issuing KDR representing Russian 
securities.
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Russia: problems of interaction with Kazakhstani financial institutions
Russian respondents mentioned the following problems of interaction with 
Kazakhstani financial institutions, e.g. registrars:
Table 8.8.
Problems of 
interaction  with 
Kazakhstani financial 
institutions
Absence of a full electronic document management system (SWIFT or similar) for interaction 
with the Central Depository.
Requirement to disclose beneficiary owner information as at the registration date within  
24 hours5. 
Unclear regulations regarding depositing Russian securities with the Central Depository, 
Kazakhstani custodians and Russian depositories.
5 Information on the beneficiary owner as at the registration date must be disclosed by a custodian within 24 hours, 
otherwise the client of the Russian professional player will not be eligible for the application of conventions on elimination 
of double taxation of securities which are not listed on the stock exchange (i.e. those taxed at a rate of 15%). Disclosure in 
such a short time span is not feasible because the procedure involves too many mediators. Not only banks but also their 
clients can act as nominal holders, i.e. within 24 hours the information received from a custodian in Kazakhstan must be 
delivered to the beneficiary owner (custodian in Kazakhstan – bank – bank’s client – nominal holder – beneficiary owner), 
and then beneficiary owner information must be sent back to the Central Depository. In other words, the only option for 
clients is to disclose beneficiary owner information in advance, so as to eliminate the need for a custodian in Kazakhstan 
to request this information from a Russian professional player. This approach leads to the need to open several accounts 
with a custodian in Kazakhstan for registering the assets of clients/nominal holders who have several clients, hence 
increased account maintenance costs for these clients.
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Potential sources of mutual portfolio investments
Theoretically, the resources of private pension funds or management 
companies can be viewed as potential sources of Russian portfolio 
investments in Kazakhstani securities. In accordance with the Federal Law no. 
111-FZ dated July 24, 2002 (version of December 27, 2009), On Investing 
for Financing the Funded Part of Pensions in the Russian Federation, pension 
savings can be invested in:
• Russian federal government securities;
• bonds of Russian issuers;
• shares of Russian joint-stock companies;
• units (shares) of index investment funds which invest in foreign 
government securities, bonds and shares;
• mortgage-backed securities issued under Russian law; 
• moneys in roubles deposited with credit organisations;
• deposits in roubles or foreign currency with credit organisations; 
• foreign currency on accounts opened with credit organisations; or
• securities of international financial organisations permitted for 
placement and/or public trading in Russia in accordance with the 
Russian securities law.
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Figure 8.12.
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To use these opportunities provided by Russian law, unitised investment 
funds holding Kazakhstani securities must be created. This is unlikely to 
happen in the near future, at least until the Kazakhstani capital market 
recovers from the global crisis and/or Kazakhstani securities are traded on 
the Russian market which offers adequate liquidity. An integrated currency 
market capable of supporting mutual convertibility of national currencies 
must be created within the CIS/EurAsEC framework; otherwise Russian 
professional players will have no incentive to deposit funds in tenge. This issue 
is discussed in more detail later. 
Kazakhstani accumulative pension funds are active on the financial markets 
of Kazakhstan and other countries, and are important sources of long-term 
finance for the respective economies (FSA, 2009) (see Figure 8.10).
APF were established in the course of pension 
reform pursuant to the law On Pensions in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan (RK, 1997). In the last year 
alone their assets increased by 31% and totalled 
1,860.5 billion tenge by the beginning of 2010 
(FSA, 2009). They invest in foreign securities, 
including Russian securities, (see Figure 8.12), but this trend is likely to 
change in the near future. According to the above FSA report, at present 
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the strategy of investing pension assets has been adjusted to favour 
Kazakh government securities (as a measure to ease domestic budgetary 
problems), and investment in foreign securities reduced as a consequence 
of this.
Main conclusions on the survey 
Our research revealed that Kazakhstani players are interested in the 
Russian financial market principally as a source of financial resources. 
By contrast, Russian businesses view the Kazakhstani capital market 
as a springboard to Kazakhstan’s natural resources. Most Kazakhstani 
No significant Kazakhstani pension fund 
investments in Russian securities should 
be expected in the near future.
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organisations are keen to have their securities traded on the Russian 
market, whereas their Russian counterparts are not interested in the 
Kazakhstani market in this way. Russian stock exchanges show a degree 
of interest in cooperation with Kazakh partners and are prepared to list 
Kazakh instruments. 
1.  Most Kazakhstani respondents (about 17%) combine their 
broker/dealer business with investment portfolio management. Other 
combinations of professional activities vary from 6 to 12%, which 
illustrates the flexibility of Kazakh law. This leaves Russian investors and 
professional market players with plenty of choice of partners with the 
required functions in Kazakhstan.
2.  Kazakhstani respondents who have affiliates in Russia (mostly banking 
structures, 17.6%), are approximately half as many as those who hold 
Russian securities (29.4%). 25% of Kazakhstani respondents hold 
securities issued by other jurisdictions.
3. In contrast to Kazakhstani organisations, Russian respondents maintain 
a stronger presence in the neighbouring capital market: some of them 
hold Kazakhstani securities and, at the same time, have affiliates in 
Kazakhstan.
4.  The Russian capital market is attractive to Kazakhstani professional 
market players. Most of the Kazakhstani organisations that already 
hold Russian securities intend to buy more in the next six months. Over 
30% of the respondents intend to buy Russian securities for the first 
time. 
5.  29% (or, we assume, 35%) of Kazakhstani respondents hold Russian 
securities. Of this number, over 85% is represented in registers by 
depositories, and only 14% is represented directly. Of those represented 
in registers by nominal holders, equal numbers preferred the services of 
depositaries and Russian custodians. 
6.  The respondents show no interest in issuing KDR representing 
Russian securities – probably because these securities can be acquired 
directly.
7.  60% of the respondents expressed their wish to use electronic 
document management systems for interaction with Russian 
registrars. 
8.  Kazakhstani respondents mentioned the issuance of RDR, direct 
trading and creating conditions for settlement on Russian securities 
in Euroclear and Clearstream as their preferred methods for the 
introduction of Kazakhstani securities to the Russian stock market.
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9.  At present Kazakhstani professional players are not keen to 
introduce their securities to the Russian market, and so, to date, 
the problem of selecting professional Russian mediators for the 
introduction is not an urgent one. As there have been no RDR issuances, 
Kazakhstani market players have difficulty assessing their prospects for 
the use of this mechanism. Direct trading on the Russian stock market 
is naturally restricted by the stringent requirements imposed by Russian 
law.
10. Most Russian respondents have no plans to introduce their securities 
to the Kazakhstani market. However, theoretically, they would prefer 
direct trading on the Kazakhstani stock market (18%) as a method of 
introducing their securities. This would enable them to avail themselves 
of the Central Depository services. This method of entering the 
Kazakhstani market is preferred because of its transparency and the 
exclusion of excessive mediators’ fees. 
11.  Kazakhstani players are interested in Russian financial market principally 
as a source of financial resources. By contrast, Russian businesses view 
Kazakhstani capital market as a springboard to Kazakhstan’s natural 
resources. As a consequence, most Kazakhstani organisations are keen 
to have their securities traded on the Russian market, whereas their 
Russian counterparts are not interested in the Kazakhstani market in 
this way. However, Russian stock exchanges show a degree of interest 
in cooperation with Kazakh partners and are prepared to list Kazakh 
instruments.
12.  Financial resources controlled by private pension funds or management 
companies can be viewed as a potential source of Russian portfolio 
investments in Kazakhstani securities. However, in order to make 
use of the opportunities provided by Russian law, unitised investment 
funds holding Kazakhstani securities must be created. This is unlikely to 
happen in the near future, at least until the Kazakhstani capital market 
recovers from the global crisis and/or Kazakhstani securities are 
traded on the Russian market which offers adequate liquidity.
13.  Accumulative pension funds are active players on the financial markets of 
Kazakhstan and other countries. However, they should not be expected 
to make any significant investments abroad, particularly, in Russian 
securities. At present they are changing their investment strategy in 
favour of increasing their holdings of Kazakh government securities and 
cutting down investments in foreign securities.
14.  Our survey covered Russia’s main stock exchanges (RTS and MICEX) 
and their Kazakh counterpart KASE. RTS ranks highest among them 
in terms of investments in the other country. To date, only RTS has a 
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subsidiary in Kazakhstan (Commodity Stock Exchange ETS) and holds 
Kazakhstani securities.
Approaches to stock market regulation
• The issues of stock market development in Russia and Kazakhstan are 
closely interrelated with the issues of recovery from the global financial 
crisis.
• Kazakhstan’s need for foreign investments is being addressed through 
prompt regulatory measures targeting financial institutions that meet 
this need on the domestic capital market.
• Whilst the Russian economy faces urgent problems of post-crisis 
recovery, no long-term financial market development policy is in place.
The analytical paper On the Status and Development Trends of the Securities 
Market in CIS Member States (CIS Executive Committee, 2009) concludes 
that the liquidity crisis and instability of international financial markets 
affected post-Soviet economies, including security markets. In 2008 the 
growth in the number of domestic issuers and capitalisation on the most 
developed CIS stock markets gave way to a decline in stock indices and 
market capitalisation levels of issuers, especially those whose instruments 
were traded internationally. The crisis highlighted the main problems and 
weaknesses of financial market regulation. A drop in liquidity of domestic 
stock markets and the market value of traded instruments and a rise in 
defaults by issuers on the organised CIS markets allowed the main areas 
of concern in the regulatory system to be identified: the protection of 
investors’ rights and interests, maintaining the financial stability of issuers 
and professional securities market players, fair evaluation of instruments 
available for investment, as well as assessment and management of 
investment and operating risks.
The global crisis seriously affected the economic situation in Kazakhstan, and 
the Government started adopting measures to maintain the financial stability 
of the stock market (RK, 2003b). In particular, the mandatory charter capital 
size for market players was raised; this indirectly pushed Kazakhstani financial 
institutions into shareholding in foreign, e.g. Russian, entities. In 2009, in order 
to increase the financial stability of brokers/dealers who are authorised to 
maintain clients’ accounts as nominal holders and perform certain banking 
operations, the procedure of equity size calculation and sufficiency ratios 
were optimised. As a measure to reduce external borrowing, FSA introduced 
capitalisation ratios for liabilities to non-residents. These are calculated as 
ratios of various liabilities to the professional player’s equity.
Another step towards enhanced financial stability of professional securities 
market players was the revision by the FSA of a number of regulations 
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which set forth risk management requirements for 
organisations engaging in dealer and/or broker 
business or investment portfolio management. As 
part of this, a double control system (for execution 
and registration of financial transactions) was 
introduced; a stress-testing procedure was 
developed; the maximum permissible loss on client’s 
assets for trust managers was set; and the procedure of making decisions 
on transactions in the player’s own assets was made more elaborate (the 
requirement to set up an investment committee to this end was added); 
and internal audit of risk management systems was made compulsory. 
This comprehensive and modern approach by the Kazakh financial market 
regulator is in marked contrast to the FFMS’ plans to switch to prudential 
supervision of securities market players. Clearly, Kazakhstan’s need 
for foreign investments is being addressed through prompt regulatory 
measures targeting financial institutions. 
In Russia, adjustments to financial market regulation are being made in line 
with the Strategy of Development of the Financial Market of the Russian 
Federation until 2020 (RF, 2008), the Concept of Creating a Global 
Financial Centre in the Russian Federation (RF, 2009a) and the Plan of 
Action to achieve this (RF, 2009b). The purpose of these documents is to 
enhance the stability and competitiveness of the Russian financial sector; 
however, they were all prepared in 2008-2009. The Plan outlines the legal 
steps to create an international financial centre (IFC); these measures may 
appear to be instrumental in reaching this goal, but they are essential for 
normal operation of any market even if it does not attain IFC status. For 
example, the formulation of the objective to “create a compensation 
system on the financial market” contains no direct indications as to the 
content, cost or effects of the required system. This objective is assigned 
to a group of agencies: the FFMS, the Ministry of Economic Development, 
the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, which in itself gives rise to 
doubts about their ability to properly coordinate this effort. Even if all 
the measures named in the IFC Concept and Strategy are implemented, 
Moscow will not automatically turn into an IFC comparable with the world’s 
top ten (Moscow and St. Petersburg currently rank 68th and 70th, 
respectively).
What the FFMS really should do in order to 
accelerate the formation of an IFC is to provide 
a regulatory framework for trading in foreign 
securities in Russia.
Notably, the IFC Concept and Strategy were 
developed before and during the 2008 
The progress of the Russian stock 
market on its way towards an IFC 
was slowed down not only (and not 
essentially) by the crisis, but also by  
the inefficient regulatory system. 
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financial crisis. However, the progress of the Russian stock market on 
its way towards an IFC was slowed not only (and not critically) by the 
crisis, but also by the inefficient regulatory system. 
Currently, the world’s largest financial centres, including the US and the UK, 
are revising their approaches to regulation, trying to draw lessons from the 
crisis. Russia’s main partner in EurAsEC and the Customs Union, Kazakhstan, 
also responded quickly to the challenge. In February the President of 
Kazakhstan approved the Concept of Development of the Financial Sector 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Post-Crisis Period (RK, 2010). This 
document defines the ultimate goal as “the development of the financial 
sector in the post-crisis period, particularly, elevating it to a new qualitative 
level of management and regulation”.
The Concept provides that regulation and supervision of the financial 
sector will be based on the counter-cyclical policy principle (i.e. formation 
of reserves and increasing equity capital and liquidity during periods of 
economic upsurge so that to use this accumulated potential during 
recession). The same principle applies to the structure and quality of 
investment portfolios of financial organisations. The document stresses the 
importance of getting rid of pro-cyclic approaches in regulation. Notably, 
similar Russian documents do not seem to contain any underlying principle 
at all.
The Kazakhstani Concept includes five sections addressing the key aspects 
of the functioning of the financial market:
1)  definition of the state’s role in mobilising financial resources;
2)  strengthening the regulatory and supervisory systems;
3)  strengthening mechanisms for protecting the rights of investors and 
consumers of financial services;
4)  enhancing the quality of corporate governance and transparency of 
financial organisations; and
5)  managing systemic risks and interaction between governmental 
agencies.
The Kazakhstani Concept also addresses the issues of government 
interference with the economy. The government will assume a more 
prominent role in planning and stimulating the economy, but the basic 
principles of free market and free private sector will be preserved. The 
state will switch from full social support for various population groups to a 
mixed system where employees will share responsibility for their welfare 
with employers and the government. As the first step in this direction, a 
savings pension system was adopted in Kazakhstan; the goals of this pension 
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reform were to reduce public expenditure, and, equally importantly, to 
create a new class of institutional investors. 
Private-public partnership will become the main 
engine of economic modernisation in Kazakhstan. 
Accumulative pension funds will be encouraged 
to invest in infrastructure projects. Individual 
deposits with second-tier banks are viewed as 
the main (albeit conservative) potential source of 
funds for the financial sector. The Concept also 
places an emphasis on the government securities 
market; notably, corporate securities are assigned 
a secondary role, as this segment is still largely 
underdeveloped. It is envisaged that “the existence 
of a moderate budgetary deficit and manageable 
government debt will permit the circulation of an 
adequate quantity of governmental securities at 
all times; this quantity will be instrumental in drawing a yield curve, defining 
short and longer term expectations, assessing the risks to which financial 
instruments are exposed, and determining spot rates for prospective 
borrowings”.
The Kazakhstani Concept states that the volume of medium and long- 
term government securities (issued in order to cover the budgetary deficit) 
must be determined by the capacity of the domestic securities market. 
Alternative sources of savings, such as private institutions, real estate 
funds and hedge funds, will also be widely employed.
Islamic financing is also named as an additional source of funds. The 
conditions necessary for the establishment of Islamic banks and investment 
funds and issuing Islamic instruments were created by amendments to 
the respective laws made in February 2009 (RK, 2009). In contrast, Islamic 
financing is not even mentioned in the IFC Concept and Strategy of Russia, 
a country with a multimillion Muslim community. Regulation and supervision 
of Islamic financial organisations in Kazakhstan will be the responsibility 
of the FSA. The main platform for the development of the Islamic 
instruments market will be the Agency for Regulation of the Regional Financial 
Centre of Almaty (the RFCA Agency). This distribution of responsibilities 
reflects the somewhat dual nature of the Kazakh regulatory system, which 
first manifested itself following creation of the RFCA Agency pursuant to 
Law no. 145, On the Regional Financial Centre of Almaty; thus, the short- 
lived integrity of the regulatory powers of the FSA was to some extent 
weakened. The RFCA Agency is authorised to: 
• approve the rules for state registration (re-registration) of entities that 
are participants in RFCA; 
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• approve the rules of accreditation of participants in RFCA; 
• set requirements for issuers whose securities are proposed for listing 
or listed on the special trading floor of RFCA, and, jointly with the FSA, 
requirements for these; 
• approve the list of rating agencies whose ratings are recognised by 
FSA;
• set rating requirements for securities and issuers applicable on the 
special trading floor of RFCA, etc.
The authors of the Kazakhstani Concept paid close attention to 
strengthening the regulation and supervision of the financial market. It is 
stressed that integrated control can exclude conflicts of interests which 
are inevitable under functional or institutional supervision systems. In other 
words, all Kazakhstani financial institutions will remain accountable only to 
FSA, although the RFCA Agency is vested with some law-making powers 
which overlap those of FSA. The Chairman of the RFCA Agency is a member 
of the FSA Board; this body, for example, controls KASE, whose largest 
shareholder (12.26%) is RFCA. This overlapping power and responsibility 
has the potential to generate conflicts of interests.
In Russia, the same financial institutions are regulated and supervised by 
the FFMS, the Central Bank, the Federal Financial Monitoring Service, the 
Ministry of Finance and Social Development, and others. 
The current regulatory system of the Russian capital market is 
cumbersome and overly complex compared to the Kazakhstani system. 
The above mentioned Russian documents also contain provisions on 
modernisation of financial market regulation, but these are essentially general 
statements. It is recognised that the current intention is not to create a 
consolidated regulatory body, but to improve the coordination of the existing 
ones. To this end, it was proposed that interministry coordinating structures 
such as the Presidential Council on Development of the Financial Market 
(actually established in 2009) and an IFC working group attached to it be 
created. The Strategy recognises the need to switch from the principles of 
industry-specific (functional) regulation to state-level regulation of financial 
market risks (threats to financial stability, unscrupulous activities and 
violation of the rights of investors and market players). However, even the 
crisis did not push the Russian regulatory bodies into practical action in this 
sphere.
In contrast, the Kazakhstani regulatory system made significant progress 
in this respect. In line with the Kazakhstani Concept, the supervisory body 
will impose additional requirements for financial organisations concerning 
transparency of decision-making on foreign investments and lending. This 
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will allow the risk of transactions with countries exposed to high legal 
risks and inadequate protection of the rights of investors and lenders to be 
reduced. 
The Russian Concept stresses the inefficiency of industry-specific banks, 
as these institutions cannot function properly in a competitive environment 
and need government support. The Russian financial market (and, first of 
all, the banking sector) is dominated by structures with heavy government 
shareholding, and their role as recipients of government resources intended 
for maintaining the liquidity of the financial system was boosted even further 
by the crisis. 
The message of the Kazakhstani Concept is that 
government support for the financial market 
must be gradually reduced. Thus, the government 
intends to reduce its interference with all market 
segments and fully withdraw when an adequate 
level of fair competition is achieved.
Notably, the Russian documents do not contain 
any indications of the government’s forthcoming 
withdrawal from the market, e.g. the Central Bank’s 
withdrawal from the capital and management 
of MICEX. However, the possibility of reducing 
government shareholding in Sberbank and VTB has 
recently been voiced.
The Kazakhstani Concept envisages that foreign participation in the financial 
sector will be limited to 50% of total equity capital. The Russian documents do 
not address this issue, although certain legal barriers to foreign capital in the 
banking sector do exist.
In order to better protect the interests of investors and consumers of services 
on the Kazakhstani securities market, the responsibility level of senior 
management of joint-stock companies will be increased; stricter transaction 
transparency requirements will be introduced, corporate governance systems 
will be improved, and issuer information disclosure will be regulated in more 
detail. 
Corporate governance and transparency of Kazakhstani financial 
organisations will be enhanced by introducing requirements for internal audit, 
risk management systems, information disclosure and fair evaluation of 
financial instruments. The Russian Strategy also addresses these issues and 
provides for similar measures. The Kazakhstani Concept contains provisions 
on strengthening macro-prudential supervision, which includes a package 
of measures for eliminating systemic risks. The purpose of this form of 
regulation is to identify key solutions on particular activities and markets 
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The message of the Kazakhstani  
Concept is that government support for 
the financial market must be gradually 
reduced. The Russian documents do  
not contain any indications of the 
government’s forthcoming withdrawal 
from the market, e.g. the Central 
Bank’s withdrawal from the capital and 
management of MICEX. However, the 
reductions of government shareholdings 
in Sberbank and VTB are planned for 
2011-2013.
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that are exposed to systemic risks which threaten financial and economic 
stability.
The Russian Strategy also provides for creating a system of prudential 
supervision at several levels: internal audit of financial market players, control 
of self-regulating organisations, and state control by government agencies. 
The other proposed measures include:
• harmonisation of methods and rules of supervision of professional 
securities market players and the banking supervision rules;
• adoption of common requirements on calculation of equity capital 
(consistent with international standards) for all professional securities 
market players and unit investment fund management companies 
in parallel with the modernisation and unification of accounting rules 
applicable to financial organisations; 
• revision of requirements for the minimum equity capital size to 
international standards;
• adoption of requirements for capital sufficiency in view of the 
organisation’s financial risks; 
• adoption of advanced risk assessment methods based on internationally 
recognised models, including ratings and digital indices reflecting 
operating risks.
The Russian Strategy outlines the principle of 
proportionality of prudential supervision – that 
is, supervisory requirements should apply to 
market players with due regard for their size, type 
of activity, nature of transactions and related 
risks. A prudential supervision system should 
employ an individual approach towards assessing 
risks to which market players or their assets 
are exposed. Unfortunately, the current FFMS 
practice is not consistent with the proportionality 
approach; a problem which is discussed in 
more detail below. It should also be noted that, whereas the Kazakhstani 
Concept upholds the principle of counter-cycle policy, the Russian 
Strategy and the current practices of Russian regulatory bodies focus 
principally on stiffening equity capital size requirements for non-
banking players, which is being presented as implementing international 
recommendations, although with no regard for the current phase of 
the economic cycle. The Kazakhstani regulatory system will employ 
a new index reflecting recovery of the banking sector – namely, ratio 
of banking system assets to pre-crisis GDP, although the current 
The development of the Kazakh financial 
market will follow the principle of  
counter-cycle policy. The Russian  
Strategy and the current practices 
of Russian regulatory bodies focus 
principally on stiffening equity capital  
size requirements for non-banking  
players, although with no regard for the 
current phase of the economic cycle.
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structure and quality of the assets are largely different from the 
pre-crisis pattern.
Our comparison of two approaches towards financial market development 
allows us to conclude that the Kazakhstani Concept is a fairly consistent 
document which covers both the banking and non-banking segments 
of the financial market and addresses the problem in a comprehensive 
and systematic manner. Unlike similar Russian documents, it is more 
fundamental and conveys a clear message for financial market players and 
investors as to the prospective changes in state regulation. On the other 
hand, the Russian documents present merely general statements rather 
than practical formulae. Whilst the Russian economy is facing the urgent 
problems of post-crisis recovery, no long-term financial market 
development policy is in place.
Interaction between Russian and Kazakhstani stock 
exchanges for capital markets development
• Russian and Kazakhstani stock exchanges as main organisers of 
trade are keen to cooperate with each other. 
• During the past decade a great deal of organisational work was done 
in both countries, however we still cannot say that an adequate level of 
integration was achieved nor can we say that we are nearing a common 
stock exchange space.
Interaction between Russian and Kazakhstani stock exchanges
Stock exchanges are the central elements of a financial infrastructure. 
Occupying a position between monetary authorities/regulatory bodies and 
stock market players, they not only organise trade and facilitate settlement, 
but also serve as a vehicle for change and innovation.
The Russian and Kazakhstani stock exchanges are striving to expand mutual 
cooperation. It is natural, in view of the fact that MICEX, RTS and KASE are 
all members of the International Association of Stock Exchanges of the CIS 
(IASE). The goals of this organisation are (CIS IASE, 2000): 
• the formation of a single stock exchange space based on advanced stock 
trading technology;
• mutual admission of non-resident traders;
• the facilitation of national currency flows between CIS countries;
• the adoption of international securities market standards in CIS countries 
and mutual recognition of issuance registrations;
• cooperation between CIS members in capital market and single stock 
exchange space development;
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The International Association of Stock Exchanges 
of the CIS was founded in April 2000 in Moscow  
in an effort to coordinate the creation of  
organised financial markets to international 
standards. 
CIS IASE comprises 20 organisations from 10  
CIS countries which play the central role in  
servicing mutual financial flows, currency 
operations and transactions in government and 
corporate securities. 
Azerbaijan (Baku Interbank Currency 
Exchange) 
Armenia (NASDAQOMX
Armenia) 
Belarus (Belarusian currency and 
stock exchange, Belarusian Universal 
Commodity Exchange)
Georgia (Tbilisi Interbank Currency 
Exchange)
Kazakhstan (KASE, Central 
Securities Depository)
Kyrgyzstan 
(Kyrgyz stock exchange)
Moldova (Moldovan Stock Exchange)
Russia (MICEX, Samara Currency 
Interbank Exchange, SPCEX, Siberian 
Interbank Currency Exchange, RTS)
Uzbekistan (UZSE, Uzbek Republican 
Commodity Exchange)
Ukraine (National Depository 
of Ukraine, Interbank Currency 
Exchange of Crimea, Ukrainian 
Interbank Currency Exchange, FSTS)
• the development of basic standards 
for unification of the interbank capital 
market;
• cooperation in the development of 
currency and lending transactions on 
national currency markets;
• the formation of the CIS monetary 
system based on national currencies;
• practical implementation of the 
principle of mutual recognition of 
national currencies and official 
quotations;
• achievement of mutual convertibility of 
national currencies for the purposes 
of current transactions;
• the introduction of mechanisms and 
instruments for currency, interest and 
price risk hedging; 
• support for floating national currency 
rates and approval of maximum 
fluctuations;
• the introduction of a banking 
mechanism and market makers 
for the purposes of supporting 
national currencies and achieving full 
convertibility of such currencies.
The goals declared by IASE CIS are very 
challenging, and they are much more 
precisely formulated than any international 
agreements in this sphere. Of course, 
the achievement of these goals does not 
entirely depend on the stock exchanges 
themselves, yet the formulation of these 
goals indicates that the stakeholders 
wish to cooperate on definite terms. 
It does not really matter whether this 
cooperation will be in the CIS, EurAsEC 
or bilateral format; what is important is 
that the IASE CIS is in a position to make 
a positive contribution to this process. 
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The persisting global crisis hit stock trade hard, especially the trade in 
securities. Of the 130 companies listed on KASE, 24 defaulted on their 
debt instruments, and five of these 24 companies defaulted on coupons 
and the principal. Many companies are more than one coupon period in 
arrears. These include two largest Kazakh banks, Alliance Bank and BTA 
Bank, whose indebtedness to bond holders (29.7 billion tenge) accounts 
for 56% of the total indebtedness on bonds of all defaulting companies.
The Kazakh financial authorities promptly responded to this negative impact 
on stock trade by revising the securities law in two ways. First, listing 
requirements for certain categories of instruments and issuers were lowered. 
This stabilisation measure had been applied in international practice to resolve 
similar problems, and the FSA decided to learn from this experience. The 
softening of listing requirements allowed some companies to recover from 
a financial setback and remain on the official list despite their deteriorated 
financial performance indicators.
Particularly, amendments were made to FSA Board Resolution no. 77 dated 
May 26, 2008, On Requirements for Issuers and Instruments Permitted 
to Trade on the Stock Exchange and Certain Listing Categories. The 
mandatory equity capital size of debt securities issuers was reduced, the 
requirement to employ a market maker for certain categories of debt 
securities was lifted, and the profit periods requirement was eased. These 
amendments to the listing requirements were dictated by the fact that 
during the crisis many listed Kazakhstani companies suffered losses and, 
accordingly, their equity capital size shrank. 
Second, a special buffer category of securities was added to the official list. 
It is stated that this measure is aimed at protecting the rights of crisis-
stricken issuers: they are given an opportunity to remain on the official list, 
although with a reduced status. These issuers can continue introducing their 
instruments to the stock exchange, which, in the opinion of the authorities, 
is less detrimental from a systemic point of view than delisting. 
The above measures undoubtedly played a role in stabilising the Kazakhstani 
stock market; however, the number and scale of continuing defaults 
seriously concerned potential Russian buyers of Kazakhstani securities, 
and this sentiment still persists. For comparison: in 2008, 16 Russian 
bond issuers defaulted on coupon payments on 20 issuances, 21 issuers 
defaulted on offers on 22 issuances, and 1 issuer defaulted on maturity; in 
2009, 50 issuers defaulted on coupon payments on 60 issuances, 41 issuers 
defaulted on offers on 46 issuances, and 17 issuers defaulted on maturity. 
Of course, these negative developments do not appear as severe as the 
Kazakh defaults in the context of the Russian market size: as at September 
1, 2009, MICEX traded 578 corporate bond issuances of 409 companies 
for a total of 2,000 billion roubles and 18 commercial paper issuances of 
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6 issuers for a total of 58 billion roubles, and had on its list 248 corporate 
bond issuances (42.5% of the total number) and 4 commercial paper 
issuances of 3 issuers; in addition, 14 commercial paper issuances were 
traded in the off-list sector.
During the past decade a great deal of organisational work was done in 
both countries, however we still cannot say that an adequate level of 
integration was achieved nor can we say that we are nearing a common 
stock exchange space. This conclusion is confirmed by the results of our 
survey which covered RTS and MICEX of Russia and Kazakhstan’s main 
stock exchange KASE. 
RTS ranks highest among them in terms of investments in the other country. 
To date, only RTS has an affiliate in Kazakhstan (Commodity Stock Exchange 
ETS) and holds Kazakhstani securities.
It should be noted that both RTS and MICEX head vertically integrated 
financial groups comprising various organisations. This allows a choice of 
specialised partners for cooperation with Kazakhstan in different aspects 
of financial markets integration. KASE also has affiliates and dependent 
business entities in its organisational structure with similar functions and 
roles. 
All these stock exchanges are shareholders of other CIS stock exchanges, 
and this determines their preferences in cooperation to some extent. 
For example, RTS is implementing several joint projects with foreign 
counterparts, and KASE has a 10.6% stake in the Kyrgyz Stock Exchange 
(unfortunately, in view of the recent events in Kyrgyzstan, this is unlikely 
to bring about any positive developments in the near future). The intention 
to cooperate is already there, and this intention takes various practical 
forms.
During the survey the respondents were asked about prospective forms of 
cooperation between Russian and Kazakhstani stock exchanges. MICEX 
provided the most extended answer to this question:
• exchange of information on working plans, stock market development 
prospects, improvements to trading systems, interaction with clearing, 
depository and settlement systems, and adoption of new technology and 
instruments;
• technical cooperation;
• bilateral commercial projects;
• mutual penetration of stock markets by Russian and Kazakhstani 
players;
• organisation of trade in RDR and KDR;
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• direct admission of Kazakhstani issuers to Russian stock exchanges;
• clearing services;
• disclosure of corporate information of Russian and Kazakhstani 
issuers;
• joint efforts to develop CIS countries’ markets under the aegis of IASE 
CIS;
• participation in CIS and EurAsEC bodies, the Russian-Kazakh Commission 
on Economic and Financial Issues, etc.
KASE mentioned the following prospective areas of cooperation with Russian 
counterparts:
• harmonisation of two countries’ laws, as a precondition for stock market 
integration projects;
• consultations on strategic development, PR and marketing;
• exchange of information for the purposes of attracting investors; 
• exchange of experience related to IT infrastructure and trading and 
clearing systems in order to enhance efficiency and quality of services;
• cooperation in developing IТ solutions for the Kazakhstani derivatives 
market.
In the short term, the main focus should be on the 
integration of the Russian and Kazakhstani stock 
exchanges as the organisers of the most developed 
markets in EurAsEC (IASE, 2009). A positive example 
of integration on the commodity market is the 
creation of the Eurasian Trade System stock 
exchange in the end of 2008 by the RFCA (40% of 
the charter capital) and RTS (60%). Unfortunately, 
as the crisis persists, to date only the farm produce 
section is operational, although oil products and 
metals sections are to be launched. We should also 
mention the project to create the Eurasian Stock 
Exchange of Farm Produce, Raw Materials and 
Foodstuffs which is being developed on the initiative 
of the EurAsEC Integration Committee, and which 
effectively competes with the above project. The 
new stock exchange will be based on the Belarusian Universal Commodity 
Exchange and is expected to start in 2011. If this project becomes a success, 
it should be integrated into the ETS through a mechanism suitable for all 
participants – such as the existing trading floor in Almaty. 
In the short term, the main focus should 
be on the integration of the Russian and 
Kazakhstani stock exchanges as the 
organisers of the most developed markets 
in EurAsEC.
Effectively, ETS (launched in 2009) 
and the prospective Eurasian Stock 
Exchange are competing projects on  
the farm produce market. They should  
be integrated, perhaps on the basis of  
the ETS which is already operational. 
Institutions of Regional 
Integration
11Eurasian Development Bank
Although the main responsibility for simplifying 
interaction between organised market players 
from two countries lies with the stock exchanges 
themselves, not everything depends on them. For 
example, as we have mentioned above, both the stock 
exchanges and professional capital market players 
such as central depositaries need an adequate 
nominal holding mechanism for foreign investors 
which would fit with the laws of two states, and a 
developed clearing system including centralised functions. 
Another important element of technical integration is the development and 
introduction of a common electronic document management technology 
which would allow information exchange between stock exchanges and 
traders to be standardised and accelerated.
Preconditions and problems of integrated currency market 
development
Professional financial market players from Russia and Kazakhstan 
understand that economic cooperation between these two countries will 
expand steadily despite the persisting global crisis. The preconditions for an 
integrated currency market are already there: the experience of interaction 
and mutual ties between Russian and Kazakh banks, including shareholding, 
and extensive market infrastructure. 
Although currency regulation varies across the CIS and EurAsEC in 
terms of openness, prior to the crisis there was a clear overall tendency 
towards liberalisation of currency laws. Generally, the currency markets in 
CIS countries demonstrate positive growth dynamics. The crisis resulted 
in significant changes in CIS currencies’ exchange rates, and companies 
and the population at large started to show greater interest in currency 
exchange transactions, hence an increase in currency market turnovers 
(Mishina, 2009).
However, the volume of transactions in CIS national currencies on the 
Russian interbank market remains negligible6. In September 2009 the 
total volume of currency conversion transactions reached $52 billion a day. 
Transactions in the Ukrainian hryvnia and Kazakh tenge totalled $6 million, 
and transactions in the Belarusian rouble about $1 million a day – less 
than 0.01% of the Russian currency market turnover. Notably, even these 
small exchange transactions involved the US dollar rather than the Russian 
rouble.
Stock exchanges, depositaries and other 
professional capital market players need 
an adequate nominal holding mechanism 
for foreign investors which would fit with 
the laws of two states, and a developed 
clearing system.
6 http://www.eabr.org, http://infoshos.ru.
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99% of all transactions on the Kazakh interbank market involve the US dollar. 
In 2008, stock trade in the US dollar increased by 9.1% to $66.6 billion. At 
the same time, trade in the US dollar dropped by 26.4% to $103.5 billion on 
the unorganised market. Transactions in the Russian rouble and euro 
accounted for less than 1% of the total turnover of the organised and 
unorganised segments of the currency market. On stock exchanges, 
transactions in the Russian rouble grew by 39.5% to 573.8 million 
Russian roubles, and euro transactions grew by 3.3% to €11 million. In the 
unorganised segment, transactions in the Russian rouble dropped by 
2.1 times to 1.9 billion Russian roubles, whereas euro transactions grew 
by 7.5% to €588.5 million (Mishina, 2009).
The reluctance to make payments in CIS national currencies and the use 
of the US dollar or euro result in higher transaction costs, inconvenience 
of mutual payments under financial transactions, and the need to 
maintain additional sums in foreign currencies – hence unnecessary currency 
risks.
According to IASE CIS, in 2008 the total volume of trade in foreign currency 
on the member stock exchanges reached $2.8 trillion – a 78% increase 
over the previous year’s figure. Trade in the Russian rouble in 2008 was 
especially extensive in Belarus: Russian rouble transactions on the Belarusian 
Currency Stock Exchange (BCSE) totalled 124.4 billion roubles, accounting 
for more than 27% of all currency transactions. On KASE, tenge-US dollar 
transactions account for 99% of all currency transactions and rouble and 
euro transaction amount to less than 1%. On MICEX, transactions in CIS 
national currencies are very rare: the last rouble-tenge transaction took place 
in 2000. Taking the objective of developing an integrated currency market 
as indicated in the EurAsEC Agreement (EurAsEC, 2006) into account, 
MICEX started preparing a project to stimulate trade in soft currencies 
(namely, receiving liquid direct quotations without US dollar mediation). On 
November 2, 2009 MICEX introduced new rules which grant EurAsEC 
countries’ residents the right to become members of the MICEX currency 
market section. Banks from EurAsEC countries will be able to participate in 
“Single Regular Trading” after the respective national (central) banks sign an 
agreement with the Central Bank of Russia.
An analysis of the soft currencies market shows that its efficiency 
largely depends on efforts to improve the settlement infrastructure and 
regulatory support from Russian and Kazakh governmental agencies. 
The commencement of the Agreement on the Customs Union of Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus in July 2010 created the conditions for the 
resumption of talks on adoption of a common currency by these three 
countries. This step would elevate the stock market integration effort to a 
new level and have a diverse effect on various economic sectors.
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Conclusions
This study conducted by the Eurasian Development Bank with support 
from the PARTAD enables an assessment of the prospects and problems 
of integration of the capital markets of Russia and Kazakhstan. In technical 
and legal terms, these problems are largely similar to those faced by the 
capital market integration effort in EurAsEC as a whole. Our analysis of the 
legal framework for mutual penetration of Russian and Kazakhstani capital in 
the form of stock market instruments shows that there are no 
insurmountable barriers to this process. Moreover, the basic legal 
preconditions for this mutual penetration are all in place. However, as the 
financial crisis persists and the capital markets of Russia and Kazakhstan 
fail to function as a single IFC in the global financial market, this mutual 
penetration is still of little use.
Notably, these two EurAsEC member countries have no explicit political 
or other barriers to integration of capital markets. This warrants 
synchronisation of their regulatory systems and infrastructure, which will 
allow them to quickly and efficiently organise trading in Kazakhstani 
securities and depository receipts on Russian exchanges; to secure 
reliable communication between the holder, the issuer and the registrar by 
electronic document management systems; and to enable the disclosure of 
information on these financial instruments at a single EurAsEC centre, 
irrespective of location, in both Russian and English.
The survey reveals that currently potential issuers and professional players 
show little interest in the integration of the stock markets of Russia and 
Kazakhstan and prefer to work on international markets. Thus, competition 
with other financial centres necessitates significant effort to improve the 
attractiveness of regional financial solutions and instruments. 
Accordingly, the ultimate goal should be defined as a common Eurasian 
financial centre with infrastructure elements lokated across EurAsEC and 
form a single exchange trade, clearing and settlement system. Most of 
these elements will be concentrated in Russia, due to some significant 
economic or technical advantages. Nonetheless, other EurAsEC members 
(primarily, Kazakhstan) will have a role to play in the capital and physical 
infrastructure of the main institutions of this supranational IFC. 
As part of this effort, the EDB can position itself as a unique institution which 
can not only catalyse the investment process but also serve as an 
infrastructure bridge between the capital markets of Russia and 
Kazakhstan and, potentially, other EurAsEC countries. This is especially 
important because, according to the survey, the level of mutual Russian and 
Kazakhstani capital market penetration does not match the actual potential 
for bilateral cooperation.
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Decision-making on capital market integration issues could be greatly 
accelerated if, following the inception of the Customs Union of Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus (which seemed unrealistic just a short time ago), 
the issue of a common currency is once again placed on the political agenda. 
The adoption of a common currency would spur diverse synergetic effects 
in the economies of the member countries. In the short - to medium term 
a broader use of national currencies in mutual trade could have positive 
effect on the integration of capital markets. 
To date, the most serious concerns are centred around the fact that, though 
the Russian economy faces the challenges of post-crisis rehabilitation, 
no strategic documents or policies have yet been formulated on the 
development of the Russian financial market as the backbone of an 
integrated EurAsEC capital market. This is a dangerous oversight in the 
context of tough competition between developing markets. 
We hope that this publication will contribute to the policy-making and 
formulation of measures for the development of the capital markets in Russia 
and Kazakhstan.
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Introduction 
The current processes of intensive economic interaction are not unique if we 
look back at the last two thousand years of world economic history. We utilise 
a notion of “Eurasian exchange” coined, in particular, by Jeofrrey Gunn1. We 
will describe a Eurasian exchange as the mutual exchange of goods, services, 
people, information, ideas and technologies along established routes across 
the Eurasian continent. This phenomenon shaped the human civilisation more 
than once of the last two millennia. In this chapter we will outline distinct 
“waves” of Eurasian exchange and trace their differences and similarities as 
concerns their thematic and geographic focus as well as the primary means 
of communication.
We rely on the body of literature primarily by the school of world systems 
historians, such as Janet Abu-Lughod, Andre Gunder Frank, and Kenneth 
Pomeranz (as well as, of course, Angus Maddison for the overall macro-
economic history), probably starting with Fernand Braudel. In essence, these 
historians argue that the world history has to be reassessed. From a global 
perspective Asia – and not Europe – held center stage throughout most of the 
modern history. Before 1800 Europe – or, for that matter, the “West” – was 
not hegemonic structurally, nor functionally, nor in terms of economic weight, 
or of production, technology or productivity, nor in per capita consumption, 
nor in the development of capitalist institutions (Frank, 1998: 5). 
Four Eurasian exchanges 
There were four distinct periods of large-scale Eurasian exchanges which 
were both the product and the defining forces of major economic and 
technological breakthroughs: 
1-3th centuries A.D.: exchanges between Roman Empire, Middle East, India 
and China under Han dynasty. These exchanges were greatly facilitated by 
the political unification of the Mediterranean under the Rome and China under 
Han dynasty. 
1 Gunn (2003) is more concerned with the cultural/civilisational side of the picture, while we 
focus on the economic side.
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11-13th centuries: This is the time of multiple Silk Ways, which we outline 
below. However, despite the romantic flair of the Silk Ways, maritime routes 
were more important in terms of volume of trade than the land routes. Arab 
traders served as the major force in this era of Eurasian exchange. 
16-19th centuries: time of maritime trade and gradual European expansion 
in the Indian ocean and in the Pacific. Although Europeans led the drive, their 
role in absolute terms requires a qualification. According to contemporary 
research, the major bulk of trade exchange was still between the Asian trade 
partners. Also, the exchange of technologies was certainly mutual (Frank, 
1998; Gunn, 2003).
Approximately since the 1970s: contemporary wave of Eurasian exchange 
as an instance of globalisation. Maritime transportation firmly becomes 
the principal means for goods exchange. Still, the major feature of the 
contemporary, fourth Eurasian exchange is that there are essentially new 
means of exchange, whose economic value may be difficult to measure directly 
against trade in goods, most importantly telecommunication and information 
exchange, but also air transportation (which greatly advanced the exchange 
of people and ideas). The technological advances in transportation and 
telecommunications helped intensify the global exchange by many–fold (the 
whole 17th century Asian trade could have been served by one transocean 
container vessel!).
An important feature of the first, second and third exchanges is that the role 
of Europe was not central. In fact, the ‘Western’ civilisation firmly held the 
hegemony only since the very end of the eighteenth century. As it is changing 
now, the overall period of Western hegemony is likely to be restricted by 
200 years – out of five millennia of charted history of the human race. Any 
attempts to retouch this (such as reclassifying Japan as part of the “West”) 
are doomed. 
Eurasia itself is a Eurocentric denomination, albeit one invented on a 
distant marginal peninsula of that land mass. “Asiopa” is statistically more 
correct! Or, rather, “the relevant geographic and historical unit is really 
“Afro-Eurasia” (Frank, 1998: 2). From the point of view of the political, 
demographic, and economic history, as well as anthropology, it could 
also be called “Afrasia’. Still, we have no choice but to stick to Eurasia (just 
remember that under different circumstances our book might be entitled 
“Asiopian Integration”). 
To provide a few figures for comparison, modern demographers place China’s 
population in 1500 at 100 million, compared with Europe’s 68 million (and 
Japan’s 16 million). By 1800, China’s population would rise to over 300 million 
(300 years of peace), vastly outstripping Europe with 173 million (Frank, 
1998: 171). 
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The city of Hanchow in the 13th century had probably a million inhabitants 
and was – until 19th century London (!) – the world’s largest city 
(Abu-Lughod, 1989: 337). China was as good the central piece of the 2nd 
Eurasian exchange and a central piece of the third one, as it absorbed two 
thirds of the world silver in exchange for its higher value-added production of 
silk, ceramics, tea, etc. 
Below we reproduce the abridged version of the table on world population by 
Clark (see Table 9.1). His calculations largely coincide with other influential 
historians who charted the world’s demography.
Table 9.1.
World Population 
1200-100 (million, 
estimates by Clark) 
Source: Clark, 1
Year 1200 1500 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800
World 348 427 498 516 641 731 890
Europe 51 68 83 90 106 130 173
Asia 248 231 303 311 420 484 590
 China 123 100 150 100 150 207  315
 Japan 12 16 18 22 26 26 26
 India 75 79 100 150 200 200 190
Africa 61 85 100 100 100 100 100
Americas 23 41 15 13 13 15 25
Oceania 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
The population of China was steadily 1.5-1.7 times larger than the totality 
of Europe. Japan’s population is equal to those of the largest European 
nations, France and Great Britain. Asia makes roughly two thirds of the world 
population, compared to 20% or less of Europe.
The calculation of GDP would not be much different, as per capita GDP in China 
and Japan was equal or higher than that of the European nations well until 
the 19th century. E.g. in 1750 total world GNP was $155 billion (measured in 
1960 US dollars), of which 77% was in Asia2.
In terms of per capita income, Europe and China (and probably India) attained 
comparable levels of development between 1000 and 1500. In fact, China 
enjoyed higher levels of per capita income, technological advance etc. in 11-
15th centuries (Pomeranz, 2000). 
The standard figures by Maddison confirm this view (see Table 9.2).
Let us summarise some characteristics of the four Eurasian Exchanges in 
Table 9.3.
2 Braudel (1992) citing estimates by Paul Bairoch; his “Asia excludes Russia and Japan. If we 
include them back to where they belong geographically, Asian share would be in excess of 80%.
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Table 9.2.
World population and 
economy, 1-2003 
AD (estimates by 
Maddison)
Source: Maddison 
(2003), Statistical 
Appendix A, tables 
A1, A, and A.
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Table 9.3.
Four Eurasian 
Exchanges
Eurasian exchanges Routes Which way
First, 1-3 century A.D. Sea and land  Roman Empire – West Asia – India – China 
Second, 11-13th A.D. Sea and land (Silk Ways) More between Arab world, South, and East Asia; Europe on the 
margins of Eurasian trade 
Third, 16-19th A.D. Predominantly sea Intensive interregional exchange; Europe, West Asia – India - 
South-East - East Asia. Europe still uncompetitive in relative terms, 
compensates deficit by silver bullion.
Fourth, contemporary Sea; much less over land; 
air; telecommunications
Initially more from Europe to Asia; increasingly also in the opposite 
direction and within Eurasian land mass; significant boost as the 
Soviet Union broke up; huge boost with China rising as an eco-
nomic superpower. 
During the first exchange, the great facilitators and actors were the 
consolidated China under Han and the consolidated Roman Empire. The 
Roman Empire, for instance, was in contact with the most of Eurasia as 
far away as India and China. However, this nascent world system would not 
survive the end of the Roman Empire. According to Abu-Lughod, “… this was 
not a global or worldwide system…, it covered a significant proportion of 
the central land mass of Europe and Asia and contained most of the 
population that existed at that time, since the peripheral regions were only 
sparsely populated” (Abu-Lughod, 1989: 43).
It was a long time before the second Eurasian exchange materialized on the 
back China, India, and the Arab world. The maritime trade along the coast 
played the principal role. 
Moreover, exchanges over the continental land mass became prominent at 
the time, visible in the history of the Silk Ways. There were three land 
routes of that time – Northern, Middle, and Southern ones. The Northern 
route across the landmass of Central Asia reached its peak as the Mongol 
empire settled for a relatively short timespan in the second half of the 13th 
century, and the traders could enjoy – not always and, of course, at a price – a 
relative security on the way from Mediterranean/Europe to China. The 
Middle route – connecting Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean via 
Baghdad, Basra, and the Persian Gulf – was presumably much more 
significant in terms of volume of trade. It is also true for the Southern 
route that went through Egypt and Red Sea to the Arabian Sea and then 
the Indian Ocean and was controlled by the Arab traders. To sum up, 
Central Asian trade over land should not be overestimated! According to 
Chaudhuri, even at its height, “the Central Asian caravan trade was 
complementary to the transcontinental maritime commerce of Eurasia” 
(Chaudhuri, 1985: 172). 
Spencer observed an interesting characteristics of both maritime and overland 
trade in the 12-13th centuries, which he aptly summarised in one phrase: 
“Goods traveled farther than men”. On their way from the point of departure 
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to the point of destination goods changed hands many times, with each trader 
serving just one stretch. On this way, a handful of global entrepôts based on 
Molucca Straits as well as in the Islamic world (notably Cairo and Baghdad, 
but also Samarkand) became the verified world cities with distinct 
specialisation as trade cities. Few individuals traveled across the entire 
maritime route of trade, so goods indeed traveled farther than men3! 
The Second exchange came to an end in the second half of the 14th century 
with the fall of the world system. Scientists clash over the causes of this 
phenomenon; however, the Black Death has certainly a lot to do with the 
disruption of trade connections and the terms of trade. For example, the 
population of Venice fell by three fifths. The land transportation was also 
ultimately disrupted by the break up of the pax mongolica.
In words of Abu-Lughod, “the unification of much of the central Eurasian land 
mass under the Mongols… facilitated the expansion of trade by opening up 
the northern route between China and the Black Sea outlet to the 
Mediterranean… [However,] its very success led ironically to its eventual 
demise… The unintended consequence of unification was the eruption of a 
pandemic that set back the development of a world system for some 150 
years. When the system revived in the sixteenth century, it had taken on a 
quite different shape.” (Abu-Lughod, 1989: 171). 
Indeed, the impact of the Mongol empire on the world economy and 
trade – once the initial extremely negative effect of destroyed economies 
of Central Asia, West Asia, and Russia took place – is multi-faceted. On the 
one hand, the absence of borders from China to Europe facilitated the 
evolvement of the functioning overland trade route, which made a viable 
alternative to the Middle and Southern routes. On the other hand, among 
many things, it facilitated the creation of what can be called a ‘common 
microbes market’. The rapid and unimpeded spread of endemics through 
the Mongol-dominated space clearly enabled the 14th century bubonic plague 
to move so fast through the Eurasian landmass. 
The history of Exchanges/globalisation is intertwined with the history of 
endemics. This is quite natural, essentially because exchange of diseases 
forms an inherent part of a “shadow” side of the overall exchange. William 
McNeil suggests that by the start of the Christian era ‘four divergent civilised 
disease pools had come into existence – China, India, the Middle East, and 
the Mediterranean (including Europe) – each of which contained a population 
of some 50-60 million people and had reached relative equilibrium with its 
environment, including endemic diseases. Their relative encapsulation from 
one another prevented the transfer from one system to the next of ‘strange’ 
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diseases (those for which local populations had not yet built up natural 
immunities of cultural patterns of avoidance and treatment)” (McNeill, 1976: 
93-97).
Contrary to the second exchange the third one has already drawn in both 
Americas and virtually all of the African continent and, thus, became a global 
exchange. Despite its global character, it was still very heavily centered on 
Eurasia. Mutual exchange of goods, people, ideas and technologies (means 
of production, military, medicinal, agricultural etc.) across Eurasia to a large 
extent shaped the modern civilisation.
The story of rhubarb is illustrative of the routes and ways of influence in 
the Third exchange. Chinese rhubarb entered Europe through (1) Russian 
caravans traveling overland in the north or (2) through to Arabia or (3) by 
coastal trade routes. First, European pharmacists used it as a medication. 
Then, planting of rhubarb was attempted in Europe and in Russia, later in 
America. Starting 1970 the East India Company entered trade in a big way 
(Gunn, 2003:74).
Despite rising volumes of world trade, it should not be overestimated either. 
J.C. van Leur (1955: 212) estimates Southeast Asian trade in 15-16th 
centuries at 98,000 tons. The whole Asian maritime trade thus could be 
served by one contemporary supercargo container vessel employed over a 
year! 
The current Eurasian exchange 
To summarise, an important feature of the Eurasian exchanges is that 
they formed the heart of all world systems bar the current one (and even 
that is changing in a stunning rapid manner). The fourth Exchange has, 
however, taken a global scope. Eurasia forms a part of it, and its relative 
weight is growing due to rising Asia. 
Johannes Linn calls Eurasia the “supercontinent” that underwent several 
waves of integration and disintegration when trade, population movements, 
and communication were flowing relatively freely, albeit slowly by today’s 
standards, across the vast Eurasian space. The ancient Silk Road which 
spanned the continent East to West and North to South epitomises this time 
of economic connectedness. The interweaving tendencies of the 16th-19th 
centuries came to halt in the 20th century, notable for the establishment of the 
Iron and Bamboo Curtains, which separated the Soviet Empire and China from 
the rest of the world. “The opening up of China in the 1980s and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s led to the opening up of previously 
closed borders and the transition from central planning to market economies. 
This ushered in a historic new phase of Eurasian development by permitting 
the integration of Eurasian economies with each other and with the rest of 
the world. This process of integration is now in full swing, connecting some of 
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the largest and most dynamic economies of the world – China, India, Russia – 
with each other and with an expanding European Union.” (Linn, Tiomkin, 
2006). 
The fourth Exchange differs from the previous ones on the base of sheer 
numbers. The major feature of the contemporary, fourth Eurasian exchange 
is that there are essentially new means of exchange, whose economic value 
may be difficult to measure directly against trade in goods, most importantly 
telecommunication and information exchange, but also air transportation 
(which greatly advanced the exchange of people and ideas). The technological 
advances in transportation and telecommunications helped intensify the 
global exchange by many–fold. 
Another inherent feature of the fourth Exchange is that it will most likely result 
in a reestablishment of the “natural weight” of Asia both in Eurasia and in the 
world economy. The trickiest issue for research is not why Asia accelerates 
now but rather why it lagged and underdelivered in the 18-20th centuries. 
Quality converts to quality, as the world gets much closer to each other, 
and previously isolated parts are drawn into the exchange of people, goods, 
services, information, ideas, and technologies. This, in turns, speeds up the 
pace of economic development to the levels not known before. Having said 
that, if the history of the human race teaches us anything, then that nothing 
is permanent. This Exchange can also come to end, be it because of a war, an 
endemic, or something else. 
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This article is based on a study entitled “Educational Migration from 
Kazakhstan to Russia – one aspect of strategic cooperation within the 
Customs Union”. The study examined current trends in educational 
migration from Kazakhstan to Russia. The project1 was implemented in 
2010, with the support from the EDB Technical Assistance Fund’s 
programme for regional migration studying. 
It was not a comparative study of educational migration flows from 
Kazakhstan to different countries, except where it analyses the students’ 
reasons for choosing a particular foreign country for their education. The 
goal of the study was to identify the motivations for and possible future 
development of educational migration from Kazakhstan to Russia only. The 
analysis of educational migration tends to be very difficult – the relatively 
few studies that exist have been based on a relatively small research cohort, 
there are no points of direct comparison and there are many complex factors 
affecting each country’s migration policy. However, it is still possible to identify 
key trends and tendencies. The findings and recommendations in this article 
apply only to educational migration from Kazakhstan to Russia.
Russian and Kazakh scholars have paid relatively scant attention to the issue 
of educational migration from Kazakhstan to Russia until now, for a variety of 
reasons:
• public agencies responsible for attracting foreign students do not have 
sufficient financial and human resources to implement such studies;
1 The project’s working group: B.I. Rakisheva, Candidate of Science (Sociology) (Astana, 
Kazakhstan), D.V. Poletaev, Candidate of Science (Economics) (Moscow, Russia), A.S. Zholdybalina, 
Ph.D, D.R. Beketayeva, Master of Sociology (Astana, Kazakhstan), G.B. Yerkebayeva, Master of 
Sociology (Astana, Kazakhstan), E.A. Yascherova, Master of Sociology, G.T. Shalova, Bachelor of 
Sociology (Astana, Kazakhstan), A.B. Mazhitova, Master of Sociology (Astana, Kazakhstan).
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• studies have tended to focus on the possible ‘brain drain’ effect upon 
the scientific potential of the two countries rather than on analysing 
the attractiveness of Russian educational institutions for Kazakh 
students and benefits of educational migrations. These issues 
are indirectly related to the international educational services market 
and do not provide an accurate overall picture, which is certainly a 
necessity if the existing resource base is to be used effectively.
Case studies of educational migration and the analysis of related processes 
carried out for Kazakhstan and Russia are still relatively rudimentary. 
The interpretation of spatial interaction models by D. Harvey (1974) is 
important to any study of educational migration. According to Harvey, these 
models do not view linear measures in absolute terms in relation to human 
activity. Transportation costs are a more significant criterion for assessing 
the territorial availability of vocational training centres than their distribution 
by communication links.
We should also mention A.P. Katrovskiy’s study, which examines the influence 
of political disintegration on the development of higher and secondary 
education in the post-Soviet space. The study highlights changes in the 
number and direction of travel of educational migrants, and focuses on 
educational migration within Russia (Katrovskiy, 1999). Given the rapidly 
changing situation in Russia, this study, which uses data collated in 1996, is 
now out of date. A more recent study was carried out in 2002 by Vitkovskaya. 
It is entitled Immigrants in Regions of Russia: the Availability of Higher 
Education as a Factor of Adaptation and Social Stability. It is only of oblique 
interest to the subject addressed in this article in that it analyses a particular 
aspect of educational migration, i.e., the integration into society of foreign 
migrants moving to Russia.  
L.I. Ledeneva and E.V. Tyuryukanova conducted another study in 2002 
and 2003. The methodology of the project, which focused on the Russian 
students studying abroad can be applied to Kazakh students at Russian 
universities. However, the analysis can only be applied selectively and in 
relation to different adaptation strategies.
The Ministry of Education and Science commissioned a new study from 
the Russian New University (Scientific Research, 2003). It identifies a need 
for a pro-active migration policy with regard to educational migration from 
CIS member states based on the similarity of their education systems and 
knowledge of the Russian language.
Two further studies are worthy of note: Russian Universities on the 
International Educational Services Market (Arefyev, 2007) and The 
Scientific and Pedagogical Potential and Export of the Educational Services 
of Russian Universities (Sheregi, Dmitryiev, Arefyev, 2002). The authors 
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of these studies conducted an in-depth analysis of educational migration 
to Russia and compared Russia’s experience with a foreign country. These 
studies closely resemble our own concept, but their conclusions are based 
on quantitative rather than qualitative analysis.
However, the material collected and analysed by the aforementioned 
authors in order to find answers to specific questions cannot be used 
to identify fully the opportunities that educational migration provides for 
Kazakh citizens moving to Russia, which is the suggested scope of our 
analysis. 
This project aims to identify the problems and benefits of development 
of strategic cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia by promoting 
educational migration and finding ways to strengthen relations between the 
Kazakh and Russian governments in the sphere of education.
In order to achieve this goal, the researchers structured their study as 
follows: 
• a comprehensive analysis of social, economic and cultural incentives 
and disincentives for Kazakh citizens studying at Russian universities;
• development of recommendations for mutually beneficial cooperation 
in educational migration between Kazakhstan and Russia in the 
short-, medium- and long-term, which would help Kazakhstan enrich its 
workforce, assist in developing Russia’s education system and encourage 
harmonisation of educational standards;
• suggestions of strategies to resolve, on an international level, issues such 
as educational migrants’ safety.
Educational migration benefits Kazakhstan and Russia but it has not been 
included in the list of priorities for cooperation between the two states. 
Although educational migration is desirable for Kazakh school graduates, 
Kazakhstan’s Bolashak2 Programme and Russian universities, certain 
aspects of legislation in both countries hinder the creation of the necessary 
conditions and infrastructure which encourage it. Continuous assessment 
of educational migration, which we recommend in this paper, may help 
change this situation if the authorities act upon the issues that it identifies. 
2 The Bolashak international scholarship was established by the first President of Kazakhstan, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, on November 5, 1993. The scholarship aims to: 1) educate Kazakh 
citizens in leading foreign universities on a full-time basis for them to attain a professional 
qualification or bachelor, masters or doctoral degrees, clinical residency training, and 
Ph.D. degrees in medical sciences, according to the list of priority disciplines applied to the 
scholarship; 2) organise traineeships for Kazakh researchers at leading universities, research 
centres and laboratories around the world according to the list of priority disciplines (http://
www.edu-cip.kz/kz/).
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It is appropriate to concentrate on educational migration flows from 
Kazakhstan to Russia: many Kazakh school graduates know the Russian 
language and are familiar with the Russian way of life and Russian traditions. 
They adapt to new environment much faster and more successfully than 
students from more distant foreign countries and students from other 
CIS countries. Moreover, the economic situation of Kazakhstan in recent 
years is likely to increase opportunities for Kazakhstani school graduates 
to move abroad to continue their education,  particularly to Russia.
This study analyses available opportunities, the socio-economic impact and 
the prospects for international cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia 
in training highly qualified personnel for Kazakhstan and encouraging 
conformity between the education systems in both countries.
Kazakhstan benefits from this cooperation by educating highly qualified 
specialists in Russian universities that are highly experienced in teaching 
many disciplines which are only just starting to be taught in Kazakhstan 
(qualified specialists are already in short supply in this growing economy). 
The state planned economy of the USSR had concentrated the best teaching 
personnel in the largest cities of the RSFSR. Even though Kazakhstan is 
progressively reducing the inequalities in its existing educational system, the 
country is still unable to provide the level of training required by Kazakhstan’s 
economy.
Inward investment into Russia as a result of educational migration is not 
currently significant, although the potential of its scientific and educational 
complex is substantial. Attracting Kazakh school graduates does not only 
allow Russia to bring extra financial resources into the country; as they return 
home to Kazakhstan, the graduates of Russian universities bring with them 
a more tolerant attitude towards Russia, formed from their own personal 
experiences and relationships forged there. This has the strongest impact 
on intergovernmental relations and cooperation between the two countries. 
Because of Russia’s aging population, the higher education system is already 
experiencing a dearth of applicants. It would therefore be more effective 
not to try and cut back Russia’s existing scientific and educational potential, 
built up over many years, but to focus on attracting school graduates, 
undergraduates and postgraduates from Kazakhstan on a paid (contractual) 
basis. Kazakh students are the second largest contingent of overseas 
students in Russia (after students from China). Kazakhstan’s adoption of the 
undergraduate, masters and doctoral degree system in 2010 and abolition 
of the traditional system of thesis-based degrees (candidate and doctoral) 
will increase the flow of researchers moving to Russia to defend their 
dissertations.
Russia’s entry to the international educational services market depends on its 
ability to compete in terms of the quality of the services it currently provides, 
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and on the rational expansion of educational migration flows, which Russia is 
currently neglecting.
The anti-immigration attitudes which have emerged in Russia in recent 
years, and the absence of any active promotion of educational migration from 
Kazakhstan, have persuaded many Kazakh school graduates to look towards 
western Europe and the USA in order to continue their education.
Research Methodology
The study was carried out simultaneously in Kazakhstan and Russia (Astana 
and Moscow) over six months and began by interviewing experts to gain 
an overview of educational migration from Kazakhstan to Russia. Experts’ 
interviews were used to formulate theories, which were then tested by a 
series of in-depth surveys of Kazakh students in Russian universities and 
Kazakh citizens who graduated from Russian or RSFSR universities and now 
work in Kazakhstan.
A survey of 200 school graduates was carried out in Astana to find out what 
was influencing Kazakh would-be students in their choice of university.
Figure 10.1. 
The structure of the 
study
Notes: experts – 
1 respondents
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Republic of Kazakhstan
Astana
School Graduates
(applicants)
100 respondents 
intend to study in 
Russian universities
100 respondents 
intend to study in 
other countries
0 in-depth surveys
30 respondents 
graduated from 
Russian universities 
within the last 
 years
20 respondents 
graduated from 
RSFSR universities 
before 11
Russian Federation
Moscow
30 intervievs with 
students
10 respondents 
study at their 
expenses
10 respondents 
study at the expense 
of Kazakhstan
10 respondents 
study at the expense 
of Russia
The trends identified as a result of the interviews and the student survey 
has been complemented by an analysis of scientific literature and articles 
published in local mass media in the two regions under study (Astana and 
Moscow).
203Eurasian Development Bank
1. 30 interviewees were full-time students from Kazakhstan studying at 
Moscow universities. Half of the interviewees were young men, half young 
women. Of the 30 students, 10 are studying at their own expense, 10 are 
paid for by Kazakhstan and 10 are paid for by Russia.
2. 50 respondents were Kazakh citizens who had graduated from the 
Russian or RSFSR universities and who are currently living and working 
in Astana (Kazakhstan). Half of the interviewees were men, while half were 
women. Out of 50 respondents, 30 had graduated from Russian universities 
within the last 5 years and 20 had graduated from RSFSR universities 
before 1991. 
3. The experts interviewed (15 in Astana and 15 in Moscow) included 
scholars, university personnel and administrative and ministerial officials 
whose work is directly linked to the educational migration of Kazakh 
students to Russia.
4. Out of 200 surveyed school graduates in Astana, 100 intend to study 
at Russian universities and another 100 intend to study in other countries. 
Half of the interviewees were young men, half were young women.
Results of the survey of Kazakh school graduates 
in Astana
According to the survey, Kazakh school graduates consider the UK, the 
USA, the Czech Republic, Turkey and Japan as the main alternatives to 
studying in Russia. The choice of country is determined by the availability of 
good universities (the main selection criterion both for those who intend to 
study in Russia and those who intend to continue their education in other 
countries). However, those who plan to study in Russia say culture is the 
second most important criterion (“an attractive place to live – lots of 
entertainment and interesting places”), advice from friends as the third 
and treatment of foreign students as the fourth most important selection 
criterion. Those who intend to continue their education in other countries 
put treatment of foreign students in second place when choosing their 
country of study. Safety is next (“it is safe to live here, no violence, no racism 
or mistreatment of migrants from other countries”) and culture is again on 
the list of the most important selection criteria. We should mention that 
those who intend to study in Russia consider safety as one of the last on 
the list of important selection criteria.
Those who choose Russia as their country of study favour Moscow, Tomsk 
and St. Petersburg universities. Those who choose other countries prefer 
London, Prague and New York. When choosing the country of study, school 
graduates turn first to advice from relatives, friends and teachers and then 
the Internet. Radio, TV and newspapers are also used as information 
sources.
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The main reason for studying abroad for both groups of school graduates 
is simply their wish to study overseas. For those who choose Russia, 
their other reasons include (in descending order of importance) the higher 
cost of education in Kazakhstan, more competition for course entry in 
Kazakhstan and lack of opportunity to study their chosen subject. For those 
who choose other countries, their decision is based on the worldwide 
recognition of the university diploma of their country of study, more 
competition for that course in Kazakhstan and advice from parents or 
friends.
Those who choose to continue their studies in Russia seemed to have 
little knowledge of the Bolashak scholarship programme, while many of 
those who decide to study in other countries plan to take part in the 
programme.
Kazakh school graduates who plan to study abroad have a better knowledge 
of the Russian language and much better knowledge of English and other 
languages than those who intend to study in Russia. Those who choose 
Russia as their country of study may find it harder to secure employment in 
Kazakhstan once they graduate. For those who intend to study in another 
country, this is less of an issue, as is the possibility that their diploma will not 
be recognised in Kazakhstan.
Many of those wanting to study in Russia plan to settle there, while those 
who intend to study in other countries want to stay there only for a time. Those 
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Figure 10.3. 
Kazakh school 
graduates’ main 
reasons  for choosing 
a particular country 
of study (%)
school graduates planning to study in Russia base their plans on the greater 
job opportunities there, or have relatives living there. For those who choose 
to study elsewhere, greater employment opportunities were a deciding 
factor, and also the better standard of living. 
The majority of Kazakh school graduates intending to study in Russia had 
better school results and studied in ordinary secondary schools.
Ethnic Kazakhs account for around 90% of surveyed school graduates 
who choose to study abroad, and 35% of those who wish to study in 
Russia, while ethnic Russians account for 53% of this group of would-be 
students. 
In summary, we found that Russia is the preferred country of study among 
school graduates who are less worried about practicalities, have more 
trust in their parents’ opinion and are less informed about their educational 
opportunities. They are less interested in their potential standard of living as 
a student and have more explicit plans for their education, with the majority 
viewing their education in Russia as a step to settling there. The majority 
of those who would prefer to study abroad were keener to achieve higher 
earnings and to live more comfortably as students. They showed they were 
less influenced by the stereotypes that prevail in Kazakh society about 
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studying in Russia. They aim to gain work experience abroad and intend to 
return to Kazakhstan at some point in the future.
Results of interviews with Russian 
experts 
During the Soviet era, educational migration from foreign countries was 
concentrated in certain institutions (the largest centre being the Peoples’ 
Friendship University of Russia) and pursued primarily geopolitical objectives. 
For the USSR as a whole, educational migration was a way of presenting a 
unified ethno-cultural image of this vast country, allowing the student to 
form a holistic view of a very diverse society. After completing their education, 
the graduate would return home with a world view shaped by living in the 
USSR. According to one of the experts interviewed, the Soviet Union used 
educational and all internal migration as a special “tool for cultivating a 
Soviet-style man”.
Such measures proved to be effective; quotas were widely applied and 
very strict. University admission quotas were applied to poor or disabled 
students and students of different nationalities, including ethnic minority 
citizens of the Union Republics. Top Soviet universities, such as the 
Moscow State Institute for International Relations and the Moscow State 
University, were notorious for corrupt admission practices.
Since 1991, the situation has changed dramatically. In the years following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, educational migrants from Kazakhstan to 
Russia were mostly Russians, i.e., children from Russian-speaking families 
keen to be educated in Russia. Interuniversity communications system as a 
whole has been upset, but still Kazakhstan was in a better position, since the 
state had more leading universities. Before Kazakhstan built up its national 
education system, the country fell significantly short of meeting educational 
needs, and school graduates continued their migration to Russia, especially 
because there were no significant restrictions, nor any legal or even cultural 
barriers. The situation is gradually changing and school graduates from 
Kazakhstan are now choosing to study elsewhere.
According to the Russian experts interviewed, any discussion of educational 
migration from Kazakhstan to Russia should take into account the following 
influences:
• Russia has not kept pace with other CIS countries (e.g., Ukraine 
and Belarus) that have drastically improved their national education 
systems and are now competing to attract foreign students from within 
the CIS;
• Russia has a reputation for xenophobia, racism and nationalism in general 
and particularly in relation to foreign students;
Eurasian Integration – 
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• Russian society fails to understand the differences between educational 
and labour migration;
• Russian universities are poorly equipped;
• there has been a lack of investment in the creation of integrated 
university campuses;
• there is a lack of employment opportunities for university graduates, 
including foreign ones;
• a regulatory framework needs to be established to allow students from 
Kazakhstan to take up placements and traineeships ;
• students have to acquire a special work permit so it is legal for them to 
find work in their spare time;
• education needs to be monitored for the value-for-money it represents;
• there should be support for enterprises that employ students, and for 
student businesses and innovative businesses;
• national educational migration policies are illogical and Kazakhstan and 
Russia have not been committed to this process.
Results of interviews with Kazakh experts
It is interesting to compare the opinions of Kazakh and Russian experts, since 
all of them identify the benefits of educational migration, especially for their 
own countries. 
According to Kazakh experts, educational migration provided Kazakhstan’s 
economy with skilled personnel both in the Soviet era and after the Soviet 
Union collapsed.
Since 1991, the situation has changed; nevertheless Russia continues to 
educate qualified professionals who cannot be taught in Kazakhstan either 
because Kazakh universities do not teach the relevant specialisation or 
because their training is of a lower quality than Russia’s. Educational migration 
and Kazakh citizens moving to live in Russia helped strengthen the Kazakh 
diaspora in Russia by improving business links between Russian and Kazakh 
entrepreneurs. Kazakh populations in Moscow and st. Petersburg are the 
result of educational migration in the Soviet period (Rakisheva, 2007). Most 
of the Kazakh communities in the  USA and Canada are made up of physicists, 
biologists, chemists, artists, pianists, historians and other experts from Russia 
who migrated before the collapse of the USSR (Rakisheva, 2011).
Kazakh and Russian experts agree that both countries have been somewhat 
complacent about educational migration. They point out that their ministries 
of Education and Science view the issue of educational migration only in 
Eurasian Integration – 
Historical and Social Aspects
Dmitry Poletaev, Botagoz Rakisheva “Educational Migration from 
Kazakhstan to Russia as an Aspect of Strategic Cooperation 
Within the Customs Union”
20 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2011
terms of the fulfilment of quotas, and pay no attention to those who migrate 
independently of this system. This is despite the fact that those who travel 
abroad for their education under their own steam significantly outnumber 
those students who leave to study as part of a state-arranged programme. 
While recognising the positive impact of academic mobility (indeed, 
Kazakhstan advocates its own smooth transition into the Bologna process), 
Kazakhstan provides inadequate support for it.
Moreover, the practice of issuing dual diplomas (Russian and Kazakh), 
according to an international agreement, is poorly executed, although this 
practice is fully justified and effective.
According to Kazakh experts, the country bears no responsibility for 
employing Kazakh graduates with Russian diplomas or those who studied 
under the Bolashak programme. Many Kazakh citizens who graduated from 
Russian universities are forced to find jobs on their own without any state 
assistance. 
Nostrification of diplomas (the acceptance of foreign university degrees as 
equivalent to native ones) is still a very complicated and lengthy procedure. 
Kazakh experts are concerned that a brain drain to Russia may result from 
inadequate state commitment to employing Kazakh educational migrants 
who are not part of the Bolashak programme. 
The main obstacles to educational migration both in the Soviet era and now 
are the excessive centralisation and bureaucracy that surround the process, 
as well as the lack of autonomy of Soviet and Russian universities. Then 
and now, the universities have been ill-equipped technically and financially, 
and they have not invested in advanced laboratories and campuses which 
provide comfortable and secure accommodation for Kazakh citizens. The 
problems inherited from the Soviet era are changing for the better very 
slowly. Nevertheless, even top Russian universities are gradually losing their 
international reputation for the elite education they offer.
At present, the educational services Russia can offer to Kazakh students is 
rather limited, both in terms of the specialisations taught and the number of 
universities.
For Kazakh students, especially ethnic Kazakhs, there is quite a lengthy 
list of reasons not to choose to study in Russia: xenophobia is widespread, 
the police have a reputation for brutal behaviour towards immigrants, 
public safety is generally poor and Russian media encourage intolerance 
towards  representatives of different nationalities. Anti-immigration 
attitudes therefore become a subtle characteristic of social behaviour and 
produce a negative image of the country. Kazakh students and their parents 
see the rise of skinheads as a sign that they are tacitly encouraged by the 
authorities, who are powerless against them.
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It is perceived that there is a tendency to inflate the marks of Kazakh students 
in Russian universities, which undermines confidence in the quality of Russian 
higher education and acts as a disincentive to studying there.
According to the experts, democratisation of contemporary education is 
necessary for Kazakhstan, both on a societal and on an individual level, and 
the situation is not changing fast enough. These issues are largely ignored, 
however, and according to the experts this is the main reason that Kazakhstan 
faces such difficulty in restructuring its educational system.
The experts noted the absence of innovative technology in Kazakhstan’s 
educational and scientific sectors, the gap between theory and practice in 
supporting educational migration, and lack of incentives for business and 
industry to sponsor overseas education. There are still no opportunities 
to develop or test alternatives to the ways in which educational migration 
is currently organised, or to make effective use of the knowledge gained 
by Kazakh citizens while studying abroad. This situation can only change 
with government intervention, and particularly with state financial support. 
Students who studied in Russia do not go on to become scientific leaders, and 
the academic mobility of students and teachers in Kazakhstan’s universities 
is not being encouraged. The majority of middle-aged teachers, and those 
working beyond retirement age, do not speak conversational English but 
have a good command of Russian and could therefore travel to Russia 
for retraining courses. However, Russia has no effective short-term 
teaching resources to train Kazakh teachers in innovative and interactive 
educational technologies.
The experts also pointed out corruption in Kazakh universities, which is an 
additional impetus to students to move to Russia and other countries to 
study. 
According to experts, very little is being done to attract private investment 
in education. For example, tax incentives could be offered to organisations, 
businesses structures and individuals that provide sponsorships or make 
charitable donations to educational institutions. This would lift part of the 
state’s financial burden in supporting education in Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan had introduced a system of academic credits based on the 
American model, but soon afterwards the country joined the Bologna 
process. This forces Kazakhstan to implement the European Credit Transfer 
and Accumulation System (ECTS). Now, experts say, Kazakhstan needs to 
choose which system it wants – a credit system or ECTS.  
Councils of trustees are considered to be a step forward in the 
democratisation of university management. The councils are public advisory 
bodies that help to attract additional funding and  oversee the activities of 
the university, but they have not yet been set up. Certain universities have 
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alumni associations, but so far these have only acted as social groups, and 
are not used as a means to provide additional support to Kazakhstan’s 
universities.
Russia and Kazakhstan have responded poorly to the globalisation of 
education and are slow in implementing innovative learning techniques; 
distance learning, for example, is still barely developed.
It is clear that Russia’s manufacturing and scientific infrastructure 
requires significant government investment to ensure Russian universities 
attractiveness to foreign students. However, educational migration is 
hindered by the structural obstacles which exist in Kazakhstan, as mentioned 
above. Professionals are in demand in Kazakhstan and experts note that it is 
an achievement in itself that professional education in Russia is universally 
regarded as being of very high quality.
Kazakh school graduates opting to study in Russia traditionally prefer the 
universities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, cities closer to the border of 
Kazakhstan (Novosibirsk, Omsk, Barnaul, Tomsk, Samara) and universities 
in the Volga region. The experts said that Kazakh citizens who are ethnic 
Russians use education in Russia as an opportunity to leave Kazakhstan. 
Ethnic Kazakhs are often interested in, among other things, the relationship 
between local authorities and the Kazakh diaspora, and the availability of 
Kazakh cultural centres in the cities where they plan to study. The presence of 
such centres and good relations between local authorities and Kazakh people 
tends to make a city more attractive to ethnic Kazakh prospective students 
and makes their adaptation to the city easier.
Kazakh citizens who successfully graduate from Russian universities are 
the best propaganda tool for Kazakh school graduates, therefore it would 
benefit Russian universities to set up branches of their alumni associations 
in Kazakhstan. The experts also believe that setting up “sister universities” in 
Russia and Kazakhstan would be very effective. This could be complemented 
by creating agency services headed by Kazakh alumni of Russian universities 
(or postgraduate/doctoral students). Establishing an agency network via 
such service centres, especially in border areas, Astana and Almaty, would 
also be a good step forward.
The way in which the community runs educational institutions in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan has, unfortunately, changed very little. Modern 
managers need a skill set which they do not always possess, including the 
ability to rationally assess risk in their management decisions, knowledge 
of the organisation’s development, its strengths and weaknesses, its 
traditions, the conservatism of the teaching staff, comprehensive knowledge 
of the university’s activities, the ability to respond rapidly to change and to 
think strategically. Partly because of the high turnover of staff in educational 
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management, i.e., among faculty leaders, many are not keen to engage in 
international cooperation, which, in the opinion of the experts interviewed, 
is the major stumbling block to enhancing educational migration in the 
Russian Federation.
Therefore, summing up the opinions of Kazakh experts, we can say that 
the most important strategy in developing educational migration from 
Kazakhstan to Russia is govermental support and the return of specialists 
trained in Russia to Kazakhstan.
Results of the survey of Kazakh students studying in Russia 
and Kazakh citizens who have graduated from Russian 
and RSFSR universities
Survey of Kazakh students studying in Russia 
Most of those who took part in the survey are satisfied with the education 
they received in Russia and would recommend it to their friends. However, 
it is clear that the consistent and progressive development of educational 
migration is dependent on the resolution of certain problems. It is important 
to note that, because the survey group was small, it is impossible to attempt a 
‘ranking’ of the issues identified. But the responses allow us to identify certain 
problematic situations and shortcomings.
Kazakh school graduates choosing to study in Russia do so because they 
historically have had a positive image of Russian universities as well as 
because there is no language barrier. The choice of a particular city usually 
depends on the student’s personal views or advice they have been given 
by relatives and friends. How a university is rated in internet reviews is 
also important. The final choice of Russian university will depend on its 
image and, more importantly, a comparison of the accommodation that is 
on offer. Incomplete (or withheld?) information on lifestyle and 
accommodation at the selected university is a particular problem for 
prospective students.
Other serious weaknesses which respondents criticised include poor 
technical procedures in universities, and the inadequacy of university support 
structures and technical staff .
One way to try and prepare students would be provision of adaptation 
courses in Kazakhstan or various types of training before students leave 
to take up their courses. Students have even agreed that they themselves 
could bear the cost. However, acclimatisation courses are so clearly in the 
interests of the universities and the Russian Ministry of Education they should 
be free for the students. Bolashak programme staff have often provided 
pastoral assistance to students finding it difficult to adapt. This extends to 
students arriving independently or through other programmes, not just to 
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Bolashak students. There have certainly been cases of employees of Russian 
educational institutions helping students resolve their problems.
During the first days and months of studying in Russia, psychological 
pressures can take their toll. Careful planning of admission procedures 
could help alleviate certain problems. Some new students will benefit from 
having access to counseling or psychological therapy. The Internet is an 
important learning resource, but unfortunately it is not always free for 
students.
Constant changes in teaching methods relating to the introduction of 
computers did provoke a number of complaints from respondents (poor 
content and design of Russian universities’ websites). Climate is beyond the 
control of any institution, but does have a bearing on accommodation. Being 
housed in a poorly heated room in a cold winter can be a very serious problem. 
The majority of complaints concerned living conditions. The excessive 
commercialisation of universities also has a negative influence on their 
image.
Unfortunately, latent and even overt xenophobia is a widespread phenomenon 
not only among the local population but also among teachers, and this again 
detracts significantly from the positive image of Russian universities.
Kazakh students have serious and well-founded complaints against the police, 
who often mistake male students for migrant workers.
In many respects the quality and format of teaching, and the cost-benefit ratio, 
meet the expectations of Kazakh students.
Even those Kazakh students who are not satisfied with the quality of Russian 
education feel that they would have no difficulty finding a job in Kazakhstan 
because of the good reputation Russian educational standards have in 
Kazakhstan. However, lack of fluency in the Kazakh language might be a serious 
obstacle to employment which could have been avoided had they chosen to 
study at a Kazakh university. Students may also find that there are not many 
jobs requiring the professional qualifications they acquired in Russia, or find 
that corruption in Kazakhstan restricts the type of jobs that are available on 
the open market.
By socialising with other students from Kazakhstan when they arrive in 
Russia, Kazakh students usually overcome the problems of adapting to their 
new surroundings. Some ethnic Kazakhs adopt a strategy of mixing with 
foreigners from countries much further afield, to gain an entirely new social 
circle and new perspectives. The various cultural activities universities offer 
actively encourage this process. However universities often provide limited 
opportunities for leisure activities and most of these are on a fee-paying 
basis.
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Students believe that finding a job will not seriously interfere with their 
studies, and consider the opportunity to work as a way of obtaining the 
practical skills required in the profession they are studying towards. If they 
are prevented from working legally, students can sometimes find that they 
fall victim to fraudulent employers, are badly paid or are forced to put up with 
very poor working conditions. As mentioned above, despite all the difficulties, 
the majority of students surveyed would advise their friends to study in Russia. 
Of course, for some Kazakh citizens of Russian descent, studying in Russia can 
be their stepping stone to settling there and is the reason they recommend 
this path to their friends.
As the students’ responses show, there are problems in Russian universities 
and almost all of them can be resolved or mitigated by the universities 
themselves. However, while some universities are keen to address these 
issues, others are not.
The current situation could be improved by standardising the requirements 
that universities must meet when they aim to recruit foreign students. The 
amount that universities are allowed to charge for their courses could depend 
on their level of compliance with these requirements.
Survey of Kazakh citizens who graduated from Russian and RSFSR 
universities
By conducting a survey of Kazakh citizens who graduated either from Russian 
or RSFSR universities, we were able to identify changes in the education of 
Kazakh citizens in Russia in the Soviet era and the post-Soviet period.
As a rule, university education in the USSR was based on a special distribution 
system and social quotas. Courses were offered by the leading universities of 
the RSFSR and included disciplines that were not taught in Kazakhstan. 
The image of Russian universities was positive in Soviet times and information 
about universities was widely available. Indeed, Moscow was very attractive 
as a cultural centre. 
For students in Soviet and post-Soviet periods, the difficulties they faced 
were generally associated with the higher requirements of Russian 
universities. For those who studied in the last five years, everyday problems 
were the most significant, though socialising with their compatriots usually 
helped them to adapt.
The problem of xenophobia either did not exist in the Soviet era or had no overt 
signs. One of the respondents who studied in the last five years claimed that 
some Kazakh students use xenophobia as an excuse for failing their courses. 
However, xenophobia obviously does exist in modern Russia. Some of the 
students surveyed also mentioned cases of somewhat brutal treatment at 
the hands of the police. 
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Those who studied in the Soviet era were unanimous in evaluating their 
educational experience positively. Kazakhs who studied in the Soviet era had 
to take a difficult matriculation examination, which is why the overall level of 
attainment of those who studied in the RSFSR was very high.
Living conditions in the Soviet era gave Kazakh students little cause 
for complaint: standards of living were mostly relatively poor in the 
USSR, although student dormitories were maintained much better 
than they are now. Because student dormitories have always been 
central to the student way of life, some of their worse aspects were 
overlooked.
Those who studied in the last five years voiced more complaints about 
living conditions because socio-economic conditions in Kazakhstan have 
changed and alternatives to studying in Russia have emerged.
Views of the quality and cost of education expressed by those who had 
studied in the past five years in elite universities were mainly positive with 
some neutral and very few negative comments.
The Soviet diploma awarded by RSFSR universities was a hallmark of 
quality and guarantee of a good start in life for Kazakh graduates during 
Soviet times. For those who studied in  the last five years, the Russian 
diploma is an advantage but not a one-hundred-percent guarantee of finding 
a job. 
In Soviet times a scholarship was enough for postgraduates to live on, but 
students needed extra financial help from their parents. But students of 
course made some money on the side in the RSFSR as well. Among those 
who had studied in the last five years, the attitude towards extra earnings is 
different and being allowed to work legally is an important issue for students 
from Kazakhstan.
It is important to note that the majority of Kazakh citizens who wanted to 
stay in the USSR, no longer live in Kazakhstan. Therefore, the survey 
mostly reflects the views of those who initially planned to return to 
Kazakhstan and now in many cases see their return to Kazakhstan as 
an expression of patriotism. Those who studied within the past five years 
demonstrate various motivations for their migration and their decision is 
not always an unambivalent one.
The image of Russian education has changed significantly over time. This 
clearly reflects the dramatic changes that have occurred since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and changes in economic conditions in Kazakhstan over the 
last five or so years. 
The prestigious image of a Russian university education remains from Soviet 
times, and leading Russian universities do still offer teaching of a very high 
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standard. But the pressure on other institutions to improve the quality of their 
educational experience is increasing and higher education in Russia generally 
clearly needs to be reformed if it is to retain its desirable image in the eyes of 
Kazakh students.
Short-, medium- and long-term strategies to encourage educational 
migration from Kazakhstan to Russia
Short-term measures:
•  find a way to support universities willing to increase their admission of 
foreign students; build new campuses and dormitories or refurbish and 
modernise existing ones;
•  develop existing scientific institutions by equipping them with modern 
technology. This will help strengthen the reputation of Russia as an 
educational powerhouse;
•  develop institutions regionally. Support and modernise metropolitan 
universities and higher education institutions in Russia’s far east 
(Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk, Tomsk and Irkutsk).
It is obvious that these measures will require a degree of political will and are 
not just a matter of state funding or co-financing.
Medium-term measures 
Specialist secondary technical schools, vocational schools and colleges 
should be created which will help to attract foreign and Russian students. 
Secondary vocational education is very important strategically and should 
be developed in parallel with higher education. Universities that do not meet 
required higher education standards could be transformed into secondary 
vocational colleges.
In the medium to long term, there should be a policy of boosting the image of 
blue-collar occupations. This is an enormous task given that, even in Soviet 
times, the policy only succeeded with a great deal of difficulty.
The Russian belief that any type of work is worthy of honour needs to be 
modified. Again, since this can only be achieved in the long term, any near-
term initiatives must be closely linked with educational and labour migration 
policies. A 10-year educational migration programme should incorporate 
migration to secondary specialised educational institutions. The export of 
educational services should be a multi-layered initiative. Educational migration 
from Kazakhstan (and elsewhere) to Russian universities is a way of promoting 
Russian education, gradually increasing its quality and attracting more 
students from abroad to Russia’s specialised secondary educational 
establishments. This engages those who will later work in Russian factories. 
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Promoting the quality of education provided by universities in the Russian 
Federation should have a “domino effect” in regard to the export of Russia’s 
educational system as a whole. By educating young people from other countries 
and improving its institutions Russia also provides work for its teachers.
Measures to enhance educational migration need to be focused on higher 
education students from Kazakhstan who intend to go back to their native 
country once they have completed their education. As graduates return to 
Kazakhstan, they forge links between the two countries, which cannot be 
replicated by any political agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan. They 
also return to Kazakhstan equipped with in-depth knowledge of the special 
characteristics of the Russian educational system, and, assuming they 
are happy with and give good account of their education, will encourage a 
new influx of Kazakh school graduates into Russian universities. If Russia 
is to maintain the high quality and good image of its educational system, 
a steady stream of Kazakh school graduates into Russian universities 
could be boosted with a second flow of educational migrants to its 
secondary education institutions (not necessarily from Kazakhstan). This 
will help attract school graduates from around the CIS, who will have 
the opportunity to stay on and work in Russian industrial enterprises (which 
face an acute shortage of workers) after they complete their education in 
Russia’s specialised secondary schools. To secure the inflow of educational 
migrants from the CIS into the secondary education system, Russia must 
consider changing its legislation, since 15–year-old college students are 
considered as children. New laws are required to allow underage foreign 
citizens to stay in Russia.
Any comprehensive, medium-term (ten-year) programme must include 
regulatory changes, development planning, research, approbation, and 
several well-targeted studies (e.g., a study of international practices and 
region-by-region reviews of the policy implementation). An effective federal 
policy on educational migration must resist the temptation to adopt new 
laws once the policy has been implemented – i.e., avoid the process of “filling 
in holes” in existing legislation.
Russia is not in a position at the moment to implement this legislation, 
and therefore all initiatives to develop educational migration remain on 
hold.
Long-term goals
Long-term objectives include the establishment of required educational 
policies alongside the creation of a tolerant society and socio-cultural cohesion. 
Encouraging an attitude of respect towards migrant workers can be achieved 
in part through the work of students on campuses in particular, which is one 
of the long-term goals related to educational migration. 
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The following measures may help to encourage educational migration to 
Russia from Kazakhstan:
• investment in the scientific and technical infrastructure of Russia’s 
educational system; 
• the simplification of Russian registration procedures and the elimination 
of unnecessary bureaucracy;
• the legalisation of employment for Kazakh students, especially during 
holiday periods; 
• international agreement with Kazakhstan to simplify nostrification 
procedures, and mutual recognition of university diplomas by Russia 
and Kazakhstan to make postgraduate training and masters courses in 
Russian universities more accessible to Kazakh citizens;
• government measures to promote greater tolerance of Kazakh students 
in Russia, using a media campaign in Russia to counteract racism and 
intolerance towards immigrants;
• a clean up of the police force, removing officers who extort bribes from 
Kazakh students when verifying documents;
• taking a hard line with criminal skinhead gangs (particularly Nazi 
skinheads3) and similar anti-immigrant groups;
• establishing a tolerant learning environment that eliminates racism 
towards students from Kazakhstan on the part of Russian students, 
teaching staff and administrators in educational institutions;
• actively involving Kazakh students in social and cultural activities at 
university and in Russian student hostels and allowing students from 
Kazakhstan to travel around the Russian Federation (freedoms that 
other countries extend to foreign students);
• building and refurbishing dormitories to offer car parking facilities and 
free access to the internet for all students. Small specialised universities 
could be allowed to rent a small number of places in large university 
campuses;
• the Ministry of Education and Science should create an innovative 
internet-based information system, which would provide a single source 
of information on public and private higher education institutions. The 
information must be detailed, clear, multilingual and free;
3 National Socialist skinheads (or Nazi skinheads) – radical nationalists and racists, who adhere 
to National Socialist ideology, advocate the idea of race separatism and White Power supremacy, 
cultivate violence, idealise the Third Reich and collaborationists. The activities of National 
Socialist skinheads are extremist and in many cases of a terrorist nature.
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• creating a grant system to support talented school graduates from 
Kazakhstan, including full reimbursement of all costs;
• introducing a programme of support for students from Kazakhstan 
and Russia to find their compatriots abroad; private Russian charity 
foundations could be involved in setting up pastoral organisations which 
would use the higher education system as a way of strengthening 
international relations and supporting expatriates;
• establishing alumni associations for USSR and Russian universities 
in Kazakhstan4 using them to support the activities of Russian higher 
education institutions in Kazakhstan and to strengthen cultural and 
scientific relations;
• creating cultural, educational and job exchange programmes similar 
to those which exist in Germany, Britain, Australia and the USA. These 
would promote Russian education and Russian culture in Kazakhstan 
and attract individuals and organisations to participate in such 
programmes;
• promotional activities in Kazakhstan, via the Russian Embassy and 
cultural institutions (participating and organising educational 
exhibitions, creating a network of coordinators responsible for 
educational issues who would disseminate information on Russian 
educational opportunities to Kazakh school graduates). Existing 
expatriate associations abroad should be linked together5; 
• restoring Russian language teaching in Kazakhstan and news 
broadcasting in Kazakh on Russia’s national radio stations and TV 
channels (with the focus on cultural and music programmes for youth).
There is potential to expand educational migration from Kazakhstan to 
Russia, facilitated by the shared border, common history and culture, and 
the establishment of the Customs Union. The education ministries in both 
countries, their migration and integration agencies can also help promote 
educational migration.
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Economic Cooperation in 
Industries and Sectors
Integration Processes in CIS 
Telecommunications Sector
11
AiGUl AbsAmetovA
The purpose of this article is to provide an insight into integration processes in 
the CIS telecommunications sector, the prospects for telecom companies as 
potential targets for investment, the region’s transit potential, and integration 
of CIS countries into the regional and global information community. The 
authors focus on the current status of telecommunications in the CIS, existing 
investment opportunities, cross-border investments, and major players in the 
mobile communications. The article is based on the EDB sector report no. 9 
“Integration Processes in CIS Telecommunications Sector”.
Introduction
Globalisation of world economy and the increasing transparency of national 
borders elevated the role of information to a new level. Information can provide 
critical advantages to an individual company, country or the entire region. The 
possession of a competitive telecommunications sector is a precondition to a 
nation’s entry into the global economic and information community.
The telecommunications market consists of a number of distinct service 
segments based on the following telecommunications types: fixed-line 
telephony; mobile communications; data transfer (Internet access); satellite 
communications. According to the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU), by the end of 2009 over 4.6 billion people (about 67% of the world 
population) used mobile communications, and Internet users accounted for 
26% of the world population (1.7 billion people). Fixed-line telephony already 
lags behind mobile communications (23% of the world population or 640 
million people) (ITU, 2009).
This trend is also observed in the post-Soviet states. The last decade saw a 
telecommunications boom, and the level of penetration of fixed-line, mobile 
and Internet services was especially high in Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine: 
according to the ITU, by the end of 2008 there were 314 million users of 
mobile communications, 72 million users of fixed-line telephony, 69 million 
Internet users in CIS countries (see Figure 11.1).
The CIS is one of the most dynamic mobile communications markets with 
an average annual growth of 44% (in 2003-2008). Penetration of mobile 
communications services increased from 17.9% in 2003 to 113% in 2008. 
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This rapid development can be partially explained by increasing competition 
between market players. 
ICT development levels vary greatly across the CIS. In Russia and Ukraine the 
penetration of mobile communications services is approaching 120%, whilst 
in Turkmenistan this index does not exceed 10%. The attractive targets for 
investment may be Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which have the lowest 
penetration levels in the region. Growth rates in the CIS during 2002-2007 
averaged at 60%, which is a fairly high figure compared with other world 
regions. The main reasons for this rapid growth are the underdeveloped 
fixed line networks and increasing competition on the telecommunications 
market (ITU, 2009). A notable increase in the number of mobile 
communications subscribers during 2000-2005 was achieved principally by 
the introduction of the second generation 2G and 2.5G networks based on 
GSM technology.
Investments in CIS telecommunication market
Investments are critical to the development of any market, and 
telecommunications is no exception. In recent years there has been some 
increase in investments in ICT in CIS (see Table 11.1), notably in mobile 
infrastructure and broadband Internet access. However, the latter remains 
quite expensive and largely inaccessible in rural and remote areas. According 
to the World Bank, there was a sustained upward trend in investments in 
the CIS telecommunications market until 2007, including private sector 
investments.
One of the ways to attract foreign capital is to privatise state telecom 
assets, because privatisation could open the monopolised fixed-line market 
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Table 11.1. 
Investments in CIS 
telecommunications 
market ($ millions)
Source: Absametova 
et.al., 2010
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Armenia 61.7 132 0 104 110.6
Azerbaijan 109 123 413.6 188 474
Belarus 148 187.6 220.4 660.9 1130
Kazakhstan 275.7 484.5 635.2 838 1146.6
Kyrgyzstan 0.6 0.6 35.9 5 75
Moldova 9.6 36.5 34 163.3 81
Russia 5952.3 5906.3 6397 6586.1 7692
Tajikistan n/a n/a n/a 11 53
Turkmenistan 383.8 7328.9 1991.7 2215 3954
Ukraine 738 1407.3 865.2 1345.8 1363.8
Uzbekistan 3 93 90 272.1 318.8 
Total 7681.7 15699.7 10683 12389.2 16080
of the CIS to private investors. At present the telecom companies are 
co-owned by governments in all post-Soviet countries except Armenia. Some 
countries have already made the first steps towards the privatisation of 
these assets.
The Kazakh operator Kazakhtelecom was the first state-owned company to 
offer its shares for sale. 51% of its shares are now held by the government via 
Samruk-Kazyna and 49% by private investors (Kazakhtelecom, 2010). The 
controlling stake (51.3%) of Azerbaijan’s leading operator, Azercell Telekom, 
is held by Azertel Telekommunikasyon Yatirim Dis Ticaret A.S., a subsidiary of 
Fintur Holdings B.V. All telecom assets in Armenia are in private ownership. 
In 2007 the country’s main operator, ArmenTel Joint Venture, was sold to 
VimpelCom for $540 million, $52 million of which was paid to the government 
for its 10% stake.
The telecom companies of the eight post-Soviet states remain unprivatised. 
Whereas in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine the sale of state assets is highly 
possible (the shares of telecom companies have been offered for sale), in 
other countries this process is likely to take many years. The last attempt 
at privatising Kyrgyztelecom was inconclusive due to the change of 
government in April 2010. This prospective transaction attracted interest 
from Turk Telekommunikasyon A.S. (Turkey), Axos Capital GmbH (Germany), 
Kazakhtelecom and Rostelecom.
The privatisation of the Ukrainian monopolist Ukrtelecom has long been the 
subject of speculation, but so far the controlling stake (92.79%) is held by 
the government. It is expected that the company will be offered for open bid 
at an initial 7 billion hryvnias (about $882 million). The prospective bidders 
are Rostelecom, SKM, Deutsche Telekom, Telenor Group, Turkcell, Roman 
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Abramovich’s companies, Privat Group, Telekom Austria, Sistema Financial 
Corporation, VimpelCom, Bank of New York, UBS, Namura and others 
(Karpenko, 2010). 
The privatisation of Uzbektelecom has lingered for a decade. The last 
attempt to sell a 49% stake was made in 2004, with participation of 
Golden Telecom, Sistema and China Mobile Communications Corporation as 
bidders. However the company is still owned by the government.
A similar situation can be observed in Belarus and Russia. In November 
2009 the Belarusian Ministry of Telecommunications and Information 
Technology once again postponed privatization of Beltelcom for at least 
two years. In it’s turn, the reorganisation of Russia’s Svyazinvest foresees 
the establishment of a single operator on the basis of Rostelecom (51% 
is owned by Svyazinvest, 30% by the Agency of Deposits Protection, 9.8% 
by Vneshekonombank, and about 10% of common stock and 100% of 
preferred stock is freely circulated) (Rostelecom, 2010).
A key point in the Svyazinvest reorganisation concept was an establishment 
of an alliance with one of the “big three” operators (MTS, VimpelCom or 
MegaFon), but no such plans are being discussed at present (Sergina, 
Bursak, 2010).
The privatisation of the Tajik operator Tochiktelecom have began in 2003, 
when the company was included in the government’s strategic privatisation 
plan. However, there has been little progress so far. Kazakhtelecom has 
indicated its interest in bidding in case the Tajik operator will be offered for 
sale. As for Turkmenistan, no intention to privatise Turkmentelecom has ever 
been voiced (Shepovalnikov, 2009).
Table 11.2.
State telecom assets 
to be sold
Source: 
Shepovalnikov, 200
Note: n/i – no 
information
Country Assets Package (%)
Estimated value
($ million)
Ukraine Ukrtelecom 67.79 882
Moldova Moldtelecom 51 223.7
Kazakhstan Kazakhtelecom 27 178.2
Uzbekistan Uzbektelecom 49 115.3
Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyztelecom 77.84 78.1
Azerbaijan AzEuroTel Telecom-
munications,
50 n/i
Ulduz Telecom 28 n/i
Another efficient strategy for attracting capital to the sector is to promote 
an alliance between the government and private companies (e.g., on the 
principles of private-public partnership). The benefit of private-public 
partnership is that the government retains control over the sector while 
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considerably easing the burden on the state budget by involving external 
investors. In our view, private-public partnership schemes deserve more 
attention in the context of the telecommunications sector, but their success 
will depend on the availability of an adequate legal framework.
We do not expect any large privatisation transactions in CIS countries 
during 2010-2011. The operators’ activity is likely to be limited to individual 
investment projects to develop networks and new services. Subject to the 
success of these projects, the investors will be better positioned to claim 
larger stakes in privatised telecom assets, although we will not see the likes 
of the large-scale transactions of the past decade again.
Mutual investments in telecommunication by CIS countries
From the early 2000s the Russian telecommunications market was 
characterised by high levels of penetration of most services, which can be 
explained by the large population and relatively developed infrastructure. 
Foreign capital also played a role in this rapid growth. For example, the leading 
Russian operators MTS and MegaFon were co-founded by Deutsche Telecom, 
Siemens and TeliaSonera.
Although the domestic market was not yet fully saturated, Russian operators 
started to seek new opportunities for expansion. The markets of neighboring 
countries which have close political and economic ties with Russia appeared 
to be ideal targets. The post-Soviet countries had much in common: high 
growth rates, relatively low basic penetration levels, and a similar business 
environment.
Another incentive for Russian mobile operators to penetrate post-Soviet 
markets is associated with the so-called “follow your client” strategy. Many 
corporate clients from different economic sectors are already integrated 
with foreign market players (Lisitsyn et al., 2005). For example, LUKoil 
participates in the development of oil deposits in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Ukraine and sells hydrocarbons all over the CIS. LUKoil and other corporate 
clients of mobile operators need sustained communications with their 
overseas branches. 
In an effort to expand their subscriber base and better serve the 
customers’ needs, Russian operators started to penetrate international 
telecommunications markets in 2000 and made first steps towards a 
common CIS market. Merger and acquisition (M&A) deals became the 
key element of the penetration strategy. This practice is very popular in 
telecommunications as it foresees the use of the existing infrastructure and a 
subscriber base of the operator being purchased. At present, major Russian 
mobile operators, including Mobile TeleSystems (MTS), VimpelCom (under 
the Beeline trademark) and MegaFon have established their presence in all 
CIS countries (see Figures 11.2. and Table 11.3).
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Figure 11.2.
Service area of 
Russian mobile 
operators
Source: Absametova 
et.al., 2010
Russia
Kazakhstan
China
Mongolia
Ukraine
India
Iran
VimpelCom  
(Beeline)
Mobile TeleSystems 
(MTS)
MegaFon
As of April 2010, VimpelCom took the lead in terms of increase of subscriber 
base geography. Its affiliate under the Beeline trademark offers mobile and 
fixed-line services and high-speed wireless and broadband Internet access 
in Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Georgia, Armenia, 
Vietnam and Cambodia (since 2008) (Beeline, 2010).
Mobile TeleSystems has over 85 million subscribers in Russia, Armenia, 
Belarus, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (MTS, 2010). 
MegaFon has the most narrow business geography among the “big 
three” Russian mobile operators. The company operates in Tajikistan, 
where owns a 75% stake in local TT-Mobile operator. However, MegaFon 
does intend to cover more overseas markets. According to its General 
Director Sergei Soldatenkov, the company is not interested in Ukraine 
or Belarus because of tough market competition. Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Azerbaijan and Moldova are all dominated by Fintur Holdings B.V. (a joint 
venture of TeliaSonera and Turkcell). Therefore, MegaFon’s targets are 
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the least penetrated markets (Kepman, 
2010).
Another prominent player in the Russian and CIS markets is Altimo (by 
2005 known as Alfa Telecom), a member of Alfa Group. Altimo is an 
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international investment telecommunications company which has stakes 
in MegaFon (25.1%), VimpelCom (44%), Kiyevstar G.S.M. (43.5%) and 
Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S. (4.99%) The latter operates in Ukraine, 
Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and other countries through its 
joint venture Fintur. In 2009 Altimo’s market capitalisation exceeded $16 
billion (Altimo, 2010).
Operator Year Country
Transaction 
price 
($ million)
CAPEX 
($ million)
Stake 
(%)
Description of transaction 
MegaFon 2001 Tajikistan joint venture 75 Joint venture with Tajiktelecom, using the 
ТТ-Mobile brand
MTS 2002 Belarus joint venture 40.26 49 Co-founded with Beltelecom and MTS
MTS 2003 Ukraine 373 2 974.5 100 Purchased Ukraine’s leader, UMC 
VimpelCom 2004 Kazakhstan 350 518.64 100 Purchased Kazakhstan’s second largest 
operator, KaR-Tel. VimpelCom assumed 
liabilities of $75 million
MTS 2004 Uzbekistan 121 739.4 100 Purchased 74% of shares in 
Uzdunrobita, and 100% in 2007 
MTS 2005 Turkmenistan 47 158.4 100 Purchased Barash Communications 
Technologies, Inc. (BCTI)
MTS 2005 Kyrgyzstan 150 0 51 Purchased controlling stake in Tarino 
Limited, owner of Bitel 
VimpelCom 2005 Ukraine 231 205.2 100 Purchased Ukrainian Radiosystems
VimpelCom 2005 Tajikistan 12 52.2 60 Purchased Takom
VimpelCom 2006 Georgia 13 44.7 51 Purchased Mobitel, member of GMC 
Group, with the option to purchase the 
remaining 49%. Contract with Alcatel for 
the construction of a new GSM/GPRS/
EDGE network 
VimpelCom 2006 Uzbekistan 260 213.2 100 Purchased Buztel and Unitel, assuming 
Unitel’s liabilities of $7.7 million and 
Buztel’s liabilities of $2.4 million
VimpelCom 2006 Armenia 539.7 88 100 Purchased 90% of shares in ArmenTel 
from Hellenic Telecommunications 
Organisation SA (OTE) for $487 million 
and the remaining 10% from the 
Armenian government for $52 million, 
assumed liabilities of €40 million
Altimo 2006 Kyrgyzstan 10 n/i 100 Purchased Sky Mobile from US-Kyrgyz 
joint venture Katel. Bitel (51% held by 
MTS) sold to Sky Mobile its fixed assets, 
rights and liabilities to creditors 
KOMSTAR 2006 Ukraine joint venture n/i 50 Foundation agreement with Neotel 
of Ukraine on joint management and 
development of the subsidiary Komstar 
Ukraine
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Table 11.3.
Russian operator’s 
presence in oversees 
markets
Source: Absametova 
et.al., 2010
Note: 1 At the end of 
2010 the Russian 
Government will 
acquire 20% in 
Shyam by partial 
conversation of the 
Indian debt;
n/i – no information
Operator Year Country
Transaction 
price 
($ million)
CAPEX 
($ million)
Stake 
(%)
Description of transaction 
KOMSTAR 2006 Armenia not 
disclosed
n/i 75 Purchased Callnet and its 100% 
subsidiary Kornet
KOMSTAR 2006 Ukraine 4.7 n/i 100 Purchased DG Tel and Technological 
Systems 
MTS 2007 Armenia 425 97.1 80 Purchased K-Telecom (VivaCell 
trademark) with the option to purchase 
the remaining 20%
VimpelCom 2008 Kyrgyzstan 350 0 100 Purchased Sky Mobile via Kar-Tel’s 
subsidiary 
VimpelCom 2008 Russia 4 240 0 100 Purchased 100% of share in Golden 
Telecom
MTS 2009 Russia 1 272 n/i 51 Purchased controlling stake in 
KOMSTAR – United TeleSystems
Sistema 2007  India 58.1 n/i 74 Sistema Shyam Teleservices – joint 
venture between  Sistema and Shyam 
Group1 of India
VimpelCom 2008 Vietnam joint venture 267 40 Joint venture with Vietnamese 
state-owned company Global 
Telecommunications Corporation (GTEL) 
VimpelCom 2009 Cambodia 28 n/i 90 Purchased 90% of shares in SOTELCO 
LTD
VimpelCom 2010 Egypt 1800 n/i 51.7 Purchased Weather Investments 
S.p.A., which offers services in Algeria, 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Greece, Italy, 
Pakistan, Tunisia and North Korea. 
In November 2009 Altimo announced a merger of stakes in MegaFon and 
Turkcell with TeliaSonera with a view to establish a leading international 
operator which will serve over 90 million subscribers in the CIS and Turkey. 
Moreover, Telenor and Altimo signed an agreement on merging their 
stakes in Vimpel-Communications and Kiyevstar G.S.M. (Bogapov, 2009) 
and establishing a new mobile operator, VimpelCom Ltd. The new operator 
provides integrated mobile and fix-line services in Ukraine and other CIS 
countries, Georgia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. 
Today many mobile and fixed-line Internet access providers have entered the 
triple play market (provisioning of Internet access, television and telephone 
services over a single connection) (Yefanov, 2008). A brilliant example of 
conquering new market segments was VimpelCom’s purchase of Golden 
Telecom for a record $4.3 billion in 2008 and purchase of KOMSTAR Unified 
TeleSystems by MTS in 2009. Therefore, VimpelCom and MTS entered the 
market of broadband Internet services and evened up scores with fixed-line 
operators.
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The interest of the “big three” in alternative fixed-line operators can be 
explained by the high demand for Internet services coupled with low 
competition. The structure of the Internet market is generally identical in 
all CIS countries (except Russia and Ukraine): a large number of small local 
providers and one monopolist controlled by the government that owns all 
trunk networks.
Apart from mobile operators, there are a number of alternative Russian 
Internet providers on CIS markets. For example, KOMSTAR Unified 
TeleSystems Group (established in 2004 via the merger of KOMSTAR, 
MTU-Infor and Telmos) is a leading Internet provider in Russia, Ukraine and 
Armenia. The group has aggressively invested in telecommunications in 
other post-Soviet countries. For example, in 2008 it fully financed and 
launched the world’s first national wireless WiMAX network in Armenia.
The Internet market in the CIS is largely underdeveloped and non-transparent, 
but the situation is likely to change dramatically in the near future. First, 
new 3G networks will create a completely different environment; second, 
the consolidation of CIS markets will inevitably lead to the emergence of 
transnational operators.
The market analysis shows that the most lucrative segments of the ICT in the 
CIS, such as mobile communications, have been long dominated by Russian 
players. On the other hand, de-monopolisation of telecommunications opened 
CIS markets to large European TNCs which now hold up to 100% of shares in 
various structures. 
Bearing in mind the extinction of the traditional technology principles and 
enormous profitability of mobile services, any future scenario will be shaped 
principally by the corporate will of shareholders of leading Russian operators. 
Events like the recent merger of the assets of Telenor and Altimo suggest 
that the main players at a regional are established, and no new competitors 
should be expected to appear on the CIS market in the next few years. Any 
prospective M&A transactions will depend on the preferences of large 
shareholders, notably, Telenor and Altimo. 
As a conclusion, the market is nearing saturation (in terms of the number 
of subscribers), and investors are making attempts to breakthrough by 
introducing highly integrated NGN capable of boosting regional and global 
traffic, which will result in a better use of the existing capacity.
Corporate integration and formation of Russian 
“Eurasian transnationals”
Telecommunications provide us with a brilliant success story, as the 
Russian mobile operators saturated the domestic market and successfully 
proceeded with expanding their business to other CIS countries. 
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The fact that the largest players are purely private had a positive impact 
on their international competitiveness and activity. Liberalisation of 
telecommunications markets triggered a capital inflow in the sector, which in 
turn led to improvements in the quality of telecom services. The liberalisation 
of developed markets and the emergence of cheaper technology fuelled 
competition and caused companies to seek new sources of income, often 
outside their home countries.
Heifetz and Libman (2007: 9) define corporate integration as a system of 
interconnections which emerges within the international intra-corporate 
space, with products, labor resources and capital in free circulation. 
Transnational corporations are trade enabling structures which strengthen 
the benefits of intraregional trade, thus promoting regional integration. Libman 
(2009) identifies the following tools of corporate integration:
• direct  investments  and  development  of  production  chains  within jointly 
controlled structures;
• international alliances and long-term production cooperation;
• contacts with companies from different countries, which have a common 
large client.
The first two tools are especially efficient in the CIS telecommunications 
market. For example, direct investments proved its efficiency in mobile 
communications (VimpelCom, MTS, Altimo) and international alliances in 
fixed-line and satellite communications.
According to Danning’s classic theory of globalisation, a company can enter 
international markets using the following strategies:
• export of products or services via distributors; 
• export of products or services via its own structures;
• transfer of production assets;
• full-cycle production; or
• international integration of production assets.
The latter three strategies are more useful for strengthening integration. 
TNCs establish alliances with existing manufacturers of equipment in other 
countries in the form of joint ventures (e.g. in Russia) or by purchasing 
companies (the main strategy of Russian mobile operators in CIS 
countries).
As we have mentioned above, the most common model of integration in 
post-Soviet countries is corporate investments. It is based on the 
investment expansion of Russian businesses. In the past decade Russian 
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companies invested about $1.5 billion in mobile communications in the CIS 
(Libman, 2009).
Territorial proximity and common infrastructure is the basis of a market. In 
this context, the preserved ties between CIS economies and the ability to use 
the former shared infrastructure is of key importance. It can be safely said 
that a number of post-Soviet TNCs emerged due to the ties inherited from 
the Soviet period. Another precondition for investment integration is social 
integration: cultural similarities, common traditions and language, similar 
legal systems, preserved personal contacts, good knowledge of local 
conditions, and better understanding of the real political and economic 
situation, as well as similar management styles and organisational culture 
(Yudanov, 2000) .
Investment flows are asymmetric, with Russian and (to a lesser extent) 
Kazakh capital playing the main role; the other CIS countries are essentially 
recipients. On the whole, the CIS has very few centers of formation of new 
TNCs and a large number of recipient countries.
The scale of private investment cooperation is considerable, but the financial 
crisis could create serious barriers to corporate expansion. However, it can 
also weaken national business groups’ control over assets, thus promoting 
the corporate investments model (Libman, 2009).
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The purpose of this article is to analyse integration processes in the nuclear 
energy sector of Russia and Kazakhstan. Particularly, we will focus on the 
two countries’ initiatives in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and evaluate the 
progress of the integration projects. We also provide an overview of the world 
nuclear market, Kazakhstan’s and Russia’s uranium industries, elaborating 
on the roles of the Kazakh national nuclear company Kazatomprom and 
Russian State atomic energy corporation Rosatom, as main representatives 
of the countries on the international nuclear market. Finally, we analyse some 
Russian-Kazakh bilateral cooperation initiatives in nuclear sector. The article 
is based on the EDB sector report no. 11 “Russian and Kazakhstani nuclear 
energy: trends in economic cooperation”.
Introduction
Nuclear energy presently enjoys a renaissance and plays an increasingly 
prominent role in the world economy. Notably, developing countries that do 
not possess the necessary technology are the main driving force behind this 
revival of interest. States that possess immense fossil fuel resources, such 
as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, are also showing significant 
interest in nuclear energy.
Nuclear energy is three times cheaper than wind energy and five times cheaper 
than solar energy. The operation of an NPP is more environmentally friendly 
than other power stations as there are almost no greenhouse gas emissions. 
In this respect, the full nuclear energy cycle, including uranium mining, nuclear 
fuel transportation, construction of reactors and disposal of wastes, is 
comparable to electricity generation from the renewable sources. If all the 
world’s 440 reactors were replaced by thermal power plants, generation of 
the same quantity of electricity would lead to an annual increase in carbon 
emission of 3.2 billion tons (Deripaska, 2009).
Swift fluctuations in fossil fuel prices and the rapid depletion of oil, gas and coal 
deposits prompt the main producers of these resources (including Russia 
and Kazakhstan) to search for new sources of income. Under such conditions, 
the uranium industry has the opportunity to become the mainstay of these 
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economies. Moreover, the strong political and economic ties between Russia 
and Kazakhstan could help them in their quest for leading positions in the 
global nuclear market. In the near future, cooperation with Russia could enable 
Kazakhstan to emerge not only as an international supplier of raw materials 
but also as a nation that has mastered the full nuclear fuel cycle. Russia, in 
turn, will benefit equally greatly from access to cheap Kazakh uranium.
Trends in nuclear energy development
Both the growing energy dependence of most global economies and volatile 
fossil fuel prices give rise to the search for new sources of energy. Nuclear 
energy promises to be one of the most reliable, economic and environmentally 
friendly solutions. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), the use of nuclear energy plants results in reducing CO2 emissions by 
2.9 billion tons per annum compared to coal-fired generation, or 24% of the 
total annual energy market emissions (Technology Roadmap, 2010).
The IAEA forecasts a nearly two-fold increase in global demand for energy in 
the next 25 years, which cannot be met by conventional sources such as oil, 
gas or coal. In parallel with that, by 2030 global demand for nuclear energy 
will rise by 66% from the 2008 level (Vestnik Atomproma, 2009b).
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According to the World Nuclear Association, in March 2009 there were 
436 functional nuclear reactors in 30 countries; 55 reactors were under 
construction; 108 reactors were at the project preparation stage; and 266 
projects were under consideration. Nuclear energy currently provides 16% 
of the world’s electricity. However, nuclear energy policy differs between 
countries: in France, NPPs generate 78% of all electricity consumed, whereas 
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in China they account for as little as 2%. Yukio Amano, General Director of 
the IAEA, says that over 50 nations have declared their interest in developing 
nuclear energy. This interest is driven by the highly volatile prices of fossil 
fuel and unstable energy supplies. Uranium is much easier to transport, and 
decreases the cost of electricity 4-6 times, compared to that generated using 
coal or natural gas (Vestnik Atomproma, 2009а).
Another advantage of nuclear energy is that the fuel component in the tariff 
for electricity is small, preventing strong fluctuations in electricity rates. For 
example, a triple increase in the price for natural gas automatically leads 
to a triple increase in the price of electricity. By contrast, the same triple 
increase in the price of uranium would result in a 5-6% increase in the 
price of electricity generated by a NPP (Simakova, 2009), because fuel cost 
accounts for merely 24% of all nuclear power plant costs (including 
Figure 12.2. 
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uranium mining, conversion, enrichment and the actual production of nuclear 
fuel). Most NPPs purchase nuclear fuel under long-term contracts at prices 
which are typically lower than the market price (this difference can be up to 
60%) (Bank of Moscow, 2008). Operation, maintenance and decommissioning 
account for 58%, and construction for about 18% of all NPP costs (see 
Figures 12.2. and 12.3).
An important factor in favour of nuclear power plant (especially after 
the Chernobyl disaster in 1986) is that reactors are subject to strict 
safety regulations. All new generation reactors are “passively safe” – that 
is, in case of an emergency the operator does not need to take any special 
action, as the reactor design features include automatic shutdown (Simakova, 
2009).
Analysis of the world nuclear energy market
It should be noted that the nuclear energy market is a combination of several 
different markets (see Figure 12.4). The first market is natural uranium 
production and processing. This fully developed market is dominated by 14 
countries; ten of them account for 90% of the world’s uranium production.
The second is uranium enrichment services market. This market has four 
key players: Russia, the USA, France and the British-German venture 
URNCO. Russia controls one quarter of the market (export of low enriched 
uranium).
Figure 12.4.
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Source: Eurasian 
Development Bank
Note: 
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2010а)
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The third market is the production of fuel assemblies. There are many 
national players on this market. The largest players are TVEL (Russia), 
AREVA (France), Toshiba/Westinghouse and GE/Hitachi (Japan/USA). This 
stage of nuclear fuel production accounts for about 6% of the total nuclear 
fuel cycle cost.
The fourth market is design of reactors. To date, there are several types of 
nuclear reactors available globally, including Russian, American (General 
Electric, Westinghouse) and German-French (Siemens-Framatom) designs 
(Beckman, 2009).
The current status of the Kazakh uranium 
industry
At present the uranium industry in Kazakhstan shows the most rapid 
growth rate. The country’s current energy resources structure is as follows: 
coal – 34%, oil – 8.8%, natural gas – 6.6%, minerals – 4.2%, and uranium – 
46%. Thus according to Kairat Kadyrzhanov, General Director of the National 
Nuclear Centre, Kazakhstan is a uranium nation, and it is nuclear energy 
that can make the country truly competitive internationally (Shaternikova, 
2009). This is facilitated by the fact that Kazakhstan has immense uranium 
deposits, ranking second globally in recoverable reserves (21% of the world’s 
total).
In 2009, uranium production in Kazakhstan rose by 63% to about 14,000 
tons. Thus, the country became the leading producer of uranium (28% of the 
world’s production), outperforming Canada (24%) and Australia (19%). To 
mention, Kazatomprom itself produced only one third of this volume and the 
rest was mined by joint ventures.
Kazatomprom today
By 2008 Kazatomprom had secured agreements with the key players in the 
international nuclear market for building conversion, enrichment and fuel 
assembly facilities, thus finalising its transformation into a vertically integrated 
company.
Kazatomprom is a holding company comprising 26 subsidiaries engaged in 
geological exploration; production, processing and enrichment of uranium; 
production, storing, transportation and processing of molybdenum and 
copper ores; design of small and medium capacity nuclear reactors; 
construction of NPPs; generation of electricity and heat; and joint 
production of nuclear fuel for VVER-1000 type water-cooled power 
reactors. Kazatomprom owns a uranium plant, a tantalum plant and a 
beryllium plant which supply materials to the nuclear, aerospace, electric 
and instrument-making industries, and has commenced construction of 
sulphuric acid and enrichment facilities at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant. 
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Kazatomprom also has a research centre, a special training centre and 
an educational centre. On the whole, Kazatomprom and its affiliate 
Stepnogorsk Mining-Chemical Complex LLP employ about 22,000 
people. Kazatomprom and its subsidiaries operate 16 deposits in 
Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan’s uranium production in the first half of 2010 totaled at 
8,452 tons – a 42% surplus compared to the same period of the 
previous year. According to reviewed production plans, 9,770 more tons 
will be mined in the second half of 2010. The growth was achieved by 
increased production in almost all subsidiaries of the holding; particular 
mention should be made on the commencement of commercial production 
by Baiken-U LLP and Kyzylkum LLP and pilot production by the Akbastau 
joint venture (Invest-market, 2010). Kazatomprom’s gross income in the 
first half of 2010 amounted to 105.687 billion tenge – a 58% rise compared 
to the first half of 2009. Net income was 19.414 billion tenge (a 64% rise) 
(Kazatomprom, 2010).
One of the major events of 2010 is the placement of Kazatomprom’s 
debut 5-year Eurobonds for $500 million with a 6.25%-coupon. The order 
book totalled $4.3 billion. The proceeds will be used to expand production 
and repay loans ($50 million will go towards the subsidiaries’ most 
expensive borrowings). Kazatomprom is also considering acquiring 
companies that possess uranium conversion and enrichment technology 
(Kazatomprom, 2010).
Kazatomprom’s nuclear fuel cycle
Prior to independence, Kazakhstan’s uranium industry was under the control 
of the Soviet military nuclear agency code-named the “Ministry of Medium 
Engineering”. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the country mastered 
two steps of nuclear fuel cycle – uranium mining and production of uranium 
dioxide pellets. The company plans to set a vertically integrated complex 
capable of running a full nuclear fuel cycle. The State Programme for Industrial 
Development in 2010-2014, in particular, provides for the development of 
missing nuclear fuel cycle stages (conversion, enrichment and production of 
fuel assemblies) (see Figure 12.5).
Nuclear fuel cycle stages already mastered by Kazatomprom are marked 
green; stages to be obtained under the company’s development strategy are 
marked blue; and stages which will not be developed are marked red.
Kazatomprom is currently engaged only in uranium mining and fabrication 
of UO2 powder and pellets. Notably, 6,537 tons out of 6,609 tons of the 
company’s uranium sales in 2009 were sold in the form of raw material 
– triuranium octoxide (U3O8). U3O8 accounts for just 35% of the cost of fuel 
assembly (Business Resource, 2010).
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Figure 12.5. 
Kazatomprom’s 
prospective nuclear 
fuel cycle
Source: 
Kazatomprom, 
2010b
Table 12.1. 
Fuel assembly cost 
structure ($1 million)
Source: Business 
Resource, 2010
Note:        highlighted 
columns indicate 
nuclear fuel cycle 
stages mastered by 
Kazatomprom
Raw material 
(U3O8)
Conversion to 
hexafluoride 
(UF6)
Enrichment 
Fabrication of 
UO2 powder 
and pellets
Alloys 
Fabrication of 
fuel rods and 
assemblies
35% 4% 37% 6% 9% 10%
The current status of the Russian uranium industry
The Russian government attaches great importance to nuclear energy 
development. About 1 trillion roubles will be invested in this industry by 
2015, and another 68 billion roubles will be allocated from the federal 
budget for the construction of new NPPs (Beroyeva, 2010). Special 
positions will be created in selected Russian embassies whose responsibility 
will be to lobby and promote Russian nuclear technology (Kommersant FM, 
2010).
Rosatom is a corporation comprising over 240 companies and organisations. 
These include all civil nuclear companies, military nuclear companies, research 
institutions, organisations in charge of nuclear and radiation safety, and the 
nuclear icebreaker fleet. Russian nuclear industry employs over 190,000 
people. Uranium is mined by three companies: Priargunsky Mining and 
Chemical Works JSC, Dalur CJSC and Khiagda JSC.
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Figure 12.6. 
The current status of the Russian uranium industry
Source: Rosatom, 2010
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In 2006 it was decided to establish a specialised vertically integrated company 
for producing NPP equipment. Nuclear industry was divided into the military 
and civil segments. All companies in the civil segment were reorganised into 
joint stock companies, with the corresponding transformations in terms of 
accounting. According to Rosatom’s General Director Sergey Kiriyenko, the 
reform was successful: the value of the corporation’s net assets rose by 
360% and productivity by 170%. In 2009 Rosatom’s income totalled 518 
billion roubles, a 37% surplus compared to 2008 (Kommersant FM, 2010).
Geological exploration was carried out in fields operated by existing and 
prospective Russian ventures. Some 170,000 running metres were drilled, 
and total investments in uranium exploration amounted to 1.05 billion roubles. 
It is expected that a reserve increment of uranium will amount to 8,000 tons. 
In addition, geological exploration was started in Armenia and Namibia (Vestnik 
Atomproma, 2010v).
Even now Rosatom has an advantage on the international nuclear energy 
market, as it has mastered the full nuclear fuel chain from uranium mining 
to the construction of NPPs (only French AREVA can compete with Rosatom 
in this regard). Rosatom controls 34% of the enrichment market, 22% 
of the conversion market, 12% of the nuclear fuel market and 12% of the 
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NPP construction market. However, the corporation is not satisfied with its 
current status. During the visit to Volgodonsk NPP Russian Premier Minister 
Vladimir Putin said: “We need to strengthen our positions in the field of 
peaceful nuclear energy. These are unique technologies. It is within our power 
to capture at least 25% of the NPP construction and operation services 
market. We should actively offer not only NPP construction services, but also 
operation and maintenance and fuel disposal services” (Beroyeva, 2010).
Russian-Kazakh cooperation
Apart from Rosatom, the most active player in the CIS is Kazatomprom. 
Hence, successful cooperation between these two giants is a precondition 
for progress not only in the national nuclear energy sectors, but also in the 
Kazakh and Russian economies in general. Therefore, on December 7, 
2006, a comprehensive programme of Russian-Kazakh cooperation in 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy was adopted, and on November 20, 2009 
the parties signed a Roadmap of additional measures for implementing that 
programme.
On many occasions, the presidents of Rosatom and Kazatomprom have 
voiced the idea of recreating a single structure identical to the former Ministry 
of Medium Engineering in a new format. The fact that Russia and Kazakhstan 
are discussing the creation of a unified nuclear agency has been known widely 
for long. Respective plans were announced by the Presidents of the two states 
in a series of negotiations (Gilyova, 2010). The establishment of a unified 
structure would be beneficial to both parties: Kazakhstan would be able to 
create high-technology production facilities through which would address a 
wide range of issues (increase tax revenues, decrease unemployment rate, 
solve the power shortages problems, etc.), and Russia would gain access to 
cheaper uranium.
However, these negotiations are still dragging on. In Rosatom’s opinion, the 
Kazakh party is deliberately protracting the process. Initially Rosatom insisted 
on owning 50% plus one share, and Kazatomprom stood for parity terms. In 
the autumn of 2008 Russia agreed to the parity terms which included, inter 
alia, exchange of all Kazakh assets for equal Russian assets (at market value). 
Rosatom delivered a draft of intergovernmental agreement establishing a 
unified company, but no reply followed.
On June 9, 2010, at the ATOMEXPO exhibition, Kazatomprom’s Vice-
President Nurlan Ryspanov announced a forthcoming uranium development 
programme under which Kazatomprom is scheduled to complete its 
transformation into vertically integrated company with a full nuclear fuel cycle 
by 2020 (ATOMEXPO, 2010a). In particular, the uranium  conversion was 
entrusted to the specially founded joint venture Ulba Conversion LLP (with 
Cameco, Canada).
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There is also a contradiction between Russia and Kazakhstan concerning the 
construction of an NPP in Kazakhstan. According to Kazatomprom, at present 
a respective feasibility study is being agreed. According to the Russian party, a 
draft agreement was approved and passed to the Kazakh Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources in 2009. In February 2010 Russia received a new 
Kazakh version of the agreement. According to Russian party, this version 
virtually brings the discussion back to the starting point (Konstantinov, 
2010).
There were also some positive developments. On July 5, 2010, during the 
working visit of Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev to Kazakhstan, an 
added impetus was given to the integration of the two states’ nuclear energy 
sectors. Rosatom’s General Director Sergey Kiriyenko and Kazatomprom’s 
President Vladimir Shkolnik signed two documents: a Memorandum on 
integration and cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and 
a Joint Statement on the uranium enrichment centre project.
The first document outlines a concept for gradual establishment of a 
Russian-Kazakh nuclear company. “The parties confirm that they shall 
adhere to the principles of integration and, whilst taking consecutive steps 
towards a unified, parity-based nuclear company, shall strive to position 
it on the global nuclear fuel cycle market as a strong joint player, and make 
use of market conditions in the best interests of future integration”, reads 
the memorandum (Baranov, 2010). At an initial stage, this company will 
sell natural and low enriched uranium, as well as other products and 
services produced by the joint ventures to end users. The second document 
seals the parties’ agreements in respect of common use of a uranium 
enrichment centre in Russia through Kazakhstani shareholding in the Ural 
Electrochemical Integrated Plant JSC. Moreover, the document outlines the 
principles of concerted sales and marketing policy.
Thus Kazakhstan receives access to the world’s largest enrichment 
facility and can increase the value added of nearly a half of all uranium it is 
now selling to the markets as a raw material. This will reduce Kazatomprom’s 
dependence on the volatile prices of natural uranium (enrichment services 
are more stable and predictable). Moreover, the enriched uranium is much 
more expensive than the natural one. The two documents are equally 
beneficial to Russia as well.
First, they provide for processing of Kazakh uranium on Russian territory, 
i.e. Rosatom has secured additional workload for its facilities. Second, Russia 
has secured the Kazakh government’s support for the forthcoming purchase 
of assets of Canadian Uranium One by Atomredmetzoloto (see below).
In 2006 ARMZ and Kazatomprom started the consolidation of assets by 
creating two joint ventures, Zarechnoye and Akbastau. In addition to the 
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creation of joint ventures, Russian companies enter the Kazakh market 
by acquiring international uranium companies which operate deposits in 
Kazakhstan. For example, ARMZ has acquired Effektivnaya Energiya N.V. 
which owned 50% in Karatau LLP and 25% in the joint venture Akbastau. 
As a result, ARMZ consolidated Russian assets in Kazakhstan and doubled 
its production capacity (Vestnik Atomproma, 2010b). 
In 2009 ARMZ purchased 16.6% of shares in Uranium One. To be specific, 
ARMZ exchanged its 50% share in Karatau LLP for 117 million ordinary 
shares in Uranium One Inc. plus $90 million; up to $60 million more will be 
paid if Karatau achieves certain financial results within three years. Therefore, 
ARMZ gained the right to purchase part of Uranium One products (Interfax, 
2010).
In June 2010 Atomredmetzoloto entered into another agreement with 
Uranium One under which it will increase its share in Uranium One by 
purchasing an additional share issue (356 million ordinary shares) for 50% 
in Akbastau and 49.7% in Zarechnoye plus $610 million. After closure of this 
transaction ARMZ’s share in Uranium One will account for at least 51% (and, 
as a result, ARMZ will have the right to acquire at least 51% of Uranium One’s 
products) (Tserikh, 2010).
Transaction is subject to the approval of all regulatory authorities in Russia, 
Kazakhstan, the USA and Australia. According to recent reports, the US 
Committee on Foreign Investment has approved the transaction on October 
25, 2010. Thus, Atomredmetzoloto’s assets in Kazakhstan will comprise 
Akbastau, Zarechnoye, Betpak Dala, Karatau and Kyzylkum uranium fields 
with total reserves of 133,293 tons.
Rosatom is in the lead in terms of the number of joint projects with 
Kazatomprom and total uranium production (over 25% of 
Atomredmetzoloto’s uranium output in 2009 was mined by joint ventures 
in Kazakhstan, and this figure is expected to increase in 2010). ARMZ 
plans to strengthen cooperation with Kazakhstan not only through its own 
subsidiaries but also by supporting the Kazakh subsidiaries of Uranium One. 
For example, it is expected that Karatau will boost the output of processing 
solutions to meet the needs of the Akbastau deposit) and, in the longer 
term, develop refining production based on Karatau JV and build a sulfuric 
acid plant.
Despite the disagreements, Kazakhstan and Russia recognise the need 
for collaboration in the nuclear industry, as illustrated by the recent 
bilateral initiatives. We can presume that the former management of 
Kazatomprom aimed to maintain a balance between the interests of 
Russian and other foreign investors and not to allow any particular group 
of investors to dominate. The current management takes a pro-Russian 
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stance. This, in our opinion, would greatly facilitate the process of 
integration of two countries.
Conclusions 
The main objective of this industry review was to describe the current 
status of the global nuclear energy market and nuclear energy market in 
Russia and Kazakhstan. Our analysis of integration processes in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy in the CIS shows that both Kazakhstan and Russia 
attach great importance to the development of nuclear industry. Possession 
of nuclear technology enables a nation to diversify the entire economy – this 
is especially relevant to large exporters of raw materials and fossil fuel such 
as Russia and Kazakhstan, as they are highly dependent on world prices for 
energy resources.
The international nuclear energy market is dominated by competing giants 
such as AREVA, Cameco and others. In order to keep footing on the market, a 
country must possess both a strong uranium base and the entire technology. 
Neither Kazatomprom, which controls immense reserves yet has mastered 
only two nuclear fuel cycle stages, nor Rosatom, which has mastered the 
entire nuclear fuel cycle yet has access only to expensive uranium, can boast 
of having access to both components. Therefore, cooperation between these 
two companies is the most favorable decision. The understanding of this fact 
has long been there, but progress is being delayed by various contingencies, 
resulting in unnecessary losses.
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2010: Data and Events
nAtAliA 
mAqsimchook
13 Chronicle of Eurasian 
Regional Integration 2010
2010 is notable first of all for the commencement of the Customs Union 
of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. In early 2010, business circles faced 
difficulties with the introduction of import licensing for an array of goods, 
including some types of alcohol, electronics and medications, and had to 
halt imports of these products. The CU member states still pose questions 
concerning the customs and tariff regulations; however they showed 
understanding of inevitable need for fine-tuning of a new mechanism during 
the first stage, performed by the Customs Union Commission.
The launch of the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia 
remained in a focus of public attention during the first half of 2010. It was 
expected that the CU would come into force on July 1, 2010, with the 
adoption of the Customs Code by the three member states. However the 
parties’ disagreement over a number of sensitive issues led to the approval 
of the Customs Code by two out of the three member states. On July 1, 
2010 the Customs Code of the Customs Union came into force in 
Kazakhstan and Russia, and the first customs-free rail shipment of 700 tons 
of wheat was successfully transported from Kazakhstan to Makfa, a Russian 
manufacturing enterprise situated in Chelyabinsk. Despite the difference 
in the CU member states’ positions over the abolition of export duties, on 
July 6, the Customs Code came into force in all three states. Unresolved 
issues between Russia and Belarus on Russia collecting export duties for 
supplies of oil products to Belarus led to a gas conflict, which was settled 
only after both sides demonstrated readiness to go to extreme measures.
The main highlight of the Regional Organisations section is the continuing 
work on the use of national currencies in settlements between the CIS 
member states, which is interrelated with issues of the reorganisation of the 
CIS Interstate Bank. Having taken over the chairmanship of the CIS in 2010, 
Russia is advancing the initiative on the establishment of the CIS Free Trade 
Zone. A corresponding agreement will be presented to the CIS heads of 
governments for signing in the first half of 2011. The agreement is designed 
to replace over a hundred current agreements and arrangements. 
One of the central news from EurAsEC is the signing of a Declaration on 
establishing a single economic space for Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. The 
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parties undertook great efforts to prepare and harmonise the international 
agreements that laid the foundation for the successful operation of the 
Common Economic Space of the three countries. It will take several years to 
unify economic laws and regulations. Basic provisions will come into force 
starting January 1, 2012. Some issues will demand a longer transition 
period that will last up to 2017-2020. 
With the establishment of the Customs Union and the Common Economic 
Space, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan advance towards creating a Eurasian 
Economic Union that will ensure a mutually beneficial cooperation with other 
countries and international economic alliances.
The SCO membership is likely to increase, as the heads of SCO member 
states signed an array of documents, including the Regulations on procedure 
for admitting new members to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
CSTO revises its emergency response mechanism after a failure to respond 
adequately to the interethnic collisions in Kyrgyzstan in June. 
Russia-Ukraine relations are to be noted in the block of bilateral relations, 
as traditionally challenging set of issues. However, the change of country’s 
political leadership gave start to new positive trends. Throughout 2010, the 
presidents, prime ministers and key ministers of both countries held several 
meetings. Among the most important developments are the signing of a set 
of “Fleet-for-Gas” agreements, discussion of prospects for a possible joint 
Gasprom and Naftogaz venture, as well as several joint projects in nuclear 
energy, transport infrastructure and aircraft engineering.
Russia and Azerbaijan are moving towards signing an agreement on the 
legal status of the Caspian Sea. During a state visit of the Russian 
president to Armenia the sides signed agreements on cooperation in the 
military and political spheres, including the prolongation of deployment of 
Russian military base in Gyumri and widening its geographic strategic 
responsibility, as well as joint projects for the construction of new power 
units at the Armenian nuclear power plant. The period of deployment of 
military bases in Kyrgyzstan is also being prolonged. The heads of Russia 
and Tajikistan met during the CIS August summit in Sochi and settled 
outstanding problematic issues on the repayment of Tajik energy debt, 
the construction of Sangtuda hydropower plant (HPP), the deployment of 
Russian Air Force at a base in Gissar, and the supplies of Russian oil products 
at a discount price.
Kazakhstan is in search of new oil transportation routes and nuclear energy 
development partners. The agreement on parallel operation of Russia’s 
Unified Energy System (UES) and power grids of Belarus and Ukraine is 
bringing positive results. Russian Railways and Kazakhstan Temir Zholy 
are joining forces in the competition with sea transportation by introducing 
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a simplified freight customs clearance procedure and establishing a unified 
customs broker.
Russian companies report facing risks in their operations in the CIS member 
states. One of Russia’s largest dairy manufacturers lost its local assets in 
Uzbekistan after its local branch was de facto nationalised “in profit of state”. 
Barash Communications Technologies, Inc., a subsidiary of Russia’s MTS, 
halted its operations in Turkmenistan. Russian Transmashholding managed 
to successfully complete the acquisition of Ukrainian Luganskteplovoz, and 
Polyus Gold resolved the controversy over the reverse takeover deal with 
KazakhGold.
Late 2010 was also marked with considerable activity in the financial sector. 
Belarus successfully placed its 2-year sovereign rouble denominated bonds 
on MICEX; thus becoming a first foreign issuer to place bonds in Russia. 
Sberbank established a direct investments fund for Belarus. Kazakh-Tajik fund 
for direct investments was also put into operation. The Council of the heads of 
state agencies for regulation of securities markets of the CIS member states 
reviewed issues on interaction between the CIS stock markets, and with the 
introduction of the “Agreement on agreed principles of monetary policies in 
the member states of the Common Economic Space”, Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus moved further towards establishing unified conditions for the banks 
and currency markets of the three countries. 
REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS
CIS 
CIS studies possibility of shifting to regional currencies
March 10, 2010
On March 10–11, the CIS Expert Group discussed a possible way for the 
Post-Soviet countries to shift to settlement in national currencies in mutual 
trade. However, the structure of the turnover within CIS appears to be a main 
obstacle. Russia sells a lot more goods to neighbours than buys from them 
and a shift away from the US dollar would create an imbalance. The inflow 
of national currencies to Russia would substantially exceed the demand 
for these currencies, thus building up excessive liquidity. The scheme for 
calculating the national currencies’ exchange rate also remains an unresolved 
issue. The Central Bank of Russia only sets the nominal exchange rates for 
national currencies, while the real exchange rates are determined at the stock 
exchange. There is no trade in the CIS national currencies at present.
The issue of shifting to national currencies, including the rouble, is of principal 
importance to Russia, which intends to become a regional financial centre. 
However, according to experts, the transfer to the new settlement scheme 
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should not be expected in the near future due to complexity of technical 
regulations. 
RBK Daily
Russia suggests turning CIS into free trade zone
March 31, 2010 
The government of Russia developed a project to establish a free trade zone 
within the CIS and expects that it will be approved by the Commonwealth this 
year. The initiative should boost the modernisation of Russian economy by 
means of innovative cooperation and technology transfer with neighbouring 
countries. Russia takes chairmanship in the CIS in 2010 and the multilateral 
free trade zone project will top the agenda of Russia’s chairmanship. Various 
free trade agreements have been in force in the CIS since the early 1990s 
but all of them are of a bilateral character. The level of trade liberalisation 
in the CIS multilateral free trade zone would be lesser, compared to the 
Customs Union. However, the Customs Union is designed to offer a single 
trade policy with regard to non-member countries, which is not the case with 
the CIS multilateral free trade zone agreement. Certain branches related 
to trade, however, would still require harmonisation. According to Russia’s 
Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Russia intends to almost fully harmonise 
the economic regulations with all the CIS member states that are not party 
to the Customs Union or the EurAsEC. 
RBK daily
Reorganising CIS Interstate Bank
May 12, 2010
The CIS Executive Committee held a regular meeting of the Commission on 
Economic Issues under the CIS Economic Council. The participants of the 
meeting discussed the activities of the CIS Transport Coordination Council in 
2006-2009, the draft forecast for energy production and consumption by 
CIS member states for the period to 2020, as well as the issue of introducing 
amendments to the conditions of production and technology operations, 
according to which the country that performed the production and technology 
operations is considered the country of origin of the goods. The Commission 
also reviewed the progress on the implementation of the CIS supreme 
authorities’ instructions on the reorganisation of the Interstate Bank. The 
issue of developing recommendations for defining the goals and functions 
of the Interstate Bank was included in the action plan for implementing 
the first stage of the CIS Economic Development Strategy in 2009-2011. 
The Bank’s major functions include arrangement and settling of accounts 
between economic entities and other CIS organisations in national and other 
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currencies; loan financing of foreign trade operations of economic entities 
and other CIS organisations among others. 
Analysis Unit of the CIS Executive Committee’s 
Strategy and Research Department
Prospects of interaction between CIS stock markets
October 21, 2010
Kazakhstan hosted the 11th meeting of the Council of heads of state agencies 
for regulation of securities markets of the CIS member states on October 20-
21, which was attended by representatives of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine.
The participants exchanged information on the current state of stock markets 
in the CIS member states in the post-crisis period. The issues of establishing 
an International Financial Centre in Moscow and interacting with the Council 
for regulation of securities markets, as well the issue of establishing a 
coordinating agency within the framework of the Council in order to boost 
the creation of the International Financial Centre topped the agenda of the 
discussion. Following the results of the discussion, the parties agreed to 
review these issues again.
The participants reviewed Russia’s draft recommendations for regulating 
the activities of the CIS investment funds, discussed the results of the CIS 
national legislations’ comparative analysis, as well as issues of taxation at 
the securities markets raised on the initiative of Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. 
Moreover, the sides discussed the draft action plan of the Council for 2011-
2012, and approved a research and information report on the state of the 
securities markets in the CIS member states, prepared by the Central Bank 
of Armenia.
www.cis.by
CIS discusses draft agreement on free trade zone
December 23, 2010
Maxim Medvedkov, director of the trade negotiations department of the 
Russian Economic Development Ministry and head of the working group 
on negotiating a draft agreement on a free trade zone, chaired the regular 
meeting of the working group in Moscow. Representatives from Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and Ukraine took part in the meeting. The working group asked 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to file their positions 
on the list of international documents that will cease to be effective with the 
adoption of a new agreement to the CIS Executive Committee by January 15, 
2010: Data and Events
21Eurasian Development Bank
2010. The CIS member states should also clarify their positions on certain 
articles and clauses of the agreement, settle the issue of specifying the list of 
import duties exemptions, and provide information on domestic progress in 
putting into force the Agreement on the Rules for Determining the Country 
of Origin of Goods in the CIS, dated November 20, 2009. The next meeting 
for the purpose of the final approval of the draft agreement will be held on 
February 8-10, 2011.
Analysis Unit of the CIS Executive Committee’s 
Strategy and Research Department
EurAsEC 
EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund receives first 
applications
February 25, 2010. 
The Board of the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund (ACF) 
approved a set of documents, including the rules 
for allocation of investment financing from the 
Fund’s resources. The rules set the lower limit 
for investment loans to low-income countries at 
$10 million and $30 million to other countries. 
Moreover, the Council approved the limits for 
each of the member state. The access limit is 
an amount of the Fund’s resources that can be 
allocated to a member state either in the form 
of stabilisation loan or investment financing. The 
access limit is proportional to the gross national 
income per capita. According to the data for 
2010, limit for Armenia is set at 13% of the 
Fund’s finances, Belarus – 21%, Kazakhstan 
- 24%, Kyrgyzstan - 3%, Russia – 37% and 
Tajikistan – 2%. At present, the Fund’s total 
capitalisation amounts to $8.55 billion.
INTERFAX-AFI
Tajikistan to be the first to receive funds 
from EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund
June 18, 2010
The Board of the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund has 
approved the first application for allocation of 
funds. During the meeting of the ACF Board in 
St. Petersburg the finance ministers of the ACF 
Note: The EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund was 
established by the Heads of Governments of 
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia and Tajikistan. It aims to help the 
countries cope with the negative effects 
of the global financial crisis on the national 
economies, as well as secure their economic 
and financial sustainability and facilitate 
the integration processes between the 
EurAsEC member states. The Fund provide 
loans to the countries for anti-crisis goals,  
stabilisation loans and financing for the 
implementation of Interstate investment 
projects. The Fund’s resources will be 
distributed on conditions of maturity, 
serviceability and recoverability. During the 
voting process each country’s votes will carry 
weight in proportion to their contributions 
to the Fund. The fund will have $8.5 billion in 
charter capital. Russia will supply $7.5 billion, 
Kazakhstan $1 billion, Belarus – $10 million, 
and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia –  
$1 million each. The fund will be managed  
by a council made up of the finance  
ministers of the participating states and 
representatives of participating international 
organisations. The chairman will be elected  
by the council members, whose votes will  
carry weight in proportion to their  
contributions to the fund. Each vote is the 
equivalent of $100,000 in contributions. The 
Eurasian Development Bank facilitates as 
manager of the Fund’s resources. 
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member states – Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Armenia – made the decision to allocate a $70 million loan to Tajikistan with 
a maturity of 20 years (including five year grace period), and a fixed interest 
rate of 1% per annum.
The Government of Tajikistan intends to use the loan to maintain budgetary 
financing for social sectors (education, health, and social protection). 
Moreover, the ACF loan will allow Tajikistan to maintain budget expenditures 
for healthcare, education and social protection at a pre-crisis level and support 
reforms in public administration and public finance management. 
www.eabr.org
Belarus pays its share in EDB 
June 22, 2010
Belarus paid in its share of $15 million in the charter capital of the Eurasian 
Development Bank (EDB), thus completing the procedures required for 
joining the EDB, and became the fifth full member along with Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Armenia and Tajikistan. At present, the Bank is reviewing a 
number of investment projects in Belarus, including a project to construct 
the Polotskaya Hydropower plant on the West Dvina.
Reuters
Heads of governments of Customs Union member states reach 
agreement on oil and gas issues
October 15, 2010
Russia reached a compromise on the contentious issues in the oil and gas 
relations with the countries of the Customs Union, Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin said after a session of the Council of Ministers of Russia and 
Belarus and the meeting of the heads of governments of the Customs Union 
member states.
According to Putin, after Belarus signs and ratifies the set of agreements on 
the Common Economic Space, Russia will abolish import duties on crude oil 
deliveries to Belarus. 
Russia is ready to discuss the participation of all CIS and EurAsEC partners 
in such integration unions as the Customs Union and the Common Economic 
Space. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan expressed their readiness to join the Customs 
Union and the Common Economic Space. However, according to Russian 
Prime Minister, the admission process for the new members wouldn’t be 
straight forward, as countries that join later will have to accept the conditions 
set by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
INTERFAX
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Establishment of a unified antimonopoly agency of the Customs Union
October 19, 2010 
From 2011, the functions of the antimonopoly agencies of the Customs 
Union member states will be transferred to the Customs Union Commission. 
According to the Chairman of Kazakhstan’s Agency for Competition 
Protection, Mazhit Esenbayev, a supranational antimonopoly body will start 
handling unfair competition, monopolies and cartel conspiracies. According 
to the head of the Economic Development Ministry’s department for 
developing competition, Aleksandr Pirozhenko, the respective agreements 
have been reached but the principle of creating a unified antimonopoly agency 
is still under discussion. 
For now, the antimonopoly bodies of the Customs Union member states 
plan to conduct a joint investigation into the overpricing of roaming services 
by mobile operators. However, a supranational body may handle more 
complicated cases. According to the Ministry of Economic Development, 
before the formation of the Customs Union, Belarus was in the lead in applying 
restrictive measures, with 23 restrictions against Russian products, 17 
cases of restricting goods from the EU and 10 restrictions against Ukrainian 
products. At the same time, Russian dairy manufacturers and producers of 
agricultural equipment filed complaints against unfair competition on the part 
of Belarusian companies. 
The Customs Union Commission will receive its new antimonopoly functions 
on a gradual basis. The Customs Union Commission will also start handling 
unfair competition on a transnational level 20 months after the signing of 
an agreement, cartel conspiracies after 22 months and abuse of the 
dominant position after 24 months. The countries now need to formulate 
a regulatory framework for the Customs Union Commission activities and 
the rebuttal procedure, as well as harmonise their own legislative acts on 
competition.
Vedomosti
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan sign agreements 
on Common Economic Space
December 9, 2010
The participants of the EurAsEC Interstate Council’s meeting at the level of 
heads of states discussed issues surrounding basic development trends of 
EurAsEC, the Customs Union and the EurAsEC Common Economic Space. 
The sides also signed 17 documents that regulate the establishment of the 
CES, including agreements on trade in services and investments in the CES 
member states, a coherent macroeconomic policy, the creation of conditions 
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in the financial markets for the free movement of capital, and the agreed 
principles of monetary policies. 
The presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed a declaration on 
establishing the Common Economic Space, according to which the CES will 
start operating on January 1, 2012. By developing the Customs Union and 
the Common Economic Space, EurAsEC is moving towards the creation of a 
Eurasian economic union that will secure a well-balanced, complementary and 
mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries, international economic 
alliances and the European Union.
However, according to Russian Economic Development Minister Elvira 
Nabiullina, it will take several years to unify economic laws and regulations. 
Basic provisions will come into force starting January 1, 2012. Some issues 
will demand a longer transition period that will last up to 2017-2020.
http://www.tsouz.ru, RBK daily, Expert Online
Customs Union 
Customs Union Commission adopts resolution on deposition and 
distribution mechanism of import customs duties
March 25, 2010   
The Customs Union Commission held a working meeting in Moscow. During 
the meeting the members of the commission adopted a resolution on 
Establishment and Application of the Procedure of Deposition and Distribution 
of Import Customs Duties (other duties, taxes and fees of similar effect).
According to a resolution, the import customs duties equal 4.7% for Belarus, 
7.33% for Kazakhstan and 87.97% for Russia.
www.tsouz.ru
Ukraine may join Customs Union
February 19, 2010
Russian president Dmitry Medvedev held a meeting with the head of the 
Federal Customs Service Andrey Belyaminov. During the meeting, Medvedev 
instructed the customs chief to study the issue of admitting Ukraine to the 
Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The Russian president 
expressed willingness to have closer cooperation with Ukrainian colleagues 
as the turnover between the countries is quite considerable. 
Official representatives of Ukraine are cautious about joining the Customs 
Union. Ukraine views the Customs Union as an important integration process 
and intends to take part in certain stages in accordance with the country’s 
national interests. Taking into account the country’s membership in the WTO, 
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Ukraine will not become a full member of the Customs Union. Ukraine is 
more interested in cooperating with Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan within 
the framework of the single customs territory.
Ъ-Online
Customs Union Commission broadens mandate
March 18, 2010 
From 2012 onwards, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan may delegate a 
substantial part of the national governments’ powers to the Customs Union 
Commission, following the scheme that was used for the establishment of the 
Customs Union.
According to Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Karim Masimov, the Customs 
Union Commission needs to be strengthened and broadened via the transfer 
of some functions of state administration, including, in particular, regulation 
of natural monopolies, tariff design in this area, unified competition policy, 
and energy policy. This is a wide process that needs to be strengthened by 
coherent and ratified agreements between the three countries.
The field of the Customs Union activities includes a 
common customs territory and external borders, as 
well as unified trade policy. The Common Economic 
Space is the next step towards a unified competition 
policy, unified tariff policy with regard to natural 
monopolies and an array of other policies being 
deliberately transferred to the supranational bodies’ 
sphere of duties by the heads of sovereign states. 
However, according to Masimov, tax policy should 
remain a duty of the sovereign government. It is 
likewise early to speak of a single monetary union since central banks should 
remain non-integrated. Nuclear energy is also an exception because it can’t 
be transferred to the duties of the Common Economic Space.
Kazakhstan had a hard time making a decision on raising the protective import 
tariffs for cars and aircraft engineering to Russia’s level. 
Kursiv
Approval of regulations for fuel and motor transport 
in the Customs Union
May 6, 2010
Russia’s Industry and Trade Ministry redrafted technical regulations for motor 
fuel, motor transport and motor vehicle emissions. The documents now need 
to be approved by Belarus and Kazakhstan and will come into force in 2011. 
Note: The Customs Union of Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan was launched  
on January 1, 2010. Starting July 1, 
2010 The Customs Code of the Customs 
Union comes into force and the Single  
Economic Space of the three states will  
be established by January 1, 2012.
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The key adjustment made to the new technical regulations for gasoline 
and aviation fuel, diesel and marine fuels, jet engine fuel and burner fuel is 
the toughening of requirements for fuel grade. According to specialists, 
synchronisation of environmental requirements for fuel and motor transport 
in the Customs Union may lead to serious problems. While Russian and 
Belarusian oil refineries are ready to shift to Euro-3 grade fuel, Kazakhstan’s 
refineries will need time and investment to upgrade from Euro-2. In order 
to avoid tough restrictions, Russia’s partners suggest dividing the fuel 
technical regulations into three parts, foreseeing different environmental 
requirements for gasoline, marine fuels and aviation fuel apart from 
lowered environmental requirements for diesel fuel for agriculture needs. 
Russia advocates a simultaneous synchronisation of requirements for 
fuels, vehicles environmental rating and motor vehicle emissions within the 
framework of the Customs Union.
Kazakhstan’s motor vehicle requirements are set at the Euro-2 level. Belarus 
produces vehicles (MAZ, BelAZ, MTZ tractors) without specifying any 
strict environmental standards. In 2010 Russia introduced Euro-4 grade 
requirements for motor transport. Russia is in talks with Kazakhstan on a 
two-year transition period for the production of Euro-2 grade fuel without 
the right to sell it in Russia from 2011. The Ministry of Internal Affairs will 
be responsible for the non-admission of motor transport that fall short of 
accepted standards to Russia’s auto market.
Kommersant
Drafting of Customs Union regulatory framework enters 
the closing stage 
May 19, 2010 
Six weeks before the introduction of the single customs territory of Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan into effect (elimination of inner borders and 
introduction of a common Customs Code starting July 1, 2010) the process 
of drafting the Customs Union regulatory framework entered its final 
stage. Three draft agreements on issues of pipeline transport, intellectual 
property, and customs charges for transit still need to be coordinated. The 
two more vital documents – a supranational Customs Code of the Customs 
Union and a draft law “On Customs Regulation in Russia”, the successor to 
the domestic Code, are also on their way.
The draft law provoked debates in business circles. During a meeting with 
Vladimir Putin on May 17, the head of the Russian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs Aleksandr Shokhin noted that the enactment of the draft 
law could impede business in Russia, in particular due to the presence of 
over 150 reference rules that refer to government resolutions, as well as 
delegation of decision-making authority to the customs services.
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According to Russian Federal Customs Service, Russia is ready to transfer 
control from the Russian-Belarusian border to the external boundary of 
the Customs Union. The situation of Russian-Kazakh border is more 
complicated. Starting July 1, 2010, border control will be alleviated but 
remain in effect. Given the weak development of Kazakhstan’s borders 
with neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and China, Russian authorities are uptight 
about a possible inflow of smuggled goods and drug trafficking from these 
countries. Therefore, the checkpoints on the border with Kazakhstan will 
remain in effect for an indefinite time. 
The continuing efforts of Belarus to win the exemption from customs duties 
on Russian crude oil and oil products starting July 1, 2010 remain one of the 
unresolved issues. 
Kommersant
Customs Union launched
July 5, 2010
The participants of the EurAsEC Interstate Council’s meeting in Astana signed 
a declaration launching the Customs Union and a set of about 20 documents. 
Russia and Kazakhstan enacted the Customs Code of the Customs Union 
starting July 1, 2010, and on July 6, 2010 the Code comes into force in all 
the three countries.
Following the results of the Customs Union Commission meeting, the 
participants made decisions on implementation of the second stage of 
establishing the Customs Union; international agreements of the Customs 
Union on cooperation in criminal and administrative cases; export control 
of the Customs Union member states; the structure of the Customs Union 
Commission’s Secretariat for 2011, and other international obligations of 
the Customs Union member states to be considered in the Customs Union 
decision-making.
The Customs union was to go into effect on July 1, but was delayed 
due Belarus’ strong stand against export taxes Russia charged for its oil 
supplies to Belarus. Moscow said the oil tax would be waived on January 
2012, when the three countries establish a full-fledged Common Economic 
Space.
RIA Novosti
Chronology of ratification of the Agreement on the Customs Code 
of the Customs Union 
On May 21, the premiers of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan failed to 
harmonise the most sensitive issues that aroused between the countries 
during the formation of the Customs Union.
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On May 28, Belarus refused to take part in the meeting on issues of the 
Customs Union, objecting to export taxes Russia charged for its oil supplies. 
During the meeting Russia and Kazakhstan signed an array of agreement on 
a bilateral basis.
On June 1, Belarus expressed its readiness to make concessions on an array 
of issues, sensitive to Kazakhstan and Russia.
On June 3, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a federal law “On 
Ratification of the Agreement on the Customs Code of the Customs Union”. 
Medvedev also signed a federal law “On Ratification of the Protocol on 
Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Agreement on the Customs 
Code of the Customs Union dated November 27, 2009”.
On June 4, the Parliament of Belarus ratified a package of documents 
and agreements on issues of the Customs Union, including the principles of 
levying indirect taxes in the export/import of goods, regulating the relations 
of the three countries in the turnover of the products that are subject to 
compulsory conformity assessment, as well as the hygiene and veterinary 
control. 
On June 8, the Agreement on the Customs Code of the Customs Union was 
passed to the house of representatives of the National Assembly of Belarus 
for ratification.
On June 11, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko met with the 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to 
discuss the issues related to the establishment of the Customs Union and 
the Common Economic Space, as well as oil and gas deliveries.
On June 14, the Parliament of Belarus postponed ratification of the 
Customs Code. 
On June 25, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a law “On 
ratification of the Agreement on the Customs Code of the Customs Union”.
On July 6, the Customs Code of the Customs Union was put into force by all 
the three states – Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, with the corresponding 
declaration being signed during the EurAsEC summit in Astana.
RIA Novosti, RBK
Major changes introduced with enactment of Customs Code
July 12, 2010
The key novelty, introduced by the Customs Code of the Customs Union, is 
the cancellation of the customs borders between the three states. Customs 
control will be carried out on the external borders of the Customs Union 
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member states, and customs clearance procedures on Russian-Kazakh 
and Russian-Belarusian borders will be simplified. Customs terminals will be 
abolished by July 1, 2011.
The formation of the single customs territory will result in free movement 
of goods and labour force, liberalisation of mutual trade and abolishment of 
customs duties. It is expected that unified duties and quotas will be applied to 
goods from non-Union countries, and that mutual trade between the three 
states will be free from import duties, restrictions and exclusions, with zero 
VAT rate and excise taxes. 
The members of the Customs Union are only unifying customs legislation - 
civil, banking and tax legislation remains separate for each country.
With the introduction of the new Customs Code, the time permitted to pay 
customs duties and taxes has been increased from 15 days to 4 months. 
The time span for post-customs control was prolonged from one to three 
years. Customs declaration now has to be registered or denied registration 
within two hours from the moment of its submission. The new Code 
excludes verbal and implied avowal (crossing the border in the “green 
corridor”).
Ordinary travellers are also affected by the new Customs Code for it 
foresees the increase in duty free import rates from 35 to 50 kg, and 
lowers the total value of duty free goods from 65,000 roubles to around 
57,000 roubles (€1,500).
Vlast’ Magazine, Vedomosti
Customs Union to establish its own unified court
November 26, 2010
The Customs Union Commission suggests establishing a unified court of the 
Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
It is expected that the representatives of the Customs Union member states, 
working in the CIS Court and the EurAsEC Court, would make decisions 
within the framework of the Customs Union Court.
The EurAsEC Court operates within the framework of the CIS Court with the 
same judges making decisions for the five states. The Customs Union Court 
would be established within the EurAsEC Court, in order not to increase 
the number of judges. The heads of governments of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan supported the idea. 
A first experts’ council will also be established within the Customs Union 
Commission. It will be formed of five representatives from each of the 
three states, legal advisers on customs matters, international affairs and 
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trade. The experts’ council will also deal with complaints filed by business 
representatives against the Customs Union Commission’s decisions.
Kursiv
Sectoral Issues surrounding the Customs Union
Advantages of sector alliances within Customs Union
May 17, 2010
Agriculture Minister of Belarus, Semyon Shapiro, and the chairman of Russia’s 
National Union of Milk Producers Soyuzmoloko, Andrei Danilenko, agreed to 
establish a union of Russian and Belarusian manufacturers of dairy products. 
The association will pursue the interests of milk producers of the two countries, 
elaborate common approaches to pricing and the product quality control. In 
addition, it will be a good opportunity to join efforts against unfair competition 
and unauthorised supplies of goods. According to Danilenko, Soyuzmoloko 
is currently studying an opportunity of establishing a similar alliance of dairy 
products manufacturers with Kazakhstan.
Kommersant
Russia, Kazakhstan close first deal within the framework 
of Customs Union
July 1, 2010
According to Magnitogorsk customs office of Ural customs administration, 
the first customs-free shipment from Kazakhstan successfully crossed the 
Russian border on July 1. A rail shipment of 700 tons of Kazakhstan’s wheat 
was delivered to Makfa, a Russian manufacturing enterprise situated in 
Chelyabinsk.
Kazakhstan Today
Russia bans free movement of alcohol production within the 
Customs Union
August 25, 2010
Russian Federal Customs Service takes steps to prevent imports of alcohol 
production from the Customs Union member states. Last week, following 
the instructions of Rospotrebnadzor, the Federal Customs Service banned 
imports of Moldovan and Georgian wines and cognacs from the territories of 
Belarus and Kazakhstan.
According to the Federal Customs Service, the agreement on common 
customs borders for the Union does not alter the provisions of the federal 
law “On State Regulation of Production and Turnover of Alcohol”. It requires 
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clearance of alcohol when crossing Russia’s borders and prohibits selling 
alcohol in Russia without being labelled with Russian excise stamps.
Therefore, manufacturers and distributors of alcohol products from Belarus 
and Kazakhstan will not be able to make use of the Customs Union and 
are supposed to clear their goods on a par with importers from all other 
countries.
RBK Daily
Customs Union to receive its own system of unified technical 
regulations
September 30, 2010
The participants of the forum Customs Union 2010: First Results and 
Prospects were informed that the presidents of the Customs Union member 
states may sign an agreement on unified principles and rules for technical 
regulation in the nearest future. The document will foresee the establishment 
and use of unified technical requirements for the goods (production facilities, 
manufacturing process, storage, transportation, sales, utilisation, etc.) that 
are produced in Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. According to the draft 
agreement, the provisions of the unified technical regulations will have a 
direct effect in the three countries. As soon as unified technical regulations 
of the Customs Union come into force, the national requirements will become 
inoperative. A single information system will also be established within the 
framework of the Customs Union. It will provide consumers with the ability 
to check the compliance of the purchased goods with the technical 
regulations. The unified technical regulations will be based upon the CIS 
system of interstate standards (GOST). Introduction of unified standards will 
lower the likelihood of conflicts between the three states, and secure equal 
competition between the manufacturers on a single product market with 
regard to requirements for goods.
The unified technical regulations may be put into effect in 2012.
RBK Daily
Kazakhstan’s businesses report problems with access to Russian 
market due to the Customs Union
November 1, 2010
At a round-table discussion The Customs Union: from Theory to Practice 
held in Astana on November 1, 2010, Kazakh manufactures reported 
that in the 10 months of the Customs Union being in force Russian imports 
to Kazakhstan grew while entry barriers to the Russian market increased. 
They suggest that an introduction of a moratorium on sovereign law- 
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making in the field of technical regulations may help establish an equal 
partnership. 
According to the Tax Committee of Kazakhstan’s Finance Ministry, in the 
period from July 1 to October 20, 2010, the number of importers grew 
by 14% and amounted to 7,682 importers from Russia and 667 from 
Belarus. Meanwhile, local producers noted the emergence of more barriers 
to entering the Russian market. A unified certificate posed lots of questions. 
At present the Customs Union member states have a common list of 
205 types of products that are subject to obligatory certification. The 
rest of the products (2,500 in Russia, 1,500 in Belarus and 812 in 
Kazakhstan) are certified according to national regulations. A draft 
agreement on the introduction of unified principles and rules for technical 
regulations will address other issues within the framework of the Common 
Economic Space. 
The participants of the round-table touched upon the rise in railway tariff on 
the part of Russian Railways by adding VAT.
Defining the customs value of goods remains a serious problem. Several 
provisions of the agreement on defining the customs value within the 
Customs Union appeared to be in conflict with the Agreement on the Customs 
Value between WTO member states. Necessary adjustments will be made 
in the short term, during the meeting of heads of customs services of the 
Customs Union member states.
Kursiv
SCO
SCO gets ready for enlargement 
June 11, 2010
The 10th Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) took 
place in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, on June 10-11, 2010. The heads 
of the six SCO member states signed a package of documents, including 
the regulations on procedure for admitting new members to the SCO. 
Those countries applying for SCO membership (including Iran, Pakistan 
and India) have long awaited the approval of these documents. 
Common approaches of the SCO Member States to the situations in 
Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan were reflected in the Declaration of 
the 10th Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States 
of the SCO, signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan and China. The SCO member states confirmed their 
principle position on mutual support of the state sovereignty, the 
independence and territorial integrity of Kyrgyzstan, spoke against 
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interfering in the country’s internal affairs and expressed readiness to 
offer support and assistance.
The Regulations on Procedure for Admitting New Members to the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation play a strategic role. Given the organisation’s 
criteria, the most probable applicants for the SCO membership are India, 
Pakistan and Mongolia, which already have observer status. In order to boost 
their status in the organisation, all countries need to file a corresponding 
application, which would be studied by the six SCO member states. The 
final decision will be based on a consensus of opinions. If any one of the six 
countries speaks against admitting a new member, the candidate country 
would be refused membership in SCO.
www.sectsco.org
SCO to establish interaction framework in field of agriculture
October 26, 2010
Beijing hosted the first meeting of agriculture ministers of the six SCO 
member states. The heads of the agricultural ministries discussed the issues 
of establishing multilateral cooperation in the field of agriculture and its 
development prospects. The parties confirmed that at the current stage of 
developing agricultural cooperation in the SCO framework priority attention 
will be paid to implementation of joint projects in the areas outlined in the 
Agreement on Cooperation in Agriculture, facilitation of agricultural trade 
and investment. 
www.sectsco.org
Results of SCO summit in Dushanbe
November 25, 2010
Dushanbe hosted a regular Meeting of the Council of the Heads of 
Governments of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Member States. 
Delegations from the SCO member states exchanged opinions on the current 
political and economic situation, as well as issues of stability and security 
in the SCO region. The participants of the meeting also discussed state 
and prospects for developing trade and economic cooperation within the 
framework of the SCO. Kyrgyzstan expressed gratitude to the SCO member 
states for the humanitarian assistance.
The heads of governments expressed an intent to further strengthen 
cooperation in customs services, improve customs, administrative and 
transport procedures, as well as develop electronic commerce.
During the meeting, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister, Karim Masimov, suggested 
establishing a joint regional digital network that would aid SCO member 
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states in speeding up customs clearance of cargoes and developing of an 
SCO high-speed information highway.
The participants of the meeting voiced the need to facilitate the interaction 
with the SCO Observer States and Dialogue Partners in implementing joint 
projects in the areas of high technology, agriculture and transport, as well as 
developing investment cooperation to assist the needs of mutual development 
and prosperity in the region.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called for deepening financial and monetary 
cooperation among the SCO member states, noting that they should expand 
business financing channels, conduct research into the establishment of an 
SCO development bank, discuss new ways of joint financing and joint benefiting, 
and expand cooperation on local currency settlement to promote regional 
economic and trade exchanges.
www.sectsco.org, Kursiv
BILATERAL COOPERATION 
Russia-Georgia 
March 2, 2010 
In late 2009, under the Swiss mediation Georgia and Russia agreed to 
reopen their land border to traffic. The Upper Lars Checkpoint, a border 
crossing between Russia and Georgia that was closed in 2006, was reopened 
on time. However Russia refused to restore a visa-free regime. Therefore, the 
citizens of Russia and Georgia who intend to pass the Upper Lars-Kazbegi 
checkpoint should apply for a visa to Swiss Embassies in Tbilisi and Moscow, 
as Switzerland acts as mediator in the process. The citizens of other CIS 
countries still enjoy a visa-free border crossing. The Upper Lars Checkpoint 
will reach its full daily capacity of 7,000 people, 50 buses and 900 motor 
vehicles by summer 2010.
Kommersant
Georgian airline gets permit to fly 
to Russia
May 18, 2010
Russia’s Transport Ministry has allowed a 
private Georgian company, Airzena Georgian 
Airways, to fly direct charter flights between 
Tbilisi and Moscow from May 24 till June 9, 
2010.
RIA Novosti
2010: Data and Events
Note: Russia cut regular direct flights with  
Georgia in October 2006, following the 
deterioration in relations between the two 
countries. The flights were restored in late 
March, 2008, but were again suspended after 
the August war. Russia’s Transport Ministry 
allowed Georgian Airways to run nine charter 
flights between the two capitals in early January 
and April this year during the New Year and 
Easter holidays.
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Russia-Kazakhstan
Baikonur lease extended to 2050
March 4, 2010 
Majilis, the lower house of Kazakhstan’s parliament, ratified an agreement 
extending Russia’s lease of the Baikonur spaceport until 2050. Among 
other things, the document envisages the development and construction 
of a promising environmentally friendly space missile complex Baiterek at 
Baikonur, based on Russia’s Angara complex.
On March 11, the Roskosmos head, Anatoly 
Perminov, expressed his discontent with the 
provisions of the agreement, which, in his opinion, 
limit Russia’s role and participation in international 
space cooperation.
Russia is developing a separate Vostochny 
spaceport in the Amur region set to open in 2015. 
The new facility aims to rival Kazakhstan’s Baikonur launch site and may 
lead to early lease termination. However, Russia cannot abandon Baikonur 
at present due to existing international obligations to implement various 
space programmes. Additionally, missions to the ISS are launched exclusively 
from Baikonur due to advantages of its geographic location.
Kursiv
Russia-Ukraine 
New scheme for Russian-Ukrainian relations
March 25, 2010  
A meeting of the prime ministers of Russia and Ukraine, Vladimir Putin and 
Nikolay Azarov, was held in Moscow. The Ukrainian delegation offered a 
packet agreement on the establishment of a gas transportation consortium 
of companies from Russia, Ukraine and the EU for managing the Ukrainian 
Gas Transport System in exchange for a substantial discount in price for 
Russian gas.
However, Moscow is neither willing to lower gas prices nor is it ready to regard 
the participation in gas transportation consortium as a reason for gas price-
cutting.
The premiers touched upon other issues as well. Russia wants the Ukrainian 
government to guarantee the protection of Russian business interests in 
Ukraine, and intends to initiate a review of a repartition of property, which took 
place in Ukraine after the “orange revolution”.
Note: The governments of Russia and 
Kazakhstan signed the Agreement on 
the lease of the Baikonur spaceport on 
December 10, 1994 in Moscow. Russia 
pays a total of $115 million a year.
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Russia is also interested in the project to construct a nuclear fuel production 
facility. Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich instructed the government to 
study this issue and discuss the possibility of Russia’s participation in building 
three power units at a nuclear power station.
Moreover, the countries are studying the possible amalgamation of Russian 
and Ukrainian aircraft industries.
Kommersant
Russian president pays first official visit to Ukraine
May 17, 2010
The President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, paid an official visit to Ukraine. 
Earlier in the course of Medvedev’s visit to Kharkov a set of so called “Fleet-
for-Gas” agreements was signed between Ukraine and Russia.
On May 17, the respective ministries of Russia and Ukraine signed 
agreements on border demarcation, use of GLONASS satellites system, as 
well as cooperation in science and education.
The presidents signed three joined statements on issues of European security, 
the Transdniestria conflict settlement and the Black Sea region’s security 
issues.
Economic projects discussed in Kyiv may lead to large-scale agreements. 
However, the merger of Gazprom and Naftogaz could become the most 
important project. On May 17, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine touched 
upon this issue for the first time.
Ъ-Online, RBK Daily
Presidents of Russia and Ukraine fail to settle 
gas and borders issues
November 26, 2010
A meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian 
Presidents, Dmitry Medvedev and Viktor 
Yanukovich, was held at the Gorki residence. The 
heads of states signed seven documents, including 
an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation 
in the field of transporting oil to Ukrainian refineries 
and transiting it via the Ukrainian territory that 
will increase Russia’s oil transit to 18.5 million 
tons. However the presidents didn’t manage to 
reach agreements on such important issues as 
a possible discount in gas price for Ukraine, plans 
Note: The border between the two 
states in the Kerch strait linking the 
Sea of Azov to the Black Sea has been 
a bone of contention between the two 
countries since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Ukraine unilaterally established a  
maritime border with Russia in the 1990s, 
saying it was based on the Soviet-era 
administrative border between the two 
republics. Russia has repeatedly denied  
the existence of Soviet administrative 
borders and called for shared use of the 
Kerch Strait. Russia suggests dividing 
the seabed of the Azov Sea, while the two 
countries should jointly use the water area, 
however, Ukraine opposes the idea.
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for establishing a joint venture between 
Russian Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogaz, 
as well as settlement of disputes 
concerning the delimitation of the Azov-
Kerch Strait.
Kommersant
Russia-Tajikistan
Problematic issues in Russian-Tajik 
relations
August 19, 2010
The presidents of Russia, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and Tajikistan took part in a 
four-party summit in Sochi. The summit 
focused on the situation in Afghanistan, 
as well as drug trafficking and a terrorist 
threat coming from this country.
Within the framework of the summit, 
Dmitry Medvedev met with Emomali 
Rakhmon to discuss several issues. 
In particular, Tajikistan is willing to 
cooperate with Russia’s Inter RAO UES 
in the construction of several hydropower 
plants. Furthermore, Tajikistan asks 
Russia to lower tariffs on its deliveries of 
oil products. Russia is ready to discuss 
the proposals but only on condition of 
Tajikistan’s fulfilling its old obligations, 
including the repayment of an energy debt 
of $20 million to the Russian companies 
in Sangtuda-1 HPP holding. The long 
standing issue in Russian-Tajik relations 
is the problem of deploying Russian air 
force at Gissar air facility near Dushanbe. 
According to an agreement dated 2004, 
Russian pilots and aviation equipment 
were to be transferred to Gissar from 
Dushanbe civilian airport. However, 
Tajikistan violated its obligations and five 
Su-25 battle planes were relocated to the 
Kant base in Kyrgyzstan.
Note: several more claims took place in the history of 
Russian-Tajik relations:
• September 2007 – Tajik authorities denounced 
an agreement with Russia’s UC RUSAL on the 
completion of the construction of Rogun HPP. The 
company was accused of upholding Uzbekistan’s 
interests after it refused to construct a 325 m 
high dam, which would have allowed the region’s 
water resources to be controlled.
• March 2009 – Tajikistan stopped the  
broadcasting of RTR-Planeta TV-channel on 
its territory, referring to an unpaid debt of All- 
Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting 
Company VGTRK for 2008 at an amount of  
$7 million. The debt was repaid but broadcasting 
didn’t resume as Tajikistan raised retranslation 
tariffs 50%.
• July 2009 – Tajik authorities demand that  
Russia pays $307 million per year for leased  
facilities (201 military bases, real estate and land). 
Meanwhile, according to a bilateral agreement, 
rent for military basis is not provided for until  
2014. Tajikistan renounces its claims only in 
October 2009, prior to Emomali Rakhmon’s visit 
to Russia.
• Summer 2009 – Tajikistan refuses to sign 
acceptance certificate for the Sangtuda-1 HPP, 
constructed by Russian companies. Without a 
certificate, Russia is unable to raise HPP tariffs to 
the market rate and demand that Tajikistan pays 
its share in the project. The Tajik party signed  
the document on July 31. However, Barki Tochik 
state company was soon unable to pay for energy, 
which led to a debt of $30 million.
• October 20, 2009 – During the meeting with 
Russian Energy Minister Sergey Shmatko, Tajik 
President Emomali Rakhmon criticised Gazprom 
activities in the country. According to the Tajik 
President’s press office, discontent was caused 
by the fact that “Gazprom was developing only  
one out of the four gas deposits transferred to  
the company”.
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Moscow is also ready to make concessions to Tajikistan and reduce tariffs 
on those oil products that are supplied for Tajikistan’s domestic use. Taking 
into account Tajikistan’s practicing a scheme of reselling oil products, 
similar to the Belarus, Russia asked for documents verifying the supply and 
consumption balance.
Kommersant
Problematic issues in Russian-Tajik relations settled
November 26, 2010
Dushanbe hosted the meeting of heads of governments of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation. In parallel to the summit the Prime Minister of 
Russia Vladimir Putin and the President of Tajikistan Emomali Rakhmon 
held bilateral talks that resulted in settling problematic issues between 
the two states, from repayment of energy debts to the deployment of 
Russian servicemen. The broadcasting of RTR-Planeta TV-channel 
was resumed. On September 7, the countries signed an agreement on 
settling the debt for Sangtuda-1 HPP energy. Tajikistan acknowledged the 
$20 million debt and started the repayment. Inter RAO UES also benefited 
from this agreement as it paved the way for the construction of new 
hydropower plants. The sides made significant progress in settling the issue of 
redeploying Russian pilots to Gissar air facility.
The final decision may be taken in 2011, together with the resolution on the 
status of Russian border guards.
In addition to this, Putin conducted negotiations with Kyrgyz President Rosa 
Otunbayeva to discuss economic assistance to the country (in particular, the 
abolition of duties on oil products starting January 2011).
Ъ-Online
Russia-Belarus
Belarus raises transit tariffs for oil products
January 1, 2010
According to the Economy Ministry of Belarus, from January 1, 2010 
the specific tariff for transiting oil products through the territory of 
Belarus will be increased by 4.4% to $1.42 per ton per 100 km. A 
corresponding resolution was adopted in line with the Belarusian-Russian 
intergovernmental agreement on cooperating in the operation of main oil 
product pipelines located in Belarus, dated June 8, 2004.
On January 1, 2009, transit tariffs for oil products were increased by 
52.8% to total $1.36 per ton per 100 km. The transportation of Russian 
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oil products through Belarus’ territory is carried out by Zapad-
Transnefteproduct (a subsidiary of Russian Transnefteproduct).
RIA Novosti
Dispute over oil supplies and transit continues
January 4, 2010
Russia and Belarus, having entered the year 2010 without a new contract 
on oil supplies and transit, continue talks. Oil transits to Europe and oil 
supplies to Belarusian refineries continue as well.
According to a Belarusian state group of companies, Belenergo, an 
interruption of Russian electric power to Kaliningrad region is possible due 
to unconcerted transit conditions. However, the Belarusian side have noted 
that this issue is not interrelated with negotiations on oil supplies and 
transit.
RIA Novosti
Russia and Belarus agree on oil supplies
January 27, 2010 
Russia and Belarus have signed an array of agreements on crude oil 
deliveries. According to a joint statement by the Russian deputy prime 
minister Igor Sechin and Belarusian first deputy premier Vladimir Semashko, 
the parties also signed a statement pledging uninterrupted oil transits to 
Europe.
Previous agreement on oil supplies to Belarus expired in late 2009. Oil 
duties became a bone of contention between the two countries. Oil deliveries 
from Russia to Belarusian refineries were cut by 40% to 19,000 tons a day 
because Belarus made a prepayment based on a 2009 preferential duty, 
which constitutes only 35.6% of the standard oil duty (around $380 per 
ton). However, Russia demands the full oil export tariff be taken into 
account, which would lead to a price increase to $570 per ton. A decree 
of Russian Federal Customs Service on adding a standard oil export duty 
to the price for Russian oil and oil products, supplied to Belarus, came into 
force starting January 2. Russia earlier offered to supply Belarus with some 
6.3 million tons of oil for domestic consumption duty-free and demanded 
Minsk pay full import duties on crude it refines and transits to Europe, 
dropping considerable subsidies. Belarus refused and made a proposition 
that Russian companies supply oil to Belarus duty-free in January-February 
and jointly work out a mechanism of intergovernmental distribution of 
duties within the framework of the Customs Union by early March.
Ъ-Online
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Belarus offers assets in exchange 
for gas
February 10, 2010 
Belarus offered Gazprom a share in the project on the construction of 
a combined cycle gas turbine power unit at Berezovskaya GRES with 
capacity of 400-500 mW at a total cost of $490 million, as well as the 
construction of a new chemical plant on the basis of the Grodno Azot 
company. In exchange, Belarus asks for a decrease in gas price for 2010 
to the level of 2009, i.e. $150 per 1,000 m3. Currently, Belarus 
purchases gas for $168.8 per 1,000 m3.
If Gazprom agrees to the proposal, the company may lose 
$394–414 million in revenues from the delivery of 21-22 billion m3 
of gas to Belarus in 2010. Starting from 2008, the gas price for Belarus 
is being calculated every three months at a formula that is tied to the oil 
price.
The Belarusian proposal is basically of interest to Gazprom. For instance, 
the Grodno Azot project foresees the construction of a new “three-in-one” 
chemical plant for production of ammonia, methanol and carbamide. The 
plant will make it possible to process up to 600 million m3 of natural gas a 
year. However, the project demands investment of $1.5 billion in the 
next six years. Gazprom has repeatedly tried to acquire Grodno Azot in 
exchange for Belarusian gas debts; however the president of Belarus, 
Alexander Lukashenko, has been cancelling negotiations on the grounds of 
unfavourable conditions for the asset sale.
Expert Online
Protocol on oil supplies ratified, Belarus unhappy 
with the introduction of export duty 
on Russian oil
February 12, 2010 
The President of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, signed a decree to approve 
a protocol on amendments to the Belarusian-Russian intergovernmental 
agreement on measures for regulating trade and economic cooperation in the 
export of oil and oil products dated January 12, 2007.
In line with the document, Belarus can import zero-duty Russian oil in an 
amount sufficient for domestic consumption. The amount has been set at 
6.3 million tons for 2010. The duty for any amounts of oil above of the 
agreed figure will be set in accordance with the Russian law. The Russian 
State Duma ratified the protocol on oil supplies to Belarus a little earlier 
on February 12.
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February 16, 2010
Soon after the ratification of the agreement on Russia’s oil supplies to Belarus, 
Minsk accused Russia of breaking its obligations on establishing the Customs 
Union by introducing oil export duties starting January 1, 2010. Minsk 
advocates the mechanism of a duty-free trade within the Customs Union with 
a following intergovernmental distribution of duties, applied on the external 
border of the Customs Union.
Ъ-Online
Positions of parties in Russian-Belarusian talks have 
not changed
March 16, 2010
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin held talks with his Belarusian 
counterpart Sergei Sidorsky to discuss bilateral relations and integration 
initiatives. The premiers exchanged opinions on the current economic 
problems, including the balance of fuel and energy resources for 
2010. Vladimir Putin reaffirmed Russia’s position to lift duties with the 
establishment of a single economic space on January 1, 2012.
Russian Prime Minister advocates Russia’s and Belarus’ transit to a single 
currency. According to Putin, a single currency could give an impetus to the 
market participants, simplify mutual settlements and minimise expenditures 
of the economic agents.
RBK Daily, Finam.ru
Russian power transit via Belarusian UES again 
under threat
March 23, 2010
Transit of Russian electric power via the Belarusian Unified Energy System 
to the Baltic States and Russian enclave of Kaliningrad is again under threat, 
this time for technological reasons.
The Belarusian State Energy Company Belenergo dragged out repairs of 
the 750 kW trunk transmission line, which is used for transiting Russian 
electric power to the Kaliningrad region. Currently, the energy is being 
supplied via 330 kW power lines that have an adverse effect on the amounts 
of electric power transited to Kaliningrad and the operational reliability 
of the south part of Russia’s “Centre” integrated power system, as well as 
the scheme of power distribution of Smolensk nuclear power plant (NPP). 
The 750 kW trunk transmission line interconnects the Smolensk NPP with 
the 750 kW Belorusskaya power substation and plays an important role 
in securing a sustainable parallel operation of power grids of Belarus, 
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Russia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuatnia (BRELL), 
which are parties to an agreement on parallel 
operation.
Expert Online 
Belarus, Russia given time for out of court 
settlement of oil dispute 
September 7, 2010
The CIS Economic Court has suggested that 
Belarus and Russia should try to find an out of court 
settlement of their dispute regarding the legality 
of Russia’s collection of customs duties for the oil 
products Belarus buys.
The next session of the CIS Economic Court will take 
place on October 7, 2010. By that time the court 
expects Belarus and Russia to reach an out of court 
settlement of their dispute.
Ъ-Online
Russia, Belarus agree on transport control in 
Union State
October 5, 2010
The Transport Ministers of Russia and Belarus, 
Ivan Shcherbo and Igor Levitin, signed an 
agreement in Minsk, which cancels the control of 
the road transport on the common Belarusian and 
Russian border and moves it to the outside borders 
of the Union State of Belarus and Russia. The 
countries plan to establish a unified technological 
base for road transport monitoring and invite 
Kazakhstan to join, which would allow the control of 
transport flows from China to Europe.
The document will give a new impetus to the 
development of transport systems. According to the 
statistics, 400,000 cars that cross the Belarus-
Poland border are transit to Russia.
Russia and Belarus also developed a project for uniting transport 
infrastructures in 2011-2012.
Ъ-Online
Note: Russia and Belarus have been 
discussing the amount of oil to be 
supplied to Belarus duty-free starting 
early 2010. On March 17, the Prime 
Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin  
agreed that with the introduction of 
a single customs territory all duties  
should be abolished. However, Putin 
reminded that the single customs 
territory would not be put into force 
until 2012. Until then, Russia is ready 
to supply Belarus with 6.3 million  
tons of duty-free oil for domestic 
consumption. However on March 25, 
Belarus announced that they have  
filed a suit against Russia in the 
CIS Economic Court, requesting an 
assessment of the legality of the 
customs duties on oil products and 
crude oil that Russia supplies to  
Belarus. On June 24, the court  
dismissed a request from Belarus 
that Russia be prohibited from levying  
export duties on oil products until the  
end of the dispute.
Note: The agreement was signed in  
the context of a continuing deterioration 
of Belarusian-Russian relations. Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev noted 
that the head of Belarus Alexander  
Lukashenko attempts to make an enemy 
out of Russia in response to Lukashenko’s 
statements at his meeting with Russian 
journalists, when he criticised Russia’s 
leadership and accused Moscow of  
trying to oust him from the presidency.
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TRADE AND INVESTMENTS 
Importers of alcohol request to postpone Customs Union regulations
January 13, 2010
The establishment of the Customs Union posed serious problems to the 
Russian alcohol market. The agreements of the Customs Union member 
states on the common rules of licensing in the sphere of foreign trade and 
the list of goods that are subject to obligatory licensing came into effect 
starting January 1, 2010. According to the agreements, imports and 
exports of strong drinks and wine are subject to licensing. Customs 
clearance of wine was fully stopped on January 11, because the importers 
didn’t have the required licenses. Local branches of Industry and Trade 
Ministry were responsible for issuing licenses starting January 1; however, 
they began to accept applications later and the process of receiving 
licenses still needs to be adjusted. In its official statement the Industry and 
Trade Ministry noted that the process of issuing a license takes up to two 
weeks.
The Customs Union member states agreed upon a common list of 
products that are subject to restrictions when being imported from non- 
Union countries and require obligatory licensing starting January 1, 2010. 
Ethyl alcohol and alcoholic beverages - excluding vodka, tequila and some 
other strong drinks – were previously exempted from licensing and then 
included in the common list of goods, which led to a halt in customs 
clearance of alcohol starting January 11. 
January 18, 2010
The eleven largest importers of alcoholic beverages filed an appeal to Russian 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the head of the Federal Customs Service 
Andrei Belyaninov to postpone the commencement of the Customs Union 
regulations, which limit wine imports, for six months. According to experts, 
the current situation is damaging not only to importers, but also to the local 
producers of wine, because 70% of wine materials for still wines and 100% of 
materials for champagne are imported from abroad. According to estimates, 
the participants in the alcohol market will lose $300 million in revenue.
January 19, 2010
The Federal Customs Service has informed of “conditional clearance” of 
alcoholic beverages to the territory of Russia “to reduce the time of customs 
clearance” in case the importers provide a document certifying the appeal 
for a license is filed with the Ministry of Industry and Trade. However, 
“conditionally cleared” goods could not be sold until the completion of customs 
clearance procedure, i.e., license acquisition. Overall, the market is in need of 
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tens of thousands of licenses. A temporary import permit allows importers 
to transport goods to their warehouses and cut expenses for customs 
temporary storage warehouses. However, according to the market 
participants, these expenditures are insignificant, compared to overall 
losses due to the import suspension.
RBK Daily, Vedomosti
Protocol on establishing Eurasian Stock Union signed
February 18, 2010 
The Customs Union member states would have another common territory. 
The heads of commodity exchanges of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan 
signed a protocol of intent to establish the Eurasian Exchange Union, a 
new common trading floor for trading in agricultural production and raw 
materials from the member states.
The Belarus Universal Commodity Exchange, Moscow stock exchange and 
International commodity exchange of Kazakhstan will act as shareholders of 
the new Eurasian Exchange Union. The chairman of the board of the Belarus 
Universal Commodity Exchange, Arcady Salikov, will represent the interests 
of commodity exchanges in the EurAsEC bodies.
Mirtv.ru
Trade protection brings billions in losses 
to Russian exporters
March 1, 2010 
Russian exporters lost around $2.04 billion last year due to measures 
restricting supplies of their products to external markets. According to 
the Trade Negotiations Department of Russia’s Economic Development 
Ministry, 23 countries, from Australia to Uzbekistan, apply a total of 
98 restriction measures to Russian goods. As of early February 2010, 
Russian goods faced 40 antidumping measures, 11 special safeguards 
and 47 measures for nontariff trade regulation, including administrative 
control measures. Moreover, four antidumping and four special safeguards 
investigations are being carried out, as well as five re-examinations of earlier 
antidumping measures. The bulk of restriction measures applied to Russian 
goods are registered in Belarus (23), the EU (17), Ukraine (10) and the 
USA (9). The main trouble spots for Russian exports are the markets of the 
EU, Mexico, Australia, the USA, India, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belarus and 
Ukraine. 
More than half of antidumping measures apply to Russian ferrous metals. 
The second place goes to mineral fertilisers and chemicals.
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The actions of Russian Economic Development Ministry resulted in abolition 
of 26 restriction measures that impeded access of Russian goods to 
external markets in 2009.
RBK Daily
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan compete for trade flows
March 24, 2010
Competition between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus for future trade 
flows in the single economic space within the framework of the Customs 
Union topped the agenda of a meeting of Russian government’s presidium.
The Russian government raised concerns that European companies will 
use Belarus as a springboard to the 180 million market of the Customs 
Union. First of all, customs regulations in Belarus are much simpler. 
Secondly, Belarus developed processing industry as early as in Soviet times 
and served an outpost for promoting soviet goods to Europe. If Belarus 
institutes a more simple and transparent conditions on the external 
boundary, this could have a serious influence on the overall trade flow. The 
preferable customs conditions of Kazakhstan and Belarus may attract 
businessmen who would transfer the supply chains to areas with more 
transparent and easy-to-understand customs procedures.
Russia intends to compete for transit. According to the Economic 
Development Ministry, the customs control procedure in Russia often 
becomes a reason for large-scale expenditure by foreign partners, has 
a negative influence on the country’s investment image and needs to be 
simplified.
RBK Daily
ECONOMIC SECTORS 
Oil and Gas
Gazprom to buy gas from Azerbaijan in 2010
January 11, 2010 
Gazprom chairman Alexei Miller held a meeting to discuss main 
performance indicators for the first ten-day period of January. According 
to the company’s leadership, the beginning of 2010 was marked by an 
important event – for the first time ever, Gazprom bought gas from 
Azerbaijan. In 2009, the company held a series of constructive talks with 
the Azeri colleagues and within several months after signing an agreement 
Gazprom began pumping Azeri gas. Common boundary and operational 
gas transportation infrastructure create conditions for mutually beneficial 
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cooperation in the sphere. The parties didn’t 
specify a ceiling value for gas purchases. 
Gasprom will buy as much gas as Azerbaijan 
can supply.
March 9, 2010
Azerbaijan doubled daily supplies of gas to 
Russia. According to Gazprom’s head, Alexei 
Miller, starting March 5, 2010 the amount 
of gas supplies from Azerbaijan increased 
twofold to 3 million m3 per day.
Kommersant, RBK Daily, Finam.ru
Oil transit via southern branch of Druzhba pipeline halted
February 9, 2010
Kazakhstan has halted Urals crude oil supplies to Slovakia and Hungary via 
the Druzhba pipeline amid a trade dispute with Ukraine, prompting Russian 
oil company LUKoil to intervene to compensate for the loss.
In January-March 2010 Kazakhstan was to transit 1.356 million tons of oil 
via the southern branch of Druzhba pipeline, including 756,000 tons to 
Slovakia and 600,000 tons to Hungary. In January, Kazakhstan supplied 
around 340,000 tons of oil to Slovakia, while no deliveries were made to 
Hungary and Poland. As of February 8, Kazakhstan halted oil transit to these 
countries. On this account LUKoil rerouted some 300,000 tons of Russian 
export blend Urals scheduled for loading from the Polish port of Gdansk in 
February to Slovakia and Hungary. In turn, Kazakh oil will be transported via 
the northern branch of the Druzhba pipeline to the port in Gdansk.
Traders said the development followed a move by Ukraine to scrap a 
crude transit deal with Kazakhstan for 2010 in retaliation for Kazakhstan 
suspending crude deliveries via Ukraine’s Odessa Black Sea port last year.
Urals crude transit via Odessa stopped in late 2009 after Ukrtransnafta 
reversed the branch of Kremenchug-Odessa pipeline to supply the 
Kremenchug Refinery. Ukrtransnafta suggested Kazakhstan a longer 
transit route that led to increase in transit fees.
Reuters
Ukraine and Kazakhstan agree to resume oil transit via Druzhba pipeline
September 16, 2010
The presidents of Ukraine and Kazakhstan met in Kyiv on September 14, 
2010 and agreed upon the resumption of oil transit via Druzhba pipeline at an 
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Note: On October 14, 2010 Gazprom and  
the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) 
signed a sale-and-purchase contract for 
Azerbaijan’s gas for 2010-2015 with the  
option to prolong the agreement. In January 
Gazprom and SOCAR agreed to increase 
purchases of Azeri gas to 1 billion m3 in 2010  
and up to 2 billion m3 in 2011. Azerbaijan’s  
proven reserves of natural gas amount to around 
1.5 trillion m3, while the country’s consumption 
makes up 12-14 billion m3 a year.
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amount of 6 million tons and a further 2 million tons for Ukrainian refineries 
a year.
Kazakhstan suspended oil transit to Europe via Ukraine in February 2010 
after Kyiv changed the currency it charged for transit tariffs from U.S. dollars 
to euros, which has resulted in a 20-25% increase in charges. In light of this, 
Kazakhstan switched its oil transit to a more economically beneficial route 
through Poland. As a result, oil transit through Ukraine decreased by 23.9% 
to 17.2 million tons.
Ukraine wishes to begin talks with the Russian Energy Ministry on transiting 
Kazakhstan’s oil through its territory to Ukraine in the near future. 
On September 17, 2010, the managing director of Kazakhstan’s 
KazMunayGas, Nurtas Shmanov, announced that Ukraine’s transit fees 
remain unfavourable to Kazakh companies and at present there are no oil 
deliveries through Ukrainian territory. The difference in transit fees from 
Kazakhstan through Belarus to Poland (to Adamova Zastava) and through 
Ukraine to Slovakia (to Budkovce) amounts to $5.2 per ton or $13.6 million a 
year in additional expenses to Kazakh companies. 
KazMunayGas’ managing director mentioned that he is not familiar with the 
details of agreements reached by the presidents of the two countries, Viktor 
Yanukovich and Nursultan Nazarbayev, during their meeting in Kyiv.
Kursiv
New routes for transportation of Kazakhstan’s oil
March 3, 2010
Kazakhstan is interested in the construction of a new oil pipeline to Europe, 
which will go through the territory of Caucasus and link to Constanta-Trieste 
Romanian pipeline, Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev said after the 
meeting with his Romanian counterpart Traian Basescu.
The presidents of both countries gave instructions to the relevant oil 
companies to study the issue.
In this case, Romania plays the role of Kazakhstan’s take-off area for 
Europe. Kazakhstan supplies Europe with 4 million tons of oil a year, which 
is one third of Romania’s total exports. Moreover, Kazakhstan’s 
KazMunayGas is the 100% owner of Romanian Rompetrol, which has its 
own refinery and a sales network of 900 gas stations in six European 
countries. Romania is currently in talks with Italy on the project for 
construction of Constanta-Trieste oil pipeline, which would be used to transit 
Kazakh oil if the construction project is approved. At present Kazakhstan 
produces 70-80 million tons of oil per year, the bulk of which is being 
transported to Russia. Around 10 million tons go to China and 10 more 
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million tons are transported to Baku via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. In 
2013, Kazakhstan intends to commence a large-scale oil production on one 
of the world’s largest oil fields, Kashagan. This would give Kazakhstan an 
annual “export supplement” of 50 million tons. Kazakhstan believes that 
Kashagan’s reserves exceed the capacities of Russian Transneft, Russian-
Kazakh CPC, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and a pipeline to China. As soon as Kashagan 
reaches its project capacity, Kazakhstan would be able to export 25-30 million 
tons of oil a year via the new trans-Caucasian pipeline to Romania. 
Expert Online
Russia-Ukraine
Ukraine may lease its gas transportation system
March 19, 2010
According to the first Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine, Andrei Klyuev, 
Ukrainian government intends to grant its gas transportation system in 
concession. Gas transportation consortium should unite Russia with its gas 
reserves, Ukraine as a transit state and the European Union as a consumer of 
gas. According to Klyuev, a law on granting the country’s gas transportation 
system in concession is almost ready.
Finam.ru
Russia, Ukraine “reload” gas relations
April 21, 2010
During the working visit of Russia’s President, Dmitry Medvedev, to Kharkov, 
Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftogaz signed addenda to the natural gas supply 
contract dated January 19, 2009. The annual contract volume of gas for 
Ukraine was increased to 36.5 billion m3 in 2010. Naftogaz will pay for gas 
with a discount equal to a reduction of the export duty on gas deliveries to 
Ukraine, which is set by the Russian Government. The discount is expected to 
make up 30% of the total gas price, but no more than $100 per 1,000 m3, 
and will apply to 30 billion m3 in 2010 and 40 billion m3 in subsequent years. 
Moreover, the sides discussed measures for securing sustainability of gas 
deliveries from Russia to Ukraine and Europe.
The price formula, as well as take-or-pay conditions, remain unchanged. The 
addenda also cancelled the contract provisions covering the mutual penalty 
sanctions, which in practice haven’t been applied.
The accord was also reached that 80% of the gas transit cost would be paid 
by Gazprom before the 6th day of the following month and 20% – as per the 
existing gas transit contract – before the 20th day of the following month.
RBK Daily, Ъ-Online
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Zero-duty applied to gas deliveries to Ukraine
May 6, 2010
On April 21 Gazprom and Naftogaz inked additions to a gas-supply contract 
stipulating that Ukraine would get a discount price on gas equal to the size 
of the reduction of the export duty on gas supplies to Ukraine.
A Russian government resolution on export duty rates for gas deliveries 
to Ukraine, ratified by parliaments of both countries on April 27, put a zero 
export duty on Russian gas deliveries to its neighbour until 2019.
With a contract gas price of less than $333.33 per 1,000 m3, the duty 
will be zero. If the price is equal to or greater than $333.33, the duty will be 
the difference between 30% of contract price and $100.
A special customs duty is in effect for 30 billion m3 of gas sent to Ukraine this 
year and 40 billion m3 that should be going to the country in 2011-2019. The 
volume of gas exceeding that amount will be subject to a general 30% duty on 
Russian gas exports. As a result, the Russian government will receive less tax 
– about $3 billion less in 2010 and around $4 billion in 2011.
The duty has been applicable since April 1, 2010. On May 5, Ukraine reported 
on fulfilling the gas payment of $419 million inclusive of the discount. According 
to the Ukrainian Prime Minister, zero duties saved Ukraine around $250 
million. However, Kyiv still insists on changing the price formula stipulated by 
the gas contract of Russia and Ukraine.
Kommersant
Prospects for Gazprom and Naftogaz merger
May 14, 2010
The day before the visit of Russian President to Kyiv, Fuel and Energy Minister 
of Ukraine Yuri Boiko held first negotiations in Moscow on the merger of 
Gazprom and Naftogaz. The results of the talks are still uncertain, though 
Ukrainian authorities emphasise they would not agree to Naftogaz’ take-over 
by Gazprom. Ukraine would like to preserve control over a new company, 
bringing in Ukrainian transportation system with Russia contributing part of 
its gas fields.
The idea of a Gazprom and Naftogaz merger was first made public by 
the Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin on April 30, 2010. However, 
Naftogaz assets equate to approximately 8-10% of Gazprom’s shares. From 
the very beginning, Ukraine demonstrated a restrained reaction to Russia’s 
proposal, pointing out that the deal should be an equal merger. The take-over 
of Naftogaz by Gazprom is uneconomic to Ukrainian authorities. Kyiv would 
prefer Gazprom to buy a share in Naftogaz, which would allow Ukraine to keep 
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control over the asset and rely on investment 
from Russia. Alternatively, Ukraine proposes 
to get back to the issue of rehabilitating its 
gas transportation system (GTS). The country 
suggests three variants of investments in the 
project: loans from Russian and western banks 
with long-term maturity and a reasonable 
interest rate, loans from Gazprom and western 
energy companies on the same conditions, and 
establishment of a consortium for managing 
the GTS with investments from the consortium 
participants in the company’s authorised capital. 
According to Viktor Yanukovich, the overall cost 
of GTS modernisation may amount to $600- 
700 million. He noted that Ukraine is willing to 
invite either Russia or the EU member states to 
take part in the project.
However, Gazprom’s head Alexei Miller put 
forward Russia’s key argument in the talks with 
Ukraine, that the Ukrainian GTS was constructed 
specially for transporting Russian gas to Europe 
and Russia can do without the GTS immediately 
after the construction of the South Stream gas 
pipeline to Europe, which is due to be completed 
in 2015.
Kommersant, Ъ-Online, RBK Daily
Russia-Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan awaits Russian oil 
February 5, 2010 
Kazakhstan is relying on the resumption of oil deliveries from Russia, halted 
due to unsolved issues on defining export duties after the two states 
introduced a single customs tariff.
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan formed the Customs Union and starting 
January 1, 2010 introduced a single customs tariff. However, the 
disagreements on export duties for Russian oil have already become an 
occasion for dispute between Moscow and Minsk, settled in late January.
On February 4, the majority of Russian oil companies suspended oil deliveries 
to Kazakhstan’s refineries due to the possible introduction of export duties. 
According to Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister, the disruption in oil supplies 
occurred due to different interpretation of the normative documents. He 
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Note: Gazprom OJSC is the largest  
Russia’s oil and gas company, which  
accounts for around 18% of worldwide 
gas production (around 461.4 billion m3 in  
2009). The state holds 50.002% of the 
company’s shares. Gazprom’s revenues in 
2009 amounted to $102 billion with the  
profit of $27 billion. Gazprom holds 
a monopoly right for gas exports and  
manages a unified gas transmission system 
with 156,900 km of gas pipelines, 268 
booster stations and 24 underground 
storages.
National Joint Stock Company Naftogaz 
of Ukraine is engaged in production, 
transportation and sales of energy  
resources. The company is wholly owned 
by the state. Naftogaz revenues in 2009 
amounted to $10.95 billion with net profit 
of $290 million. The company operates 
Ukraine’s gas transportation system with  
the overall length of 39,800 km. Naftogaz 
owns 233 oil and gas fields, 74 booster 
stations and 13 underground storage 
locations.
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expressed hope that Russian customs services 
will clarify all points at issue and zero duty oil 
deliveries will be resumed. 
In 2009, Russia delivered 5.7 million tons of oil 
to Kazakhstan for refining. The official amount of 
Russian oil re-exported from Kazakhstan to China 
amounted to around 1.5 million tons. 
Reuters
Russia, Kazakhstan agree to develop 
Imashevskoye field
September 7, 2010
Russia and Kazakhstan have signed agreements 
on joint geological exploration of the Imashevskoye 
gas condensate deposit and joint use of trans- 
border water area. The documents were signed 
within the framework of the seventh Kazakh- 
Russian forum for interregional cooperation.
The agreement on joint geological exploration of 
the Imashevskoye gas condensate deposit allows for 
the identification of the field’s reserves and getting 
it ready for development. Given the high sulfur 
content (15%-17%), the field’s development 
demands implementation of innovative technologies to raise the level of 
environmental safety during exploration, production, preparation and 
transportation of outputs.
The agreement on the joint use and protection of trans-border water 
area promotes the strengthening of regulatory and legal frameworks of 
Russia and Kazakhstan on interaction in securing rational water resources 
management.
The Imashevskoye field would become a first cross-border site to be 
developed jointly by Russia and Kazakhstan. The field has long been 
a matter of dispute between Russia and Kazakhstan over the border 
delimitation. 
In March 2010, the government of Russia accepted a draft agreement 
with Kazakhstan on joint geological exploration of the Imashevskoye gas 
condensate deposit. It took the states five years to settle all issues 
surrounding the project.
Kursiv, Finam.ru
Note: In its dispute with Minsk, Russia 
was in favour of levying a 100% export 
duty on oil that is being re-exported by 
Belarus after refining and agreed upon a 
zero duty on oil for Belarusian domestic 
consumption. Minsk accepted the bulk of 
Russia’s conditions.
Note: The Imashevskoe deposit, with 
reserves estimated at over 128 billion 
m3 of gas and 20 million tons of gas 
condensate, is located on the border 
between Russia and Kazakhstan, east 
north-east of Astrakhan in Russia and 
southwest of Atyrau in Kazakhstan.
Russia and Kazakhstan are jointly 
developing the Khvalynskoye,  
Kurmangazy and Tsentralnoye oil 
fields. The launch of commercial crude 
production at the Kurmangazy field  
may commence by 2016.
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Russia – Turkmenistan
Ashkhabad to construct East-West pipeline 
May 24, 2010
As events show, the relations between Russia and Turkmenistan 
haven’t been restored after last year’s discontinuation of Turkmen gas 
purchases.
The energy-rich Central Asian republic decided to build the East-West 
pipeline with an annual capacity of 30 billion m3 of natural gas on its own. The 
construction will be funded by the state concern Turkmengaz. A resolution 
authorising the start of construction was signed by the President, Gurbanguly 
Berdimuhamedov. The works are scheduled to begin in June 2010, and the 
gas pipeline should be commissioned in June 2015. The construction costs 
are estimated at around $1 billion.
The new pipeline will allow Turkmenistan to choose whether to supply oil to 
Russia or bypass it completely. 
The pipeline is to link Turkmenistan’s north-
eastern gas fields with the Caspian region and 
with major transnational gas transit systems 
beyond. Construction was to be carried out 
by Gazprom. The parties intended to sign a 
corresponding agreement in March 2009. 
However in April 2009, Gazprom made a move 
to cut exports of Turkmen gas. Some time later, 
a blast occurred on a natural gas pipeline and gas 
exports were halted completely. In May, Ashkhabad 
announced an international tender for construction 
of the East-West pipeline.
RBK Daily
Russia and Turkmenistan freeze Pre-Caspian pipeline project
October 25, 2010 
Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev wrapped up his visit to Turkmenistan. 
Igor Sechin, Russia’s vice premier, who was part of the delegation, said it 
was decided to freeze the long-stalled Pre-Caspian pipeline following the drop 
in European demand. They believe consumption will rise slowly again in the 
next 3-4 years, but only by small amounts.
The Pre-Caspian pipeline project foresaw the transportation of 30 billion 
m3 of gas from Turkmenistan to Russia through the territory of Kazakhstan 
and was agreed upon in 2007.
Note: In late 2009, Gazprom announced 
having reached an agreement with 
Turkmengas on resumption of gas  
deliveries to Russia starting January  
2010 and joint implementation of a project 
to construct the Pre-Caspian pipeline and 
the East-West pipeline. However in late 
April Gazprom said it will purchase only  
10 billion m3 of gas from Turkmenistan, or 
five times less than previous purchases.
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The parties touched upon the issue of Gazprom’s meagre orders for 
gas, which this year are down to 10-11 billion m3 of gas. Gazprom would not 
be increasing its orders because of reduced demand from the European 
Union.
Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev also discussed the possibility of 
Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, becoming involved in the 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline. Gazprom is prepared to 
take part in any capacity – “as a contractor, as a designing company, or as a 
full-fledged participant of the consortium.”
Kommersant
Russia – Belarus
The chronology of the Russian-Belarusian gas dispute
June 25, 2010
In accordance with a four-year agreement between Gazprom and 
Beltransgaz, Belarus has to pay 100% of an averaged European price for 
gas minus export duty and transportation expenses. In 2010, the price is 
subject to a reduction factor of 0.9, while Belarus insisted on a 0.7 figure. 
The contracted price for gas was set at $169.22 per 1,000 m3 in the first 
quarter of 2010, $184.8 per 1,000 m3 in the second quarter and an annual 
average of $187 per 1,000 m3. However Belarus used a 2008 price of 
$150 per 1,000 m3 to pay for gas, which led to Belarusian indebtedness. 
June 11 – Belarusian President held meetings with Russian President and 
Premier. The parties didn’t manage to settle the key issues. The situation 
was aggravated further by Gazprom’s statement that the price for gas in 
2011 will rise to $250 per 1,000 m3.
June 15 – Russian President gave Belarus five days to settle gas payments.
June 18 – Alexander Lukashenko stated that Belarus doesn’t acknowledge 
its debt to Gazprom.
June 21 – Gazprom commenced a gradual reduction of gas supplies to 
Belarus for domestic consumption against the background of painstaking 
negotiations on gas prices between the countries. Gazprom said that 
Belarus ran into debt for earlier deliveries, while Minsk, still hoping for a 
decrease in contracted price, demanded that Gazprom repay its debt for gas 
transit. 
June 22 – Belarus’ President ordered a halt to Russian gas transit to Europe. 
Gazprom considers an alternative route for gas transit to Europe, including an 
increase in transit through Ukraine, use of gas from European underground 
storage locations and the spot market.
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June 23 – Gazprom limits gas supplies by 60%.
June 23 – Beltransgaz paid $260.1 million for May deliveries of Russian gas.
June 24 – Belarus confirmed that Gazprom paid off its debt for gas transit.
June 25 – Russian-Belarusian gas conflict settled, the sides reached 
agreement on gas transit rate for the next year.
Reuters, RIA Novosti, RBK
Gazprom, Beltransgaz sign addendum to gas supply and transit 
contract for 2007-2011
July 2, 2010
Gazprom and Beltransgaz signed the Addendum to the gas supply and transit 
contract for 2007–2011.
Due to the fact that the Belarusian party raised the 2010 wholesale mark-
up for the gas sold by Beltransgaz to $11.09, as was agreed when Gazprom 
was purchasing a stake in the company, the rate for Russian gas transit via 
Beltransgaz owned networks will be equal to $1.88 per 100 km in 2010.
In addition, Gazprom and the Government of the Republic of Belarus have 
signed the Protocol on contributions by Beltransgaz, the joint Russian-
Belarusian gas transmission company, to the Innovation Fund of the 
Belarusian Energy Ministry.
Pursuant to the Protocol, the Belarusian party shall set the amount of 
contributions by Beltransgaz to Belarusian innovation funds in 2011–2012 
at the level not exceeding the minimum contribution amount adopted in the 
country.
The Belarusian party guarantees not to impose individual taxes, charges and 
contributions on Beltransgaz. It is planned to use the funds released from 
the reduction as contributions to the innovation fund for the construction of 
underground gas storage facilities in Belarus.
The decisions were made in furtherance of the accords stipulated by the 
protocol of December 31, 2006, on setting up the joint Russian-Belarusian 
gas transmission company, Beltransgaz.
Finam.ru
Oil hinders the establishment of CES
November 4, 2010
Belarus suggests unifying export customs duties and then distributing them 
according to the formula, similar to how the import duties on goods from 
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non-CES countries are divided. The formula will be defined by a special 
agreement. However, Kazakhstan and Russia object to such unification 
and are studying other mechanisms, including the levying of the export 
customs duty on Russian oil being exported to non-CES countries through 
the territory of Kazakhstan in accordance with Russia’s rates established 
on external borders. The levied funds would be transferred to Russia in full. 
A similar scheme would be applicable to Kazakhstan’s oil delivered to 
non-CES countries through Russia and Belarus. At the same time, Russia 
and Belarus managed to agree on the order of levying export customs duty on 
oil and oil products. Thus, Russia suggested zeroing duty on oil being supplied 
to Belarus in exchange for levying export customs duty on oil products, 
made from this oil. However, Russian oil products supplied to Belarus will not 
be subject to duties on condition of unifying Russian and Belarusian export 
duties. The parties also agreed that export customs duty on oil products 
manufactured out of Belarusian oil would be transferred to Belarus’ budget. 
However, Kazakhstan did not support the Belarusian stance due to the 
export customs duty rate that amounts to $20 per ton in Kazakhstan 
(from August 2010), while Russian export customs duty rate will be 
$290.6 per ton from November.
According to specialists, the unification of Russian and Kazakh export 
customs duties is technically near impossible due to a different structure of 
tax liabilities of both countries. Levelling Kazakhstan’s export duty with the 
Russian one would turn it into a prohibitive tariff for Kazakh oil exporters. 
And vice versa, if Russian export duty is lowered 14.5 times to match 
Kazakhstan’s rates the Russian budget would loose a substantial amount 
of funds.
Kursiv
Moscow and Minsk agree on oil and oil products duties
December 10, 2010 
During the meeting of the EurAsEC Interstate Council on December 9, 
2010, the presidents of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan agreed to ratify all 
agreements on the Common Economic Space before the beginning of next 
year. The CES will be put into effect in 2012.
The agreement was reached after the President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, 
and his Belarusian counterpart, Alexander Lukashenko, agreed terms on oil 
and oil products duties. 
Russia said it would drop duties on crude oil exports to Belarus from next 
year if Minsk hands Moscow all the duties it gets from exporting products 
made from Russian oil.
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The negotiations lasted the whole year. Moscow didn’t want to allocate 
investment support to Belarusian refineries that will in future receive all oil 
from Russia at zero duty (at present only 6.3 billion tons out of 21.5 billion are 
duty free). 
Total abolition of duty may cost the Russian budget around $2 billion a year, 
however, the losses may be reduced. According to a draft agreement on 
export duties on oil and oil products, Belarus will have to level its rates with 
the Russian ones (according to Belstat, Belarus exported 15.5 million tons 
of oil products in 2009). In October 2010, deputy Finance Minister of Russia 
Sergei Shatalov noted that the duty on oil products may reach up to 90% of 
crude oil export duty. However, the authorities didn’t dare introduce such a 
drastic measure at this time. The Finance and Energy Ministries have agreed 
the rate scale for 2011-2012. The levy for heavy oil products is set at 46.7% 
of crude export tax in 2011 and 52.9% in 2012. The light oil products duty 
is set at 67% of the crude oil export tax, starting February 1, 2011, and then 
64% in 2012. Duties for the two types of oil products will then equalise at 
60% of the crude tariff in 2013.
Vedomosti
Energy
Sangtuda-1 HPP produces first 3 billion kWh 
of electricity
February 1, 2010 
Tajikistan’s Sangtuda-1 HPP is one of largest energy projects in the CIS. 
The hydropower plant will reach its full project capacity of 670 mW with the 
commencement of the last, fourth power unit in 2010.
The other three power units have already been put into operation, however 
one of the units is currently undergoing routine maintenance and the other 
one was put in reserve.
Nonetheless, the power plant has already produced its first 3 billion kWh.
South Kazakhstan and Afghanistan are to become potential consumers of 
Sangtuda-1 HPP electricity as soon as the transmission line reaches them. 
The price for exported electricity is still uncertain. 
Mirtv.ru
Export-import of electricity may be expanded
March 11, 2010 
Inter RAO UES and Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company 
(KEGOC) have reached the final stage of talks on the electric power 
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purchase and sale agreements which will be supplemented to a new 
agreement on parallel operation of the power systems of Russia and 
Kazakhstan. 
Inter RAO UES expects the amount of trade transactions between Russia 
and Kazakhstan to triple after the parties sign corresponding agreements. 
Last year, Russia imported 2.1 billion kWh from Kazakhstan and exported 
0.6 billion kW-hours.
During the talks between KEGOC JCS, Inter RAO UES OJSC, FGC OJSC and 
SO UES OJSC, the companies discussed conditions of agreements on the 
parallel operation of power systems of two countries, on purchase and sale 
of electricity, as well as electricity transmission services. 
The energy companies agreed to introduce a daily approval of supplies to 
compensate hourly deviations during electricity transmission and specified 
the ceiling value for permissible deviations during daily energy interchange 
for a period to 2013.
The Energy Ministry of Russia and Inter RAO UES are also agreeing terms of 
a new agreement on parallel operation with the Nonprofit Partnership 
“Council for Organising Efficient System of Trading at Wholesale and Retail 
Electricity and Capacity Market” (NP “Market Council”).
The agreements aim at boosting the long-term and mutually beneficial energy 
cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan, improving the reliability and 
further development of the Russian and Kazakh power grids, as well as their 
transition to a brand new level of functioning with their increased role as 
system operators.
Along with reliability improvement of the two poser grids and establishment 
of a new market of interstate system services and reserve capacities the 
agreements will also boost the efficiency of Inter RAO UES and KEGOC trade 
operations.
Finam.ru
Russia and Kazakhstan agree to build third power unit 
at Ekibastuz GRES-2
July 6, 2010
During the meeting of the EurAsEC Interstate Council in Astana, 
Vnesheconombank, the Eurasian Development Bank, Inter RAO UES OJSC, 
Samruk-Energo JSC and Ekibastuz GRES-2 Station JSC signed a credit 
agreement to finance the project to construct a third power generating unit 
of the Ekibastuz Power Station with an installed capacity of up to 540 mW in 
Kazakhstan. The total value of the project is around $800 million.
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Under the agreement Vnesheconombank’s participation in financing the 
project is to extend a long-term (for a period of 15 years) credit line worth 
12 billion roubles. These funds are to cover the costs of services and items 
produced by Russian companies (Silovye Machiny OJS, MZ ZIO-Podolsk 
OJSC, etc). The Eurasian Development Bank on a parity basis with 
Vnesheconombank is also to extend a 15-year credit for a total amount of 
$385 million. The project is in line with the EDB’s mission and increases mutual 
trade and mutual investment. The power station is owned on a parity basis by 
Russian and Kazakh shareholders (OJSC Inter RAO UES and JSC Samruk-
Kazyna), and a significant part of electric power generated by the power 
station is exported to the unified energy system of the Russian Federation.
The project to build the third power-generating unit of the Ekibastuz GRES-2 
is being implemented under the agreement dated September 11, 2009 
between Russia and Kazakhstan. The annual output of the Ekibastuz GRES-2 
after the project’s completion is scheduled to increase by 50% and amount 
to 10 billion kWh. This will make it possible to significantly reduce power 
shortages and increase electric power imports from Kazakhstan to Russia. 
The parties believe that the launch of the third power unit at the Ekibastuz 
Power Station would help to restore the unity of Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s 
energy systems, promote the development of integration trends in the former 
Soviet republics and enhance cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation.
The Ekibastuz GRES-2 generates about 12% of all electric power produced in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan; the installed capacity of the station’s two power 
units amounts to 1,000 mW.
Finam.ru
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine sign new agreement on parallel operation 
of power grids
July 14, 2010
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine signed a technical agreement on the provision of 
parallel operation of power systems of the three countries. The agreement was 
signed by FGC UES, SO UES, Belenergo, ODU republican unitary enterprise, 
and Ukrenergo.
This agreement is the basic document, governing the interaction of system 
operators and power companies, while ensuring parallel work of power 
systems in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The agreement defines responsibility 
and interaction between the parties, including the harmonisation of actions 
to plan and ensure the implementation of agreed hour schedules of power 
interchange balance, control of power, while maintaining the frequency and 
operation of interstate power lines.
2010: Data and Events
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Under the signed agreement, SO UES in cooperation with ODU and Ukrenergo 
perform a twenty-four-hour dispatching management of the parallel operation 
of power systems. The main responsibilities of the company include the 
maintenance of AC frequency within acceptable values, regulation of power 
interchange and power of national energy systems, coordinated planning of 
the parallel operation of power systems, as well as the coordination of actions 
to prevent and eliminate process failures.
Furthermore, the agreement foresees creating conditions for mutual 
exchange of technological information, necessary for the arrangement and 
implementation of the parallel operation of power systems of Russia, Belarus 
and Ukraine, as well as obligatory mutual information sharing on planned 
activity for technical upgrading and reconstruction of energy facilities, which 
affect the parallel operation of power systems.
Finam.ru
Nuclear energy
TVEL and Ukrainian Energoatom sign long-term contract
June 1, 2010
TVEL Fuel Company of Russia and the National 
Nuclear Energy Generating Company of Ukraine, 
Energoatom, signed a long-term agreement on 
deliveries of fresh fuel for Ukrainian NPPs after 
2010.
IA REGNUM Novosti
Russia to finance Khmelnitsky NPP construction
June 9, 2010
Russia and Ukraine have signed an intergovernmental 
agreement to finish the construction of Reactor Units 
3 and 4 at Ukraine’s Khmelnitsky Nuclear Power Plant. 
The agreement was signed on June 9, in the Ukrainian 
capital, Kyiv, by Ukraine’s Minister of Fuel and Energy 
Yury Boiko and Russia’s head of the state nuclear 
corporation Rosatom, Sergey Kiriyenko. 
According to Kiriyenko, this is a long-term contract 
to be financed via loans from Russian banks. Both 
Russia and Ukraine will be providing funding for the 
project. Russia has taken on the obligation to invest 
$5-6 billion. These funds are to cover the costs 
of services and items produced in Russia. But it is 
Note: Cooperation between TVEL and 
Energoatom started in 1996, when  
the Russian company won an 
international tender for supplies of 
nuclear fuel for VVER reactors of 
Ukrainian NPPs. In 1997 TVEL and 
Energoatom signed a contract for  
fuel deliveries for a period to and 
including 2010.
Note: On June 7, the President of 
Ukraine took part in the summit of 
the Conference on Interaction and 
Confidence-building Measures in 
Asia (CICMA) in Istanbul and held an 
array of bilateral meetings. During the 
meeting with Russian Premier the  
sides touched upon energy issues.  
Viktor Yanukovich appealed to Vladimir 
Putin to render financial support to 
Ukraine in completing the construction 
of reactor units at Rivne and  
Khmelnitsky NPPs.
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unclear for how long and on which terms exactly the export credit will be 
extended to Ukraine.
Ъ-Online
Challenges of Russian-Kazakh cooperation in nuclear energy
June 17, 2010
Rosatom’s head Sergey Kirienko arrived in Astana 
to discuss the state and prospects of bilateral 
cooperation of the two countries in peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy. The agenda of his meeting with 
Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Karim Masimov 
included such issues as securing gradual 
implementation of the project for establishing a 
unified Russian-Kazakh civil nuclear power company; 
combining efforts in the marketing of natural uranium 
by creating a joint trading company; and boosting 
work on designing a nuclear power plant and its 
subsequent construction. Russia is also ready to 
discuss the cooperation in producing fuel pellets at 
the Ulba Metallurgical Plant.
Both sides have to settle a considerable amount of 
claims and discrepancies on these issues. 
On July 5, 2010, Rosatom’s General Director 
Sergey Kiriyenko and Kazatomprom’s President 
Vladimir Shkolnik signed two documents: A 
Memorandum on integration and cooperation in the 
field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and a Joint 
statement on the uranium enrichment centre 
project. The first document outlines a concept for 
gradual establishment of a Russian-Kazakh nuclear 
company. “The parties confirm that they shall adhere to the principles of 
integration and, whilst taking consecutive steps towards a unified, parity-
based nuclear company, shall strive to position it on the global nuclear fuel 
cycle market as a strong joint player, and make use of market conditions in 
the best interests of future integration”, reads the memorandum. At an initial 
stage, this company will sell natural and low enriched uranium, as well as 
other products and services produced by the joint ventures to end users. The 
second document seals the parties’ agreements in respect of common use 
of a uranium enrichment centre in Russia through the Kazakh shareholding 
in the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant JSC. In addition, the document 
outlines the principles of concerted sales and marketing policy.
Finam.ru, RBK Daily, RIA Novosti, Kursiv
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Note: From 2008, the parties have not 
been able to agree on the distribution 
of shares in the unified company, thus  
the draft intergovernmental agreement 
on creating a unified company is yet to  
be approved. In this regard, Russia 
suggested treating joint uranium 
production enterprises as the first  
stage of creating a unified company, and 
a joint trading company as the second 
stage. Rosatom has already sent its 
proposals and a draft agreement to 
the corresponding Kazakh agencies for 
consideration. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan 
announced a forthcoming uranium 
development programme under 
which Kazatomprom is scheduled to  
complete its transformation into a 
vertically integrated company with a full 
nuclear fuel cycle by 2020.
There is also a contradiction between 
Russia and Kazakhstan concerning the 
construction of a NPP in Kazakhstan.
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Minsk puts forward new proposals for energy cooperation with Russia
July 29, 2010
Moscow refused to sign an agreement with Minsk on the construction of a 
first Belarusian nuclear power plant unless a joint venture for selling electric 
energy from the NPP is established.
Moscow lays claim to 50% of profit from energy 
sold from the Belarusian NPP if it is to be financed 
by the Russian loan.
Belarus declared that the establishment of a joint 
venture for sale of future NPP electric power is not 
under consideration; however, Belarus is willing to 
offer Russia its own variants. The set of agreements 
between Russia and Belarus on the NPP construction 
will be signed by the end of September at the latest. 
Earlier, the Belarusian leadership stated that a 
package of agreements on the NPP construction 
would be signed before the end of July 2010.
On August 27, 2010, Belarus submitted its proposals to Russia. Minsk agreed 
on the establishment of a joint venture for sale of future Grodno NPP electric 
power. However, Belarus believes that the bulk of revenue should stay in the 
country, following the “country of origin of electricity” principle for revenue 
distribution. Russia refrained from commenting on the new Belarusian 
proposals.
Ъ-Online, Lenta.ru
Russia to help Armenia with NPP construction
August 20, 2010
According to Rosatom’s head Sergei Kiriyenko, Russia may finance over 20% 
of the project for constructing a nuclear power plant in Armenia.
The total cost of the project is still uncertain and 
will depend on the NPP’s equipment. The preliminary 
cost of construction is estimated at $5 billion. 
According to Kiriyenko, a recently established 
joint Russian-Armenian company will finance at 
least 40% of the NPP’s cost. Investors will finance 
the remaining 60%. The construction of a new 
1,000 mW reactor unit at the Armenian NPP will 
commence in 2011.
Lenta.ru
Note: Belarus plans to build the NPP 
with two reactor units of 1,200 mW 
each in its western Grodno region, with 
the first reactor expected to be put 
into service in 2016 and the second in 
2018. Atomstroyexport is to implement 
the project. In May 2009, Belarus 
asked Russia for a $9 billion loan for the 
construction of a nuclear power plant.
Note: Rosatom State Corporation was 
established in December 2007 on the 
basis of the dissolved Federal Atomic 
Energy Agency. Rosatom is actively taking 
part in international projects, carrying 
out construction in India, Iran and China. 
The company has repeatedly stated its 
willingness to undertake NPP construction 
projects in countries such as Bulgaria  
and Belarus.
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Ukraine acquires 10% of Russian-Kazakh centre in Angarsk
October 8, 2010
On September 5, the Ukrainian state company 
Nuclear Fuel became a shareholder in the 
International Uranium Enrichment Centre based 
on the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex 
by purchasing a 10% stake. The Nuclear Fuel 
state company intends to negotiate a mechanism 
for cooperation with the International Uranium 
Enrichment Centre in the very near future and 
collect all documents necessary for the enrichment 
contract.
Kursiv
Mining Industry
Polymetal to optimise Varvarinskoye
March 18, 2010
Polymetal had to engage in a large-scale optimisation of the Varvarinskoye 
gold and copper mine in Kazakhstan after purchasing it in 2009. The 
company managed to substantially curtail expenses by terminating 
contracts with several foreign experts, an array of contractors and an 
insurance agent.
Last year, Polymetal acquired 100% of the shares in Three K Exploration and 
Mining Limited, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Orsu Metals, which operates 
Varvarinskoye, for $235 million. The new owner of the mine had to make an 
array of fundamental changes of Varvarinskoye management. The alteration 
of the production process control allowed Polymetal to save $10 million. In 
particular, the company transferred the procedures for drafting local mining 
projects and reservoir modelling of the field from London to Russia. Moreover, 
Polymetal replaced around 15 foreign specialists (including the financial 
director, geologists, mechanics and mining engineers) with locals. Personnel 
replacements made it possible to achieve a better value for money ratio and 
save $1.5 million a year.
Polymetal also reviewed the mine’s expenses for insurance by terminating 
the contract with the current insurance agent and holding a large-scale 
tender. As a result, the company will save $1.3 million in 2010. In addition, 
Polymetal revised agreements with a contractor and a buyer to exclude 
unbeneficial conditions for the seller (Varvarinskoye), which in its turn saved 
the company a further $3.1 million. 
RBK Daily
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Note: In August 2010, Nuclear Fuel 
signed an agreement with Rosatom 
on purchasing 10% of shares of the 
International Centre for Uranium 
Enrichment established in 2007 on the 
grounds of the Angarsk Electrolysis 
Chemical Complex. Kazakhstan owns a 
10% stake while Russia holds 80% of  
the Centre’s shares.
23Eurasian Development Bank
Polyus Gold problematic asset
July 21, 2010
Kazakhstan has launched a process aimed at 
terminating a merger of Russia’s top gold producer, 
Polyus Gold, and Kazakh gold miner KazakhGold 
Group Ltd due to the undercharging of the deal 
price.
In autumn 2008, Polyus Gold estimated 
KazakhGold’s controlling stake at $746 million, but 
the company’s capital had considerably fallen, so 
the companies later agreed on a merger valued at 
$269 million.
Machine Building Industry
Russia and Kazakhstan establish car 
assembly JV
April 12, 2010
Russian Industry and Trade Minister, Viktor 
Khristenko, visited Kazakhstan to settle problems 
in the automotive and aviation industries, which 
originated from the establishment of the Customs 
Union. Following the results of Khristenko’s 
meetings with Kazakhstan’s Prime Minsiter 
Karim Masimov, Economic Development and 
Trade Minister Zhanar Aitzhanova, Oil and Gas 
Minister Sauat Mynbayev and first Vice-Minister of 
Industry and New Technologies Albert Rau, the 
parties adopted several decisions. First of all, they 
agreed to ease customs regulations for export-
import of cars from Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s 
secondary markets, which will pave way for Kazakh 
traders to access the much larger Russian 
second-hand auto market. Second, the sides 
agreed to establish a car assembly joint venture in 
the short term.
The JV will have a project capacity of 50,000 
cars a year, with an estimated project cost of 
around $200 million. The project will be 
implemented under government support with 
Kazakhstan providing 25% of the project’s total 
cost at the initial stage.
Note: In July, KazakhGold and 
Polyus Gold, which owns 50.1% of  
KazakhGold via its subsidiary Jenington 
International Inc, announced a reverse 
takeover, under which KazakhGold  
would acquire its parent company  
Polyus Gold. Under the scheme, one 
share of Polyus Gold will equal 9.26  
Global Depository Receipts of  
KazakhGold, and one American 
Depository Receipt of Polyus Gold will 
equal 4.885 GDRs of its subsidiary. 
The deal is aimed at merging the two 
companies into one holding, which will  
be traded on the London Stock  
Exchange as a single company, while 
Polyus Gold plans to delist its ADRs  
from the LSE soon.
In late June 2010, Kazakhaltyn MMC 
JSC, a subsidiary of KazakhGold Group 
Limited belonging to Polyus Gold, and 
Jenington International Inc., controlled 
by the Russian company, initiated a trial 
against former leadership and core 
owners of KazakhGold, in relation to a 
violation of several contract terms and 
fund embezzlement of $200 million.
Established in 2006, Polyus Gold is 
the leading gold producer in Russia 
and Kazakhstan and the only Russian 
company among the world’s largest  
gold producers. Polyus Gold’s operating 
mines and development projects are 
located in five Russia’s major gold mining 
regions, as well as in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, Romania and Kyrgyzstan.
KazakhGold is one of the largest and  
oldest gold mining companies in 
Kazakhstan (established in 1929) with 
three principal operating mines, Aksu, 
Bestobe and Zholymbet located in 
the northern part of Kazakhstan with 
estimated reserves of around 60 million 
ounces of gold.
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Sollers OJSC will represent Russia in the parity-
based car assembly plant, while Kazakhstan 
still needs to choose which company will be 
involved.
The sides didn’t specify the range of car brands 
the joint venture will be assembling, though a 
possible production of Ssang Yong SUVs, in 
addition to Fiat-based car manufacture, was also 
discussed. 
The joint venture will be headquartered in 
Karaganda Industrial Park or Stepnogorsk.
Kursiv
Russia, Ukraine to integrate aircraft industries
April 23, 2010
Russia and Ukraine once again announced their intention to unite the 
countries’ aircraft manufacturers. A unified company will aim at widening 
joint production and supplies of An-148, An-124 and An-140 plane 
series. Additionally, the joint venture will be responsible for developing and 
implementing common marketing policies on local markets and abroad. 
The establishment of a unified company is only an intermediate stage of 
integrating aircraft industries of both countries.
Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) may receive a controlling stake 
in the Ukrainian state-owned aircraft manufacturer, 
Antonov, in exchange for a stake in the Corporation. 
According to the last draft agreement on cooperation 
in aircraft industry, Russia’s UAC will receive a 
50.01% stake in Antonov. In return, Ukraine will 
receive a stake in UAC, but its size will be determined 
after an independent evaluation of the market values 
of Antonov and UAC. The deadline for the final decision 
is August 1, 2010.
Ъ-online
Rostselmash wins 40% of Kazakhstan’s grain 
harvesters market
October 25, 2010
One in ten grain harvesters produced by Russia’s 
Rostselmash is being supplied to Kazakhstan, 
Rostselmash press service announced.
Note: Rostselmash and Kazservice 
established a joint venture for assembling 
VECTOR grain harvesters on the basis of 
Kazakhstan’s Vector Grain Harvesters 
Plant LLC. 
Rostselmash made it into the world’s  
top 5 companies engaged in production 
of grain harvesters and other agricultural 
equipment with over 2.6 million units 
of equipment sold in 48 countries. The 
company accounts for 17% of the  
world’s agricultural equipment market  
and 65% of the Russian market. 
Rostselmash produces ACROS, VECTOR, 
DON 1500B, Niva-Effect, and DON  
680M grain and fodder harvesters.
2010: Data and Events
Note: Sollers OJSC is a Russian automobile 
company that provides a full scope 
of automobile services comprising all 
stages from manufacturing to sales and  
maintenance services. The company  
produces such brands of cars as UAZ and 
SsangYong. In late February, Sollers signed 
an agreement with Italian Fiat on establishing 
a joint venture to produce Fiat and Chrysler 
brands with a capacity of up to 500,000  
cars a year. The project’s cost totalled €2.4 
billion.
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From 2000, supplies to Kazakhstan topped 5,000 grain harvesters. 
Rostselmash now accounts for 40% of the Kazakh grain harvesters 
market.
According to the company’s representative in Kazakhstan, Rostselmash 
is currently in the lead on Kazakhstan’s market in terms of grain harvesters 
and tractors.
Kursiv
Transmashholding acquires Luganskteplovoz
June 15, 2010
The State Property Fund of Ukraine declared Russia’s Bryansk Machine 
Building Plant (BMZ, part of Transmashholding) a winner in the tender for 
the sale of 76% in Luganskteplovoz, which offered $51.8 million for the 
asset. Thus BMZ became the owner of Luganskteplovoz for the second 
time. Luganskteplovoz was first privatised in March 2007. It was sold to 
BMZ for $58 million. However, the results of the competition were cancelled 
by court, and this stake went back to state ownership. 
In 2007 Transmashholding had paid UAH 292.5 million for the 76% stake; 
the contract was signed in USD and equalled $58 million. At the 2009 
auction, the selling price of the stake equalled UAH 410 million or $52 million. 
Thus, Transmashholding demanded the State Property Fund of Ukraine 
compensate the difference between the USD-denominated prices, while 
the Fund refused to do it. 
Earlier Transmashholding announced its intention to invest around $120 
million in Luganskteplovoz during the next 15 years. In 2009, Luhansteplovoz 
curtailed the production to UAH 523.5 million ($66 million) compared to UAH 
1.272 billion in 2008.
September 1, 2010 – The State Property Fund of Ukraine sent a letter 
to Bryansk Machine Building Plant inviting it to break the contract on 
acquisition of a 76% stake in Luganskteplovoz by the parties’ mutual 
consent. As the State Property Fund noted, this proposal resulted 
from Bryansk Machine-Building Plant’s failure to pay the amount it had 
declared at the privatisation tender for the state-owned shares of 
Luganskteplovoz.
According to the Fund, within the framework of the contract the Bryansk plant 
had to transfer the full amount of funds for the purchase of Luganskteplovoz 
to the Fund’s account by August 31, but this was not done. As a consequence, 
the buyer lost its right to return of the paid bid deposit (UAH 40 million) and 
would have to pay additional UAH 82 million as a fine, as well as UAH 2 million 
as a penalty for delay.
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The Russian company has 20 days to either accept the offer of the Fund or 
to pay for the company with all the penalties. Otherwise, the Fund will have 
to go to court to terminate the contract.
December 22, 2010 – The last obstacle to closing the deal on the acquisition 
of Ukraine’s Luhanksteplovoz by Russian Transmashholding was finally 
removed. The State Property Fund of Ukraine agreed to a cross-cancellation 
of debts with Transmashholding’s subsidiary, Bryansk Machine Building 
Plant, making it possible to close the deal in the near future.
Reuters, RBK Daily
Financial Sector
MICEX gets permit to buy FSTS
April 2, 2010
The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine granted permission to Moscow 
Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) to purchase over 50% of shares in 
the Ukraine’s First Stock Trading System (FSTS). 
In late December 2009, the FSTS Association, which is the 100% owner 
of FSTS, approved a plan to bring in MICEX as the strategic investor. FSTS 
will place 1,601 new ordinary nominal shares in favour of MICEX at a 
nominal price of UAH 16.01 million. The issue will double the charter capital 
to UAH 32.01 million and give MICEX 50% plus one share. 
The shares will be sold for a total of $10 million at the hryvnia exchange rate 
as of the settlement date. That corresponds to about UAH 50,000 per 
share.
The cooperation between MICEX and FSTS began in April 2009 with the 
launch of a new trading system of the FSTS. The trading system was 
developed on the basis of the IT platform ensuring the operation of the 
MICEX Group’s on-exchange market. Further development of the project 
envisages the creation of a unified trading system that will combine the 
terminals of the stock, derivatives, currency and commodity markets.
RBK Daily
Kazakhstan’s bank awaits Russian depositors
September 16, 2010
The subsidiaries of Kazakhstan’s banks continue to 
expand their operations in Russia. The Central Bank 
of Russia granted a retail banking license to the 
Russian subsidiary of Kazakhstan’s Centre Credit 
Bank, Bank BCC-Moscow. Bank BCC-Moscow started 
Note: Currently two other subsidiaries 
of Kazakh banks, AMT Bank (42.8  
billion roubles in assets) and 
Moscommertsbank (28.8 billion in  
assets) operate in Russia.
2010: Data and Events
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its operations in Russia in 2008 and offered only consumer credits and 
remittances. In the short-term, the bank plans to launch new products, 
including an auto-credit programme and mortgage, while financing of small 
and medium sized enterprises will remain the bank’s main focus. 
Bank BCC-Moscow foresees a two-fold increase of its capital resources 
and a five-fold increase in its credit portfolio. 
RBK Daily
Sberbank’s Kazakh Unit places 10 billion tenge bonds
November 18, 2010 
The Kazakhstan-based subsidiary of Russia’s Sberbank has completed the 
initial placement of registered coupon junior bonds in the informal market for 
a total amount of 10 billion tenge. The subsidiary is offering 5 billion tenge 
in seven-year first-series and 5 billion tenge in nine-year second-series 
bonds, issued as part of the first bond programme. The placement of the 
aforementioned papers was carried out through subscription.
Second tier banks, pension funds, insurance companies, broker and managing 
companies and individuals participated in the subscription.
The total demand for the bonds exceeded the amount of the issue by 4 times. 
The Bank satisfied orders with a yield of up to 7% APR.
The proceeds will be used to bolster the subsidiary’s capital and step up 
lending to SMEs and larger enterprises, funding for investment projects and 
other purposes.
Kursiv
Sberbank to set up FDI Fund for Belarus
November 22, 2010
Sberbank of Russia has plans to set up a foreign direct investment fund (FDI 
Fund) for Belarus, Chairman of the Board of BPS-Bank Vasily Matyushevsky 
told reporters on November 19. Sberbank is currently in the process of 
selecting the eligible investment projects. The FDI Fund’s resources will be 
provided by Sberbank and other co-investors.
Apart from that, BPS-Bank and Banque Havilland (Luxemburg) are setting up 
another FDI Fund in Belarus of $100 million. During the next two years, the FDI 
Fund will invest in Belarusian Biokom, engaged in production of milk substitute 
and fodder additives for farm livestock. BPS-Bank will manage the fund.
Another BPS-Bank’s four-year project deals with the construction of 9 hotels 
and 12 restaurants in Belarus by the Netherlands’ Blue Eagle Private Equity. 
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The project is estimated to cost $200 million. Investors will provide at least 
50% of the financing.
Moreover, EBRD plans to provide BPS-Bank with a $50 million loan for 
further credit financing of small and medium-sized enterprises. According to 
Matyushevsky, the substantial part of the resources will be provided by the 
project proponent. However, BPS-Bank is ready to provide its own funds and 
raise financing from local and foreign banks.
Sberbank arranged the debut issue of Belarus’ $1 billion Eurobonds and 
two issues of rouble-denominated bonds totalling 7 billion and 8 billion 
roubles on the Russian market.
Vedomosti
Unified conditions for banks and currency markets 
of Customs Union member states
November 24, 2010
The Economic Development Ministry of Russia published a draft agreement 
on the principles of a coordinated currency policy in the countries participants 
of the Common Economic Space. According to the agreement, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Belarus will open their national currency markets for each other 
on conditions of a favourable legal treatment.
The sides will coordinate their exchange rate policies; secure the 
convertibility of national currencies on current and capital accounts of 
the balance of payments without restrictions, and create conditions 
to the central banks for investing their foreign currency assets in national 
currencies and government securities of the states participants to the 
agreement.
Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus will also secure a free movement of 
cash money and securities between the states by residents and non- 
residents of the countries participants to the agreement. The sides will unify 
the requirements for control of foreign exchange transactions, as well as 
norms of responsibility for violating the legislative acts on currency 
regulation. The three countries commit to hold mutual consultations in order 
to prepare and coordinate exchange rate policy actions, systematically 
exchange information on the state and prospects for currency market 
development, and establish an integrated currency market of the states 
participants to the agreement.
Moreover, Russia’s Economic Development Ministry also published a draft 
agreement on creating conditions for free movement of capital on financial 
markets of the Common Economic Space member states. 
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According to the agreement, the sides will harmonise their national banking 
legislation with regard to acquiring stakes in the banks by investors from 
countries participants to the agreement, as well as methods of risk 
regulation on financial markets.
Kazakhstan Today, Kursiv
Kazakh-Tajik Direct Investments Fund 
November 24, 2010 
Kazakh-Tajik Direct Investments Fund has been officially presented in 
Dushanbe. The fund was established by the Kazyna Capital Management and 
the Tajik State Committee for Investments and State Property Management. 
The fund’s authorised capital of $80 million will be invested into a series 
of projects on the territory of Tajikistan, Chairman of the Kazyna Capital 
Management’s Board Abai Alpamysov told the reporters. The overall goal 
of the Kazakh-Tajik fund, which is registered in Kazakhstan, is to implement 
investment projects on the territory of Tajikistan that are linked with 
Kazakhstan’s economy and other projects. The fund will prioritise projects 
in such spheres as the financial sector, telecommunications, light industry, 
food industry, energy, non-ferrous metal industry, and metal mining industry. 
Speaking at the presentation, Akyl Akylov – the Tajik Prime Minister – said 
that the fund was initiated by Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rakhmon and 
his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbayev with the goal of attracting 
investment in Tajikistan’s economy. The Tajik PM stressed that the Fund will 
give an impetus to the development of cooperation and will contribute to the 
further development and strengthening of economic relations between the 
two states.
Kursiv
Belarus places bonds in Russia
December 24, 2010
Belarus became the first foreign country to float bonds on the MICEX in 
the amount of 7 billion roubles and 8.7% annual interest rate. Sberbank of 
Russia has been authorised to organise the floatation of Belarusian bonds in 
Russia. The leadership of the Federal Service on Financial Markets expressed 
hope that other issuers, including non-CIS ones, will follow Belarusian 
example.
According to Sergei Vidyayev, head of primary bond issues department 
at Troika Dialog, the Russian market is very promising and has two major 
advantages – a high liquidity level and an option of placing rouble-denominated 
bonds with the future conversion into US dollars.
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Floatation of CIS issuers’ bonds on the Russian market goes in line with 
the plans of turning Moscow into an international financial centre with the 
Russian rouble becoming an interregional currency for corporations and 
banks in the CIS.
Vedomosti
Transport
Kazakhstan Temir Zholy and Russian Railways unite to compete 
with sea carriers
September 16, 2010
Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZh) and Russian Railways (RZD) intend to join 
efforts in competing with sea carriers by simplifying the customs clearance 
of cargo and establishing a unified customhouse broker. A memorandum of 
mutual cooperation between KTZh and RZD in customs procedures on the 
customs territory of the Customs Union was signed during the meeting of 
the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan in Ust-Kamenogorsk on 
September 7.
Transit freight traffic, mainly railway transportation, suffered a sharp 
decline after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The neighbouring 
countries and part of Russia’s regions gave way to overseas 
transportations. The revival of freight turnover became one of the reasons 
for the establishment of the Customs Union and a single transport 
territory within the framework of the EurAsEC. However, the parties first 
need to unify their customs legislation and settle a set of issues on 
international freight traffic. Both Russia and Kazakhstan supported a pilot 
project to establish a joint venture between the Customs Broker Centre 
LLC, the certified customs broker of the RZD, and Kazakhstan’s Transport 
Services Centre JSC.
According to KTZh, the establishment of a JV could cut down time needed 
for customs clearance of cargo. The consigners will pay for the JV services, 
by-passing the customs brokers. The JV will also be responsible for issuing 
shipping documentation and declarations, as well as exchanging information 
with KTZh, RZD and customs services.
The concentration of information on international transit freight traffic under 
one structure would make it possible to monitor car detention and plan trans-
shipment of cargo. Generally, the JV will speed up freight traffic, raise the 
reliability of customs processing and promote the establishment of a unified 
customs network, which in its turn would boost the profitability of transit 
freight traffic.
Kursiv
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Turkmenistan suspends license of Russia’s 
MTS subsidiary
December 22, 2010
Mobile TeleSystems OJSC (MTS), the leading telecommunications provider 
in Russia and the CIS, announces that the Company has suspended its 
operations in Turkmenistan in accordance with the notice from the Ministry 
of Communications of Turkmenistan received by MTS on December 15, 
2010. The notice informed the Company of a decision to suspend licenses 
held by Barash Communications Technologies, Inc. (BCTI), MTS’ wholly-owned 
subsidiary in Turkmenistan, for a period of one month starting from December 
21, 2010.
According to the Turkmen Ministry of Communications, the BCTI’s license 
was suspended due to the expiration of the trilateral agreement signed 
between BCTI, MTS and the Ministry of Communications in 2005. However, 
the Ministry of Communications failed to grant the extension in accordance 
with the terms of the Agreement.
As of September 2010, MTS Turkmenistan had 2.39 million subscribers. 
BCTI boosted third quarter revenue 29.7% year-on-year to $55.9 million. 
OIBDA rose 32.7% to $34.1 million and the net profit was up 34.6% to about 
$21 million. 
MTS has been operating in Turkmenistan under a trilateral agreement 
signed in November 2005 by BCTI, MTS and the Ministry of Communications 
of Turkmenistan, which expires on December 21, 2010, unless extended 
pursuant to its terms and conditions. 
In accordance with certain provisions of this agreement, BCTI shares net 
profit derived from its operations in the country with the Ministry of 
Communications of Turkmenistan. The amount of shared net profit is 
calculated based on the financial statements prepared in accordance with 
local GAAP subject to certain adjustments. Under the terms of the 
agreement, BCTI shared 49% of the net profit since the date of acquisition 
through December 21, 2005, and 20% of the net profit commencing 
December 21, 2005.
Since the acquisition of BCTI in 2005 for $46.55 million, MTS invested around 
$280 million in Turkmenistan. The Company has brought legal actions against 
the Ministry of Communications of Turkmenistan in the International Court of 
Arbitration and in the Arbitration Court of Turkmenistan (this court dismissed 
MTS’ suit) in connection with the decision to suspend BCTI’s licenses.
Turkmentelecom has already dissolved a lease agreement with BCTI and MTS 
has to dismantle 90% of its equipment by the end of the year. Furthermore, 
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from January 1, 2011 the company will be deprived of frequencies and has 
to cancel contracts with subscribers and settle payments with them.
RBK Daily, Vedomosti
Agriculture
Russia bans grain exports
August 5, 2010
The Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed a decree to ban grain 
exports between August 15 and December 31 this year due to the drought 
in the country. 
According to Putin, Russia has a sufficient amount of reserves, however, it is 
necessary to prevent domestic prices in Russia rising, as well as preserve the 
cattle stock and form reserves for the next year. The ban applies to wheat and 
maslin, barley, rye, corn, and wheat and wheat-and-rye flour. 
Agropromsoyuz doesn’t leave out a possible extension of the ban on grain 
exports until mid 2011.
September 1, 2010
The Russian government has partially lifted a grain export ban, introduced 
from August 15 to December 31, and allowed exports under international 
contracts signed by the Russian Federation and as humanitarian aid. The 
regulation permits grain and flour exports to create grain reserves under the 
Custom’ s Union legislation and to feed Russian military, diplomatic, consular 
and other missions abroad.
Grain can also be exported for rescue operations, as well as to feed Russian 
ships and Russian organisations on the Svalbard archipelago.
October 25, 2010
Russia, once the world’s third-biggest wheat exporter, has extended a ban 
on overseas sales of grain until July 1, 2011 to ensure domestic supply after 
drought damaged crops, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said. According to him, 
the stability of Russia’s internal food market and the feed for livestock must 
be the priority.
Putin also backed the governors’ proposal to extend discounts on grain 
transportation by rail. He said preferential railway transportation tariffs for 
grain will be valid till July 1, 2011.
Moreover, the reduced tariffs will also be applicable to rail transportation of 
soy and soy oil meal being delivered from the Far East regions.
RBK, Finam.ru, Kursiv, RBK Daily
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Other sectors 
EuroChem expands agrochemical network in Ukraine 
March 17, 2010 
EuroChem is investing over 25 million roubles to 
establish a new distribution centre for Agrocentre 
EuroChem-Ukraine in Northern Ukraine. 
The new Agrocentre EuroChem-Ukraine distribution 
centre will provide additional interseasonal storage 
space for 50,000 tons of fertilisers, reduce annual 
logistics costs, increase efficiency, and raise mineral 
fertiliser sales. In addition, the distribution centre will 
provide employment opportunities for residents of 
Buryn in the Sumy Region.
The new distribution centre will open in October 
2010, on premises covering 9.3 ha and including 
a 6,500 m2 warehouse, an administrative building, 
power substation, water tower and other facilities. 
The new distribution centre will be strategically 
located near the Bakhmach railway station through 
which EuroChem delivers mineral fertilisers to 
Ukraine from PG Phosphorite (Leningrad Region) 
and NAK Azot (Tula Region).
Wimm–Bill–Dann loses business in Uzbekistan
September 20, 2010
One of the largest Russian dairy and food producers, 
Wimm-Bill-Dann Foods, lost its business in 
Uzbekistan. The property of Wimm-Bill-Dann’s local 
subsidiary, WBD-Tashkent, was nationalised by 
decision of the Tashkent Municipal Court. Authorities 
claim company management breached Uzbek tax 
and customs law, produced defective products, 
embezzled property and did not invest the previously 
pledged amount of $7.2 million in capacity upgrade 
(WBD had previously invested some $5 million in 
the Uzbek business and planned to invest up to $2.2 
million more by the end of 2011). Earlier in 2010, a 
criminal case was initiated against management of WBD Tashkent; however, 
it was closed a few days ago, while the company’s assets were acknowledged 
instruments of crime and nationalised. 
Finam.ru, RBK Daily
Note: Agrocentre EuroChem-Ukraine 
is part of EuroChem Agro-Network 
and operates two leased sites in 
Ukraine – Krasnogorovka (Donetsk 
Region) and Kazatin (Vinnitskiy Region). 
EuroChem Agro-Network is a network of  
agricultural centres located in the key  
grain producing regions of Russia. 
EuroChem’s agricultural centres provide 
a full range of agricultural products 
and services: mineral fertilisers, 
plant protection agents from leading 
international providers, high quality  
seeds from Russia and abroad, mixed 
fertilisers, soil analyses and field surveys, 
precision technology applications 
of agrochemical products on fields, 
storage, delivery, agrochemical product 
packaging, water-soluble fertilisers and 
microelements, as well as agrochemical 
consulting services.
Note: WBD launched its business in 
Uzbekistan in 2004 after buying 77% 
of a local company Toshkentsut for 
$131,400. The company planned to 
invest $7.2 million in the project by  
late 2011. In 2005, the Uzbekistan 
authorities offered it tax privileges, which 
were to last until 2011. In September 
2005 WBD-Tashkent launched 
production of milk, with the capacity  
of around 60 tons a day.
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Russia’s Pharmstandard buys Ukraine’s Biolek 
November 19, 2010
The Ukrainian Antimonopoly Committee granted 
permission to Russia’s Pharmstandard to 
purchase over 50% of shares in Ukrainian 
pharmaceutical company Biolek. Biolek, the 
largest Ukrainian pharmaceutical company, 
produces immunobiologicals, vaccines, serums and 
diagnostics products, as well as culture mediums 
and hormonal, antiviral, antibacterial, enzymatic 
and blood products. 
In 2009, the company accounted for 0.18% of 
Ukrainian pharmaceuticals market. According to 
unaudited data, Biolek’s sales comprised $12 million 
in 2009.
Pharmstandard’s acquisition of Ukrainian pharmaceutical company Biolek 
will increase the Russian drug-manfacturer’s already extensive portfolio and 
substantially boost its presence in the Ukrainian drug market.
Vedomosti
Rosatom buys Ukrainian special steel maker
December 27, 2010
Rosatom found an alternative source of metallurgical production. The 
Russian nuclear power engineering company Atomenergomash, which is 
incorporated in the Rosatom state corporation, has bought a controlling 
stake of Energomashspetsstal, a producer of special steel in Ukraine. The deal 
on acquisition of a 92.68% stake in Energomashspetsstal from the Cyprus-
based EMSS Holdings Limited was closed on December 21, 2010. The total 
sum of the deal was not disclosed.
The acquisition of a Ukrainian asset is a pivotal decision for Rosatom, 
for it demonopolises the steel market, turning Energomashspetsstal 
into another supplier and thus ruining the monopoly of OMZ Special Steels 
LLC. 
The significant share in Energomashspetsstal backlog of orders falls to the 
contracts with Russian enterprises, such as ZIO Podolsk, Power Machines, 
Ural Turbine Plant, AEM-technologies and others. After joining 
Atomenergomash Company Group, Energomashspetsstal will obtain the 
opportunity to expand greatly its cooperation with the nuclear power plants. 
The plant will become a supplier for Alstom-Atomenergomash Joint Venture 
too, where low speed turbines for NPPs will be manufactured. 
2010: Data and Events
Note: Pharmstandard is the leader of 
the Russian pharmaceutical industry. 
Pharmstandard became a public  
company in 2007 by offering the public 
27.6% of its share capital in the form 
of GDR on the London Stock Exchange  
(LSE) and 18.1% of its share capital in  
the form of ordinary shares on two 
local stock exchanges (RTS, MICEX). 
Approximately 54.3% of the company’s 
voting shares are held by Augment 
Investments Limited. 
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After the implementation of the project aimed at completion of power unit 
No. 3 and 4 at Khmelnitsky NPP, Energomashspetsstal will become the 
main supplier of semi-finished metallurgical products for manufacturing of 
equipment of reactor and turbine houses.
RBK Daily
SECURITY
Agreement on Manas to be prolonged
March 10, 2010 
Kyrgyzstan’s President Kurmanbek Bakiyev held a meeting with commander 
of US Central Command General David Petraeus. During the meeting, Bakiyev 
noted that Kyrgyzstan is interested in restoring stability in Afghanistan and 
sees no reasons to terminate agreement, according to which the US military 
use Manas International Airport as a centre for transit traffic to transport 
servicemen and equipment to Afghanistan. The agreement expires on June 
22, 2010; however, if neither of the parties makes an official statement 
terminating it, the agreement is automatically prolonged for another year. 
On February 20, 2010, Bakiyev met with Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special 
envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan to discuss Manas issues.
Kommersant
Multilateral cooperation of Caspian states
March 12, 2010 
On March 11-12, Baku hosted the Third Summit of the Five Caspian Littoral 
States, which touched upon issues of security. The leaders of the Caspian 
states signed an agreement on security cooperation. Azerbaijan, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran agreed to cooperate in countering 
terror, organised crime, drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and poaching, as well as providing security for the oil pipelines 
infrastructure.
However, security issues are just one component of interrelation between 
the Pre-Caspian states. The framework agreement on the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea is still missing. In other words, for almost twenty years all five 
states that have access to the Caspian Sea, namely Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, have been unable to agree on how to divide 
the inland Sea along national lines and how to manage its vast hydrocarbon 
resources. 
In 2003, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan signed an agreement to define 
national boundaries according to the median line principle. Iran argues against 
this principle for it will leave the country with 13% of the Caspian seabed. In 
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this light, Iran proposes dividing the seabed into five equal parts of 20% each. 
The resolution of the Caspian issue is an important condition for Kazakhstan’s 
successful implementation of a state programme to develop Kazakhstan’s 
sector of the Caspian Sea in the period to 2015. Generally, Kazakhstan 
expects to satisfy the most of its own interests within the framework of the 
final decision on the Caspian. In particular, its own scheme for dividing the 
Caspian Sea between the five states sees Kazakhstan receiving the largest 
part, which amounts to approximately 30%.
Kursiv
Military and Political Cooperation
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to stay in Crimea after 2017
April 21, 2010
On April 21, 2010, the Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych and his Russian counterpart Dmitry 
Medvedev signed a deal extending the lease allowing 
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to be stationed in Crimea, 
Ukraine for another 25 years beyond its original 
expiry date of 2017, with a possible further 5-year-
extension. 
Yanukovich noted that the sides speeded up the 
decision-making due to the fact that Russia “needed 
certainty about its navy base stationed in Crimea”. He 
also explained that the Black Sea Fleet guarantees 
security to all the countries of the Black Sea. 
The agreement was ratified by the parliaments of both countries on April 27. 
Members of the Ukrainian opposition are protesting the fleet agreement as it 
violates Ukraine’s constitution, which prevents foreign countries from holding 
bases on Ukraine’s territory.
Ukraine’s constitutional court held that the agreement on extending 
deployment of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea corresponds to Ukrainian 
constitution. Yanukovich also noted that the ratification of the agreement was 
carried out within the law and will be implemented.
Ъ-Online, RIA Novosti
Uzbekistan closes its border with Kyrgyzstan
April 7, 2010
Kyrgyzstan closed its border with Kazakhstan at the request of the Kazakh 
authorities. According to Kyrgyz Border Guard Service, the border was closed 
Note: The previous agreement on the 
deployment of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet  
in Ukraine was signed on May 28, 
1997 for 20 years. According to the  
agreement, the Fleet could be stationed 
in Sevastopol up to 2017 with an annual 
rent of $97.75 million. The addenda to 
the agreement on gas supplies, signed  
on April 21 in Kharkov, grants Ukraine 
a 30% discount on gas in exchange for 
extending the deployment of the Black  
Sea Fleet in Sevastopol till 2045.
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for an indefinite time, which would depend on the 
social and political situations in Kyrgyzstan.
The state border between Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan is also temporarily closed at Tashkent’s 
initiative. Kyrgyz state borders with China and 
Tajikistan are open and functioning in a normal 
mode.
Acting Kyrgyzstan Defence Minister Ismail Iskakov 
said earlier that the border control was reinforced.
RIA Novosti
Kyrgyzstan cuts irrigation water supply to 
Zhambyl region, Kazakhstan opens border with 
Kyrgyzstan
May 18, 2010
Kyrgyzstan cut off water supply to Kazakhstan’s 
Zhambyl region from the Kirov reservoir on May 18, 
without warning. Moreover, on May 19, Kyrgyzstan 
halted the discharge of water from the Chumysh 
hydro system to the Chu River. The water level in 
the trans-border Talas River decreased drastically. 
Around 173,000 ha of Zhambyl region’s 520,000 
ha of crop area are irrigable and in order to preserve 
the emerging crops water supply has to be restored 
in the shortest possible term.
Kazakhstan closed its border with Kyrgyzstan after Kyrgyzstan’s April 
turmoil. The representatives of local business circles noted that by closing the 
border, Kazakhstan deprived Kyrgyzstan of around $1 billion in revenue for 
the country’s economy. According to experts, over 80% of goods produced 
by Kyrgyzstan’s light industry, as well as milk and dairy products are being 
exported through the territory of Kazakhstan.
May 19, 2010
On May 20, Kazakhstan will re-open its border with Kyrgyzstan, Kazakh 
Foreign Ministry reported. “Given the difficult social and economic situation 
in Kyrgyzstan and taking into account the numerous appeals of Kyrgyz 
citizens,” the President of Kazakhstan instructed the government to lift 
temporary restrictions, imposed on the Kazakh-Kyrgyz border, at the Kordai, 
Sypatai Batyr, and Aisha Bibi checkpoints, runs the statement of the Foreign 
Ministry.
Note: Protest rallies swept over  
different cities of Kyrgyzstan due to the 
authorities’ ban to hold the people’s 
qurultai (meeting) and the arrest of 
opposition leaders. On April 6, riots  
broke out in Talas regional centre in 
the north, the mob seized the local 
administration. In the morning of April 
7, public rallies were organised all 
over Kyrgyzstan with demands to free 
the opposition leaders. Protesters in  
Bishkek took hold of a state television 
broadcaster, parliament’s building and 
battled through to the government. In  
the afternoon, the leaders of opposition 
were set free. On April 8, the newly 
established opposition government 
announced the dissolution of Parliament 
and the assumption of the president’s 
and the Cabinet’s authority. The acting 
government intended to function for 
six months until amendments to the 
Constitution were introduced. The 
Kyrgyzstan President, Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev, left the country after the mass 
protest rallies.
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The checkpoints will service international transit passenger and freight traffic, 
as well as transportation of foodstuffs, medications, fuels and lubricants and 
agricultural produce across the state border.
Meanwhile, the border, customs and migration control will be reinforced 
in order to provide prompt counteraction of possible challenges and 
threats.
IA Novosti-Kazakhstan, Kursiv
CSTO will not send troops to Kyrgyzstan
June 11, 2010
The Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, said 
the Collective Security Treaty Organisation post-
Soviet security bloc will not intervene to stabilise 
the situation in volatile Kyrgyzstan.
Medvedev said the forces of the, which 
includes Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, can only 
be deployed when the border of a member state 
is violated.
RIA Novosti, ITAR TASS 
CSTO to send aircraft, military equipment 
and transport, special warfare
June 14, 2010
The Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
(CSTO) met in Moscow to discuss how to 
halt rioting and clashes that have left parts of 
two cities in southern Kyrgyzstan in ruins 
and sent tens of thousands of Uzbeks fleeing for 
the border. Reporting to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, CSTO Secretary 
General Nikolai Bordyuzha said national security chiefs from the seven-nation bloc 
hammered out a proposal to help Kyrgyz authorities by supplying equipment, 
helicopters, ground transportation, gasoline and special warfare but not 
weapons.
The Collective Security Treaty Organisation has at its disposal all the 
necessary arsenal of measures to act in similar situations – a peacekeeping 
contingent, and the collective rapid response forces in Central Asia. 
But they should be used after careful consideration, the CSTO Secretary 
General, Colonel General Nikolay Bordyuzha noted.
Fergana.Ru
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Note: Inter-ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz  
and ethnic Uzbeks broke out in the southern 
Kyrgyz city of Osh on June 11. Law  
enforcement authorities failed to put a stop 
to the conflict that has rapidly spread to  
the neigbouring areas. The interim  
government imposed the state of emergency 
in the cities of Osh and Uzgen, as well as  
Kara-suu, Aravan and Uzgen regions 
of Kyrgyzstan and brought troops into 
Osh. People have fled to the neighbouring  
Uzbekistan trying to escape from attacks 
and robbery. According to the United Nations 
Office of High Commissioner for Human  
Rights (OHCHR), the number of refugees 
reached 275,000 people. At least 258  
people were killed and hundreds suffered 
injuries.
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Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan to settle border issues
June 1, 2010
The chairman of the State Border Service of Kyrgyzstan, Colonel Kurmankul 
Matenov, and the Commander of Uzbek border guard troops, Major General 
Ruslan Mirzayev, met in the Vuadil village of the Ferghana Valley on June 1 to 
discuss the situation on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border.
The parties intended to settle the conflict that started at the border on May 
26, when tensions aroused between the Kyrgyz Sogment village and Uzbek 
Khushyar village near the Uzbekistan’s enclave of Sokh. Following the results 
of the meeting, the sides agreed on an array of issues. In particular, the sides 
agreed to
• boost the activities of the intergovernmental commission on issues of 
delimitation and demarcation of the state border,
• review the issue of constructing temporary reinforcing obstacles in 
separate sections of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border that are exposed to 
conflicts,
• create necessary conditions for secure operations of all Uzbek and 
Kyrgyz checkpoint facilities,
• take appropriate measures to prevent 
conflict situations over water and land use in 
the concerted and unconcerted sections of 
Kyrgyz-Uzbek border. Regional authorities of 
both countries expressed intention to sign a 
corresponding bilateral agreement on use of 
pastures.
In addition, Uzbekistan agreed to withdraw heavy armoured forces from the 
Sokh enclave that were introduced following the events in Batken in 1999-
2000. According to the Batken regional administration, currently there are 
45 units of heavy armoured vehicles in the Sokh enclave.
Fergana.Ru
Russia and Kyrgyzstan settle military issues
September 16, 2010
Kyrgyzstan will not increase the rent for Russian military facilities on its 
territory and wants to continue receiving payments in the form of military 
assistance, the Kyrgyz Defence Minister Abibilla Kudaiberdiyev said during 
his visit to Moscow. Previously, Kyrgyzstan said it wanted a four-fold increase 
in the $4.5 million rent that Russia pays for leasing military facilities in the 
country.
Note: On June 2, Uzbekistan began to 
withdraw heavy armoured units from the 
Sokh enclave.
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The countries also agreed to extend the term of deployment of Russia’s 
military facilities to 49 years. By late 2010, Russia and Kyrgyzstan are to 
sign an agreement on cooperation between the Defence Ministries of both 
states. The parties also discussed the issue of combining all Russian military 
facilities in Kyrgyzstan into a United Russian Military Base.
Expert Online
Kazakhstan holds Peace Mission 2010 anti-terror drills
September 24, 2010
On September 9-25, Kazakhstan hosted the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation Peace Mission 2010 military exercise, at the Matybulak 
training range in Zhambyl region, designed to showcase the organisation’s 
capabilities against extremism, separatism and terrorism. Peace Mission 
2010 assembled 6,000 servicemen from China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia and Tajikistan and over 1,500 units of equipment, firepower and 
weapons systems. The anti-terror drills were attended by Defence Ministers 
of SCO member states.
The agreement on arranging the Peace Mission 2010 anti-terror drills in 
Kazakhstan was approved by Defence Ministers of the SCO member states 
in May 2008.
www.sco2011.kz
Chebarkul firing range hosts artillery drills
October 25, 2010
A joint operational tactical exercise of the Collective Rapid Reaction forces 
(CRRF) of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the Interaction-2010, 
began at Chebarkul range in Chelyabinsk Region of Russia on October 25. 
Over 1,700 servicemen and 270 units of military hardware participated in 
the drills. 
The goal of the Interaction-2010 is training and tactical activities of the CSTO 
CRRF to contain an armed conflict in the CSTO region. The use of non-lethal 
weapons is going to become yet another novelty marking the event. It is the 
first time that the CSTO is holding its CRRF drills on Russian soil. Previous 
CSTO joint drills were held at the Matybulak range in Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan Today
CSTO to improve its crisis response system
December 9, 2010
The Collective Security Treaty Organisation held a session of the 
Collective Security Council in Moscow to discuss issues of improving the 
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efficiency of the organisation in the field of emergency response. The need 
for changes came after the tragic interethnic clashes in Kyrgyzstan in 
June this year, when the CSTO appeared to be incapable to take rapid 
measures.
Simply put, the CSTO was virtually prevented by Belarus and Uzbekistan 
from intervening in the crisis in Kyrgyzstan in June and an informal summit 
of the alliance in Yerevan in August had mandated that changes should 
be made in the statutes of the CSTO “to improve the efficiency in the field 
of emergency response”. The heads of the CSTO member states have 
already prepared three sets of documents aimed at improving CSTO 
efficiency.
Thus, the statement on CSTO Peacekeeping Forces was signed and the 
declaration of CSTO member states was adopted. Changes were made to 
the Collective Security Agreement, Statute, Rules and Procedures, Provision 
on CSTO Bodies with the purpose to improve crisis response system. The 
participants of the session formulated a new document, the CSTO statute 
on crisis response, which governs the work of permanent bodies and 
provides for emergency consultations and the adoption of decisions to 
prevent (or settle) crisis situations.
According to new amendments, a rapid decision-making procedure 
was introduced in order to be able to arrive at a decision by means of 
videoconferencing or absentee voting and save time on convening emergency 
summits. Additionally, decisions may now be made on a limited basis, i.e. 
solely by the countries concerned, while disinterested parties will have the 
opportunity to maintain their neutrality.
Vedomosti
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF COOPERATION
Tajikistan drops Russian as official language
March 5, 2010 
Tajikistan banned the use of the Russian Language 
by country agencies and in official documents to 
boost the role of the local language. A corresponding 
decision was taken by Tajik Parliament’s Upper 
Chamber that ratified amendments to the law “On 
Regulatory Legal Acts”. According to the amended 
articles, all laws and legal acts will now be published 
exclusively in Tajik.
Meanwhile Shavkat Saidov, an aide to the upper 
house speaker for public affairs said that the 
Note: The Parliament of Tajikistan passed 
the new law “On State Language” in 2009. 
The law abolished the Russian language’s 
status as the ‘language of inter-ethnic 
communication’, which had been provided 
for in the constitution. The new law obliged all 
nationals to know Tajik and speak it in official 
situations and public workplaces, while all 
government agencies, including courts 
and local authorities should issue official 
documents exclusively in Tajik.
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Tajik President’s national council may translate any of the legal acts to other 
foreign languages as the need arises.
Expert Online 
RTR-Planeta to resume broadcasts to Tajikistan 
August 21, 2010
Russia’s RTR-Planeta TV channel is resuming its 
broadcasts to Tajikistan, suspended more than a 
year ago by the Tajik side. An agreement to this 
effect was reached by Russian and Tajik Presidents 
Dmitry Medvedev and Emomali Rakhmon during 
their recent meeting in Sochi on August 18.
RIA Novosti
Draft law on languages submitted to Verkhovna 
Rada
September 8, 2010
A draft law expanding the sphere of application of 
the Russian language in Ukraine has been submitted 
to the Verkhovna Rada.
The bill defines proactive measures in order to implement the status of 
regional languages for each of the regional languages in Ukraine and to secure 
the possibility for regional or minority language speakers in Ukraine to be 
able to use their language in the spheres of public life. In particular, the draft 
bill removes the existing threshold for official use of the Russian language 
in all major areas of public life – television, advertising, film industry, local 
administration, courts and education.
When the ruling Party of Regions, led by President Viktor Yanukovych, was 
campaigning for parliamentary elections, and when Mr. Yanukovych himself 
was running for the presidency, they promised voters to make Russian a 
second state language.
Ъ-Online
2010: Data and Events
Note: Tajikistan stopped airing the state-
run RTR Planeta on March 2, 2009 
due to unpaid fees by the Russian side. 
The Tajik side has increased their tariffs 
by 50% in 2009, justifying it by the  
increase in prices for electricity and 
equipment. Russia’s VGTRK agreed 
to pay according to newly established  
rates; however, Tajikistan soon  
announced that Russia ran into debt 
of $7 million roubles and demanded 
repayment. RTR-Planeta was the only 
Russian-language broadcaster operating 
in Tajikistan.
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After a sharp decline in 2009, the world economy demonstrated signs 
of recovery in 2010. To support post-crisis economies, central banks of 
developed countries have kept their interest rates at low levels. The largest 
economy in the world – the US economy – continued to pursue a quantitative 
easing policy throughout the year. After some deceleration in July and 
August of last year, the US economy started to grow again after the second 
round of quantitative easing, which was approved by the Federal Reserve 
System in August 2010. Despite some growth, Eurozone countries have 
been struggling with their sovereign debt problems. The instability of the EU 
economy was further exacerbated by high interdependence of the Eurozone 
economies. Developing economies have been growing as well, with China being 
the growth engine in Asia, and Brazil being the growth rate leader in Latin 
America.
The CIS economies, which were growing steadily in the pre-crisis period, 
decelerated during the crisis, and, on average, grew by 4.2% in 2010. 
Economies of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, 
and Moldova experienced growth rates of more than 5%, while the largest 
economy in the region, Russia, grew by 4%. A key driver of economic 
growth in the CIS region was industrial production. On average, industrial 
production in the CIS countries increased by 7-11% in 2010 (except 
Azerbaijan, where industrial production grew by only 2.6%). After a 
significant drop in Moldova and Ukraine in 2009 (21.1% and 21.9%, 
respectively), the industrial sector grew by 7% in Moldova and 11% in Ukraine 
in 2010. On the other hand, the agricultural sector was the weakest link in 
the CIS economies. A dry, hot summer observed in the middle of last year 
led to bad harvest in a number of countries in the region. The largest decline 
in agricultural output was observed in Armenia (-13.5%), Russia (-11.9%) 
and Kazakhstan (-11.7%). Nevertheless, some countries in the region saw 
their agricultural sectors grow. Moldova experienced the largest increase 
in agricultural output among the CIS countries - it grew by 7.9% in 2010. 
In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan agricultural output increased by 6.8%, while in 
Belarus it increased by 2%.
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Figure 14.1.
World GDP growth 
(%)
Source: World 
Economic Outlook, 
IMF
Figure 14.2.
CIS economic 
recovery
(GDP growth, %)
Source: CIS Statistical 
Committee
Since most of the CIS countries are commodity-exporters, positive 
dynamics of global commodity prices had a favourable impact on trade balance 
of these countries. As usual, fuel and energy products made up the bulk of 
exports in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
Azerbaijan, an oil and gas exporter, observed a positive trade balance of 
$14.7 billion in 2010. Kazakhstan being a major exporter of energy products 
has also experienced trade surplus ($29.5 billion) due to increasing export 
revenues. Commissioning of a gas pipeline to China at the end of 2009 and a 
rise in raw material prices (energy products, cotton, grain) led to a slight 
increase in Turkmenistan’s exports, which by year end increased to 
2010: Data and Events
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$9.7 billion from $9.6 billion in 2009. Uzbekistan, which joined the 
Turkmenistan–China gas pipeline, also benefited from this development, and 
thus experienced an 11% increase in exports. The temporary close-down 
of Kyrgyzstan’s borders with neighbouring countries in the middle of last 
year reduced export revenues, but an increase of global metal prices in the 
second half of the year helped the country make up for some of these earlier 
losses. The spike in raw material prices, on the other hand, worsened trade 
balance of commodity-importing countries. A negative trade balance of 
$7.4 billion in Belarus was attributed to price increase of intermediate 
goods, such as energy products, materials and components. Due to a rise in 
wheat prices, which is Tajikistan’s main import product, the country ended 
up with a negative trade balance of $1.5 billion in 2010. On January 1, 2010 
the Customs Union (CU) between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan was 
launched. By the end of 2010, trade turnover between Belarus and its CU 
partners increased by 20.6%, trade turnover between Kazakhstan and 
its CU partners increased by 28.1%, and trade turnover between Russia 
and its CU partners increased by 18.9%. Nevertheless, these results have 
not yet leveled off with the pre-crisis figures. In 2009 the drop in trade 
turnover between Belarus and its CU partners was 31.1%, between 
Kazakhstan and its CU partners – 37.4%, between Russia and its CU partners 
– 32.5%.
Figure 14.3. 
Commodity price 
dynamics: 
2000-2010
Source: IFS, IMF
Metals Food Energy Products
0
0
100
10
200
20
300
Ja
nu
ar
y 
2
0
0
0
S
ep
te
m
be
r 
2
0
0
0
M
ay
 2
0
0
1
Ja
nu
ar
y 
2
0
0
2
S
ep
te
m
be
r 
2
0
0
2
M
ay
 2
0
0
3
Ja
nu
ar
y 
2
0
0

S
ep
te
m
be
r 
2
0
0

M
ay
 2
0
0

Ja
nu
ar
y 
2
0
0

S
ep
te
m
be
r 
2
0
0

M
ay
 2
0
0

Ja
nu
ar
y 
2
0
0

S
ep
te
m
be
r 
2
0
0

M
ay
 2
0
0

Ja
nu
ar
y 
2
0
1
0
S
ep
te
m
be
r 
2
0
1
0
Elvira Kurmanalieva, Gaukhar Ormantayeva 
“Key Macroeconomic Indicators of the CIS Countries in 2010” 2010: Data and Events
In 2010 all developing countries faced a major problem of high inflation. By 
the end of the year, the rise in global consumer prices averaged 3.8%. Since 
foodstuffs constitute a major part of the consumer price index, food inflation 
31 EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2011
Figure 14.4.
Geographical 
structure of trade 
turnover in CIS 
countries in 2010
Source: National 
Statistics
was a key driver of overall price increase. As had been the case in 2007, 
increase in food prices was mainly driven by long-term fundamental factors, 
such as improvement in overall economic conditions and population growth, 
which in turn led to increase in demand for food in developing countries; 
energy-saving policies in developed countries; and poor weather conditions 
that had a negative impact on agriculture (Trostle, 2008). Other factors 
include depreciation of the US dollar, a decline in global grain stocks, and 
introduction of export quotas in a number of food exporting countries. In many 
commodity-importing countries high prices on energy products increased the 
cost of agricultural output, which in turn increased domestic prices. Monetary 
and fiscal stimulus policies that were pursued in many countries in 2009 and 
2010 also contributed to additional inflationary pressure.
Prices in the CIS region were rising even faster than in other countries. In 
the first half of last year, when prices were declining and annual inflation in 
the CIS region was at 5.8% in July 2010, it seemed that inflation will remain 
at low levels throughout the year. But as it was the case in 2007, economic 
recovery and growth of trade turnover observed were accompanied by the 
major problem of inflation. The most sharp price increase was observed in 
September, when average monthly inflation reached 2.9% in Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan, 1.9% in Tajikistan and 1.6% in Belarus. By the end of the year 
the highest rate of annual inflation was observed in Kyrgyzstan, where 
the annual price rise stood at 19.2%. Annual inflation rates in Armenia, 
Belarus, Tajikistan and Ukraine exceeded 9%, in Moldova and Russia – 8%, in 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – 7%. Due to the fact that a number 
of countries, such as Russia and Kazakhstan, are major producers of 
agricultural output, unfavourable climate conditions contributed to a price 
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rise. Dry summer led to bad harvests, which in turn led to a hike in the price of 
agricultural products. For countries that mainly import agricultural products, 
such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, increase in agricultural food prices served 
as an additional component in creating an inflationary pressure. For the 
region as a whole, inflation rate exceeded 8% in 2010, which far exceeds 
the rate of global inflation.
Figure 14.5. 
Global inflation 
(%, YoY)
Source: IFS, IMF
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Figure 14.6.
CIS inflation (%, 
December, YoY)
Source: IFS, IMF
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In addition to a number of non-monetary factors that contributed to 
inflation, sharp expansion of money supply led to price increases in the 
region. This in turn forced central banks to adopt policies targeted at 
tightening money supply. Money supply of net-exporting countries was 
boosted through export earnings, while importing countries increased their 
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money supply through rising external borrowing. In order to fight inflation, 
the National Bank of Azerbaijan increased its benchmark interest rate by 
1%, while Armenia raised its REPO rate 5 times, which reached 7.25% by 
the end of the year. After the first signs of inflation were observed In Moldova, 
the National Bank of Moldova increased its benchmark interest rate by 
1% and at the end of the year it reached 7%. High inflationary pressure 
persuaded the National Bank of Tajikistan to increase its refinancing rate 
at the end of 2010 by 0.25% to 8.25%.
In 2010 most countries in the region aimed their fiscal policies at mitigating 
the worst consequences of the global financial crisis, with the major part of 
budgets going into social expenditures. As a result, fiscal deficits were observed 
in almost all of the CIS countries. The government of Russia pursued an active 
fiscal policy by expanding social expenditures, which led to a sharp decline in 
the balance of the state budget. After a long period of state budget surplus, 
Russia observed a fiscal deficit for a second consecutive year, reaching a 
deficit of 3.6% of GDP in 2010. Financing of social expenditures was also 
a major part of budgetary spending in Belarus. By the end of 2010 the 
country’s consolidated budget deficit averaged 2.6% of GDP. In Kyrgyzstan 
political events of the first half of last year had an additional burden on 
government spending. About half of government spending was directed 
towards measures to stabilise the economy, ensure safety and social 
security. As a result, Kyrgyzstan’s budget deficit increased from 1.5% of GDP 
in 2009 to 5.1% of GDP in 2010. The budgetary spending in Kazakhstan was 
also aimed at supporting social needs, as well as at supporting the banking 
sector, which was significantly affected by the global financial crisis. As a result, 
the state budget deficit averaged 2.5% of GDP in 2010 compared to 1.4% in 
Figure 14.7.
State budget balance 
(% of GDP)
Source: CIS Statistics 
Committee
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2009. Ukraine’s state budget also resulted in a deficit, which was at 5.9% 
of GDP at year end. Despite implementation of economic reforms and hikes 
in utility prices, Ukraine’s significant deficit was attributed to the country’s 
soaring liabilities that were the result of servicing increasing government 
debt. As a consequence of a rise in budget deficits in 2009-2010, private 
investments in the region decreased. The CIS countries’ need to finance their 
budget deficits from external sources led to a significant increase in their 
external debts.
Figure 14.8. 
Savings and 
investments in the 
CIS: weighted average 
(% of GDP)
Source: National 
Statistics, expert 
estimations of IMF 
and EDB
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In 2010 some positive changes were observed in the region’s banking 
system. In most of the region’s countries, banking indicators improved, 
including in the credit sector. The highest growth of the credit sector was 
observed in Uzbekistan, where the volume of credits to economy increased 
by 35%. In Armenia the credit portfolios of commercial banks rose by 29% by 
the end of the year. The volume of credits to economy increased in the range 
Figure 14.9.
Non-performing 
loans (% of total)
Source: National 
Statistics, EBRD
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of 9% and 14% in Azerbaijan, Moldova, Russia and Tajikistan. In Kyrgyzstan, 
where most of the credit activity is related to trade and agriculture sectors, 
the volume of credits provided increased by 4.6%. Despite this positive trend, 
it should be noted that a large proportion of the loan portfolios of countries 
in the region is made up of non-performing loans. In Tajikistan 40.9% of 
loans were non-performing. Overdue loans accounted for 11.2% of credit in 
Moldova, 11.9% in Ukraine and 4.7% in Russia. In Kazakhstan, the share of 
overdue credits is high despite a restructuring of the banking sector’s external 
debt, where bad debt accounts for 26.4% of outstanding credit and written 
off loans account for 20%.
Figure 14.10. 
Growth of monetary 
aggregate (M2) 
(%, December, YoY)
Source: National 
Statistics, IFS
Overall, 2010 results demonstrate a recovery of economic activity in both 
developed and developing countries. The CIS countries are no exception to 
this. In spite of the downturn in agricultural production in some of the region’s 
countries, the growth of industrial production, private consumption and state 
investment became engines of economic growth. However, resolving such 
problems as high inflation, large budgetary deficits and increasing external 
debt, will require encouraging of continuous growth in the region.
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This paper aims at analysing the activities of international and regional 
development banks in the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as Russia, Armenia and Belarus. The 
international financial organisations engaged in the region include the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank (WB), the Eurasian Development 
Bank (EDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB). The legal ground for activities of any 
international development bank (IDB) in the country is, first of all, the country’s 
membership in the bank, which is also provided with immunity and the status 
of international organisation.
Development banks provide medium- and long-term financing for capital-
intensive projects that are not very attractive to private investors. At the 
same time, the implementation of these projects is of great importance to 
the country’s economy. First of all, these are infrastructural projects that 
lay the foundations for the further development of industrial production 
and the provision of essential living standards including energy, transport, 
communications and municipal infrastructure. Some of the development 
banks also aim to support the social sector by financing projects in education 
and medicine, as well as the corresponding reforms.
Financing provided by the international development banks in 2010 exceeded 
the target value that was previously pledged in commitments to support the 
post-crisis development and stability of the banking sector. These support 
measures helped to prevent a crisis in the system and the collapse of 
monetary lending to the real economy. At the same time the region still 
faces a challenge in real sector credit financing and a high risk of possible 
aftershocks. Together with governments and the European interstate 
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institutions, the IDBs are doing their joint best to solve the region’s problems 
by providing local currency financing to unhedged borrowers and developing 
local capital markets.
The year 2010 is also notable for the IDBs’ efforts to enhance the 
efficiency of their activities, which is studied in the “Improving the 
Organisational Effectiveness of Development Banks” section of the current 
paper.
It should be noted, however, that the annual reports for 2010 had not been 
published when this article was written, so it is based on the data published 
by the IDBs on their official websites. At the same time this paper does not 
aim to compare the quantitative index of investments.
Priority Areas of Activity in 2010
The major investment areas for international development banks have 
traditionally been energy, transport and transport infrastructure, which 
account for a considerable part of the sectoral structure of investment 
portfolios, as well as targeted financial support for small and medium-sized 
enterprises.  For instance, transport projects account for 51% of the total 
ADB projects approved in 2010 in the countries of the region mentioned 
above, 78% of the IsDB projects and 31.5% of the IFC’s projects in the 
region in 2010. Energy projects make up around 20% of the EBRD total 
financing, and 40% of the EDB project portfolio. Investments in the financial 
sector are also significant, with 13% of the ADB projects given to targeted 
microfinancing initiatives, 38.1% of the total IFC projects this year, 24.8% of 
EBRD total investments and a shade less of the EDB funding (18%). 
Meanwhile, as the world is coping with the after-effects of the global 
financial and economic crisis, issues of energy efficiency, climate change 
and environment, as well as multilateral partnership between development 
institutions, are coming to the fore once again.
Environmental Issues and Mitigation of Climate Change
Leading international development banks (IDBs) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have mapped out an action plan to support sustainable 
global recovery and have agreed to finance the mitigation of climate 
change within the framework of the Copenhagen Agreement. In addition 
to the necessary anti-crisis support, the IDBs focus their attention on 
crisis prevention, supporting sustainable growth and development, and, 
especially, the need for taking measures against climate change. IDBs and 
the IMF supported the obligation undertaken by developed nations within the 
framework of the Copenhagen Agreement to provide developing countries 
with additional immediate financing of $30 billion in 2010-2012 and to 
raise another $100 billion by 2020 in order to help them cope with the 
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consequences of climate change and substantially cut greenhouse gas 
emissions, which is a must to stop the global temperature rising. IDBs 
confirmed their intention to provide technical assistance to the UN process 
and underlined the importance of signing a legally binding international 
agreement on climate change prevention after 2012 as soon as possible. IDBs 
have the necessary expertise and capabilities to catalyse state and private 
resources in order to invest them efficiently in low-carbon technologies and 
projects for adapting to climate change in developing countries. The Clean 
Technology Fund (CTF) is ready to allocate $4.3 billion for co-financing the 
development and use of solar energy, environmentally safe municipal transport 
and other similar projects.
The First Asian Solar Energy Forum was held in Manila within the framework 
of the Asian Solar Energy Initiative (ASEI). The participants of the forum 
noted that multilateral development institutions, such as ADB with its 
development partners, are in a position to play a catalytic role in technology 
transfer facilitation and knowledge sharing for solar energy development. 
However, high initial capital investments in solar energy and the perception 
of high risks keep many investors from putting up the capital for solar energy 
developments. The Forum was organised by ADB in association with the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO) and the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Partnership (REEEP). ASEI will also establish and, initially, host the Solar 
Energy Forum, an international knowledge-sharing platform that will track 
solar development projects, discuss new solar power proposals and incentive 
mechanisms, and organise major conferences. ASEI will also be responsible 
for raising concessional funds from donor countries to partly mitigate the 
risks of the high up-front capital costs of investing in solar energy, as well as 
design other innovative ways to attract private-sector investment.
Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) are unique financing instruments designed 
to pilot low-carbon and climate-resilient development through an extended 
fund facility provided by the African Development Bank, ADB, EBRD, Inter-
American Development Bank and the World Bank Group.
The Multilateral Carbon Credit Fund (MCCF) funded by the EBRD and the 
EIB is active in Central European and Central Asian countries. In 2010 the 
fund closed two deals for purchasing carbon credits (CO2 emission quotas) in 
Armenia and Ukraine.
Energy Efficiency
Energy efficiency is of key importance to the sustainable development of the 
Eurasian region, which is characterised by relatively high energy intensity. 
In order to implement the corresponding programs and coordinate their 
efforts, development institutions are establishing strategic partnerships. The 
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improvement of energy efficiency and reduction of energy consumption will 
boost the industry’s competitiveness, release resources and cut CO2 emissions. 
Investments in energy efficiency are usually spent on the replacement or 
modernisation of outdated production and heating facilities, the installation 
of metering equipment, thermal insulation, renovation of heat and electricity 
distribution systems, as well as different projects in the fields of biomass, 
biogas and solar energy. Energy-intensive sectors such as the production of 
building materials, the food-processing industry and light industry are usually 
the principal choices for investment.
In particular, the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment 
Partnership (E5P) Fund was founded in 2009 and, a year later, began to 
finance projects in the fields of improving the energy efficiency of central 
heating, waste water treatment and waste management, including waste-
to-energy projects. The partnership unites the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), 
European Investment Bank (EIB), EBRD, WB, IFC and the Nordic Environment 
Finance Corporation (NEFCO), as well as the European Commission and the 
government of Sweden, and receives strong political support especially from 
Denmark, Norway and the Baltic states.
According to the IFC report “Energy Efficiency: A New Resource for 
Sustainable Growth” published in 2010 around 70% of Ukrainian industrial 
companies could reduce production costs by raising the energy efficiency of 
their production facilities, which would also help raise their competitiveness 
under the post-crisis conditions. The report also recommends to improve 
planning and control over energy consumption at industrial companies, as 
well as widening awareness of the benefits received through financing energy 
efficiency projects.
The EBRD and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signed a 
memorandum of understanding to support economic and social development 
in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia, with a 
special focus on energy efficiency and climate-related projects. 
Under the Memorandum, the EBRD and JBIC will cooperate in co-financing 
environmental projects, the development of carbon emission reduction 
instruments, co-financing of large infrastructure and corporate projects, 
and the non-sovereign financing of municipal infrastructure, that are linked 
to climate-related projects in particular, as well as local currency financing in 
the region.
In addition, development institutes are implementing local energy efficiency 
programs, aimed at solving highly specialised problems. For instance, 
IFC – a member of the World Bank Group, – in partnership with the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Employment and the Economy of 
Finland, is implementing a new Russia Residential Energy Efficiency Advisory 
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Services Project, which aims to stimulate investment into the energy-efficient 
renovation of residential multifamily buildings and to reduce CO2 emissions 
in Russia. Energy consumption in residential housing could be halved, which 
would reduce CO2 emissions by approximately 150 million tons per year. The 
project will create an effective legal and institutional platform to support local 
homeowner associations and housing management companies in obtaining 
access to financing.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is active in implementing energy 
efficiency projects in Central Asian countries. So, ADB signed an agreement 
with the Uzbek Finance Ministry to boost the efficiency of Uzbekistan’s 
electricity supply through the construction of Central Asia’s first 800 
mW combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) power plant and an array of other 
projects. The government of Uzbekistan has put energy saving and improving 
the energy efficiency of industrial companies at the top of its economic 
agenda.
Multilateral Partnership
The year 2010 is notable for the launch of several large-scale investment 
projects, jointly financed by several international and national development 
banks, as well as commercial banks.
The EBRD, IFC, and FMO (the entrepreneurial development bank of the 
Netherlands) have joined up with Asia Debt Management Hong Kong (ADM 
Capital) to establish the ADM CEECAT Recovery Fund to invest in mid-size 
companies facing financing difficulties as a result of the financial crisis. 
The ADM CEECAT Recovery Fund, targeting Central and Eastern Europe, 
Central Asia and Turkey, will help the region recover from the crisis by 
supporting companies that represent a major source of jobs and significantly 
contribute to economic development. 
The EBRD will invest €60 million, IFC €35 million, and FMO €15 million in the 
targeted €300 million ADM CEECAT Recovery Fund, which will be managed 
by ADM Capital. 
The fund’s investments will focus on rehabilitating operationally strong but 
financially distressed companies via restructuring, rescheduling, refinancing, 
debt-equity swaps and liquidity management. It will also fund growth 
opportunities where alternative sources of capital are not available.
The EBRD, EIB and IFC, and the shareholders of Nabucco and Nabucco Gas 
Pipeline International GmbH signed a mandate letter that marks the start 
of the appraisal process of the Nabucco project, a required step towards 
a potential financing package of up to €4 billion. The Nabucco gas pipeline 
project is the flagship project for meeting future EU gas demand and will 
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diversify Europe’s pool of supplier countries. The potential financing package 
will consist of up to €2 billion from the EIB, up to €1.2 billion from the EBRD 
(up to €600 million for the EBRD’s account and up to €600 million to be 
syndicated to commercial banks) and up to around €800 million from IFC 
(up to €400 million for the IFC account and up to €400 million to be syndicated 
to commercial banks).
The involvement of the three international financial institutions (IFIs) is a 
demonstration of global and European support for the project and represents 
an important milestone in ensuring the overall financing of Nabucco. The early 
involvement of the IFIs will support Nabucco in meeting the highest standards 
in environmental and social risk evaluation and procurement. The appraisal 
of the project will include a thorough assessment of commercial, social and 
environmental aspects. The Nabucco gas pipeline project addresses the EU’s 
priority goal of achieving energy security via the diversification of gas routes 
and gas supplies.
The IDBs have also supported the project for the expansion and 
modernisation of St. Petersburg’s Pulkovo International Airport on the 
basis of a public-private partnership. The total loan financing package of 
approximately €716 million will be provided by IFC, EBRD, the EDB, NIB, 
the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), Russia’s 
Vneshekonombank, and several commercial banks.
Moreover, the IsDB joined the IFIs’ working group on counteracting 
corruption.
Improving the Organisational Effectiveness of Development 
Banks in 2010
Asian Development Bank
In 2010 the ADB made efforts to enhance the effectiveness of its activities 
in accordance with the recommendations made in the Development 
Effectiveness Review 2009, paying special attention to co-financing, 
supporting educational programs and boosting the developmental impact of 
implemented projects.
Thus, the ADB spurred its work with donors on attracting them to joint 
funds and establishing new funds. The ADB launched a multilateral Urban 
Financing Partnership Facility to help drive environmental infrastructure 
improvements in urban centres, with the government of Sweden the first 
to inject funds. In 2010 the government of Spain provided an additional $5 
million each to the ADB-administered Water Financing Partnership Facility 
(WFPF) and Clean Energy Financing Partnership Facility (CEFPF). The 
government of Luxembourg has committed a further €1.5 million to another 
ADB fund, the Financial Sector Development Partnership Fund. The ADB 
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and ASEAN nations, along with the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and 
the Republic of Korea, established a jointly owned Credit Guarantee and 
Investment Facility (CGIF), as a trust fund of the ADB with initial capital of 
$700 million, including the ADB’s contribution of $130 million and a 
combined $570 million from the ASEAN+3 governments.
The ADB returned to the US dollar bond market twice this year with the 
pricing of a $2.5 billion five-year global benchmark bond issue and a $3 billion 
three-year global benchmark bond issue, proceeds of which were used in the 
bank’s non-concessional lending operations.
In 2010, the ADB initiated the modernisation of business processes in 
order to improve the quality and efficiency of its operations, as well as 
reduce expenditure. Moreover, the ADB launched a human resources 
plan, Our People Strategy, to be more transparent in staff recruitment, 
compensation and promotion. The strategy foresees the introduction of a 
collective assessment scheme aligned with the regular monitoring of project 
implementation. The ADB will be recruiting a significant number of new 
staff, both internationally and locally over the next three years. Our People 
Strategy provides the framework for ensuring ADB has high-calibre, motivated 
people with technical and interpersonal skills that match client needs, 
managers who are inspiring, proactive and accountable, and a workplace 
environment to support them. Our People Strategy will guide ADB human 
resources management until 2015. 
ADB reviews its public relations policy every five years. In 2010, the bank 
began a regular review process to improve the policy’s efficiency, 
transparency and relevancy. The renewed public relations policy will be 
approved by the Board of ADB directors in 2011 after a series of public 
discussions and consultations.
Table 15.1.
ADB projects in 
2010 in the region by 
sector (loans)
Sector
Armenia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Russia TOTAL
$ million
Agricultural, irrigation, water supply - - - - 140 140
Transport infrastructure 210 456 - - 115 781
Microfinance - 150 - - 50 200
Energy, ecology - - 16.7 - 340 356.7
Economic, municipal, infrastructure services - - 48.5 - - 48.5
ADB’s investment priority in the region is the development of transport 
corridors within the framework of the Central Asia Regional Economic 
Cooperation (CAREC) Program. ADB has served as CAREC’s Secretariat 
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since 2000. In 2010 Pakistan and Turkmenistan joined the organisation. 
Starting 2001, around $10.4 billion was invested in the transportation 
sector within the framework of the CAREC Program, including $219 million 
for trade facilitation, and $2.5 billion for energy projects.
World Bank Group
In order to support the new post-crisis strategy of the World Bank Group 
(WBG) and a comprehensive reform package to make the bank faster, more 
flexible and more accountable, the WBG shareholders approved the first 
general capital increase for the World Bank for more than 20 years.
This measure included the increase of $86.2 billion in capital for the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – the arm that 
lends to developing countries – from a general capital increase and a selective 
capital increase linked to the change in voting powers; this includes $5.1 
billion in paid-in capital; a $200 million increase in the capital of the IFC – the 
WBG’s private sector arm – as part of an increase in shares for developing 
and transition countries. The IFC will also consider raising additional capital 
subject to board approval by issuing a hybrid bond to shareholding countries 
and by retaining earnings. The voting power of Developing and Transition 
Countries (DTCs) at IBRD was increased to 47.19%. The IBRD 2010 
realignment resulted from a selective capital increase of $27.8 billion, including 
paid-in capital of $1.6 billion. The voting power of Developing and Transition 
Countries at IFC was increased to 39.48%. The IFC 2010 realignment 
resulted from a selective capital increase of $200 million and an increase 
in the basic votes for all members. The IBRD and IFC shareholdings will be 
reviewed every five years.
The World Bank Group opened free access to its statistical databases and 
challenged the global community to use the data to create new applications 
and solutions to help poor people in the developing world. The WBG provided 
free, open and easy access to its comprehensive set of data on living 
standards around the globe – some 2,000 indicators, including hundreds 
that go back 50 years. Drawing from numerous data sources and working 
with statistical partners, the WBG has worked intensively to modernise its 
storehouse of statistics to create data.worldbank.org, a new, user-friendly 
data access site. 
In 2010 the WBG commenced the development of a new energy 
strategy a framework for rendering assistance to developing countries in 
improving access to energy sources, and boosting the transition to a more 
environmentally friendly scheme for developing energy. The new energy 
strategy may be approved in 2011. The bank also held broad consultations 
on its new environmental strategy to discuss challenges and opportunities 
of environmentally sustainable growth and development, the bank’s role in 
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meeting these challenges and making use of opportunities, as well as ways of 
reaching a balance between economic development and ecological safety, and 
many other issues.
The World Bank is taking active part in environmental initiatives. In 2010 
the bank launched two new climate programs - Scaling-up Renewable 
Energy Program for Low Income Countries (SREP) and Forest Investment 
Program (FIP). Both programs receive financing via the Strategic Climate 
Fund (SCF) – one of two trust funds established within the framework of 
international Climate Investment Funds (CIF). The Clean Technology Fund 
(CTF) has supported investment plans for Columbia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan 
and Ukraine.
Also in 2010, the World Bank published the intermediate outcomes of its 
water strategy implementation, which was adopted in 2003 and focuses 
on improving the quality of drinking water and solving problems of growing 
hydrological instability due to climate change. In addition to an array of 
successful projects in the water sector, the bank achieved progress in 
improving sanitation in countries with limited access to water.
IFC, a member of the WBG, has also financed a set of investment projects in 
2010 that add to the WBG’s operational effectiveness.
Table 15.2.
IFC projects in 2010 
in the region by 
sector (loans)
Sectors
Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Russia TOTAL
$ million
Finance & Insurance 8 10 - - - 516 534
Accommodation & Tourism 
Services
- - - - - 40 40
Transportation and 
Warehousing
- - - - - 441 441
General - - - - - 250 250
Construction and Real Estate 9 - - - - 41.66 50.66
Nonmetallic Mineral Product 
Manufacturing
- 30 - - - - 30
Electric Power - - 40 - - - 40
Other - 5 2 7.8 1.3 - 16.1
TOTAL 17 45 42 7.8 1.3 1288.66 1401.76
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
The shareholders of the EBRD have decided to increase the bank’s capital 
by 50% and so pave the way for a rise in EBRD investments over the next 
five years as the region emerges from the sharpest throes of recession. 
The bank’s Board of Governors approved the capital increase in the context 
of their overall endorsement of the bank’s strategy for the period 2011-
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2015. As a result, the bank’s capital will rise to €30 billion from €20 billion, 
via a temporary increase in callable capital of €9 billion and a transfer from 
reserves to paid-in capital of €1 billion. The EBRD’s strategy for the next five 
years envisages a continued high demand for the bank’s investments. The 
New Growth Agenda aims specifically to address economic vulnerabilities 
that were unmasked in the region during the crisis, particularly, imbalances 
such as the mismatch between external and domestic sources of financing, 
the continuing lack of diversification within the economies of the region and 
the need for a strong focus on energy efficiency to boost competitiveness 
and achieve low-carbon growth. In the broader context of investments 
over the next five years, there will be a significant focus on tackling energy 
efficiency, climate change and helping to ensure energy security as well 
as accelerating transition in the infrastructure sectors. EBRD via its 
investments in the corporate sector, the also supports the further 
diversification of economies, helping to reduce some countries’ dependence 
on raw materials or a limited number of product groups. The bank invests 
in infrastructure, paying special attention to projects in the fields of energy 
efficiency and continuity of power supply. The West Balkans and less developed 
countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia are among the bank’s priority 
investment directions.
The EBRD has launched an initiative to develop local currency and capital 
markets in the region of its operations in order to help reduce unhedged 
foreign currency borrowing and the region’s dependence on external capital, 
which have emerged as the key vulnerabilities in the EBRD region during 
the global economic crisis. The Local Currency and Local Capital Markets 
Initiative aims to support and complement the actions of many governments 
in the region, which are helping to build up local sources of domestic funding 
and reduce the use of foreign exchange in the domestic financial system. 
Crucially, the initiative does not look at promoting the use of local currency in 
isolation, but at the overall macroeconomic, regulatory and market 
framework to ensure long-term, sustainable and liquid local currency 
markets.
In 2010 the EBRD stepped up its work with co-investors. For instance, 
Taipei increased its support for the EBRD projects by contributing $2 million 
in additional financing to the bilateral Taiwan Business – EBRD Technical 
Cooperation Fund and the multi-donor Early Transition Countries Fund.
Last year the EBRD issued $1 billion five-year global bonds to finance 
its operations and widened its range of products. In particular, the bank 
together with Daiwa Securities Group introduced new EBRD microfinance 
bonds. The funding will be raised under the EBRD’s Global Medium Term 
Note Program. Proceeds will support EBRD operations to fund financial 
institutions that provide microfinance to small businesses. The inaugural 
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issuance of EBRD’s Microfinance Bonds will be arranged by Daiwa Capital 
Markets and distributed by Daiwa Securities Co. Ltd. to Japanese retail and 
institutional investors.
Another novelty of 2010 was the new rouble interest rate swap derivative 
instrument, Overnight Index Swaps (OIS). An OIS gives Russian market 
participants the possibility for the first time to manage overnight interest 
rate risk exposure in roubles without using cash assets or resorting to 
currency swaps. The use of the OIS in Russia was made possible by the launch 
of the Rouble Overnight Index Average (Ruonia), which is calculated on a 
daily basis by the Central Bank of Russia, based on the contributions of 31 
banks. Ruonia is the Russian equivalent of the Euro Overnight Index Average 
(Eonia), a weighted average of all overnight unsecured lending transactions 
made by 57 contributing banks in the Euro area’s interbank market. The 
Eonia index is calculated by the European Central Bank.
Moreover, the EBRD launched an online training facility under its Trade 
Finance Program for EBRD member issuing banks. The training facility will 
provide courses to banks in 29 countries from Central Europe to Central Asia, 
aiming to ensure bank staff have the requisite skills to issue, process and 
honour traditional trade products in line with the International Chamber of 
Commerce trade rules. 
In order to improve its operating activities, the EBRD initiated 
reorganisation of its management structure and created the position of 
Managing Director for Russia. Unfortunately, EBRD operations in Russia 
were overshadowed by the investigation into the alleged criminal activities 
of a group of Russian bank officials.
The results of the EBRD activities are reflected in the following table 15.3.
Sector
Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Russia TOTAL
$ million
SME 13 - - 5.4 2 - 20.4
Lending to banks, financial 
institutions
55 - 50 1.4 - 554 660.4
Equity in banks 2.4 - - - - 148 150.4
Energy efficiency and climate 
change
7 - - - - 237.5 244.5
Non-bank financial institutions 4 - - - - 16 20
Agribusiness - - - - 8.9 56.765.6
Municipal and environmental 
infrastructure
- - 62.9 - 10 11.3 84.2
Equity funds - - 49.5 - - 50 99.5
Property and tourism - - - - - 89 89
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Islamic Development Bank
For the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), 2010 was a year of active work 
with its member states. The bank held consultations with each of its member 
states on working out cooperation agreements in line with the country’s 
key priorities. The partnership strategy is part of the bank’s new business 
model, which aims to improve the interaction of the IsDB with its member 
states, introduce a strategic approach to regulating the bank’s activities on 
development financing in these countries, and aid the implementation of the 
IsDB Vision 2020 strategy.
Table 15.4.
IDB projects in 2010 
in the region by 
sector (loans)
Sector
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan TOTAL
$ million
Transport infrastructure - 17.3 20 167.2 204.5
Rural education - - - 11.7 11.7
SME - 0.7 - - 0.7
Agriculture 30 0.5 10 - 40.5
Energy and electricity - - 4.05 - 4.05
TOTAL 30 18.5 34.05 178.9 261.45
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Sector
Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Russia TOTAL
$ million
Natural resources - - - - - 87 87
Power and energy - - - - - 649.3 649.3
Transport - - 285.2 - - 398.9 684.1
Telecoms, informatics and 
media
- - 14 - - 14.6 28.6
Treasury - - - - - 138.8 138.8
General manufacturing, 
Manufacturing and Services
- 3.5 8 - 1.7 320 333.2
TOTAL: 81.4 3.50 469.6 6.8 22.6 2771.1 3355
In 2010 the IsDB approved a capital increase from the current 16 billion to 
18 billion Islamic dinars. Moreover, the IsDB board of governors approved the 
increase of Nigeria’s subscription in the IsDB capital to reach 1.384 billion 
Islamic dinars (about $600 million). Following that increase, Nigeria was 
afforded the right to appoint a permanent executive director representing 
it on the board of executive directors, subject to paying the first share of 
the announced subscription in IsDB capital. Therefore, the Board of IsDB 
Executive Directors will be immediately widened from 16 to 18 members, 
with nine of them being appointed to represent major shareholding member 
countries and the other nine elected by the Board of Governors.
Table 15.3.
EBRD projects in 
2010 in the region
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In order to finance planned growth in IsDB operations, the bank has 
successfully updated its Sukuk Trust Certificate Issuance program and 
increased the ceiling of the program from $1.5 billion to $3.5 billion.
The results of the IsDB investment activities in the region are listed in the table 
15.4.
Eurasian Development Bank
The institutional development of the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), 
the youngest development bank, has continued throughout 2010. Belarus 
completed the procedures required for joining the EDB, and became the 
fifth full member. The bank signed agreements on the terms of its presence 
and investment activities in Armenia, Tajikistan and Belarus, and opened 
representative offices in Minsk and Yerevan. 
The EDB became a member of the two leading international professional 
associations: the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA1) 
and the International Capital Market Association (ICMA2). Membership of 
these associations enables the EDB to perfect its system of market risk 
management on an ongoing basis in line with current market trends, and play 
an active role in preparing and discussing respective regulations.
The EDB also widened its range of products by approving the Program of Trade 
Financing Instruments and Development of Mutual Trade, and the Program 
for Supporting the Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 
aimed at securing loans for real sector businesses by providing target credit 
facilities to financial institutions.
Moreover, the EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund (ACF) was put into operation. The 
ACF was established in 2009 by six states of the region. The ACF mission is to 
help its member states overcome the implications of the global financial crisis. 
The EDB has been appointed manager of the ACF.
 In order to expand funding of its investment operations, the EDB had its Euro-
Commercial Paper Program registered for a total of $3.5 billion. The purpose 
of the program is to raise financial market resources for a term of up to one 
year. 
The results of the EDB investment activities in the region are listed in the 
table 15.5.
1 International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) was founded in 1985 and now has 
membership of more than 800 entities from 57 countries. The ISDA specialises in identifying 
and reducing risks associated with derivatives.
2 International Capital Market Association (ICMA) was founded in 1969 and has about 350 
members from 45 countries. Since its inception the ICMA has played a central role in creating 
the global framework for the operation of financial markets based on the rules and recommen-
dations of the modern economy and production.
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IFI projects in 2010 in the region by country
Armenia
The Asian Development Bank provided a loan to help build a new terminal 
at Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan, Armenia, helping the airport 
to increase the number of destinations it serves and boost the frequency of 
flights. By the time the terminal opens in 2012, the airport should be able 
to handle about 3.2 million passengers a year, up from the current 1.8-2.0 
million. This project is crucial for a landlocked country. The financing of the 
project will reach $40 million. 
In 2010 the EBRD contributed around $80 million in financing, including 
to Armenia’s financial sector projects and a carbon credits deal within the 
framework of the Multilateral Carbon Credit Fund. The EBRD has agreed to 
buy carbon credits from a group of ten small hydropower plants in Armenia, 
bundled into a single project under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
framework. 
The Eurasian Development Bank embarked on full-scale work in Armenia 
in 2010. The bank provided funding to two banks under its SME support 
program, and financed a grain export deal to enhance food security. In 2010 
the EDB provided a total of $80 million for Armenia.
The World Bank Group focused its attention on infrastructural gaps in 
transportation, education, healthcare and water supply areas in Armenia 
in 2010. In particular, the WBG approved financing for a road rehabilitation 
project to drastically improve the accessibility of the country’s main road 
network for the rural population and to create employment. It will also help 
Armenia mitigate the impact of the global economic crisis on the country’s 
economy.
The bank also supports the health system modernisation project to widen 
primary healthcare services on the basis of family medicine. Moreover, the 
International Development Association (IDA, a member of the WBG) and the 
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Table 15.5.
EDB projects by 
sector in 2010
Sector
Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Tajikistan Russia TOTAL
$,million
Finance (including Direct Investment 
Funds)
50 50 - 3 75.1 178.1
Agriculture 30 - 106.5 - - 136.5
Transport - - - - 90 90
Extractive productions (including metals) - - 48.7 - - 48.7
Energy - - 385 - 44.2 429.2
Chemicals, oil and gas - - - - 100 100
TOTAL 80 50 540.2 3 309.3 982.5
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International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, a member of 
the WBG) provided loans of $21 million and $4 million respectively to provide 
assistance to the poor and support development of human capital assets in 
Armenia.
IFC (a member of the WBG) launched the Armenia Sustainable Energy Finance 
Project, which aims to establish a sustainable market for energy efficiency 
and renewable energy investments and contribute to Armenia’s energy 
self-sufficiency by working with local and international financial institutions. 
Established in January 2010, the program is supported with funds from the 
Austrian Ministry of Finance. Moreover, the IFC opened credit facilities for real 
estate and financial sectors to support financial institutions and SMEs.
Belarus 
According to the IMF statement made after the Article IV consultations with 
the Belarusian authorities in November 2010, Belarus avoided a recession 
and resumed economic growth but there are still serious vulnerabilities. The 
first order of business should be to reduce the current account deficit. The IMF 
also welcomed the authorities’ initiatives on further economic liberalisation 
and the promotion of entrepreneurship focusing on the development of small 
and medium enterprises.
The World Bank has approved a $42.5 million loan and a $5.5 million Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) grant for the Integrated Solid Waste Management 
Project for the Republic of Belarus. The project will strengthen national 
capacity for managing hazardous waste, and support Belarus in meeting 
its obligations under the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants.
What is more, the World Bank has approved a $150 million loan for Belarus 
for a road upgrading and modernisation project, which will help develop 
Belarusian transport infrastructure on a strategic transit corridor and 
introduce electronic tolling. The project is part of the Belarus government’s 
Roads of Belarus National Transport Development Program, which covers 
the period 2006-2015. Implementation of the project will start in 2011 and 
will take four years.
The EBRD and IFC, a member of the World Bank Group, have agreed to make 
a convertible loan totalling $8.5 million ($3.5 and $5 million respectively) 
to finance the construction of a greenfield detergent plant in Belarus. The 
project is topical for Belarus as over 90% of detergents are imported, 
mainly from Russia and Poland.
Moreover, the IFC provided a $30 million corporate loan to the Belarusian 
Alutech Group of companies engaged in the nonmetallic mineral product 
manufacturing sector. The proposed transaction will support the company’s 
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strategic growth through vertical integration, cost optimisation and 
operational efficiency.
In 2010 the Republic of Belarus paid its share in the charter capital of the 
EDB, thus completing the procedures required for joining the EDB, and 
became the fifth full member. The EDB opened a representative office in Minsk 
and embarked on investment activities in Belarus. The bank agreed to provide 
$99.8 million for the construction of Polotsk hydroelectric power plant in 
Belarus. The project envisages the construction of hydropower stations on 
the Western Dvina River. The EDB’s funds will be used to finance the hydraulic 
complex of the Polotsk plant including design, construction, equipment and 
spare parts, assembly, pre-commissioning, testing, commissioning and 
personnel training. 
Besides, the EDB supports projects for delivery of spare parts for assembling 
multi-purpose loaders, public cleansing vehicles and excavators to be sold in 
Russia and other CIS countries, which will promote cooperation between the 
two major machinery manufacturers, and boost commodity turnover between 
Russia and Belarus. The bank also provided $50 million for SME and trade 
financing projects.
Kazakhstan 
The financial crisis has emphasised the challenges currently faced by 
Kazakhstan, such as strong dependence on primary industries and 
commodity exports, and the banking system’s excessive reliance  on foreign 
capital markets, as well as the need to accelerate the development of its 
energy and transport infrastructure. 
The EBRD’s Board of Directors has adopted a new strategy for Kazakhstan, 
which reinforces the bank’s commitment to further support the Kazakh 
economy and sets out the priorities for its activities in the country over the 
next three years. The bank will support the development of the private sector 
by financing projects promoting innovation, best business and environmental 
practices, as well as energy efficiency. In order to help diversify the country’s 
economy, the EBRD intends to invest up to $1 billion in projects that will be 
selected by the bank in close cooperation with Kazakhstan’s Industry and 
Trade Ministry and Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund. In this regard, 
the parties signed a trilateral memorandum of understanding, according to 
which the parties will cooperate in selecting, preparing and implementing 
different industrial and infrastructural projects in Kazakhstan. The choice of 
projects will be determined by their sound market principles and economic 
efficiency.
In 2010, the EBRD invested a total of around $470 million in various 
economic sectors in the country. The bank assisted the implementation of 
projects for the renewal of railway rolling stock and the modernisation of 
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Kazakhstan’s railway network, restoration of the water supply and sewerage 
system in Aktau and Shymkent, as well as enhancement of urban transport in 
Almaty. The EBRD finances the construction of an oil and gas field chemicals 
production plant in Kazakhstan and the completion of exploration works at 
Petrolinvest’s main oilfields. The bank’s projects in the financial sector are 
aimed at supporting Kazakhstan’s exporters and importers when financing of 
the real economy remains limited.
Moreover, the EBRD and Samruk-Kazyna National Welfare Fund have 
established the Kazakhstan Capital Restructuring Fund (KCRF), to the 
amount of $121.5 million to help Kazakhstan’s companies restructure their 
debts. KCRF will be capitalised with $100 million at the first closing, with the 
EBRD and KCM each committing $49.5 million and ADM Capital investing 
1%. The fund is expected to increase its capital base by attracting additional 
investors.
In 2010 the ADB investments in Kazakhstan topped $606 million, 
including $456 million for the implementation of two large-scale transport 
projects within the framework of the MFF–CAREC Transport Corridor 
investment program: Western Europe–Western China International Transit 
Corridor section in Zhambyl region, Project 3 ($173 million) and the Aktau–
Beineu Road, Project 1 ($283 million). The bank also supports the SME 
project, which aims to widen access to medium-term financing for small and 
medium-sized enterprises via the local banks. The first tranche will make up 
$150 million.
The World Bank approved a $17 million loan for the Kazakhstan Tax 
Administration Reform Project (TARP). The project, with an overall value of 
$57 million, is co-financed by the government of Kazakhstan (to the tune of 
$40 million). The project will facilitate efforts to make the Tax Administration 
more efficient and effective through the introduction of modern standards. 
Moreover, the World Bank provided a $29.2 million loan for the Technical 
and Vocational Education Modernisation Project for Kazakhstan. The Kazakh 
government co-financed the project in the amount of $4 million.
The IFC provided financial support for three projects in Kazakhstan in 2010 
at a total sum of $42 million. The loan for $40 million was provided to 
JSC Central-Asian Electric Power Corporation (CAEP Co.) to finance its 
comprehensive investment plan to support major energy efficiency and 
environmental improvements and support its growth strategy. The $2 million 
went to Ust Kamenogorsk Poultry Farm, JSC.
The Eurasian Development Bank increased its investment portfolio by 
$540 million. The bank took part in a large-scale investment project for 
construction of a third power unit at the Ekibastuz GRES-2 power plant to 
help restore the unity of Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s power grids. Moreover, 
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the EDB proceeded to finance the construction and launch of a new 
production facility with a full production cycle, from ore mining and dressing 
to metal tin production. The implementation of this project will effectively 
create a new sub-sector in the country’s non-ferrous metallurgy. Along with 
that the bank financed export-oriented projects in the republic’s agricultural 
sector.
The Islamic Development Bank invested around $30 million in leasing 
transactions in the agricultural sector. 
Kyrgyz Republic
In April–June 2010, Kyrgyzstan faced widespread social and political 
instability that had a negative influence on the country’s economic 
development. Bishkek hosted the international donors’ conference, during 
which the representatives of the Kyrgyz government, civil society, private 
sector, international development organisations and bilateral donors 
discussed the role of each partner in the process of moving towards peace 
and understanding, as well as Kyrgyzstan’s recovery. In support of the 
government program and the proposals of the Joint Economic Assessment 
and the United Nations Flash Appeal, donors have pledged a total of about 
$1.1 billion to support vital government expenses and services, social needs 
and vital investments.
The Asian Development Bank invested over $65.2 million in providing 
emergency assistance to the country.
The World Bank provided $70 million for the Emergency Recovery Project 
to provide financing for high-priority expenditure in emergency recovery 
and reconstruction, and to support the rehabilitation and repair of energy 
infrastructure and networks to ensure country-wide energy supplies in 
the winter period. Moreover, the bank approved additional financing of 
$10 million for the National Road (Osh–Batken–Isfana) Rehabilitation 
Project.
The EBRD allocated over $6 million for supporting small and medium-sized 
businesses in Kyrgyzstan.
Investments by the Islamic Development Bank came to $18.5 million and 
were spent on financing projects in transport infrastructure and agriculture, 
as well as SME support.
Russia
Russia traditionally attracts investors with its broad investment 
opportunities. Almost all international development banks operating in 
the region took part in the project for the expansion and modernisation of 
St. Petersburg’s Pulkovo International Airport. The total loan financing 
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package of approximately €716 million will be provided by IFC, EBRD, the 
EDB, NIB, the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), Russia’s 
Vneshekonombank, and several commercial banks.
The EBRD’s investment portfolio in Russia increased by around $2.8 billion 
in 2010. The bank was active in Russia’s telecommunications, financial 
sector, transport, real estate, natural resources, manufacturing and 
other fields. Moreover, the Multilateral Carbon Credit Fund (MCCF) closed 
its second deal in Russia by purchasing carbon credits from Air Liquide 
Severstal resulting from an energy efficiency project involving a modern Air 
Separation Unit in Russia’s Vologda region.
The EDB invested $309 million in Russia’s projects in 2010, including the 
construction of a high-tech complex for the production of polycrystalline 
silicon, modernisation of OJSC Yenisei Territorial Generating Company (TGС-
13), and projects in transport infrastructure and the financial sector.
The World Bank approved a $25 million loan for the Financial Education 
and Financial Literacy Project for the Russian Federation. Moreover, the 
bank provided a $100 million loan for the Preservation and Promotion of 
Cultural Heritage Project. The project will also help cultural institutions to 
strengthen their internal capacity for cultural heritage management. In 2010 
the IFC launched the implementation of 14 projects in different spheres, 
including construction and transport. The projects’ overall value topped 
$1.2 billion.
Tajikistan
The World Bank Group launched a new Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 
for Tajikistan, which provides the framework for the World Bank Group’s 
assistance to Tajikistan for 2010-2013. The main objectives of the new CPS, 
prepared at a time when Tajikistan is addressing the impacts of the global 
economic crisis, are to reduce the negative impact of the crisis on the poor 
and vulnerable and to pave the way for sustainable and inclusive post-crisis 
growth. The new CPS envisages World Bank Group financing of about 
$140 million over the next four years through the International 
Development Association (IDA) and about $62 million to be attracted 
through trust funds. Key initiatives will include strengthening the business 
environment and access to finance; boosting agricultural productivity; 
improving the reliability of electricity and water supply; expanding the 
country’s energy production and export potential; and enhancing human 
capital through higher-quality education and health services. The World 
Bank Group will selectively use a variety of instruments to support the priority 
areas identified in the new CPS. These will include investment operations, 
budget support and analytical work. The World Bank approved the 
$24.4 million Fourth Programmatic Development Policy Grant for the 
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Republic of Tajikistan to help the government mitigate the impact of the 
global economic slowdown and to help it continue to implement its medium-
term reform program.
Also the World Bank approved a $2 million grant as an Additional Financing 
for the Education Modernisation Project in Tajikistan. The Additional Financing 
will be complemented by the capacity building and technical assistance 
activities focused on learning assessment funded by the Russian Education Aid 
for Development (READ). The World Bank also provided a $10 million grant 
as additional financing for the Ferghana Valley Water Resource Management 
Project in Tajikistan. The main objective of the additional financing is to 
increase the coverage of the drained and irrigated areas in Bobojon Gafurov 
and Kannibodom districts, strengthen the early warning system of the 
Kayrakkum Dam, and assess geotechnical risks associated with the dam. The 
International Development Association provided $3 million for a healthcare 
project to raise the potential and management efficiency of basic benefit 
packages and financing of the primary healthcare per capita on the national, 
regional and local levels. IFC financed a project in food industry.
The EurAsEC Anti-Crisis Fund disbursed a $70 million financial credit 
to Tajikistan to maintain the level of budgetary financing of social sectors 
(education, health and social protection) as originally legislated in 2010.
The EBRD supported small farmers, cotton and edible oil producers in 
Tajikistan. The total amount of EBRD investments in 2010 topped $22 million, 
including financing of projects for widening the electronic payment services 
and improving water supply in North Tajikistan. 
The IsDB focused its attention on projects in transport infrastructure, energy 
and agriculture by investing a total of $34 million.
The EDB provided financial support of $3 million within the framework of the 
microfinancing program.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan has the most industrialised and energy-intensive economy in 
Central Asia. It uses four times more energy than the world average to produce 
one dollar of gross domestic product. This is due to aging and dilapidated 
energy infrastructure, low technological base and lack of investment. Thus, 
improving the energy efficiency of industrial enterprises is a key task for 
Uzbekistan’s government.
The World Bank approved a $25 million credit to Uzbekistan for the Energy 
Efficiency Facility for Industrial Enterprises Project (UZEEF). Improving energy 
efficiency and reducing energy consumption in the production process 
will improve Uzbek industries’ overall competitiveness, free up scarce gas 
resources for exports and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
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The ADB participated in financing the project for the construction of a new 
power plant to improve energy security and facilitate regional energy trade. 
The project also aims to increase energy efficiency and save energy through 
clean power generation. The ADB financing of $340 million will help fund the 
construction of Central Asia’s first 800 MW combined cycle gas turbine 
(CCGT) power plant. Moreover, the ADB provided a $50 million loan and a 
$600,000 grant to three Uzbek banks to help them finance micro and small 
enterprises, with around 25% of microloans to be extended to women.
The IsDB will extend a record $167.2 million for the reconstruction and 
upgrading of the M-39 highway in the Surkhandarya region, the biggest IsDB 
endeavour in Uzbekistan to date. Moreover, the IsDB will provide $11.7 million 
in financing for the construction and equipping of 13 secondary schools and 
the training of 300 teachers in rural areas.
Directions for Further Growth
As specified in the current review, the international development banks play 
a significant role in the development of the region’s economies. However, 
this work should be continued. The region obviously has a high need for wider 
investments focused on a sustainable long-term development that will raise 
the standards and quality of living in the post-soviet states. It is necessary 
to secure capital inflow and attract strategic investors to the private sector. 
The region’s economies need diversification, improvement of corporate 
and state governance, the introduction of openness and transparency 
standards, as well as the implementation of business environment and social 
responsibility principles. Given Central Asia’s particular exposure to the 
implications of climate change, additional requirements must be set for the 
environmental impact assessment level. The bulk part of future investments 
should be directed to basic infrastructural sectors needed for sustainable 
economic development: energy, transport infrastructure, and municipal and 
telecommunications infrastructure.
At the same time, it is worth noting that the international development banks 
are currently the most competent investors in the region, able to provide 
financing for capital-intensive projects and add knowledge and expertise, 
consistent with modern requirements.
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